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FOREWORD
HAIL BILL BEANEY
ROBERT B. YEGGE t
Professor William M. Beaney: What is the constitutional significance of Marbury v. Madison?
Student: Establish the independence of the judiciary.
Professor Beaney: Elaborate...
When: 1956
Where: Course in Constitutional Law, Princeton University, arguably one of the toughest courses in the curriculum.
Student: Robert B. Yegge
Teaching Materials: American Constitution Law by William Beaney
and the legendary Alpheus T. Mason, now in its 7th edition.
And so began my admiration of Bill Beaney, some forty-seven
years ago.
I am not the only admirer of Bill Beaney. Several other recognizable names took the same course: George Will, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, and many others.
The son of a borne Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania coalminer, Beaney
went to Harvard for his undergraduate degree and PhD in political science. He then gained a law degree at the University of Michigan. His
undergraduate studies were interrupted by his service in the infantry in
World War II where he was wounded in action. Convalescing, he was a
defender and prosecutor in military courts martial.
Beaney joined the Princeton faculty in 1949, rising to occupy the
Cromwell Professorship of Law in 1964.
Bill Beaney had an exemplary career and tenure at Princeton. It
was my personal pleasure to continue to stay in touch with Beaney and
his charming wife Pat from my graduate days until he surprised me in
1968 by accepting an appointment to the University of Denver College
of Law faculty, requiring him to resign his professorship at Princeton and
begin teaching law students at DU.

t

Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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Many have asked why Beaney left his comfortable and venerable
position at Princeton. His answer, at least to me, was that he always
wanted to teach at a law school-not a traditional law school-a law
school that seriously integrated law and the social sciences. Beaney insisted that Denver was the one place that was doing just that. Indeed, the
University of Denver College of Law was one of four Russell Sage
Foundation Centers for the Study of Law and Society (University of
California Berkeley, University of Wisconsin, and Northwestern University being the other three), but Denver was the only university in which
the program was in the law school-all others were in related disciplines,
mostly sociology.
The appointment of Beaney to the University of Denver faculty was
a giant step for establishing the University of Denver College of Law as
a major academic player in the law of society movement. He had been
preceded by Professor Gresham Sykes, also at Princeton, and followed
by James Wallace and Wilbert E. Moore, both also from Princeton. With
the team of interdisciplinary scholars assembled, each with impeccable
credentials, the reputation of the University of Denver College of Law as
a major player in the law and society movement was assured.
A personal antidote: after the "raids" of the Princeton faculty, I was
at an occasion with then President Robert F. Goheen of Princeton who
asked me simply, "Whom else are you going to steal from me?"
When the College of Law established its first professorial chairthe William Delaney, Jr. Professor of Law-he was destined to hold the
position, after the initial incumbency of Thompson G. Marsh.
Beaney brought a particular prospective to his teaching of law students. He was a recognized and credentialed political scientist, having
served as President of the American Political Science Association, and
he was a carefully trained law person. With his experience teaching
Princeton undergraduates, his recognized scholarship and distinction in
the field of political science and as a man of the wriest honor, he brought
special experience and flavor to his University of Denver College of Law
classes.
Bill was not just a teacher and respected scholar. He was always on
the policy committee, and always its chairman. He also twice served as
acting dean.
From 1968 until his retirement in 1989, students at the College of
Law were privileged to study under Bill Beaney. His legacy is remembered and cherished by hundreds of law students whose lives he touched.
Few law schools in the United States can boast a more illustrious
scholar and teacher than Bill Beaney. We are proud that he elected to
serve the majority of his career with our law students and that he shared
his wit and wisdom with faculty, alumni, members of the bar, and stu-
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dents. Incidentally, Bill was singularly honored by the Colorado legal
profession by his election as a fellow of the Colorado Bar Foundation,
notwithstanding his lack of practice and his absence from formal admission to practice before the Colorado Supreme Court.
Let us salute and hail Bill Beaney, a colleague, a friend, a mentor,
and one of the most enthusiastic vocal supporters of the University of
Denver College of Law as we read the pages to follow.

FOREWORD
BILL BEANEY'S CONTINUING RELEVANCE
ALAN K. CHEN'

I am honored to contribute this brief essay in honor of my friend,
colleague, and mentor, William Beaney. His recent passing brings great
sadness to all of us in the University of Denver community. Yet, as with
the end of every well-lived life, this sober occasion provides us with an
opportunity to reflect on the manner in which that life touched us as individuals and as a community. It also allows us to look back on the
broader national significance of a rich professional career.
I had the privilege of getting to know Bill in the later years of his
life. Bill formally "retired" in 1989, three years before I joined the College of Law faculty. Fortunately for me, as well as for the entire DU
community, Bill continued to teach as an emeritus professor until just a
few years ago. He also continued to read and think about thorny issues of
constitutional law and theory, provide thoughtful comments on drafts of
law review articles, and patiently mentor at least one novice constitutional law professor. This was an extraordinary level of professional activity for someone who was supposedly winding down his career.
Indeed, a remarkable feature of Bill's career as one of the nation's
leading constitutional law scholars and teachers was not only its longevity-he took his first teaching position in 1949-but also its substantial
influence on multiple generations of judges, lawyers, and legal scholars.
Perhaps, however, I should dispense with the past tense, for there appears
to be no slowing down now. Bill remains influential in the legal world
and likely will always be so. This essay is a tribute to Bill Beaney's continuing relevance.'

Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Case Western Reserve University,
t
1982; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1985. Thanks to the Denver University Law Review for inviting
me to share these thoughts. I can think of no better tribute to Bill Beaney's legacy than to publish
these observations in a scholarly journal.
I. This essay focuses on Bill's contributions to both the course of law and the academic
world. In doing so, I do not mean to diminish Bill's numerous other professional and personal accomplishments, including his selfless military service, the public service he provided through numerous roles as a consultant to various government agencies, his institutional citizenship on behalf
of the University of Denver (Bill twice served as Acting Dean for the College of Law and provided
institutional support in numerous other ways, both large and small), or the bonds he established with
his family and close friends.
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I. THE INFLUENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLAR

I am embarrassed to confess that I had never heard of Bill Beaney
before I entered the academic world. While other renowned constitutional law scholars received greater recognition in the national community and grabbed the attention of the media, Bill's national influence was
quieter, though no less powerful.
Over the course of his career, Bill exhibited three signal characteristics of a great legal scholar. First, he was incredibly prolific. Even a brief
glance at Bill's record of legal scholarship should be jaw dropping to any
legal academic.2 Bill wrote, coauthored, or edited multiple books about
the law and more than a dozen major law review articles. That list does
not even include the numerous studies and reports Bill produced for government agencies or other shorter expositions about important legal topics.
Second, Bill's scholarship was of tremendous quality. As even a
casual reader of his work could discern, his research was exhaustive, his
analysis both incisive and rigorous, and his approach balanced and
thoughtful. He was also an elegant writer. Even on the most technical of
subjects, his prose is flowing and lucid. These qualities of Bill's scholarly work were recognized not only by several of the nation's most prestigious law reviews, but also by the academic presses, which published
his widely influential scholarship in political science and law.
Another mark of the quality of Bill's work is that it continues to be
cited regularly. A recent search on the electronic Westlaw database re-

2.
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955)
[hereinafter, BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL]; William M. Beaney, John MarshallHarlan: A Modern
Conservative Justice, in AN ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARD: ESSAYS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 121 (D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., ed., 1991); William M. Beaney, The Supreme Court: The Perspective of Political Science, in MAX FREEDMAN ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON
THE COURT 34 (1967); William M. Beaney, Justice William 0. Douglas: The Constitution in a Free
Society, 51 IND. L.J. 18 (1975); William M. Beaney, Fairnessin University Disciplinary Proceedings, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 390 (1971); William M. Beaney, The Warren Courtand the Political
Process, 67 MICH. L. REV. 343 (1969); William M. Beaney, Students, Higher Education and the
Law, 45 DENV. L.J. 511 (1968); William M. Beaney, The Griswold Case and the ExpandingRight to
Privacy, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 979 [hereinafter, Beaney, Expanding Right of Privacy]; William M.
Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (1966) [hereinafter, Beaney, Privacy and American Law]; William M. Beaney & Edward Beiser, Prayer and
Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Political Process, 13 J. PUB. LAW 475 (1964);
William M. Beaney, Comment, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 VA. L. REV.
1150 (1963); William M. Beaney, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962
SUP. CT. REV. 212 (1962) [hereinafter, Beaney, Constitutional Right of Privacy]; William M.
Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1961); William M. Beaney,
Teaching of Law Courses in the LiberalArts College: A View from the College, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC.
55 (1961); William M. Beaney, Civil Liberties and Statutory Construction, 8 J. PUB. LAW 66 (1959).
Bill also coauthored a number of books with his Princeton colleague, the equally renowned Alpheus
Mason. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES 516 (6th ed. 1978); ALPHEUS THOMAS
MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY (1959).
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veals 162 law review articles citing Bill's scholarship.3 This number is
even more impressive given that Westlaw databases have a modern bias
because they do not include older publications. Accordingly, most of
these citations are in recent work. Moreover, leading constitutional
scholars in the present generation of academics continue to refer to Bill's
work.4
Finally, Bill's research demonstrated great breadth. The scope of his
work within constitutional law, which, during the heyday of his career,
included the field that we now call "criminal procedure," is noteworthy.
Bill wrote about numerous substantive constitutional law topics, including due process, privacy, school prayer, and the right to counsel. He also
wrote tomes and gave lectures about bridging the gap between law and
political science. In fact, it is the interdisciplinary nature of Bill's work
that led Dean Robert Yegge to recruit him from the Princeton political
science department to our faculty in the late 1960s (a decade after Bill
turned down an offer from Dean Edward Levi to be appointed to the faculty of the prestigious University of Chicago School of Law). 5 Bill was
deeply interested in how law and society intersected in ways meaningful
both to the study of law and to the betterment of society. 6 His interdisciplinary approach to law was spurred by his belief that there was no
meaningful difference between the study of government and political
science and the study of law and that the connections between law and
politics were to be explored, not ignored.7
But fairly evaluating Bill Beaney's scholarly contributions must go
farther than mere quantitative and qualitative assessment and extend to
an examination of their influence on the development of constitutional
law. Bill's continuing relevance clearly emerges from a brief look at
these topics.

List on file with author.
3.
4. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law. Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle,
112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1745 n.65 (2003), Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1491, 1503 n.55 (2002); Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause

Jurisprudence,67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1092 n.13 (2000); Louis Michael Seidman, Book Review,
Akhil Amar and the (Premature?)Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281,
2293 n.74 (1998).
5. See Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to Law and Society: Reshaping
Lawfor the Last Stages of the SocialActivist State, 32 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 409,428 (1998).
6. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. BEANEY ET AL., DENVER PLEA BARGAINING REDUCTION PROJECT:
AN EVALUATION (1979) (study with Professors Larry Tiffany and Joyce Sterling examining possible
impact of program restricting plea bargaining). For a description of Bill's place in the Law and
Society movement, see Garth & Sterling, supra note 5, at 426-28.
7.
For excellent historical accounts of Bill Beaney's place in this important intellectual
movement, see Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARv. L. REV. 620, 663
n.216 (1994) (noting that "[tiwo excellent examples of the perspective of political scientists in the
post-World War H era regarding the political nature of the Supreme Court are found in the 1965
Rosenthal Lecture given by political scientist William M. Beaney and in Mason's and Beaney's
textbook."); Garth & Sterling, supranote 5, at 426-28.
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Bill's work unquestionably influenced the courts. His scholarship
was cited in United States Supreme Court opinions in eleven cases over a
span of 41 years. 8 Notably, Supreme Court Justices cited Bill in landmark cases in two of the substantive areas about which he wrote most
extensively -- the constitutional right of privacy and criminal defendants'
right to counsel. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas's majority
opinion referred to Bill's privacy scholarship in its now famous section
discussing the "penumbra" of rights emanating from the specific freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 9 In Miranda v. Arizona, Justice
Harlan's dissent drew upon Bill's widely cited book on the right to counsel in describing the background against which the law of confessions
was developed.10
Indeed, Bill's work foreshadowed the development of much of the
Court's constitutional privacy jurisprudence. For example, in a seminal
article published three years before the Court decided Griswold, he observed that "[imn a sense virtually all enumerated rights in the Constitution can be described as contributing to the right of privacy, if by the
term is meant the integrity and freedom of the individual person and personality."'" Noting that Justice Douglas, who would later write the majority opinion in Griswold, had made such an argument in his published
writings, Bill also anticipated the potential weaknesses of this "penumbra" approach. 12 After surveying the historical developments of the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as a source of a constitutional
privacy right, Bill concluded that privacy might better be grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and its protection of "liberty." ' 3 This analytical framework essentially traces, in advance, the trajectory of the Supreme Court's privacy cases that would be decided over
the next forty years. 14

8.
See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 31 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 335 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lassiter
v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 52 n.20 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 831 n.42 (1975); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 n.2 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380 n.3 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 520 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 569 n.7 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 510 (1958), overruled in part by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) and abrogated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479
(1966).
9.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (citing Beaney, ConstitutionalRight of Privacy, supranote 2).
10.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 520 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL, supra note 2).

11.
Beaney, ConstitutionalRight of Privacy, supra note 2, at 214.
12. Id. ("Apart from requiring a coverage of virtually all of the recognized constitutional
rights, such a category involves the use of a new concept in situations where adequate, if imperfect,
categories under which analysis can proceed already exist.").
13. Id. at 248.
14.
Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965) (locating privacy right in
penumbra emanating from specific provisions of the Bill of Rights), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973) (finding woman's privacy right in termination of early term pregnancies in liberty
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What is more, Bill's scholarship anticipated and supported many
important developments in the constitutional approach to individual privacy rights that would emerge over this period. In 1966, he articulated
his vision of constitutional privacy as follows: "Not all of mankind desire
or need privacy, but for those who do, a freedom to determine the extent
to which others may share in one's spiritual nature, and the ability to
protect one's beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and sensations from unreasonable intrusions are of the very essence of life in a free society."' 5 Last
term, in the path-breaking privacy decision in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice
Kennedy, echoing Bill Beaney's views, observed that:
[A]dults may choose to enter upon... [private consensual sexual relationships] in the confines of their homes and their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
allows homosexual persons the
liberty protected by the Constitution
16
right to make this choice.
Another way in which Bill influenced and anticipated the development of constitutional law is through his understanding about the necessity for the Supreme Court to adopt a fluid understanding of constitutional meaning. As he wrote in a post-Griswoldarticle:
The relevant values of society, its changing needs and demands, and
the roles assumed by other agencies of government all seem to influence the way the Court perceives its function. In this sense, the Constitution resembles less a contract to be literally applied, and instead
begins to appear as a statement of political principles, to be interapplied by the Court in the light of changing circumpreted and
7
stances.'
Or, as Bill put it more simply, "law cannot be static, unless a society is
also static."' 8 In these observations, Bill foreshadowed a recent trend on
the Supreme Court of looking to changes in the non-judicial world as one
source for defining important constitutional rights.' 9

component of due process clause) and Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476-84 (2003) (finding
right of privacy for same sex couples engaged in consensual sexual relationships in liberty component of due process clause).
15.

Beaney, Expanding Right of Privacy,supra note 2, at 995.

16.

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.

17.

Beaney, Expanding Right of Privacy,supra note 2, at 986.

Beaney, Privacyand American Law, supra note 2, at 255.
18.
See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480-83 (drawing upon changes in societal acceptance
19.
of consensual gay relationships and upon developments in other western legal systems in defining
the scope of liberty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-17 (2002) (viewing pattern of state law
opposition to execution of mentally retarded persons as relevant to determination of whether such
executions constitute cruel and unusual punishment barred by Eighth Amendment).
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Moreover, Bill understood well before it was obvious that privacy
law would have to develop in response to significant technological advances that enable government actors to acquire and catalogue important,
personal information about citizens. In one piece, he wrote:
Since we are entering the age of total information as a result of the
efforts of scientifically-minded administrators in business, government, and throughout our society; and since the technical means for
efficient gathering, storing, and retrieval are readily available, this
may turn out to be a significant battleground testing the limits of privacy of20 information against the demand of the government "to
know."

Criminal procedure scholars now take this point for granted. But Bill
wrote these words in 1966, a year before the Supreme Court even decided Katz v. United States,21 in which Justice Harlan's famous concurrence established that government conduct is limited by the Fourth
Amendment only where the person subject to that conduct has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" as defined by societal understandings.22
That test has spawned many contemporary privacy debates, ranging from
the constitutionality of police use of infrared thermal imaging technology23 to government surveillance of private telephone and email communications. 4
Looking back at Bill's impressive record of scholarship, it is clear
that he left behind a rich and meaningful body of work that current and
future generations of judges and professors can continue to draw upon
for insight and guidance. Bill Beaney's scholarship has continuing relevance.
II. THE PATIENT MENTOR
Bill Beaney was much more than a brilliant legal scholar. He was
also a giving and gracious colleague, a model institutional citizen.
In 1992, when I joined the faculty of the University of Denver College of Law, I thought I knew a fair amount about constitutional law.
After all, by that time I had studied constitutional law with some of the
nation's leading experts, clerked for a federal judge, and spent several
years as a lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union, where my
20. Beaney, Expanding Right of Privacy, supra note 2, at 991.
21.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). A majority of the Court has since
adopted Justice Harlan's approach. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
23. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-40 (2001) (holding that government use of
thermal imaging technology to detect heat from a private home is a search protected by the Fourth
Amendment).
24. See, e.g., Laurie Thomas Lee, The USA PatriotAct and Telecommunications: Privacy
UnderAttack, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371 (2003) (discussing privacy implications of
USA Patriot Act's electronic surveillance provisions).
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docket exclusively consisted of constitutional litigation. As many a
young law teacher quickly learns, however, even an experienced practitioner generally knows only some facets of his or her field and usually
cannot comprehend the breadth of knowledge necessary to becoming a
good teacher. I was soon stunned by how little I knew about constitutional law.
Fortunately, there was someone on our faculty who did know a lot
about constitutional law. I soon found myself visiting Bill Beaney's office on a regular basis, taking advantage of as many individual tutorials
as he could bear. In my initial, rather sheepish, approaches, I would
gather together specific interrogatories and Bill would fire off answers in
a blink. Soon, however, I began to worry that I was something of a pest.
Like the television character Columbo, I would return to Bill's office
again and again, apologetically muttering, "Umm, Bill, could I ask you
just one more question?"
Bill never made me feel stupid or ignorant, but patiently discussed
the issues with me in a thoughtful manner. He treated me with respect, as
a peer, rather than a neophyte. Whether he was explaining nuances of
late eighteenth century political relationships or the incoherence of the
Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, he provided a rich
and entertaining source of insight and information. Bill always had a
twinkle in his eye when we got together. I have no illusions that this was
because he particularly loved talking with me. Rather, it was clear to me
that Bill loved talking about constitutional law.
Not only did Bill give his time generously to my teaching queries,
but also he provided his insights on my own legal scholarship. When I
gave him a draft of the first law review article I wrote as a law professor,
I assumed that he would not have the time, inclination, or interest to provide me with any feedback. But he soon invited me to his office and gave
me valuable and insightful substantive comments that enhanced my
thinking and enriched my published work.
With his help, and a lot of hard work, I hope that I have overcome
my initial professorial deficiencies. Bill taught me more than substantive
doctrinal and historical knowledge, though. He taught me that a good
constitutional law professor undergoes a constant learning process, always studying, examining, and reexamining his or her understandings of
the manner in which constitutional law emerges and evolves. I have
taken these lessons to heart and they will always influence my teaching
and scholarship. As I wrote to him in the last days of his life, "Bill, you
are with me every time I walk into a classroom to teach Constitutional
Law." We will all miss you, but to me, you are still here. You will always be relevant.

SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: A ONCE AND
FUTURE REMEDY?
MICHAEL J. PI'fS

For almost four decades, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has required certain states and localities to garner federal pre-approval prior to
implementing any changes in laws that affect voting.' Initially designed
to remedy the persistent recalcitrance of southern states in providing African-Americans equal access to the electoral process, Section 5 represents one of the greatest and lengthiest federal encroachments on the
power of state and local governments in United States history and has
been characterized as "unique and stringent,"2 "reminiscent of old Reconstruction days,"' 3 and "an unprecedented federal intrusion into the
governing processes of the states."4
Section 5 seemingly raises serious constitutional concerns, as it
most certainly burdens and usurps the power of state and local governments. But the United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld Section 5's constitutionality 5 as a valid exercise of congressional enforcement power.6 Likewise, the federalist majority on the Rehnquist Court7
t Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section.
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.S.J., Northwestern University. The opinions in this
Article do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of Justice. Thanks to Jennifer Pitts, Bob Berman, Kris Brenneis, Jon Greenbaum, Tim Lambert, Peyton McCrary, and Brad
Brooks-Rubin for their helpful comments.
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)). Section 5 is at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
2. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1249, 1250 (1989).
3.
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 595 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
4. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 790 (1998); see also Giles v. Ashcroft, 193 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260
(D.D.C. 2002) (calling Section 5 "a severe process"); Ellen D. Katz, Federalism,Preclearance,and
the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1179, 1181 (2001) (describing Section 5 as "dramatically
shift[ing] the balance of power between the federal government and the States"); Charlotte Marx
Harper, Lopez v. Monterey County: A Remedy Gone Too Far?,52 BAYLOR L. REV. 435, 449 (2000)
(describing Section 5 as a "severe intrusion by the federal government into state electoral autonomy").
5.
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526, 540-41 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
6. The congressional enforcement power, as it relates to voting, resides in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment states "[tihe Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment states
"[tihe Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 2. This Article will refer to both of these constitutional provisions more generally as
Congress's "enforcement power," except in Part IV when it becomes necessary to make a distinction
between the two. A general reference to Congress's "enforcement power" also avoids confusion by
eliminating the need to constantly clarify between the two Section 5s-the one in the Voting Rights
Act and the one in the Fourteenth Amendment.
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appears unwilling, at least for now, to nullify this broad Voting Rights
Act remedy. 8
Opponents of this tremendous power wielded by the federal government can take solace in the fact that it might end soon. Section 5 expires in 2007.9 Yet, the clock has expired on Section 5 three times previously and each time Congress has extended it. At this point, with a conservative Republican president and Congress, Section 5's chances for
extension may appear dicey. However, the last extension of Section 5
occurred with a conservative Republican president and Republican Senate majority." Indeed, Republican politicians often support the remedies
12
the Voting Rights Act provides to minority voters.
Politics aside, if Congress chooses to extend Section 5, it will almost certainly be subjected to another challenge as an inappropriate exercise of congressional enforcement power-a challenge it may not survive. Why? Because the limits of Congress's enforcement power have
recently changed. In the landmark case of City of Boerne v. Flores,13 and
in several subsequent cases, 14 the Court has delivered a "significant and
7.
The federalist judges on the current Supreme Court are Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Anthony M.
Kennedy. See generally, Amy Bach, Movin' on Up with the FederalistSociety: How the Right Rears
Its Young Lawyers, NATION, Oct. 1, 2001, at 11 (describing the modem Federalist Society and its
members).
8. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999) (Lopez 11).
9. 42 U.S.C § 1973b(a)(8).
10.
Section 5 was extended in 1970, 1975, and 1982. Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 2, 5, 84 Stat. 314, 314-15 (1970); Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 204, 206, 405, 89 Stat. 402, 402-05 (1975); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(8), 96 Stat. 131, 133 (1982).
11.
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75 (2000) (remarking on how the 1982
extension and revision of the Voting Rights Act was approved by a Republican-controlled Senate
and signed by President Ronald Reagan).
12.
See Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 177, 191-92 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds.,
1992) (noting that "Republican presidential administrations ... have warmed to the prospect of
redistricting arrangements that concentrate black and Hispanic Democrats in urban jurisdictions");
ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 9 (1987) (describing how Voting Rights Act
enforcement under the Reagan Administration differed little from previous administrations); see also
Adam Cohen, Why Republicans Are Shamelessly in Love with the Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2002, § 4, at 14 (describing the Republican Party's support of "max black" redistricting
after the 1990 census). This Article uses the term "minority" to encompass those groups that generally benefit from application of the Voting Rights Act-namely African-Americans, Asians, Latinos,
and Native Americans.
13.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
14.
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding
that Congress could not subject states to suits under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress could not subject private
individuals to suits under the Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 67 (2000) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suits under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 630 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suits for patent infringement). But
see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1984 (2003) (allowing Congress to subject
states to suits under the Family and Medical Leave Act); Tennessee v. Lane 124 S.Ct. 1978 (2004)
(allowing Congress to subject states to suits under Title H of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
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lasting cutback" 15 on Congress's ability to exercise its enforcement
power, circumscribing its use through application of the congruence and
proportionality test. 16
As a result, this Article focuses on the basic question of whether another extension of Section 5 will pass muster under the Court's more
recent decisions. In doing so, it is the intent of this Article to establish the
framework for the coming, likely passionate, 17 debate over the constitutionality of Section 5 beyond 2007.
To answer the question posed, this Article provides a review of the
history and structure of Section 5 (Part I) before examining the limits of
Congress's enforcement power, both when Section 5 was initially upheld
as a constitutional exercise of that power and after the Rehnquist Court
more recently limited Congress's ability to exercise it (Part II). This Article then moves from the hardpan of the descriptive to the swamp of the
predictive, 18 by trying to realistically analyze how a moderately conservative, federalist-leaning Court' 9 might view an extension of Section 5ultimately concluding that the statute would not pass the congruence and
proportionality test applied by such a Court (Part lI). 20 But, despite the
likelihood that Section 5 will not survive the congruence and proportion15.

1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 947 (3d ed. 2000).

16. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (establishing the doctrine of congruence and proportionality); Kimberly E. Dean, In Light of the Evil Presented: What Kind of ProphylacticAntidiscrimination Legislation Can Congress Enact After Garrett?, 43 B.C. L. REV. 697, 725 (2002) (noting that
applications of the congruence and proportionality test represent "the Court's clear attempt to diminish Congress's [enforcement] power").
The 1982 extension and amendment of the Act was marked by discordant debate, espe17.
cially in the Senate; although the focus of much of this debate was Section 2 of the Act. See Thomas
M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative
History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1393-95 (1983) (describing the fractious tenor of the Senate hearings).
Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing FederalCivil Rights Against Public EntitiesAfter Garrett, 28
18.
J.C. & U.L. 41, 82 (2001) (describing how "[mloving to a discussion of likely effects of a legal
development is a bit like moving from the hardpan to the swamp").
Thus, all predictions are made with the caveat that the situation could change if a shift in
19.
membership occurs that causes the Court to be less inclined to diminishing federal power over the
states or if the Court substantially changes the contours of the congruence and proportionality doctrine. However, these scenarios appear unlikely.
20. Professor Pamela Karlan has argued that, despite Boerne, Section 5 remains a proper
exercise of congressional enforcement power. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section
Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 726 (1998). This
Article concurs with her assessment with regard to the constitutionality of the current extension of
Section 5. See also Giles, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (describing a challenge to the current extension of
Section 5 as "entirely frivolous in light of overwhelming Supreme Court precedent"). However,
Professor Karlan's article was written prior to the Court's six subsequent applications of the congruence and proportionality test and did not speculate on whether another extension of Section 5 would
continue to remain an appropriate exercise of Congress's enforcement power. Karlan, supra, at 74041.
Two more recent pieces have also concluded that Section 5 remains constitutional under the
congruence and proportionality standard. See Paul Winke, Why the Preclearanceand Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally ProportionalRemedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 69, 71 (2003); Victor Andres Rodriguez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
After Boerne: The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?,91 CAL. L. REV. 769, 776, 798 (2003).
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ality test, this Article sets forth two means by which Section 5 can still be
saved. First, this Article explores in some detail whether the Court will
carve out an exception to the congruence and proportionality test for
voting rights remedies (Part IV). Second, even if Section 5 is subjected to
the test, this Article sets forth three ways in which Congress could revise
the statute to conform to the test while still providing adequate protection
for the gains made by minority voters since passage of the Voting Rights
Act (Part V).
I. THE RATIONALE FOR ENACTING SECTION 5 AND How IT WORKS
A. Section 5: Why It Was Enacted
The Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965 after almost a century of
overt, rampant, and purposeful discrimination against minority voters,
most notably against African-Americans in the Deep South. 21 The initial
goal of the Act was to provide African-American voters with access to
the ballot because, at the time, numerous state and local governments
used the discriminatory application of literacy tests or other devices, such
as tests of good moral character, to prevent African-Americans from
registering to vote.22 The discriminatory application of these tests was
generally performed by voter registrars who often excused white appli21.
In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, guaranteeing that the right to vote could
not be "denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CONST. amend XV, § 1. Following ratification of the Amendment, Congress passed several laws
designed to eradicate voting discrimination against African-Americans. See, e.g., Enforcement Act
of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 140 (1870) (guaranteeing the right to vote "without distinction of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude" and providing for penalties for interfering with the
right to vote); Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433, 433-34 (1871) (providing for the
appointment of federal officials to oversee and monitor elections). However, these Acts did little to
end discrimination. See Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No.5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong. 3-4 (1965) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of United
States Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach) (describing post-Civil War attempts to guarantee the right to vote as "neither adequately enforced, nor of long duration" and later repealed).
In the late nineteenth century, as Reconstruction ebbed, southern states began to implement
numerous devices, such as literacy tests, to massively disenfranchise African-American voters. See
Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fifteenth Amendment, 64
NEB. L. REv. 389, 397 (1985) (listing "gerrymandering, poll taxes, literacy tests, 'grandfather
clauses,' white primaries, malapportionment, residency requirements ....
fraud, and violence" as
methods used to disenfranchise African-American voters). During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court gradually found some, but not all, of these practices to be unconstitutional. See Lassiter
v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (refusing to declare all literacy
tests unconstitutional); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (upholding a challenge to Texas's
white primary); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 382-83 (1915) (invalidating Annapolis, Maryland's grandfather clause); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1915) (invalidating Oklahoma's grandfather clause); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1903) (dismissing, for lack of
jurisdiction, challenges to Alabama's grandfather clause, literacy test, and property ownership requirements for voter registration).
22. For example, as a condition of registration in the State of Alabama, an applicant had to be
able to "read and write any article of the United States Constitution ... be of good character and
embrace the duties and obligations of citizenship." United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 678
(M.D. Ala. 1961). In the State of Louisiana, an applicant had to "'understand and give a reasonable
interpretation of any section' of either the Constitutions of the United States or of Louisiana. United
States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 357 n.6 (E.D. La. 1963).
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cants from taking the tests, gave them easier versions of the test, provided assistance in taking the test, or gave passing scores despite serious
errors in their answers, while African-American applicants took difficult
versions of the tests, were prevented from receiving outside assistance,
were given failing scores for even the most marginal error, and were not
informed if their application was rejected. 23 Moreover, even if an African-American applicant passed the test, the registrant might not be issued
a registration certificate.2 4 And when all of these other tactics failed, jurisdictions would just resort to old-fashioned intimidation.25
The United States Department of Justice tried to halt these disgraceful tactics through litigation brought under the Civil Rights Acts passed
by Congress in 1957, 1960, and 1964.26 But Department of Justice enforcement failed to provide African-Americans with access to the ballot.27 African-American voters continued to feel the burden of racial dis28
crimination as evidenced by continued low registration rates. Litigation
29
proved onerous and slow. More significantly, even victory in federal
court would fail to end discrimination in registration. Often, when a court
enjoined a state or local government from engaging in a particular discriminatory practice, the jurisdiction would simply switch to a new discriminatory device not covered by the injunction.3 °

See, e.g., Alabama, 192 F. Supp. at 679-81 (describing the discriminatory application of
23.
literacy tests in Macon County); see also Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 383 (describing how the state's
test requiring interpretation of the constitution was discriminatorily applied by giving AfricanAmericans difficult sections to interpret while whites were given easy sections).
24. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. at 680.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679, 683 (5th Cir. 1964) (describing how
the registrar of Walthall County brandished a pistol when African-Americans attempted to register).
26. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorized the Attorney General to seek an injunction
against any person who interfered with the right to vote in a racially discriminatory manner. Civil
Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637-38 (1957). The Civil Rights Act of
1960 gave the Attorney General access to local voting records, authorized courts to conduct voter
registration, and allowed suits against state parties. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, §§
303, 601, 74 Stat. 86, 88, 90-92 (1960). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 required literacy tests to be
administered wholly in writing, created a presumption of literacy for certain persons, provided for
expedited hearings of certain voting cases before three-judge panels, and required the collection of
registration and voting statistics in certain jurisdictions. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, §§ 101(a)(2)(C), 101(c), 101(h), 801, 78 Stat. 241, 241-42, 266 (1964).
27. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 5. For an excellent, concise discussion of the Department of Justice's enforcement efforts between passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965: The ContinuedNeedfor Preclearance,51 TENN. L. REV. 1, 15-25 (1983).
28. House Hearings,supra note 21, at 4.
Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
29.
Cong. 9-14 (1965) (statement of United States Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach) (discussing the length of time necessary to obtain judicial relief in voting cases).
Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in
30.
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 145, 149 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (noting that new discriminatory
tools were sometimes implemented within twenty-four hours of the eradication of the previous
discriminatory tools).
In addition, to evade a court order, some local officials established rules to make registration
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Charles S. Bullock, I & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of
Racial Districting and the Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209, 1210 n.7 (1999)

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

To combat these tactics, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of
1965,"' providing a number of remedies designed to bring an end to voting discrimination, the most important of which were found in Sections
3
4, 6, and 5. 32 Section 4, the "original heart ' 33
of the Act, suspended certain jurisdictions' use of literacy tests and other devices that served as the
predominant means for disenfranchising minority voters.34 Section 6
provided for the appointment of federal examiners to conduct voter registration in certain places.35 Lastly, Section 5 froze into place the voting
laws in certain states and localities, requiring federal approval of any
changes to these laws, so that once a discriminatory law was suspended
under the Act or successfully challenged through litigation, a new discriminatory law could not be enacted as a replacement for the old discriminatory law. 36 Of these three 37core remedies, Section 5 was, and remains, the most novel and drastic.

(describing "dilatory tactics" of registration officials such as "extending breaks when no registration
applications were accepted, having irregular office hours, and refusing to allow more than one applicant at a time to apply").
31.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)).
32. Sections 4, 6,and 5 are currently at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973d, and 1973c. In addition to
these remedies, Section 10 of the Act directed the Attorney General to institute litigation against poll
taxes. 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(b). The need for such litigation, however, was soon largely obviated by a
Court decision finding all poll taxes to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harper v. Va.
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
33.
Derfner, supra note 30, at 149.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1). Section 4 banned the use of a "test or device" which was defined
as:
[A]ny requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1)
demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate
any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good
moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or
members of any other class.
Id. § 1973b(c).
When Congress extended Section 5 in 1975, it broadened the coverage to include discrimination against members of language minority groups. Id. § 1973b(f). At the same time, Congress
expanded the definition of the term "test or device" to include:
[A]ny practice or requirement by which any State or political subdivision provided any
registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral process, including ballots, only in the English language,
where the Director of the Census determines that more than five per centum of the citizens of voting age residing in such State or political subdivision are members of a single
language minority.
Id. § 1973b(f)(3).
35.
Id. § 1973d.
36. Id. § 1973c. The Senate Judiciary Committee's 1982 Report on the Voting Rights Act
Extension explained how Congress properly anticipated the implementation of new, discriminatory
devices after passage of the Act:
Following the dramatic rise in registration, a broad array of dilution schemes were employed to cancel the impact of the new black vote. Elective posts were made appointive;
election boundaries were gerrymandered; majority runoffs were instituted to prevent victories under a prior plurality system; at-large elections were substituted for election by
single-member districts, or combined with other sophisticated rules to prevent an effective minority vote. The ingenuity of such schemes seems endless. Their common purpose
and effect has been to offset the gains made at the ballot box under the Act. Congress an-
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B. Section 5: How It Works
The drastic nature of the Section 5 remedy comes from its abrogation of the autonomy of some state and local governments in all matters
related to voting. A detailed description of how it works follows, but this
is the basic framework: Section 5 prevents certain state and local governments (usually those with a history of discrimination in voting) from
implementing any change in voting laws, no matter how minor, until a
federal authority determines that the change does not discriminate
against minority voters in either purpose or effect.
About the only limitation of Section 5 is its geographic scope-it
does not apply nationwide. Rather, a coverage formula determines the
areas subject to its strictures.38 The coverage formula represents an effort
to target those places where discrimination seemed most rampant because: (1) a literacy test, or other similar device, had been employed; and
(2) there was reduced participation in the election process, as evidenced
by low registration or turnout rates. 39 Generally, two types of jurisdicticipated this response. The preclearance provisions of Section 5 were designed to halt
such efforts.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 7 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 183.
37. Peyton McCrary, Bringing Equality to Power: How the Federal Courts Transformed the
ElectoralStructure of Southern Politics, 1960-1990, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 686 (2003) (describing Section 5's preclearance requirement as the "most novel feature of the Act-and, to those concerned with the operation of our federal system, the most intrusive"). As the Supreme Court noted,
the reason for this drastic scheme was to "shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
38.
When the Act initially passed, the entire States of Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia were covered, along with forty counties in North Carolina,
and a few other counties in Arizona, Hawaii, and Idaho. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 12 (1975), reprinted
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 778. Currently, Section 5 covers all or parts of sixteen states. The States
of Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia
are covered in their entireties. 28 C.F.R. app. pt. 51 (2003). Parts of California, Florida, Michigan,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota are also covered. Id.
39.
United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1977) (plurality opinion) (describing how jurisdictions were covered by Section 5 "whenever it was
administratively determined that certain conditions which experience had proved were indicative of
racial discrimination in voting had existed in the area"); see also Timothy G. O'Rourke, Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982: The New Bailout Provisionand Virginia, 69 VA. L. REv. 765, 77273 (1983) (noting that the coverage formula "rests on the rationale that the conjunction of low voter
registration or turnout and the use of a literacy test.., establishes a presumption that discrimination
exists in the voting process").
When initially passed, the coverage formula applied to those places with lower participation
rates and that used a test or device as of November 1964. When extended in 1970, the coverage
formula applied to those places with lower participation rates and that used a test or device in November 1968. When extended in 1975, the coverage formula applied to those places with lower
participation rates and that used a test or device in November 1972. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, Voting Section, About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/types.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) (discussing history of
coverage formula) [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Justice, About Section 5]. The current coverage formula
reads as follows:
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or in any political
subdivision of a State which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census
determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were
registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in
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tions are covered: states and counties. 40 And, if a state or county is subjected to Section 5, so are all of its political subjurisdictions. In a covered
state such as Texas, for example, not only do actions of the legislature
need federal approval, so do voting-related actions of counties, cities,
school districts, and water districts. 41 Federal approval is also required
for certain changes made by political parties in these covered jurisdictions. 42
In these covered areas, Section 5 freezes into place the laws and
procedures related to voting as of the date of coverage and requires a
jurisdiction to obtain federal approval, commonly referred to as "prethe presidential election of November 1964. On and after August 6, 1970, in addition to
any State or political subdivision of a State determined to be subject to subsection (a) of
this section pursuant to the previous sentence, the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or any political subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney
General determines maintained on November 1, 1968, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of
the persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1968, or that
less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November
1968. On and after August 6, 1975, in addition to any State or political subdivision of a
State determined to be subject to subsection (a) of this section pursuant to the previous
two sentences, the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or
any political subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained
on November 1, 1972, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of
the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the citizens of voting age were registered on November 1, 1972, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the
Presidential election of November 1972.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b).
40. The two types of entities to which the coverage formula applies are states and "political
subdivisions." The term "political subdivision" is defined as "any county or parish, except that
where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term
shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting." 42 U.S.C. §
19731(c)(2). In the vast majority of states, voter registration is conducted on the county or parish
level. However, Section 5 coverage currently extends to several towns in Michigan and New Hampshire. 28 C.F.R. app. pt. 51.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c (providing for coverage of states and "any political
41.
subdivision of such State[s]"); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.6 (2003) ("All political subunits within a
covered jurisdiction (e.g., counties, cities, school districts) are subject to the requirement of section
5.").
42. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 205 (1996) (holding that a fee charged to
delegates at the state nominating convention was a voting change subject to the preclearance requirement).
The Department of Justice has issued the following guideline to determine which changes
made by political parties need federal approval:
A change affecting voting effected by a political party is subject to the preclearance requirement:
(a) If the change relates to a public electoral function of the party and
(b) If the party is acting under authority explicitly or implicitly granted by a covered jurisdiction or political subunit subject to the preclearance requirement of section 5.
For example, changes with respect to the recruitment of party members, the conduct of
political campaigns, and the drafting of party platforms are not subject to the preclearance
requirement. Changes with respect to the conduct of primary elections at which party
nominees, delegates to party conventions, or party officials are chosen are subject to the
preclearance requirement of section 5.
28 C.F.R. § 51.7 (2003). The guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General have traditionally
earned substantial deference from the courts in light of the Department of Justice's prominent role in
implementing the statute. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 281 (1999) (Lopez I).
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clearance," to implement a change in voting laws or practices.43 One
avenue to preclearance is through a declaratory judgment-from a threejudge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia-that the voting change does not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or language
minority status.44 A second route is through submission of the voting
change to the Attorney General of the United States.45 The Attorney
General then has sixty days to review the change to determine whether
the jurisdiction has proven that the change is not discriminatory in purpose or effect.46 If the Attorney General either does not object to the voting change or affirmatively indicates no objection will be made, then the
covered jurisdiction can enforce the change.4 7 Since the onset of Section
5, the vast majority of jurisdictions have opted to submit changes to the

43.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (requiring federal pre-approval whenever a covered jurisdiction "shall
enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on" the applicable date of
coverage).
44.
Id. (allowing states and political subdivisions to "institute an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such [voting] qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)").
When Section 5 was initially enacted, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia received jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions involving preclearance because
southern district judges often expressed hostility to minority voting rights. See Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofrnan, The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN
THE SOUTH 378, 379 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (describing how southern

federal district court judges would "hamstring" claims brought by private plaintiffs or the Department of Justice under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964). But see 111 CONG. REC.
10354-55 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hart) (describing the need for uniformity of interpretation of the
preclearance provisions as the reason for placing jurisdiction in the D.C. District Court).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (allowing voting changes to be enforced without a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the change is "submitted
by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney
General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection" to the change). The Attorney
General has delegated responsibility for making Section 5 determinations to the Assistant Attorney
General for the Civil Rights Division. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2003).
46.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
47.
Section 5 provides that a change becomes precleared if the Attorney General fails to
interpose an objection to the change within sixty days of its submission. Id. Thus, a change can be
precleared without any formal action by the Attorney General. However, if the Attorney General
determines that a change merits preclearance prior to the sixty-day deadline, the Attorney General
may affirmatively preclear the change prior to the sixtieth day. Id. When the Attorney General provides preclearance prior to the sixtieth day, "the Attorney General . .. reserve[s] the right to reexamine the submission if additional information comes to [light] ...which would otherwise require
[an] objection." Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.43 (2003).
If the Attorney General deems a submission to be incomplete, a written request for additional
information can be sent to the jurisdiction within the initial sixty-day period. 28 C.F.R. § 51.37(a)
(2003). This request stops the clock until the Attorney General receives a complete response and
another sixty-day period commences. 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.37(c), (d); see also Branch v. Smith, 123 S.
Ct. 1429, 1436 (2003) (allowing for an extension of time if the Attorney General makes a request for
additional information that is "neither frivolous nor unwarranted"); Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526, 539-41 (1973) (allowing the Attorney General to suspend the sixty-day clock until the
complete submission is received).
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Attorney General rather than undergo the time and expense involved in
federal district court litigation.4 8
Section 5 applies broadly to all standards, practices, and procedures
that affect voting, no matter how minor. 49 Changes affecting voting include: changes in methods of election, districting plans, annexations,
rules for candidate qualifying, procedures for casting write-in votes, and
locations of polling places. 50 Thus, the federal government must scruti48.
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, About Section 5, supra note 39 (noting that ninety-nine percent
of preclearance requests go through the Attorney General); see also Drew S. Days 1If,Section 5 and
the Role of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 52, 53 n.2 (Bernard
Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (noting that an overwhelming number of jurisdictions
choose to seek approval for voting changes from the Attorney General).
When the Attorney General objects to a change, a jurisdiction still has the option to seek a
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 28 C.F.R. §
51.11 (2003) ("Submission to the Attorney General does not affect the right... to bring an action in
). A decision by the Attorney General to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ....
preclear a change is not reviewable in any court, but such a decision does not prevent a voting
change from being attacked as violative of other provisions of federal or state law. See Morris v.
Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1977) (explaining that the Attorney General's decision to preclear
is not subject to judicial review); see also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 477-78
(1997) (Bossier I) (illustrating that a precleared change may be challenged under any applicable
provision of federal or state law); 28 C.F.R. § 51.49 (2003) (same).
49.
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 564-72 (1969). In Allen, the Court rejected a
narrow construction of Section 5, noting that the Voting Rights Act was "aimed at the subtle, as well
as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because
of their race," and that Congress's intent in passing Section 5 was to "reach any state enactment
which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way." Allen, 393 U.S. at 565-66;
see also Dougherty County v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 43 (1978) ("§ 5 must be given the broadest possible scope") (internal quotes omitted).
Since Allen, the Court has placed some, but very little, limit on the scope of Section 5. In
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992), the Court decided that changes in the
powers and duties of elected officials do not constitute voting changes subject to Section 5 preclearance. Presley involved changes made to the authority of county commissioners in Etowah and Russell Counties, Alabama. Presley, 502 U.S. at 495, 499. Prior to the changes, individual commissioners had broad authority to fix roads in their individual districts whereas after the changes, individual
commissioners had far less authority. Id. at 495-99. In the case of Etowah County, this change occurred after voting rights litigation led to the election of an African-American commissioner. Id. at
496-97.
The Presley Court held that these shifts of power were not voting changes subject to Section 5,
acknowledging that while Section 5 was "expansive within its sphere of operation," a change had to
have some nexus to voting in order to be subject to the preclearance requirement. Id. at 501-03. The
Court also provided guidance on the types of changes subject to Section 5 review, delimiting four
broad categories: (1) "changes involve[ing] the manner of voting;" (2) changes "involve[ing] candidacy requirements and qualifications;" (3) "changes in the composition of the electorate that may
vote for candidates for a given office;" and (4) changes "affecting the creation or abolition of an
elective office." Id. at 502-03.
50. The Department of Justice has provided the following list as examples of changes which
affect voting:
(a) Any change in qualifications or eligibility for voting.
(b) Any change concerning registration, balloting, and the counting of votes and any
change concerning publicity for or assistance in registration or voting.
(c) Any change with respect to the use of a language other than English in any aspect of
the electoral process.
(d) Any change in the boundaries of voting precincts or in the location of polling places.
(e) Any change in the constituency of an official or the boundaries of a voting unit (e.g.,
through redistricting, annexation, deannexation, incorporation, reapportionment, changing to at-large elections from district elections, or changing to district elections from atlarge elections).
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nize and approve everything from a city's annexation of vacant land to a
state's adoption of new congressional districts. 51 So, by way of hypothetical, if Tombstone, Arizona, moves its polling place from the local
elementary school to city hall, it must obtain preclearance.52
53
To secure preclearance, a jurisdiction has the burden of proving
the voting change does not have a discriminatory effect or purpose.54 A
change discriminatory in effect is one that leads to a retrogression of the
ability of minority voters to effectively exercise the electoral franchise.55
A change discriminatory in purpose is one adopted with the intent to
cause a retrogression of the ability of minority voters to effectively exercise the electoral franchise.56 Retrogression is measured by reference to
the existing, or "benchmark," practice.57

(f) Any change in the method of determining the outcome of an election (e.g., by requiring a majority vote for election or the use of a designated post or place system).
(g) Any change affecting the eligibility of persons to become or remain candidates, to obtain a position on the ballot in primary or general elections, or to become or remain holders of elective offices.
(h) Any change in the eligibility and qualification procedures for independent candidates.
(i) Any change in the term of an elective office or an elected official or in the offices that
are elective (e.g., by shortening the term of an office, changing from election to appointment or staggering the terms of offices).
j) Any change affecting the necessity of or methods for offering issues and propositions
for approval by referendum.
(k) Any change affecting the right or ability of persons to participate in political campaigns which is effected by a jurisdiction subject to the requirement of Section 5.
28 C.F.R. § 51.13 (2003).
51.
City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 467 (1987) (annexation of vacant
land); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S 630, 634 (1993) (congressional redistricting).
52. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387 (1971) (requiring preclearance if a covered
jurisdiction changes the location of a polling place). Tombstone is covered because the entire State
of Arizona is subject to Section 5. See supra note 38.
53. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2003) (providing that "[tlhe burden of proof is on a submitting
authority when it submits a change to the Attorney General for preclearance"); Wilkes County v.
United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (D.D.C. 1978) ("In an action for a declaratory judgment
under Section 5, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.").
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (allowing preclearance of a change so long as it "does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)").
55. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2003); City of Lockhart v. United States, 460
U.S. 125, 134 (1983) (holding that voting changes were entitled to preclearance because changes
"did not increase the degree of discrimination against blacks"); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130,
141 (1976) (holding that "the purpose of [§] 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure
changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise"); Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp.
20, 27 (D.D.C. 1994) (explaining that "preclearance [must] be denied under the 'effects' prong of
Section 5 if a new system places minority voters in a weaker position than the existing system").
56. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 340 (2000) (Bossier I1). The standards for
evaluating annexations are slightly different than for evaluating other voting changes. An annexation
can be precleared if it retrogresses minority voting strength, so long as the method of election of the
jurisdiction fairly reflects the minority voting strength remaining after the annexation occurs. City of
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1975). In Richmond, the Court held there was no
discriminatory effect in an annexation that reduced the City's African-American population by ten
percentage points-from 52 to 42 percent. Richmond, 422 U.S. at 363. The Court concluded that no
such effect existed because the city had four (out of nine) single-member districts with a majority of
African-American population. Id. at 371-72.
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An unprecleared voting change cannot be enforced. A voting
change in a covered jurisdiction "will not be effective as law[] until and
unless [pre]cleared, '58 and failure to obtain preclearance "renders the
change unenforceable. 59 If a voting change has not been precleared, the
Attorney General or a private plaintiff may challenge any attempted enforcement of the change in a local federal district court. 6° These cases are
commonly known as "Section 5 enforcement actions" and such an action
will almost always lead to an injunction prohibiting any implementation
of the unprecleared change. 6'
Jurisdictions can remove themselves from Section 5's preclearance
requirement by obtaining a declaratory judgment from the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, a so-called "bailout. ' 62 To
obtain a bailout, the jurisdiction must prove that during the last ten years:
(a) no discriminatory test or device (e.g., a literacy test) has been used;
(b) no court has judged the jurisdiction or any of its political subdivisions
to have denied or abridged the right to vote; (c) no federal examiners
have been assigned to register voters; (d) the subjurisdiction and all political units within it have complied with Section 5; (e) no Section 5 objection by the Attorney General or unfavorable declaratory judgment has
been issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; (f) the subjurisdiction and all its political units have eliminated votAn annexation can be found to have a discriminatory purpose if the jurisdiction engages in a
racially selective annexation policy. Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. at 467. Pleasant Grove upheld a
lower court denial of preclearance to an annexation of white residents when the city refused, for
racial reasons, to annex an area where African-Americans resided. Id. at 465-72. The Court has
described such racially motivated annexation procedures as objectionable because it indicates a
528 U.S. at 340.
purposeful attempt to retrogress minority voting strength in the future. Bossier 11,
57.
28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b)(1) (2003) provides:
In determining whether a submitted change is retrogressive the Attorney General will
normally compare the submitted change to the voting practice or procedure in effect at
the time of the submission. If the existing practice or procedure upon submission was not
in effect on the jurisdiction's applicable date for coverage ... and is not otherwise legally
enforceable under Section 5, it cannot serve as a benchmark, and... the comparison shall
be with the last legally enforceable practice or procedure used by the jurisdiction.
Id. Thus, the benchmark practice is almost always either the practice in place as of the date of coverage or any practice that has received preclearance since the applicable coverage date.
58.
Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975) (per curiam).
59.
Hathom v. Lovom, 457 U.S. 255, 269 (1982).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (Attorney General); Allen, 393 U.S. at 555 (private party).
61.
Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1991) ("If voting changes subject to § 5 have not
been precleared, § 5 plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting the State from implementing
the changes."). Clark does, however, leave some wiggle room for jurisdictions to avoid an injunction
preventing enforcement of a change. For example, if an injunction against enforcement of a change
was sought on the eve of an election and equitable principles existed that justified allowing the
change to be enforced. Clark, 500 U.S. at 654-55.
Implementing a voting change without preclearance could lead to a court ordering a new election to be held without use of the unprecleared change. See NAACP v. Hampton County Election
Comm'n., 470 U.S. 166, 182-83 (1985) (instructing the district court to order a new election if the
implemented, unprecleared change fails to receive post-election preclearance); John P. MacCoon,
The Enforcement of the PreclearanceRequirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29
CATH. U. L. REV. 107, 124-27 (1979) (describing the potential for retrospective relief under Section
5).
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1).
62.
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ing procedures and methods of election which inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process, have engaged in constructive efforts to
eliminate intimidation and harassment of persons exercising the right to
vote, and have engaged in constructive efforts to provide convenient
opportunities for registration and participation by minority citizens; and
(g) the jurisdiction is not engaged in any statutory or constitutional violation of the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group. 63 The jurisdiction must also provide public
notice of its intent to bail out and present evidence of minority participation in voting, including data on trends in registration and voting and
disparities between minority and non-minority electoral participation. 64
As is evident from the above description, Section 5 provides a tremendous prophylactic tool in preventing voting-related discrimination
and perhaps serves as the principal reason the Voting Rights Act "has
been hailed by many to be the most effective [piece of] civil rights legislation ever passed in this country. 65 Yet it simultaneously imposes a
substantial burden on state and local governments because they must
seek approval from federal officials before implementing even the most
minor of voting changes. In addition, the price for failure to get preclearance is steep-basically, an automatic injunction against enforcement of
the change, and a great deal of proof and expense is necessary to bail out
of this scheme.66 Section 5 places such a great burden on state and local
governments that it would seemingly be unconstitutional. But, so far, the
Supreme Court has soundly rejected every such challenge to the statute.
63.
Id. §§ 1973b(a)(1)(A)-(F), 1973b(f).
64.
Id. §§ 1973b(a)(2), 1973b(a)(4).
65.
Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3247, and
H.R. 3501 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. of the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Rep. Edwards); see also Scott Gluck, Congressional
Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 337, 340 (1996) (describing Section 5 as "the single most important provision of the
Voting Rights Act and the key to preventing electoral discrimination"); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats:
The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1419 (1991) (calling Section 5 the
"heart of the Voting Rights Act").
66.
A few other aspects of Section 5 underscore the stringent nature of the remedy. First, in
making submissions to the Attorney General, a jurisdiction must submit the change in "some unambiguous and recordable manner ...." McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 249 (1984); 28 C.F.R. §
51.27(c) (2003) (requiring a "clear statement of the change explaining the difference between the
submitted change and the prior law or practice") (emphasis added). This requirement has resulted in
ambiguities in submissions being resolved against the jurisdictions. See, e.g., Boxx v. Bennett, 50 F.
Supp. 2d 1219, 1227 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (noting the "presumption that any ambiguity in the scope of
the preclearance request must be construed against the submitting jurisdiction") (internal quotes
omitted). Second, Section 5 is so broad that even a change approved by any federal court other than
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is subject to preclearance to the extent
the changes reflect the underlying policy choices of the jurisdiction. 28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (2003)
("Changes affecting voting that are ordered by a Federal court are subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5 to the extent that they reflect the policy choices of the submitting authority."); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 150-51 (1981). Third, decisions of state courts that result
in voting changes also must be precleared. See Hathorn, 457 U.S. at 265 n. 16 (noting that "the
presence of a [state] court decree does not exempt the contested change from § 5"); see also LULAC
of Tex. v. Texas, 995 F. Supp. 719, 726 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (subjecting a decision of the state supreme court to preclearance review).
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H. FROM KATZENBACH TO BOERNE TO HIBBS: CHANGES IN THE SCOPE OF
CONGRESS'S ENFORCEMENT POWER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY TEST

The Supreme Court, on two occasions, has extensively considered
whether Section 5 represents a proper exercise of Congress's enforcement power. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach67 and City of Rome v.
United States, 8 the Court ceded broad enforcement power to Congress
and easily upheld the statute's constitutionality. 69 More recently, however, in City of Boerne v. Flores,7 ° the Court has evinced a willingness to
put much more severe limitations on Congress's enforcement power.
This Section briefly explains the changes wrought by the Court in creating the congruence and proportionality test first set forth in Boerne and
then provides a detailed description of how the Court has applied the test.
A. The Shift from a Broad to a Narrow Enforcement Power
South Carolina v. Katzenbach represented the Court's first foray
into the constitutionality of Section 5. In Katzenbach, the Court upheld
Section 5, employing a highly deferential standard that gave Congress
"full remedial powers" to use "'all means which are appropriate"' 71 to
eliminate unconstitutional voting discrimination.7 2 This power allowed
Congress to pass any "appropriate" legislation to carry out the "letter and
spirit of the constitution .... "713
After setting forth this deferential framework, the Court encountered little difficulty in finding Section 5 a rational remedy for Congress

383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966).
67.
446 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1980).
68.
69.
In Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973), the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of Section 5 in a single sentence: "And for the reasons stated at length in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, we reaffirm that the Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under [§] 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment." Georgia, 411 U.S. at 535 (internal citations omitted).
The Court's decision in Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (Lopez 11), also discussed Section 5's relationship with Congress's enforcement power. But Lopez H provided a much
less comprehensive discussion of the issue than in Katzenbach and City of Rome, and appeared to
principally rely on these precedents. See Lopez 1!, 525 U.S. at 283-84. This Article gives in-depth
treatment to Lopez H in Part IV.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
70.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
71.
421 (1819)).
72.
This deferential standard led the Court to reject the state's argument that Congress could
only "forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms" while "the task of fashioning
specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities must necessarily be left entirely to the
courts." Id. at 327.
73.
Id. at 326. The Court also noted:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the
equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought
within the domain of congressional power.
Id. at 327 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)).
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to employ in the eradication of voting-related discrimination.7 4 While
recognizing that Section 5 represented an "uncommon exercise of
congressional power," the Court held that "exceptional conditions
[could] justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate. 75 These
exceptional conditions included the lengthy and despicable history of
voting-related discrimination in many of the jurisdictions covered by
Section 5,76 including these jurisdictions' resort to the "extraordinary
stratagem" of creating new rules to perpetuate discrimination even in the
face of federal court decrees to the contrary.77 Thus, with the Court
ceding broad enforcement authority to Congress, Section 5 had survived
its first constitutional challenge.78
Following Congress's extension of Section 5 in 1970 and 1975, 79
the Court, in City of Rome v. United States,80 considered whether Katzenbach had been correctly decided and whether Section 5 continued to represent a proper exercise of Congress's enforcement power. 81 Once again
the Court ceded broad enforcement power to Congress, finding that Congress could provide a broad remedy to protect voting rights so long as the
legislation was "appropriate."
While once again giving Congress wide latitude in the exercise of
its enforcement power, the Court provided three principal rationales for
upholding Section 5.82 First, it was appropriate for Congress to ban vot74. In Katzenbach, the Court also separately upheld the coverage formula used to determine
which localities would be required to preclear voting changes-a formula also used to require these
same jurisdictions to suspend literacy tests and to allow federal examiners to register voters. Id. at
329-33. The Court held that in the places covered by the formula "actual voting discrimination" had
occurred and that the bailout procedures provided enough of a safeguard to eliminate any potential
"overbreadth" of coverage. Id. at 330-31.
75.
Id. at 334.
76.
Id. at 329-31. The Court opened its opinion with an extended discussion of the history of
voting-related discrimination, relying heavily on the legislative history from passage of the Act. Id.
at 308-15.
77.
Id. at 335.
78. Justice Black dissented in Katzenbach, as he was unconvinced that federalism allowed
such great congressional intrusion into state lawmaking. See id. at 355-62 (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting). In his view, Section 5 marked a complete distortion of the American constitutional
structure of government because requiring a state to "beg" federal authorities for approval of its laws
rendered meaningless any distinction between federal and state power. Id. at 358 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). He continued: "It is inconceivable to me that such a radical degradation of state
power was intended in any provisions of our Constitution or its Amendments." Id. at 360 (Black, J.,
concurring and dissenting). To support his view, Justice Black cited the original intent of the framers
who chose to deny Congress the power to veto state laws, a power that Congress, in Justice Black's
view, was now asserting through passage of Section 5. id. at 360-62 (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting).
79. See supra note 10.
80. City of Rome involved the denial of a declaratory judgment for preclearance in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 172-73. The city had
unsuccessfully sought approval of changes to its boundaries and the method of electing its council.
Id. at 159-62.
81.
Id. at 174 (characterizing the city's argument as one that asked the Court "to do nothing
less than overrule our decision in South Carolinav. Katzenbach").
82. These three reasons corresponded with the city's three principal contentions in this case
which were: (1)Congress did not own enforcement power broader than the substantive rights en-
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ing changes with a discriminatory effect because Congress could have
"rationally" concluded that it was necessary to prevent implementation
of changes having a discriminatory effect in jurisdictions with a "demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting .... 83 Second, Section 5 was consistent with principles of federalism because the
Fifteenth Amendment specifically allowed for an expansion of federal
power at the expense of state sovereignty. Therefore, the Court saw "no
reason" to depart from its view in Katzenbach that Section 5 represented
an appropriate means for Congress to carry out its Fifteenth Amendment
responsibilities. 84 Third, the Court rejected the idea that Section 5 had
outlived its usefulness, despite the increase in minority participation in
voting and office-holding, by deferring to congressional findings indicating the need for the Section 5 remedy to prevent a backsliding of these
gains.85 The Court also noted that an additional seven years for Section 5
seemed appropriate in view of the ninety-five year history of voting discrimination between the end of the Civil War and passage of the Voting
Rights Act.86 In short, the Court found extension of the Act to be87"plainly
a constitutional method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment."
compassed in the Constitution; (2) the remedy violated principles of federalism; and (3) the remedy
had outlived its usefulness because of the decline in incidences of voting-related discrimination. Id.
at 173, 178, 180.
The city also brought claims under the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, all of which
the Court rejected in a single paragraph. Id. at 182-83. The Court did not reach the merits of a claim
brought under the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution. Id. at 183 n. 17.
83.
Id. at 177; see also id. at 173-76 (discussing the Katzenbach standard and holding that
"prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress may not . . . outlaw voting
practices that are discriminatory in effect").
84.
Id. at 178-81.
Id. at 180-82.
85.
86.
Id. at 182.
Id. The Court then proceeded to uphold the district court's findings that the voting
87.
changes at issue were not entitled to preclearance. See id. at 183-87.
In City of Rome, Justices Blackmun, id. at 187, and Stevens, id. at 190, wrote concurrences and
Justices Powell, id. at 193, and Rehnquist (joined by Justice Stewart), id. at 206, penned dissents. Of
these separate opinions, Justice Rehnquist's dissent deserves some discussion because it presages
some of the issues raised in the recent cases in which the Court has been more restrictive of Congress's enforcement power.
Justice Rehnquist began his dissent by recognizing that the City itself had been found not to
have engaged in discriminatory practices for the previous seventeen years and that the changes
involved in the case were found only to have a discriminatory effect. Id. at 209 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He then explained the three theories of congressional enforcement power relevant to the
case:
First, it is clear that if the proposed changes would violate the Constitution, Congress
could certainly prohibit their implementation. It has never been seriously maintained,
however, that Congress can do no more than the judiciary to enforce the Amendments'
commands. Thus, if the electoral changes in issue do not violate the Constitution, as judicially interpreted, it must be determined whether Congress could nevertheless appropriately prohibit these changes under the other two theories of congressional power. Under
the second theory, Congress can act remedially to enforce the judicially established substantive prohibitions of the Amendments. If not properly remedial, the exercise of this
power could be sustained only if this Court accepts the premise of the third theory that
Congress has the authority under its enforcement powers to determine, without more, that
electoral changes with a disparate impact on race violate the Constitution, in which case
Congress by legislative Act could effectively amend the Constitution.
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With the decisions in Katzenbach and City of Rome, it appeared that
the Court would apply the relatively relaxed rational basis test to any
exercise of congressional enforcement power so long as the federal statute did not restrict, abrogate, or dilute the guarantees found in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 88 But that has changed in recent years.
With William Rehnquist's ascension to Chief Justice, the Supreme Court
has consistently reduced federal power over state governments. 89 In City
of Boerne v. Flores, the Rehnquist Court continued on this course by
redefining Congress's ability to pass legislation under its enforcement
power, applying much stricter limits to congressional authority than were
extant when Section 5 was previously upheld.
Boerne created a new test for reviewing the constitutionality of
Congress's exercise of its enforcement power: the congruence and proportionality test. In creating this test, the Court conceded that Congress
has some enforcement power broader than the scope of the Constitution
itself, allowing Congress to deter constitutional violations by prohibiting
"conduct which is not itself unconstitutional" 90 and allowing Congress to
intrude into "'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
States."' 91 However, the Court's concessions to congressional power
Id. at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist thought it one thing for Congress to exercise its enforcement power to force
a locality to submit its changes for review and bear the burden of proving a lack of discrimination,
but that it was quite another for Congress to deny a locality the opportunity to implement changes
that had been proven to lack a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 209-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He
characterized the majority's decision as a blanket ban on particular dilutive practices even if such
practices were adopted without a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist said no basis existed in the Court's precedents to have a blanket ban on dilutive
practices that have a discriminatory effect because, unlike a literacy test, there was no extensive
history of jurisdictions using dilutive practices for a discriminatory purpose. Id at 215-18
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, in his opinion, Congress had not exercised its powers in a remedial
manner, but had instead changed the nature of the substantive constitutional right to vote. Id. at 21920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88.
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966); see also David S. Day, New
Dimensions of the Section 5 Enforcement Power, 47 S.D. L. REV. 366, 368-70 (2002) (discussing
Morgan and its holding that Congress's exercise of its enforcement power would be reviewed under
the rational basis standard); Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan 'Power' and the ForcedReconsideration
of ConstitutionalDecisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 827-28 (1986) (discussing the limits of congressional enforcement power under Morgan).
89. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (finding a portion of the Brady
Act to be an unconstitutional exercise of federal power over state officials); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (finding a portion of the Indian Gaming Act to be an unconstitutional
attempt by Congress to abrogate states' sovereign immunity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zones Act to be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (finding a portion
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act to be an unconstitutional exercise of
federal power over the states).
90. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
91.
Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). As examples of Congress's
power to deter constitutional violations, the Court cited to several provisions of the Voting Rights
Act, including Section 5. Id. at 517-20. The Court also noted its upholding of the Voting Rights
Act's ban on literacy tests despite the facial constitutionality of such tests. Id. at 518. Compare
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970) (upholding a nationwide ban on literacy tests), with
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (finding literacy tests to
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stopped there, and the Court then expounded on the limits of the enforcement power.9 2 The Court held that Congress lacks power to "decree
the substance" or "alter[] the meaning" of a constitutional right, and that
legislation altering the meaning of a constitutional right could not be
considered merely as legislation that enforced the right.93 The Court then
set forth the test for determining whether Congress has exceeded its enforcement powers:
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the
governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide
latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must
be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted

legislation may become subto that end. Lacking such a connection,
94
stantive in operation and effect.

be facially constitutional). The significance of Boeme's references to the Voting Rights Act is discussed in Part IV of this Article.
92. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (noting that "'[als broad as the congressional enforcement power
is, it is not unlimited"' (quoting Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128)).
Id. at 519 ("[Congress] has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine
93.
what constitutes a constitutional violation.").
94.
Id. at 519-20 (emphasis added).
To justify this new test, the Court provided an extended discussion of the history surrounding
the adoption of Congress's enforcement power and the Court's previous decisions interpreting that
power. Id. at 520 (citing "history" for confirmation that Congress's enforcement power is "remedial,
rather than substantive"). Historical support for the Court's position came from Congress's rejection
of the initial draft of the Fourteenth Amendment because it "gave Congress too much legislative
power at the expense of the existing constitutional structure." Id. According to the Court, the revised
and adopted amendment changed Congress's enforcement power from a "plenary" power to one
which was "remedial." Id. at 522. But see Michael W. McConnell, Institutionsand Interpretation:A
Critiqueof City of Boerne v. Flores, I 11 HARv. L. REV. 153, 174-81 (1997) (criticizing the Boerne
Court's use of history to support its interpretation of Congress's enforcement power); Ruth Colker,
The Supreme Court'sHistoricalErrorsin City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783, 784 (2002)
(arguing that the Court misread the historical record in giving a narrow scope to Congress's enforcement powers). As for precedent, the Court noted that its earliest cases deciding the limits of the
enforcement power served to confirm Congress's power as remedial, and its more recent decisions,
all of which dealt with voting rights, served as additional support for finding Congress's power to be
remedial in nature. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-27.
The opinion acknowledged, however, that the Court's decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
"could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the
rights contained in" the Constitution. Id. at 527-28; see also supra note 88 (discussing this
interpretation of Congress's enforcement power as outlined in Morgan). Morgan involved a
challenge to Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act which was passed with the purpose of eliminating
New York's literacy test as it applied to Spanish-speaking citizens educated in Puerto Rico. Morgan,
384 U.S. at 645 n.3. In upholding Section 4(e), the Court implied that Congress had unlimited
authority to expand constitutional rights using the enforcement power. Id. at 651 n.10.
However, in Boerne, the Court determined that Morgan could be interpreted as upholding
Congress's attempt to "remedy" unconstitutional discrimination, not expand substantive constitutional rights. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528-29. Moreover, reading Morgan more broadly would be incorrect because it would render the Constitution on par with "ordinary legislative acts, and like other
acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
Professor Laurence Tribe described this explanation, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, of
Morgan as "rather brief and a bit cryptic." TRIBE, supra note 15, at 952. Professor Tribe posits that
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After establishing this new standard,9 5 the Court placed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a statute intended to prevent religious
discrimination, under the congruence and proportionality microscope,
and concluded that the statute could not meet that test. The Court allowed that preventive rules could sometimes be appropriate remedial
measures, but that "[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm
may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.' 9 6 The Court
found that the congressional record lacked sufficient evidence of religious discrimination. 97 Moreover, even apart from the legislative record's paucity of evidence, the Court found the statute to be clearly disproportionate to the supposed problem of unconstitutional religious discrimination.9 8 The Court thought the sweeping scope of the statute would
likely nullify a significant number of constitutional state laws. 99 The statute also exacted a "heavy litigation burden," resulted in a "curtailing [of
states'] traditional general regulatory power, ' 1°° failed to include any
limits such as a termination date or a geographic restriction, and was not
passed because of an egregious history of constitutional violations.101
Thus, the first statute subjected to the Court's new test failed to survive
that test.
B. The Court's Post-BoerneRejections of FederalRemedies Using the
Congruence and ProportionalityTest
Boerne altered and limited the scope of Congress's enforcement
power. Instead of Congress having broad leeway, legislation enacted
under the auspices of the enforcement power must sail through the narrower passage of the congruence and proportionality test. 10 2 After decidthis discussion interprets Congress's action in Morgan as remedial because Congress had made a
correct factual determination that New York's literacy test was perhaps enacted with a discriminatory purpose. Id. Professor Tribe's theory seems to be the correct one. In dissent in a subsequent
congruence and proportionality case, Justice Kennedy explained how Morgan was criticized as an
incorrect factual determination that New York's literacy test involved unconstitutional behavior by
the state. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1993-94 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing Justice Harlan's Morgan dissent).
95. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REV. 26,
117 (2000) (arguing that Boerne represented a "new rule of doctrine").
96. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
97. Id. at 530-31 (describing the congressional record as containing "anecdotal evidence"
about "laws of general applicability which place incidental burdens on religion").
98. Id. at 532 ("Regardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be considered
remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning.").
99. Id.
100.
Id. at 534.
101.
Id. at 532-33.
102.
See Day, supra note 88, at 367 (describing how the Rehnquist Court's decisions have set
"high and rigorous standards" for the exercise of congressional enforcement power); Geoffrey
Landward, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett and the Equal Education
Opportunity Act: Another Act Bites the Dust, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 313, 318 (noting how prior to
the 1990s, it appeared Congress had "seemingly limitless" enforcement power); Evan H. Caminker,
"Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1134-58
(2001) (describing the Court's shift from rational basis scrutiny of legislation passed under the
enforcement power to "rigorous scrutiny"); Katz, supra note 4, at 1202 (noting that Boerne and
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ing Boerne, the Court proceeded to reject four additional federal statutes
subjected to the congruence and proportionality test while honing the
parameters of the analysis by expounding on the three-part framework
03
for evaluating laws passed under Congress's enforcement power.1
In the initial step of the analysis, the Court precisely defines the
scope of the constitutional right being violated by states and being remedied by the federal statute.1 4 To understand how this step works, take for
example the application of the congruence and proportionality test to the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In that instance, the Court first
decided what sort of state acts would be considered unconstitutional age
discrimination. 0 5 The Court did so by undertaking a canvass of its
precedent and ended up determining that, in the context of age discrimiage if the discrimination
nation, a state can discriminate on the basis of
10 6
rationally relates to a legitimate state interest.
After finding the contours of the right at issue, the Court turns to the
second step of congruence and proportionality-undertaking a review of
the scope of the problem of unconstitutional activity that the statute was
intended to remedy. 107 To determine the scope of the problem, the Court
primarily looks to the congressional record'0 8 and, to a lesser extent, to

subsequent cases represent "increasingly stringent parameters" on congressional enforcement
power); Dean, supra note 16, at 728 (describing how Boerne and its progeny moved the Court's
review of legislation passed pursuant to the enforcement power from "the traditional rational relationship test... to a stricter congruence and proportionality test"); Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy
History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1030 (2002) (describing the Court's recent narrowing of the congressional enforcement power). But see Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of ProportionalityAnalysis Under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 473 (1999) (arguing that "the proportionality
requirement has been a staple" of the Court's review of Congress's enforcement power while acknowledging that the Court had previously "applied it with varying degrees of vigor").
103.
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that
Congress could not subject states to suits under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress could not subject private
individuals to suits under the Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 67 (2000) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suits under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 630 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suits for patent infringement).
104.
Garrett,531 U.S. at 365 (requiring courts, as the first step, to "identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue"); see also FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 640 (identifying the constitutional right at issue).
105.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-86.
106.
Id. at 83 ("States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
107.
Garrett,531 U.S at 368 ("Once we have determined the metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question, we examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional.., discrimination by the States .... ).
108.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 (declaring that examination of the legislative record is necessary to
determine if a prophylactic measure is required); see also Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 639 (noting
that for Congress to exercise its enforcement power it must "identify conduct transgressing" a substantive provision of the Constitution); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525, 530-32 (noting that "'[t]he constitutional propriety of [legislation adopted under the Enforcement Clause] must be judged with reference to the historical experience.., it reflects"' (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308)).
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judicial decisions.' 9 The Court focuses on the number of constitutional
violations by the states that Congress has identified, 10 whether the violations were identified in all or only a few of the fifty states,"'1 and whether
the violations identified occurred contemporaneous with the passage of
the statute. 12 Basically, the Court uses this review of the record to determine if a "'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional
rights'
113 has occurred to support the enactment of the federal rem1 14
edy.

Finally, after reviewing the evidence of the problem's scope, the
Court undertakes step three by considering whether the breadth of the
remedy adopted by Congress is congruent and proportional to the problem. 115 At this step of the analysis, some of the factors considered by the
Court are: (1) whether the legislation is geographically targeted to those
areas that have the greatest number of problems; 1 6 (2) whether the legislation impacts a broad number of state laws or only a discrete class of
state laws;1 17 (3) whether the legislation includes opportunities for states
109.
Garrett,531 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (remarking on the lack of "confirming judicial documentation" to show a history of widespread unconstitutional activity by the states).
110. Id. at 369 (remarking on the number of incidents of discrimination by states included in
the congressional record); FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 640 (faulting Congress for only finding two
examples of unconstitutional action by the states).
111.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27 (noting that the scope of the federal remedy was disproportionate to the problem of discrimination against victims of gender-related crimes because little evidence appeared in the congressional record to show the problem "exist[s] in all States, or even most
States"); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (noting that the congressional record did not contain evidence that
unconstitutional age discrimination was "a problem of national import").
112.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369 n.6 (acknowledging that evidence existed of discrimination by
states against individuals with disabilities, notably through forced sterilization of those with hereditary mental disease in the early part of the twentieth century, but that there was "no indication that
any State had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA was adopted");
see also Hartley, supra note 18, at 51-52 (noting that the congruence and proportionality test requires Congress to be aware of a "contemporaneous pattern of unconstitutional conduct" at the time
it passes the remedial statute); John Alan Doran & Christopher Michael Mason, Disproportionate
Incongruity: State Sovereign Immunity and the Futureof FederalEmployment Discrimination Law,
2003 DETROIT COLL. L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (noting that the congressional record "must
demonstrate that unlawful discrimination by the States, or the effect of such discrimination, existed
at the time the legislative enactments are extended to the states").
113.
FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 645 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526).
114.
In Boerne, the Court implied that the state of the congressional record would not be the be
all and end all in its review of the scope of the problem. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (noting that
"U]udicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record"); see also
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646 (allowing that "lack of support in the legislative record is not
determinative" in proving that a problem requiring a remedy does not exist). As a practical matter, in
subsequent cases, the Court has looked primarily to the congressional record.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-73 (discussing the scope of the remedies the ADA provided to
115.
plaintiffs against states); Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 639 (holding that for Congress to exercise its
enforcement power it "must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing [unconstitutional] conduct").
116.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (noting provisions of the Voting Rights Act previously upheld
as proper use of enforcement power were "confined to those regions of the country where voting
discrimination had been most flagrant"); see also FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 647 (noting that when
Congress passed the Patent Act it failed to limit its application to only those "States with questionable remedies or a high incidence of infringement").
117.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (noting provisions of the Voting Rights Act previously upheld
as proper use of enforcement power only impacted "a discrete class of state laws, i.e., state voting
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to earn their way out of any remedy;" 8 (4) whether the legislation has a
termination date;11 9 (5) whether the remedy covers a broad amount of
constitutional behavior 120 or whether it is reasonable to believe many of
the laws affected by the remedy have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional; 121 (6) whether the power to enforce the remedy is held
in the hands of many or few persons; 2 2 (7) whether the legislation carries
a heavy litigation burden for the state and whether any judicial remedy is
easily applied; 123 and (8) the number of levels of local government the
remedy implicates. 124
After Boerne and the first four subsequent applications of the congruence and proportionality test, it appeared that meeting the test would
be difficult, if not impossible. Justice Stevens, dissenting in one case,
expressed the view that the test threatened any ability of Congress to pass
prophylactic legislation using its enforcement power. 25 In fact, some
commentators thought the congruence and proportionality test akin to
strict scrutiny in that, once invoked, it appeared to be fatal'2 6 to the constitutionality of the statute. 127 However, in a more recent application

laws"); see also Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 646-47 (noting that when Congress passed the Patent
Act it failed to limit "the remedy to certain types of infringement").
118.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (noting provisions of the Voting Rights Act previously upheld as
proper use of enforcement power "permitted a covered jurisdiction to avoid preclearance requirements under certain conditions").
119.
Id. at 533 (noting provisions of the Voting Rights Act previously upheld as proper use of
enforcement power "lapsed in seven years").
120.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 (finding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act unconstitutional because it "prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would
likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable" constitutional standard); FloridaPrepaid,527
U.S. at 646 (noting that when Congress passed the Patent Act it "did nothing to limit the coverage..
to cases involving arguable constitutional violations").
121.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (faulting the RFRA for not being "designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional" (emphasis added)).
122.
Id. at 532 (noting that "[alny law is subject to challenge at any time by any individual"
(emphasis added)).
123.
Id. at 534.
124.
Id. at 532.
125.
FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This position was also the view
of Justice Stephen Breyer who wrote that the Court's actions in striking down legislation passed
under the auspices of the enforcement power seemed to have rendered as a hollow promise the
principal that Congress could prevent some constitutional activity through use of a prophylactic
remedy. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's declarations that
Congress may legislate to provide broader protections than those available in the Constitution
"sounds the word of promise to the ear but breaks it to the hope" (citations omitted)); see also Ruth
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80, 131 (2001) (speculating that
the effect of the congruence and proportionality test was to limit Congress to "banning conduct that
the courts would otherwise declare unconstitutional").
126. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (describing
strict scrutiny as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
127. See TRIBE, supra note 15, at 959 (noting that the Boerne line of cases subjects Congress's
exercise of its enforcement power to "something between intermediate and strict scrutiny, effectuating what can only be understood as a substantial, albeit not conclusive, presumption of unconstitutionality"); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegal, Equal Protection by Law: FederalAntidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000) (comparing the congruence
and proportionality test to "the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny").
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of the test, the Court proved it possible for a federal remedy to survive
congruence and proportionality.
C. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs: A Wholesale Retreat or a
Brief Respitefrom Using the Congruenceand ProportionalityTest to
Nullify CongressionalRemedies?
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs 28 marked the
first occasion in which a federal statute survived application of the congruence and proportionality test. The case involved a provision of the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) that allows a state employee to
sue for money damages if the state interferes with the employee's right to
take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a spouse, parent, or
child with a serious health condition.1 29 In Hibbs, the Court continued to
apply its tripartite congruence and proportionality analysis, but put some
new gloss on it.
The most important contribution Hibbs made to the congruence and
proportionality body of jurisprudence is that the Court somewhat lessened Congress's burden to prove a widespread pattern of recent constitutional violations to justify a prophylactic remedy. Three things are evident in this regard. First, the greater the constitutional scrutiny provided
by the Court to the right the federal remedy intends to secure, the more
deferential the Court will be to Congress.130 Second, the Court will be
more deferential to Congress when the right being secured involves discrimination that is difficult to ferret out on a case-by-case basis.1 3 Third,
the Court will relax its requirement of recent discrimination contemporaneous with passage of the statute when a long history of discrimination
exists.132

123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
128.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976.
129.
130.
The Court viewed the FMLA as an attempt to remedy "gender-based discrimination in the
workplace." Id. at 1978. Thus, the Court recited its standard for protection from gender discrimination, noting its extension of heightened scrutiny to gender distinctions and its requirement that such
distinctions "serv[e] important governmental objectives" and "must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females." Id. (internal
citations omitted). The Court then used this higher level of scrutiny to lessen Congress's burden of
identifying a pattern of constitutional violations. Id. at 1982 ("Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our rationalbasis test.. . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.").
Id. at 1982 (asserting that it was reasonable for Congress to think that gender stereotyping
131.
could "lead to subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis").
132.
In Hibbs, the Court provided a brief canvass of the history of both its and Congress's
attempts to protect citizens from gender discrimination. The Court chastised itself for sanctioning
gender-based discrimination for many years and for failing to reverse this course until 1971. Id. at
1978 ("Until our decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) ... it remained the prevailing doctrine
that government, both federal and state, could withhold from women opportunities accorded men so
long as any basis in reason. .. could be conceived for the discrimination." (internal quotes omitted)).
The Court also remarked on how Congress attempted to remedy gender discrimination through
passage of Title VII. Id. However, despite these efforts by both federal branches, the Court found
that "state gender discrimination did not cease." Id.
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The second lesson of Hibbs is that just because a prophylactic remedy is justified, Congress cannot enact any remedy it desires.' 33 The
Court's first consideration now seems to be whether any prophylactic
remedy can be enacted and the second consideration has become the
burden the enacted remedy places on the states. 34 In previous cases,
these two considerations seemed to work in concert. To put it another
way, the lack of evidence in the congressional record and the lack of
proportionality of the remedy previously seemed to merge and blur. Now
the Court has more distinctly parsed these two steps of the analysis.
So where does this surprising 135 recent case leave congruence and
proportionality and the Court's federalist bent? Does the upholding of the
FMLA represent a wholesale retreat or merely a brief respite from the
Court's recent, nearly wholesale disregard for congressional power over
the states? 136 Hibbs most likely represents a small retreat from federalist
principles, one that should not be over-read by those who pine for a return to the days of Katzenbach with a seemingly unfettered congressional
power, but one that137provides hope for core civil rights remedies like the
Voting Rights Act.
Finally, the schizophrenia of the congruence and proportionality test
leaves a large amount of uncertainty. Hibbs fails to mention a host of
factors, such as sunset provisions and geographical restrictions, that
seemed to be important to previous congruence and proportionality outAfter examining this backdrop, the Court turned to a review of the evidence before Congress
when it passed the FMLA, finding this evidence demonstrated the "persistence of such unconstitutional discrimination by the States" that passage of prophylactic legislation by Congress was justified. Id. at 1979. In this discussion, the Court cited evidence from: (1) Bureau of Labor Statistics
studies that found disparities between the provision of maternity and paternity leave in the private
sector; (2) studies showing that states provided inequitable policies for maternity and paternity leave;
and (3) testimony arguing that, even where equitable policies were in place, these policies were
applied in discriminatory ways. Id. at 1979-80.
133.
Hibbs held that an "across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all eligible employees" was allowable to solve the "'difficult and intractable proble[m]"' of gender discrimination since
previous federal remedies, such as Title VII, had failed. Id. at 1982 (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88).
The Court described the remedy as "narrowly targeted at the fault line between work and family"
unlike other federal statutes that had been found to fail the congruence and proportionality test
because they "applied broadly to every aspect of [the] state employers' operations." Id. at 1983. The
Court also stressed other limitations in the remedy, including its requirement that only unpaid leave
be provided; its exceptions for recently hired, part-time, and high-level employees; its burden upon
employees to request leave in advance and provide certification from a health-care provider; and its
limitations on recovery in federal court litigation. Id. at 1983-84.
134.
The Court found: "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and
fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to
justify enactment of prophylactic.., legislation." Id. at 1981.
135.
See Michael Kinsley, Rehnquist's Surprise, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at A23 (describing how the Court's decision to uphold the FMLA "surprised everybody").
136. See Anne Gearan, States Must Grant Family-Leave Rights, DESERET NEWS, May 28,
2003, at A2 (describing Hibbs as "a surprising departure from the conservative-leaning court's usual
stance on states' rights cases").
137.
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Rule Workers Can Sue States Over Leave, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2003, at Al (describing how Hibbs "was widely seen as a potential watershed because it moved the debate about congressional authority close to the core of traditional civil rights
concerns").
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249

comes (though it seems likely these factors have not been rendered irrelevant but will lie dormant until erupting at a later date). Thus, Hibbs
leaves a "muddle" that "underlines the absence of recognizable principles in the court's [sic] decisions governing the balance of power between states and the federal government."'' 38 In reality, congruence and
more than "the Court's view of
proportionality may represent little
139
necessary."
was
statute
the
whether
III. AN UNAMENDED EXTENSION OF SECTION 5 WILL LIKELY FAIL THE
CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY TEST

It is this muddled mess of a congruence and proportionality test that
Congress will need to evaluate while considering the extension of Section 5. So how might Section 5 fare under the test? If extended in its entirety and without revision, Section 5 seems likely to fail. Congress will
be passing the statute under constitutional provisions that protect the
right of citizens to vote without purposeful discrimination on the part of
government officials. This right, which the Court protects with strict
scrutiny, combined with the long history of purposeful discrimination in
voting and with more recent voting-related problems, will provide
enough evidence for Congress to demonstrate a pattern of discrimination
that justifies a prophylactic remedy. However, because the level of purposeful discrimination in voting has by all accounts diminished, the
Court, especially one with a generally conservative federalist bent, seems
unlikely to find the same unique and stringent Section 5 remedy initially
passed in 1965 to be congruent and proportional to the modern-day dilemma of voting discrimination.
138.
State's Rights Muddle, WASH. POST, May 28, 2003, at A 18.
Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
139.
REv. 743, 770 (1998) (describing his view of how the Court uses the congruence and proportionality
test); see also Day, supra note 88, at 373 (describing the congruence and proportionality test as
requiring Congress to produce "some undefined quantum" of evidence of unconstitutional conduct
on the part of states).
As this Article went to press, the Rehnquist Court released yet another decision involving its
congruence and proportionality doctrine-a decision that upheld Congress's passage of Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Tennessee v. Lane 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). This decision appears to further anchor the idea that first took shape in Hibbs, in that the Court seems to be placing a
lower requirement on Congress to provide a well-documented record of proof of constitutional
violations by state governments when Congress acts to protect constitutional rights to which the
Court itself would grant greater protection and when a longstanding history of discrimination exists.
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988-92 (discussing historical evidence of disability discrimination in light of the
fact that Title II seeks to protect basic constitutional rights "which are subject to more searching
judicial review"). Thus, Lane, like Hibbs, provides great hope for core civil rights remedies.
This hope, however, should not be overstated. Lane has its limits. First, the Lane Court only
endorsed Title II in one particular context-as applied to access to the Courts. Id. at 1993 (holding
that "Title 11,as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the
courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' . . . authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Second, even in the limited context of access to the courts, Lane, like Hibbs,
highlights the discrete nature of the remedy provided by Congress. Id. ("The remedy Congress chose
is nevertheless a limited one."); supra note 133 (describing how Hibbs stressed the limitations of the
FMLA).
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A. Applying Step One of the Congruence and ProportionalityTest to
Section 5: Protectingthe Right to Vote Found in the Fourteenthand
Fifteenth Amendments

The starting point for analyzing whether an extension of Section 5
will meet the congruence and proportionality test is determining the
scope of the constitutional right at issue. The Court has held that the
Constitution guarantees protection from purposeful discrimination in
voting. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits "purposefully discriminatory
denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote ...."14o In
other words, the Fifteenth Amendment protects against rules that deny
access to the ballot through, for example, discrimination in registration
procedures or in the location of polling places.14 ' The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits voting systems "'conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial ... discrimination.""1 42 Thus, as it relates to voting, the Fourteenth Amendment protects against vote dilution-the practice of limiting the ability of minority groups to "convert
their voting strength into control of, or at least influence with, elected
public officials'

43

that most commonly occurs when a cohesive bloc of

minority voters are submerged into a similarly cohesive but larger bloc
of non-minority voters. 44 These standards will then serve as the45launching pad for the Court's congruence and proportionality analysis. 1
140.
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Myers v.
Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 379 (1915) (holding that invidious motivation is necessary to a Fifteenth
Amendment claim); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363-65 (1915) (same).
141.
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 922 (1994) (Thomas, J.,concurring) (describing types of
voting laws that implicate ballot access, including registration requirements, polling place locations,
and methods of casting ballots).
142. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)).
143.
Richard L. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution: The Concept and the Court, in THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 13, 14 (Lom S. Foster ed., 1985).
144.
See Derfner, supra note 30, at 4 (defining vote dilution).
Examples of voting changes that could result in vote dilution are: adoptions of at-large methods of election, staggered terms, majority-vote requirements, numbered posts, redistrictings, annexations, and switches from elected to appointed governing bodies. See City of Lockhart v. United
States, 460 U.S. 125, 135 (1983) (noting the dilutive impact of staggered terms); City of Port Arthur
v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982) (majority vote); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627
(1982) (numbered posts); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370 (1975) (annexations); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 142-44 (at-large elections); Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 517
(D.D.C. 1982) (fragmented districts).
145.
It bears mentioning that this determination of the substantive nature of the constitutional
right to vote could aptly be criticized as overly simplistic. After all, especially in the context of vote
dilution, there are subtleties and intricacies to proving purposeful discrimination. For example,
unconstitutional vote dilution seemingly can be proved without evidence of a racial motivation on
the part of government officials. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the
majority opinion for finding purposeful discrimination in maintenance of dilutive method of election
when "the persons who allegedly harbored an improper intent are never identified or mentioned").
Yet the Court appears generally unwilling to examine such subtleties of the contours of constitutional rights in the application of the congruence and proportionality test. Rather, the Court's practice has been to summarily dictate the constitutional right at issue without providing much gloss on
the standard. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1978 (2003) (using only one
paragraph to describe the nature of the constitutional fight at issue); see also Vikram David Amar &
Samuel Estreicher, Conduct Unbecoming A CoordinateBranch, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 351, 353 (2001)
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B. Applying Step Two of the Congruence and ProportionalityTest to
Section 5: Assessing the Scope of the Problem of Unconstitutional
Voting Discrimination
After delimiting the scope of the right, the Court will review the record Congress compiles to determine the extent to which states and local
governments have engaged in purposeful voting discrimination. 46 The
Court will decide whether Congress has compiled enough evidence of
arguably1 47 unconstitutional behavior by the states to identify a "widespread and persisting" pattern of unconstitutional activity in the voting
arena. 48 Obviously, Congress has yet to compile that record. However, it
is reasonable to assume that, while Congress will certainly be able to
gather evidence of a great many instances of arguably unconstitutional
voting discrimination, it will be unable to marshal the same amount of
stark, widespread, and indisputable evidence of recent purposeful voting
discrimination that it compiled when it first imposed the stringent Section 5 scheme.
The congressional record will likely contain a broad mix of evidence related to arguably unconstitutional behavior that can be placed
into three general categories: (1) instances of unconstitutional denial of
access to the ballot; (2) instances of unconstitutional vote dilution; and
(3) evidence of racially polarized voting. The next three subsections explain how the Court will likely assess this evidence in determining the
scope of the problem of unconstitutional voting discrimination. Yet before moving on, it is important to stress that this canvass of the potential
congressional record does not purport to capture every possible example
or instance of arguably unconstitutional racial discrimination in voting
that has ever occurred. The point and purpose of this discussion is to
delimit the contours of the arguments and evidence Congress likely will
proffer to support the extension of Section 5 and the Court's likely response to this evidence.

(criticizing the Court's application of the congruence and proportionality test for failing to "make
sense of the complexity and entirety" of the constitutional right involved).
146.
It is not entirely clear whether the Court will only accept evidence of state violations or
whether evidence of local government violations can also lend support to Congress's determination
of the scope of the problem of unconstitutional voting discrimination. In one congruence and proportionality case, the Court refused to extend its inquiry as to unconstitutional activity beyond the states
themselves. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2001).
In a later congruence and proportionality test, the Court seemed to reverse itself. See Lane, 124
S. Ct. at 1991 n.16 (noting that evidence of constitutional violations of non-state governmental
actions is relevant to a congruence and proportionality inquiry). This Article assumes that in considering Congress's evidence of unconstitutional voting discrimination, the Court likely will accept
evidence of problems at the local level as well as the state level.
147.
The term "arguably" is used because the Court's congruence and proportionality test
appears to give this sort of deference to Congress's judgment. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 (considering evidence of disability discrimination even though the unconstitutionality of such discrimination was "debatable").
148.
See supranotes 107-14 and accompanying text.
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This discussion proceeds along two different tracks in its assessment of how the Court will handle the congressional record. First, it
undertakes a "strict, skeptical review"'' 49 of the potential evidence-the
same type of stringent review the Court took in its first five applications
of the congruence and proportionality test.' 50 Second, it briefly undertakes a more relaxed review of the potential evidence-similar to the
review applied in Hibbs. Either way, the point of this discussion is that a
long history of voting discrimination combined with evidence of recent
problems will serve as an adequate justification for Congress to pass
some sort of prophylactic remedy. However, the more recent history of
discrimination is of a different and less widespread quality than the recent history demonstrated when Section 5 was initially enacted and was
subsequently extended.
1. A Strict, Skeptical Review of the Congressional Record
a. Evidence of unconstitutional vote denial
Congress will likely encounter the most difficulty in creating a substantial record of continuing widespread, purposeful, and unconstitutional discrimination in the area of minority voters' access to the ballot.
Gone are the days when state voter registration laws and local registrars
frequently and severely limited and denied minority voters' access to the
ballot. As Professor Samuel Issacharoff observed in the early 1990s, "A
quarter century of federal policing of the electoral processes has markedly transformed the political landscape. Gone are the poll ' taxes,
the
5
literacy tests, and the other overt barriers to voter registration."' '
In fact, with the advent of laws such as the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 152 which allows for voter registration by mail and
makes voter registration widely available at places such as state depart153
ment of motor vehicles agencies and public assistance agencies,
minority voters seemingly enjoy widespread registration opportunities,
and, once on the voting rolls, minority voters can no longer be easily

149.
Landward, supra note 102, at 327; see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 125, at 123
(describing how the Rehnquist Court has subjected congressional fact-finding and support for antidiscrimination law to "searching, skeptical review").
150. For example, in Garrett, a broad array of evidence of disability discrimination was presented to the Court. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 366-74 (analyzing the respondent's evidence of disability discrimination as well as discussing the Court's decisions on prior cases involving evidence of
disability discrimination). Yet the Court picked apart this evidence in such a way as to render most
of it irrelevant. Id.; see also Pamela Brandwein, ConstitutionalDoctrine as Paring Tool: The Struggle for "Relevant" Evidence in University of Alabama v. Garrett, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 37, 4365 (2002) (discussing how the Court used constitutional doctrine as a "paring tool" to limit evidence
of unconstitutional activity).
151.
Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1833-34 (1992).

152.
153.

National Voter Registration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (2000).
Id. §§ 1973gg-2 to 1973gg-5.
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purged. 154 Also mostly, but not entirely, gone are the days when polling
places were intentionally placed in environments known to be unwelcome to minority voters, such as all-white social clubs. 155 And many
states, including a number subject to Section 5, have continued to open
up additional avenues to access, through the adoption of pre-election day
56
easier absentee voting,
voting,1
15
mail.

57

and even elections conducted by

The Department of Justice's recent enforcement of Section 5 confirms that minority voters' problems have largely not been related to
ballot access. For the six-year period from January 1, 1997, to December
31, 2002, the Department of Justice received submissions of about
29,500 changes that could potentially be dilutive of minority voting
strength and about 48,100 changes that could potentially restrict minority
voters' access to the ballot. 159 During the same time period, the Department prevented implementation of forty-two changes, thirty-six of which
dealt with changes that would have a dilutive impact on minority votes
while only six dealt with changes that would have negatively impacted
minority voters' ballot access. 60 What these statistics show is that only
fifteen percent of the Department's recent objections have been to
changes that have the potential for vote denial, even though about tworeviewed by the Department have been to
thirds of the recent changes
161
vote denial-type changes.

154.
See id. § 1973gg-6.
See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Report on the Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After,
155.
104-07 (1975) (discussing the placement of polling places in environments hostile to minority voters); see also U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Report on The Voting Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals,
29-31 (1981) (same).
E.g., TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 85.001 (Vernon 2003) (allowing so-called "early voting"
156.
that lets voters cast ballots up to seventeen days before an election).
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-226 (2002) (allowing no-excuse absentee voting).
157.
E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-409 (West 2003) (allowing for the conduct of "mail
158.
ballot" elections by certain jurisdictions).
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, Section 5 Changes by
159.
Type and Year, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/changes_.00s.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2004) [hereinafter Section 5 Changes 2000s]; see also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
Voting Section, Section 5 Changes by Type and Year, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/changes.90s.htm (last revised Jan. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Section 5 Changes 1990s]. For
the purposes of this tally, the following change types were considered as having the potential for
vote dilution: redistricting, annexation, incorporation, method of election, form of government, and
consolidation or division of political units. Id. The following change types were considered as having the potential for vote denial: polling places, precincts, registration or voter purge, bilingual
procedures, special elections, voting methods, and candidate qualifications. Id.
160. See generally See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, About
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/obj-activ.htm (last
revised Jan. 31, 2004) (listing documents that identify the Attorney General's changes relating to
voting).
161. In addition to the above listed changes that clearly fall into one category or another, the
Department of Justice has also precleared about 16,100 changes it describes as "miscellaneous." See
Section 5 Changes 2000s, supra note 159. Most of these changes would probably be included in the
vote denial category.
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The states do, however, have a long history of purposeful denial of
minority voters' access to the ballot. 162 But, the congruence and proportionality test may require more recent evidence of widespread purposeful
discrimination in this area. 163 True, there have most certainly been instances in the past couple of decades of state officials' purposeful discriminatory denial of minority voters' access to the ballot.164 Yet, despite

162. See supra Part I.A.
163. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (searching the congressional
record for "modem instances" of unconstitutional state action).
164. For example, the State of Mississippi operated a very burdensome voter registration
system until the late 1980s. See generally Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH, Inc. v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 402-04 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing Mississippi's past purposeful, discriminatory
efforts of impeding black citizens' participation in voting). The State of Mississippi used a "dual
registration" system requiring a citizen to register with the county to vote in federal, state, and
county elections, and to register with the city to vote in municipal elections, while also severely
limiting county registrars from conducting registration outside of the registrar's office. Mabus, 932
F.2d at 402. This system was challenged under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and was ultimately found to violate Section 2. See id. at 404 n.3.
The mere existence of felon disenfranchisement laws may provide a modern-day example of
arguably unconstitutional race discrimination, with the basic argument being that felon disenfranchisement laws constitute racial discrimination because they disproportionately impact AfricanAmerican voters and are often adopted with discrimination in mind. See Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisementand Its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1145, 1160-69 (1994) (discussing constitutional arguments against felon disenfranchisement);
see also Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Disenfranchisement-A Race Neutral Punishment for Felony Offenders or a Way to Diminish the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 359, 391-95
(2002) (arguing that felon disenfranchisement violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
In addition, the manner in which these laws are implemented could provide evidence of arguably
unconstitutional behavior. See Laura Parker, Panel Scrutinizes Mistake-Riddled 'Cleansing' of Voter
Rolls, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2001, at 4A (describing Florida officials' bungled attempt to purge
felons from the registration books); see also Robert E. Pierre, Botched Name PurgeDenied Some the
Right to Vote, WASH. POST, May 31, 2001, at A01 (describing how Florida's felon purge procedures
disproportionately affect African-Americans); John Lantigua, How the GOP Gamed the System in
Florida,THE NATION, Apr. 30, 2001, at 11 (describing Florida's felon purge as "a very old, traditional form of racism").
However, the courts have generally looked unfavorably on challenges alleging that felon disenfranchisement laws violate either the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53-54 (1974) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to a felon disenfranchisement
law); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 810-11 (1969) (holding that pretrial
detainees have no Equal Protection right to an absentee ballot); see also Wesley v. Collins, 605 F.
Supp. 802, 814 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding that the Tennessee felon disenfranchisement law does
not violate the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act). But see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,
233 (1985) (finding a felon disenfranchisement law unconstitutional because it was adopted with a
discriminatory purpose).
While overt barriers to access have greatly receded, more subtle barriers may still exist, such as
through programs to intimidate or harass minority voters. See, e.g., Sherry A. Swirsky, Minority
Voter Intimidation: The Problem That Won't Go Away, 11 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 359,
360-67 (2002) (describing anecdotal evidence of minority voter intimidation and harassment). However, while some intimidation and harassment undoubtedly occurs, it is not clear this activity is
recent and widespread. See id. at 381 (acknowledging "a surprising dearth of serious news reporting
on minority voter intimidation in recent years"). Moreover, some of this activity could be characterized as politically, rather than racially motivated; that is, of course, unless minority voters are the
only voters targeted. See id. at 383 (noting that "in close races in which Democrats regard the turnout of their traditional minority base as critical to victory, Republicans can be expected to respond
with attempts to suppress that turnout"). Finally, much of this action is perpetrated by private individuals or political parties, not state or local government actors, and thus, will likely not qualify as
evidence to support the need to extend Section 5. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (noting that Congress's enforcement power "is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions").
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this recent evidence, the Court will likely view it as much more limited
than the recent evidence of vote denial surrounding passage of Section 5
and 1982.165
in 1965 and its subsequent extensions in 1970, 1975,
b. Evidence of unconstitutional vote dilution
Congress could encounter some difficulty proving recent instances
of unconstitutional discrimination in the area of vote dilution. There will
likely be few clear examples and court findings of purposeful, unconstitutional adoption or maintenance of discriminatory methods of election
or districting plans. 166 Yes, Congress can cull a number of examples of
grossly outrageous purposeful discrimination, such as when Georgia had
a legislator who was found by a federal court to be a "racist" as chair of
167
one of its redistricting committees. However, a substantial amount of
There have also been cases involving arguably unconstitutional behavior in the hiring of poll
workers and in the hostile actions of poll workers toward minority voters. See, e.g., United States v.
Berks County, 250 F. Supp. 2d 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (describing poll workers' hostile treatment
of Latino voters); United States v. Charleston County, C.A. No. 2:01-0155-23 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2003)
(describing hostile actions of poll workers toward African-American voters), at http://www.scd.
uscourts.gov/Judges/P_Duffy.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2004); Harris v. Graddick, 615 F. Supp. 239,
242 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (confirming a settlement in a class action suit against the State of Alabama
which alleged discrimination in the appointment of poll workers). But, again, these problems seem
unlikely to be pervasive enough to satisfy a conservative, skeptical court.
A compelling case might be made that ballot access still presents a major problem for
165.
language-minorities because of the use of English-only elections. For example, the registration rate
for Latinos lags far behind whites and African-Americans. However, this may result from factors
apart from purposeful discrimination. See Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-PreferredCandidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the
Election of Minority-PreferredCandidates,in RACE AND REDISTRICTING INTHE 1990S, at 13, 25-26
(Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) (noting that there is "a greater proportion of non-voters among the
Hispanic population. This is largely a product of the lower citizenship rates among the Hispanic
population."); see also Steve Bickerstaff, Effects of the Voting Rights Act on Reapportionment and
Hispanic Voting Strength in Texas, 6 TEx. HIsP. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 112 (2001) (noting that in Texas
"[a] significant percentage of Hispanic residents remain non-citizens and cannot register to vote").
Nevertheless, other provisions of the Voting Rights Act specifically guarantee languageminorities access to the ballot. Section 4(e) of the Act protects the rights of Puerto Rican citizens. 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(e); see also Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 580 (7th
Cir. 1973) (holding that failure to provide Spanish-language materials and assistance violates Section 4(e)); Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same); Arroyo v. Tucker,
372 F. Supp. 764, 767-68 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (same). Language minorities may also bring ballot-access
cases under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Hemandez v. Woodard, 714 F. Supp. 963, 97273 (N.D. IIl. 1989) (applying Section 2 to the failure to appoint Spanish-speaking registrars). Finally,
and most significantly, Section 203 of the Act requires certain covered jurisdictions to provide
materials and assistance to language-minorities, including Asians and Native Americans. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa-la; 28 C.F.R. §§ 55.1 to 55.24 (West 2003) (outlining the requirements of Section 203);
see also United States v. Metropolitan Dade County, 815 F. Supp. 1475, 1478-79 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(requiring the provision of Spanish-language election materials pursuant to Section 203).
This is evident from the types of cases the Supreme Court has decided in recent years. The
166.
Court has not issued an opinion regarding unconstitutional vote dilution since 1982. See Rogers, 458
U.S. at 616 (finding an invidious purpose in the dilution of voting strength).
167. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 500 (noting that the Chairman of the Georgia House Permanent
Standing Committee on Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment after the 1980 Census
frequently used a highly offensive, pejorative term to refer to African-Americans). Another example
of blatant racism was one Pennsylvania state legislators' reaction upon learning the minority percentage in his district would be increased. See Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When Can Race Be Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting? 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 735,
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counter-evidence might be presented to demonstrate that a great number
of systems that prevented minority voters from electing candidates of
choice have been changed, and that a vastly greater number of minority
candidates have been elected to government at all levels. After all, in
1965 there were fewer than 200 African-American elected officials nationwide,' 68 whereas in 2000, there were 9,040 such officials, with large
gains in the number of African-American officials in Section 5 covered
states such as Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Texas. 169
Despite these facts, Congress should have a relatively easy time
compiling a record of recent arguably unconstitutional behavior in the
vote dilution area. This is because, since 1982, many cases have been
successfully brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act challenging dilutive practices, especially the practice of using at-large elections. 7° While these challenges do not necessarily amount to constitutional violations, the standard under the Section 2 "results test" seems to
closely, if not precisely, mirror the standard for proving vote dilution
17
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
750 (2002) ("Look, I'm a white mother-f--er from Philadelphia. And I don't want no more blacks or
Spics in my district." (internal quotations omitted)).
168.
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 15 (1968). In 1968, there
were 1,469 African-American elected officials. DAVID A. BosrIs, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 2000, at 5 (2002).

169. BosrIs, supra note 168, at 5. The number of Latino elected officials has also increased.
In 1981, there were six Latinos in Congress and in 1995 there were seventeen Latinos. See Bickerstaff, supra note 165, at 105 tbl.1. In Texas, there were twenty-one Latinos in the legislature in 1981
and thirty-five Latinos in the legislature in 1999. Id. at 106 tbl.2.
170. Section 2 bars the use of election procedures that have a discriminatory result. 42 U.S.C. §
1973(a) (barring the imposition of any voting practice that "results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color [or membership in a
minority language group]"). Most commonly, Section 2 has been used to attack at-large methods of
election. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42 (1986); see also Davidson & Grofman,
supra note 44, at 383-86 (describing the "numerous suits attacking ... at-large elections" since
passage of the 1982 amendment to Section 2); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1993) (describing how the 1982 amendment to
Section 2 left the courts to confront with "literally thousands of challenges to election schemes that
did not fairly reflect the voting strength of minority communities"). And it is this type of voting
rights litigation that has greatly contributed to the increases in the number of minority officials.
171.
See James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v.
Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 32
(1982) ("It is difficult, however, to distinguish the Rogers 'intent' test from the 'results' test of the
Voting Rights Act."). This position, however, runs against conventional wisdom of many commentators and a short history lesson is necessary to justify this position.
In the early 1970s, it appeared that minority plaintiffs would not have to prove a discriminatory
purpose to successfully challenge dilutive election systems as violative of the constitution. See, e.g.,
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973). However, this standard appeared to markedly shift
when the Supreme Court decided City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66-67, with a plurality of the
Court holding that a discriminatory purpose was necessary to successfully bring a vote dilution
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The City of Mobile decision sparked severe outrage and criticism. See Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standardand Equal ProtectionLaw, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 347 (1982)
(describing the criticism of Bolden). In response, Congress amended Section 2 to revert to the standard prior to the plurality opinion in City of Mobile. See Kathryn Abrams, 'Raising Politics Up':
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Nevertheless, in many respects, the Voting Rights Act, and particularly Section 5, has created the lack of evidence of recent widespread and
persisting purposeful, unconstitutional voting-related discrimination.
Section 5 has prevented such purposeful discrimination in two ways: by
preventing the implementation of purposefully discriminatory voting
changes through denial of preclearance by federal authorities and, most
importantly, by deterring the adoption of these practices in the first place

Minority PoliticalParticipationand Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 458
(1988) (describing how Congress amended Section 2 to remove the Bolden intent requirement).
Most commentators focus on this history when describing the difference between the Section 2
results test and the constitutional standard for proving vote dilution while ignoring an important
case, Rogers v. Lodge, regarding the constitutional standard that was issued shortly after amended
Section 2 became law. See generally Andrew P. Miller & Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act: What Is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY L.J. 1 (1987) (engaging in
an extended discussion of vote dilution jurisprudence while virtually ignoring Rogers). Rogers,
however, represented a retreat from the Court's position in City of Mobile, which, after all, was a
mere plurality opinion.
In Rogers, the Court reviewed the standard of proof necessary to win a case challenging an atlarge election system as being maintained with a discriminatory purpose under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 617. The Court noted that "discriminatory intent need not be
proved by direct evidence" and "may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts." Id. at
618. The Court then expounded on the type of relevant facts involved in this analysis, which included: (1) the registration level of minority citizens; (2) evidence of racial bloc voting; (3) the
electoral success (or lack thereof) of minority candidates; (4) evidence of past discrimination in the
political process; (5) evidence of past discrimination in education and employment; (6) evidence that
officials were unresponsive and insensitive to minority residents; (7) evidence of the minority community's depressed socio-economic status; (8) the size of the area encompassed by the at-large
district; (9) the legitimate state interest in using at-large elections; and (10) whether devices such as
numbered posts and a majority vote requirement were used. Id. at 623-27.
In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court held that a violation of Section 2 could be proved by a
totality of the circumstances and listed the following factors as relevant to this totality analysis: (1)
the minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a
single-member district; (2) the minority group must be politically cohesive; (3) a majority group
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority group's candidate of choice in
an election; (4) the history of voting-related discrimination; (5) the extent to which devices such as
numbered posts, unusually large election districts, or a majority vote requirement have been used;
(6) whether minority residents were excluded from any candidate slating process; (7) evidence of
past discrimination in such areas as education and employment; (8) the use of racial appeals in
campaigns; (9) the extent to which minority persons have been elected to office; (10) the extent to
which elected officials have been responsive to the particularized needs of the minority community;
and (11) the policy underlying the use of at-large elections. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-51.
The biggest difference between Rogers and Gingles would appear to be the emphasis the latter
places on certain factors. Gingles seems to place primary importance on establishing the ability of
the minority group to form a majority in a single-member district and in proving racial bloc votingthe so-called Gingles preconditions. See id. at 48-49 (stating "the use of multimember districts
generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice.
[Unless a bloc voting majority is usually able] to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group"); see also Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 293
(5th Cir. 1996) (noting that "[Ilit will be only the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of the three [Gingles] factors but still have failed to establish a violation of § 2
under the totality of the circumstances" (quoting Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir.
1994)); Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 71 F.3d 1382, 1390 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (noting
that "[s]atisfaction of the necessary [Gingles] preconditions carries a plaintiff a long way towards
showing a Section 2 violation").
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because state and local lawmakers know the federal government will be
172
reviewing any changes to prevent voting-related discrimination.
The refusal of preclearance under Section 5, while perhaps not providing definitive examples of unconstitutional voting-related discrimination, provides examples of arguably unconstitutional voting-related discrimination. One need not look very far to find recent examples where
federal authorities have blocked implementation of retrogressive voting
changes that would have diluted minority voting strength. In the post2000 redistricting cycle, federal authorities refused preclearance to
statewide redistricting plans in Arizona, Louisiana, Texas, Florida, and
Georgia.173 Additionally, preclearance has also been refused to redistricting plans submitted by a number of counties, cities, and school dis174
tricts.

172.
Section 5 also provides the intangible benefit of encouraging a continuing dialogue between minority and majority communities, at least as it relates to voting. Local governments know
they need federal approval, and community involvement in the adoption of the change is considered
in the Department of Justice's preclearance review, so local governments often confer with minority
residents before enacting changes. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.57 (West 2003) (noting that among the factors
relevant to the Attorney General's preclearance review is the extent to which the jurisdiction allowed
minorities to participate in the decision to make the change and the extent to which the jurisdiction
took minority citizens' concerns into account). This dialogue both prevents the adoption of discriminatory changes and also increases understanding between majority and minority community residents.
173.
See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated by 123 S. Ct.
2498 (2003); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to The Honorable John M. McKay, President, Florida Senate & Tom Feeney,
Speaker, Florida House of Representatives (July 1, 2002) (objecting to a redistricting plan for the
Florida House), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ltr/l_070102.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2004); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Lisa T. Hauser, Esq., Gammage & Burnham & Josd de Jests Rivera, Esq., Haralson,
Miller, Pitt & McAnally (May 20, 2002) (objecting to the redistricting plan for the Arizona legislature), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5Iltr/l_052002.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); Letter
from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
The Honorable Geoffrey Connor, Acting Secretary of State (Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.
gov/crt/voting/sec 5/tr/ll 11601.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (objecting to the redistricting plan
for the Texas House).
The State of Louisiana case necessitates a bit of extra explanation. The state sought preclearance of its plan for the State House in a declaratory judgment action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. See Louisiana House of Representatives v. Ashcroft, C.A. No.
02-0062 (D.D.C.) (ordering dismissal with prejudice), at http://www.naacpldf.org/whatsnew/pdfs/
OrderDimissingCase.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). The Department of Justice opposed preclearance
and, after discovery, the case was settled when the state amended its plan to eliminate those aspects
that were objectionable to the Department of Justice. See Feds Approve State House Redistricting
Plan; Black Lawmakers Remain Opposed to New Districts, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 21, 2003, at
5 (describing the Department of Justice's rejection of the initial redistricting plan); see also Laura
Maggi, Remap Needs FederalApproval; Senate Backs Plan, But Opponents Will Sue, THE TIMESPICAYUNE, May 8, 2003, at 1 (describing the passage of a plan to settle the litigation in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia).
174.
See, e.g., Letter from Andrew E. Lelling, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Walter C. Lee, Superintendent, Parish School Board & B.D.
Mitchell, President, Parish Police Jury (Dec. 31, 2002) (objecting to the redistricting plan for the
DeSoto Parish School District, Louisiana), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec5/ltr/A-123102.
html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); Letter from J. Michael Wiggins, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Al Grieshaber, Esq., City Attorney (Sept. 23, 2002)
(objecting to the redistricting plan for the City of Albany, Georgia Board of Commissioners), at

20031

SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

259

The deterrence factor, though, represents Section 5's greatest influence in the prevention of unconstitutional voting-related discrimination. 17 5 Jurisdictions covered by Section 5 are acutely aware of the need
to garner federal approval. For example, in the context of redistricting,
discussion and debate at the state and local level often focuses on how
the Department of Justice will view the changes made. 76 So, while Section 5 covers a wide range of constitutional activity, it arguably covers a
wide-range of activity that has the likelihood of being unconstitutional
but for the existence of Section 5.177 In other words, the deterrent impact
of Section 5 has led to far fewer instances of unconstitutional voting discrimination because state and local officials know they need federal approval of voting changes. Thus, faulting Section 5 for a lack of examples
of recent purposeful discrimination may essentially make the statute a
victim of its own success.
While the Court may certainly recognize this deterrence factor as
contributing to the lack of a record of recent unconstitutional behavior, a
Court generally inclined toward limiting federal power seems unlikely to
give great weight to this argument. For starters, the deterrence factor will
probably be hard for Congress to quantify.1 78 The Court might also look
skeptically upon the deterrence factor because it has the potential to render as impotent the Court's congruence and proportionality test. The test
date. 179
has touted remedies that are temporary and have an expiration
But, to allow continuation of such remedies based on a theory that the
remedy has caused the lack of unconstitutional behavior would seemhttp://www.usdoj.gov/crtlvoting/sec 5/ltr/ll092302.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); Letter from
Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Darvin Satterwhite, Esq., County Attorney (July 9, 2002) (objecting to the redistricting plan for the
Cumberland County, Virginia Board of Supervisors), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_51tr/
l_070902.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
175. See Mark A. Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance Requirement of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990s, at 80, 94-96 (Bernard

Grofman ed., 1998) (describing the "strong deterrent effect" of Section 5 in part because of state and
local officials' knowledge that changes would be scrutinized for discrimination); see also Steven A.
Light, Too (Color)Blind to See: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Rehnquist Court, 8 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1, 15 n.95 (1997/1998) (noting Section 5's deterrent effect); McDonald,
supra note 2, at 1285 (same).
Victor Andres Rodriguez argues that Section 5 is constitutional, in part, because the large
number of changes submitted to the Department of Justice show the continued "opportunities for
mischief' on the part of state and local officials. Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 804. This seems to be
just another way of making a deterrence argument. In other words, Mr. Rodriguez seems to be asserting that, given the opportunity to make changes without a preclearance mechanism, state and
local officials would engage in much more unconstitutional voting discrimination.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (describing how the
176.
Georgia General Assembly's "only interest" in drafting a redistricting plan was to satisfy the Department of Justice's preclearance requirements).
177. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (faulting RFRA for not being "designed to identify and
counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional" (emphasis added)).
178. Congress might try to develop this record by inviting a large group of minority elected
officials to testify on the deterrent effect of having a federal watchdog over the redistricting process.
It is, however, less likely such a vast amount of testimony could be developed to show how Section
5 has deterred the adoption of changes that would deny minority voters' access to the ballot.
179. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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ingly leave a major hole in the Court's congruence and proportionality
analysis. Finally, even if a deterrence factor gets recognized by the
Court, a skeptical Court seems unlikely to find that the current landscape
of voting discrimination, absent deterrence, would roughly compare to
the "exceptional conditions" 180 the Court has found to be extant or recently extant when Congress previously enacted and extended Section 5.
c. Evidence of racially polarized voting
Congress may also try to build a record of arguable instances of unconstitutional voting discrimination by focusing on the prevalence of
racially polarized voting. Simply defined, racially polarized voting, or
racial bloc voting, occurs when non-minority voters strongly support one
candidate while minority voters support a different candidate. 181 While
recent history shows a few minority candidates have won in electorates
that are not majority-minority, most minority candidates get elected from
majority-minority constituencies; 182 a phenomenon that has been largely
attributed to the presence of racially polarized voting patterns. 83 As Professor Lani Guinier has written, "As a general rule whites do not vote for
blacks. Numerous court decisions, anecdotal reports, surveys, and scholarly studies have confirmed the existence of racial bloc voting. Based on
this overwhelming evidence [one can conclude] that whites still harbor
racial prejudice. ' ' 184 So, armed with such evidence, Congress may be able
to marshal an abundance of examples of arguably unconstitutional voting
discrimination to justify extension of Section 5.185
Yet a conservative, skeptical Court would likely criticize and reject
this evidence on two grounds. First, it is not entirely settled that racially
polarized voting equals racial discrimination in voting. 186 The traditional
statistical analysis used to prove racially polarized voting in Voting
Rights Act cases does not account for the multiplicity of reasons why

180. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).
181.
See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 151, at 1854-56 (discussing racial bloc voting); Gingles,
478 U.S. at 53 n.21, 57 (describing racially polarized voting as being a prominent feature of "American politics").
182.
See Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and PartisanRedistricting, 106
YALE L.J. 2505, 2512 n.23 (1997). For example, after the 1992 congressional elections there were
thirty-nine African-American representatives, thirty-one of whom were elected from majorityAfrican-American districts, and there were nineteen Latino representatives, sixteen of whom were
elected from majority-Latino districts. Stephen Wolf, Race Ipsa: Vote Dilution, Racial Gerrymandering, and the Presumption of Racial Discrimination, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y

225, 229-30 (1997).
183.
Pildes, supra note 182, at 2512 n.23 (pinpointing racially polarized voting as the reason
"only one percent of white-majority jurisdictions elect black candidates").
184.
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1112-13 (1991).
185.
Professor Pamela Karlan essentially made this case when she argued that Section 5 remained a viable exercise of Congress's enforcement power even after the Court created the congruence and proportionality doctrine. See Karlan, supra note 20, at 738-41.
186.
See Pildes, supra note 182, at 2512 n.23.
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voters cast their ballots in a particular manner.187 To put it a different
way, those with conservative viewpoints often stress that other factors
such as partisan politics, might explain
aside from racial discrimination,
88
the voting patterns.
More importantly, for the purpose of justifying Section 5 as a constitutional exercise of Congress's enforcement power, assuming the
Court allows racially polarized voting to equate with racially discriminatory voting, such conduct is private action. This is significant because in
one congruence and proportionality case, the Court strongly hinted that
Congress must only use its enforcement power to attack discrimination
by government officials, not discrimination by private actors.' 89 Inother
words, Congress cannot make discrimination by private actors the object
of its remedy. 90
Perhaps, however, the Court will find evidence of racially polarized
voting relevant to its calculus of the scope of the problem of unconstitutional voting discrimination because of the "distinctive blend of state
Under
action and private choice involved in the electoral process ...."',9'
such a theory, the act of voting amounts to state action because the purpose of the vote is to choose representatives, and the vote itself is given
its effect by the machinery of government.' 92 This makes casting a ballot
state action akin to conduct of an all-white party primary,' 93 or the use of
a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner by a private,
civil litigant'94--two contexts in which the Court has recognized what
appears to be purely private action as state action.

See id.
187.
See Charleston County, C.A. No. 2:01-0155-23 (describing the county's argument that
188.
"the 'cause' of voting polarization in Charleston County is partisan differences rather than racial
ones"); see also Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (describing North Carolina as a place
where "race and political affiliation are highly correlated").
189.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000) (faulting the Violence
Against Women Act for targeting private discrimination instead of discrimination by state officials);
see also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903) (stating that "a statute which purports to
punish purely individual action cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power conferred by the 15th Amendment upon Congress to prevent action by the state through some one or
more of its official representatives").
190. See Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the
Future of FederalAntidiscrimination Law, 2000 Sup. CT. REV. 109, 143-51 (2000) (arguing that
Morrison stands for the principle that Congress cannot make private discrimination the object of its
remedy); see also Hartley, supra note 18, at 51 (noting that congruence.and proportionality requires
that the aim of the legislation be "deterring or remedying conduct the judiciary would find is [constitutionally] prohibited").
191.
Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201,
1227-31 (1996); see also Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 400-04 (1964) (finding unconstitutional
a Louisiana law requiring the race of the candidate to be printed on the ballot because the state was
contributing to the likelihood that voters would cast ballots along racial lines).
192. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 66.
193. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-65 (1944).
194. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
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It seems unlikely, however, that this Court, which has revived the
state action doctrine, would find that a private individual's electoral
choice constitutes state action. 195 Moreover, congruence and proportionality requires a showing of a constitutional violation.196 The maintenance
or adoption of a voting system in the face of polarized voting does not
make for a constitutional violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. 197 To have a constitutional violation, one needs to prove other factors in addition to racially polarized voting.
In the final analysis, the debate over whether racial bloc voting can
serve as evidence of unconstitutional activity may be largely an academic
exercise. Racial bloc voting serves as a primary requirement for proving
a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and, presumably, much
of the evidence of racial bloc voting will come from findings and settlements in Section 2 vote dilution cases. Therefore, if the Court accepts
Section 2 violations as evidence of arguably unconstitutional behavior
then the Court will 98likely have already accepted much of the evidence of
racial bloc voting.'
Summing up how the Court will dismantle the hypothetical congressional record if it chooses to engage in a strict skeptical review of the
record, as it initially performed in its first five applications of the congruence and proportionality test, it seems likely the Court will: (1) deem
evidence of arguably unconstitutional behavior in vote denial to be weak;
(2) find evidence of arguably unconstitutional behavior in vote dilution
to be more significant; and (3) discount or find as duplicative the evidence of racially polarized voting. 199 However, this strict, skeptical re195. The right to cast a ballot, even for illegitimate, hateful reasons, would seemingly be
among the most purely private and protected aspects of democracy. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 647 n.30
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the act of voting as lacking state action). While the state
action doctrine might well extend to the attempted enforcement of discriminatory laws passed by
referendum or to the systematic locking out of candidates from access to the ballot, the Court would
probably refuse to extend state action to the act of choosing one's representative. The government's
provision of a framework for citizens to express their preference as to whom will represent them
likely will not be considered state action so long as all preferences can be expressed and all citizens
can have access to the framework-absent some evidence of purposeful discrimination. See, e.g.,
Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1495-98 (11th Cir. 1988) (refusing to find the circulation and
certification of a referenda petition to be state action).
196.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
197.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
198. It seems highly unlikely that the opposite would be true. In other words, it seems unlikely
that the Court would reject Section 2 violations as evidence of unconstitutional voting discrimination
yet accept evidence of racially polarized voting. This is because a Section 2 violation involves a
searching inquiry into a number of additional factors that hint at purposeful discrimination.
199.
It might be cleverly argued that factual support for extending Section 5 could be grounded
on the unconstitutional racial gerrymandering of state and local electoral districts that occurred
during the 1990s round of redistricting. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 902 (1996) (invalidating North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan); see also Clark v. Putnam County, 293 F.3d
1261, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding a county redistricting plan to be an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander). However, it would be incongruous for the Court to find support for a remedy that
requires states and local governments to give particular consideration to the negative impact of
changes on minority voters in cases in which the Court expressed dismay at states giving too much
consideration to minority voting strength.
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view may never occur. Instead, if the Court's more recent review of the
record underlying the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is used,
the Court will more easily find a record justifying a prophylactic remedy
to prevent voting discrimination.
2. Considering the Evidence from a More Lenient, Hibbsian Perspective
A more lenient review of the evidence will start with the nature of
the right at issue. Racial classifications, like gender classifications, are
subjected to heightened scrutiny. In fact, racial classifications receive the
Court's highest level of scrutiny. 2°0 This heightened level of scrutiny puts
less of an onus on Congress to identify specific instances of unconstitutional behavior. A more lenient review will also put a major emphasis on
the long history of voting discrimination, highlighting the despicable
history of voting discrimination from passage of the Fifteenth Amendment to beyond the enactment of the Voting Rights Act. 20 ' A more lenient review would also note how racial discrimination in voting did not
come under sharp attack from the Courts and Congress until the 1950s
and 1960s.2 °2 In this way, voting discrimination may be akin to the gender discrimination that Congress and the courts failed to tackle until the
1960s and 1970s.
In the end, the Court, whether skeptical and stringent or agreeable
and deferential, will find enough evidence, both recent and historical, to
justify some kind of prophylactic remedy. However, it will also likely
recognize the overall evidence of recent unconstitutional activity to be
far less than the level of discrimination that occurred prior to, and soon
after, passage of the Voting Rights Act that served as the egregious
precedent to warrant the initial implementation of the stringent Section 5
remedy and its extensions in 1970, 1975, and 1982.203 With such a record, the Court will then turn to the last factor: whether the Section 5
remedy remains congruent and proportional to the current problem of
voting discrimination.

200.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (instructing the lower court to apply strict scrutiny to a redistricting plan that segregated voters on the basis of race); see also James F. Blumstein,
Defining and Proving Race Discrimination:Perspectiveson the Purpose vs. Results Approach from

the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633, 640 (1983) ("A government can make rational classifications in the voting context, on the basis of age for example, but distinctions drawn on the basis of
race are inherently suspect and subject to an almost insuperable burden of justification.").
201.
See supra Part I.A.
202.
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 639 (."The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is
of the essence of a democratic society. . . .' For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has
been denied to many because of race." (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964))).
203.
As one commentator has noted, the Voting Rights Act's "voluminous congressional
record" is "unique among modern legislation" passed under Congress's enforcement powers. Laycock, supra note 139, at 748.
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C. Applying Step Three of the Congruence and ProportionalityTest to
Section 5: Is Section 5 Proportionalto the Modern-Day Problem of
UnconstitutionalVoting Discrimination?
While the Court should be willing to allow Congress to enact some
type of prophylactic remedy to protect minority voting rights, the Court
likely will be unwilling to once again embrace the unique and stringent
remedy encompassed in Section 5. A Court concerned with federalism
seems apt to focus on the fact that Section 5 greatly intrudes into the traditional governing process of the states and covers a vast swath of constitutional activity. Moreover, the Court will probably express concern
about retaining the same coverage formula as a proxy for those places
where racial discrimination in voting still presents a problem. It may also
express anxiety about the difficulty jurisdictions have had in escaping the
grip of Section 5 coverage.
There is no doubt that Section 5 covers a large amount of clearly
constitutional government action, evidence of which the Court will find
in the fact that most of the laws subjected to the preclearance requirement have, in fact, been precleared. The Department of Justice, which
reviews the vast majority of these changes, denies preclearance to about
one percent of the changes submitted. °4 Indeed, even those changes that
have not received preclearance may have only a constitutional discriminatory effect and may not have been adopted with an unconstitutional
discriminatory purpose. True, Section 5 could be congruent and proportional because it only nullifies a small number of laws while merely delaying implementation of a greater number of laws. In this way, Section
5 may be distinguishable from other remedies rejected under the congruence and proportionality test because, in the final analysis, it actually
blocks enforcement of very few laws.2 °5 Yet a Court concerned with the
sovereignty of state and local government seems unlikely to split such
fine hairs between laws that are temporarily prevented from being enforced and laws that are first temporarily and then permanently prevented
from being enforced.
204.
See McDonald, supra note 2, at 1285 (noting that during the first seven years of the
Reagan administration, the Department of Justice objected to 1.02 percent of its submissions); see
also supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (describing more recent Department of Justice
statistics).
205.
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (finding that the RFRA failed the congruence and proportionality test because a large number of laws may be invalidated). To put this idea another way, the
Court may view the requirement to submit changes is not so great a burden on federalism, but rather
that the burden on federalism comes mostly through application of the substantive preclearance
requirements (i.e., the retrogression test). See Katz, supra note 4, at 1210-11 (positing that the Court

believes the federalism costs are "incurred disproportionately" during the substantive preclearance
review process rather than through the necessity of obtaining preclearance at all). Since the Court
has recently diminished the reach of the substantive requirement, the Court could consider the bur-

den on federalism to be minimal. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 329
(2000) (Bossier 1I) (limiting the ability of the federal government to deny preclearance); Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 483 (1997) (BossierI)(same).
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There is also no doubt that Section 5 imposes a substantial and serious burden on the federalist constitutional structure; 20 6 a burden both
liberal 20 7 and conservative 20 8 judges have recognized. As Justice Hugo
Black famously described it, Section 5 requires state and local governments to "beg" federal officials in Washington for every little voting
change they enact. 2°9 Section 5 also implicates numerous laws at all levels of government, thus adding to its intrusive impact on state and local
affairs.
In reviewing the remedy, the Court will likely recognize that Section 5 contains a number of the limiting aspects the Court has approved
of in the past as means by which Congress may make a remedy congruent and proportional to the problem the remedy addresses. Section 5: (1)
is limited in geographic scope and has been aimed at those areas where
voting discrimination is likely to have previously occurred; (2) only impacts a discrete class of laws-those that affect voting; and (3) includes a
termination date and an opportunity to evade coverage through bailout.
However, the Court may view the coverage formula as outdated.
The literacy test, and other such devices, will likely be found to have
been used too far back in time to serve as a proxy for those areas where
voting-related discrimination has occurred more recently. It has been a
long time since any jurisdiction employed a literacy test or other device
to intentionally depress minority registration, as the Voting Rights Act
has placed a blanket ban on such practices for many years. 2'0 In addition,
depressed registration and turnout rates due to voting-related discrimination have significantly lessened. 21 1 Registration rates, especially for mi206. See Bossier 11, 528 U.S. at 336 (describing the "substantial" federalism costs exacted by
the preclearance procedure); Bossier 1, 520 U.S. at 480 (describing the "serious federalism costs
implicated" by Section 5); see also James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms,47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1263 (1994) ("From a federalism perspective, the preclearance mechanism is surely stiff medicine.").
207. See United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 141 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing Section 5's encroachment on state sovereignty as being "significant and undeniable").
208. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
section's interference with state sovereignty is quite drastic-covered States and political subdivisions may not give effect to their policy choices affecting voting without first obtaining the Federal
Government's approval."); see also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 209 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("[R]equiring localities to submit to preclearance is a significant intrusion on local autonomy .... "
(italics omitted)); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("It is
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal authorities
to compel a State to submit its legislation for advance review.").
209.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 358 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Section 5, by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without
first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state
and federal power almost meaningless.").
210.
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa.
211.
See Bullock & Dunn, supra note 30, at 1252 (noting that the "historic disparity in black
and white registration and turnout... has waned"). In 1964, the State of Georgia had a white registration rate of 57.2% and a non-white registration rate of 25.0%; the State of Louisiana had a white
registration rate of 76.6% and a non-white registration rate of 30.5%; and the State of South Carolina

266

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

nority citizens, are much higher than in the past, and while turnout rates
have generally declined among all voters,212 those decreases appear to
reflect factors other than purposeful discrimination against any particular
group of citizens.2 13
And while Section 5 only covers a discrete class of laws, those that
relate to voting, it covers all of those laws. The Court may view such
broad coverage as failing to account for the fact that the problem of voting discrimination now mostly lies in the area of vote dilution rather than
ballot access. 1 Thus, the overbroad coverage of the type of changes
requiring preclearance seems disproportionate to the scope of the modem-day problem.
Finally, the current bailout provision has been little-used. 5 Only a
few jurisdictions have successfully escaped coverage under the bailout

had a white registration rate of 69.5% and a non-white registration rate of 34.3%. House Hearings,
supra note 21, at 32.
Comparing voting age population data from the 2000 Census and recent voter registration data
from these same states, it is evident that the registration gap has nearly been closed. In Georgia, the
white registration rate is 67.8% and the African-American registration rate is 62.4%; in Louisiana,
the white registration rate is 84.1% and the African American registration rate is 82.4%; and in
South Carolina, the white registration rate is 71.5% and the non-white registration rate is 69.1%. See
generally U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder(providing voting age population data from
2000 Census), at http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Feb. 2, 2004) [hereinafter American FactFinder]; Cathy Cox, Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Voter Registration Statistics (providing
registration data by race for Georgia as of Sept. 1, 2003), at http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/county.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004); GCR & Associates, Inc., Louisiana Voter Registration
(providing registration data by race as of Oct. 4, 2003), at http://www.gcrl.com/elections (last
visited Feb. 2, 2004); South Carolina Voter Registration Demographics (providing registration data
by race as of Jan. 5, 2003), at http://www.state.sc.us/cgi-binlscsec/96vr?countkey=all&demo=RACE
(last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
212. In the November 2000 Presidential election, 51.3% of the voting age population turned
out. See Federal Election Comm'n, Voter Registration and Turnout 2000, at http://www.fec.gov/
pages/2000tumout/reg&toOO.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). In the November 1960 Presidential
election, 63.06% of the voting age population turned out. See Federal Election Comm'n, National
Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-1996, at http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmho5.htm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2004).
213. See Kimberly C. Delk, What Will It Take to Produce GreaterAmerican Voter Participation? Does Anyone Really Know?, 2 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 133, 134-35, 176 (2001) (discussing possible reasons for low voter turnout including voter apathy and lack of convenient mechanisms for
casting ballots).
Lower minority voter turnout may reflect the legacy of discrimination against minority voters.
See Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 986-87 (Ist Cir. 1995). But see Theana Evangelis, The
Constitutionality of Compensating for Low Minority Voter Turnout in Districting, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 796, 823-25 (2002) (arguing that low minority voter turnout may not necessarily reflect the
remnants of discrimination and noting that some political scientists suggest that "differences in
turnout rates may be explained best by reference to political factors such as mobilization and competition in politics").
214. See discussion supra Parts lI.B. 1-2.
215. For an excellent history of the genesis of the bailout provision, see generally Paul F.
Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act: An Incentive to End
Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379 (1985). The original bailout provisions were considered to be
very difficult to achieve. Id. at 416 (noting that "the old bailout standard offered no realistic opportunity for bailout" because, for most jurisdictions, "[tihe only possibility for bailout would arise at
the end of the defined calendar period, but each time that date approached ... Congress acted to
enlarge the required eligibility period"); see also O'Rourke, supra note 39, at 774-75 (noting that
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standards adopted in 1982.216 Thus, the Court may well view the current
bailout provision to be, for most jurisdictions, a fiction.21 7 And, if the
bailout provision is considered to be one in name only, it is unlikely to
provide much aid in finding an extension of Section 5 to be congruent
and proportional to the scope of the problem. Moreover, the bailout provision usually does not allow individual local entities, such as cities and
school districts, to evade coverage.21 8
only seventeen bailout suits were filed prior to enactment of the 1982 standards and only nine of
these actions resulted in a jurisdiction being released from coverage).
The current bailout standard adopted in 1982 was, however, expected to generate a large number of bailouts. See Hancock & Tredway, supra, at 411; see also S. REP. No. 97-417, at 59 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 237 (noting that implementation of the 1982 bailout standards
would be delayed for a couple of years to allow the Department of Justice "to prepare for such a
heavy load of litigation under the new standards"). But see H.R. REP. No. 97-227, at 64 (1981)
(dissenting opinion of Honorable M. Caldwell Butler who believed the 1982 bailout standards
"would establish requirements impossible to achieve").
216.
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, About Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act (noting that the City of Fairfax, and Frederick and Shenandoah Counties, Virginia,
have bailed out under the 1982 standards), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/types.htm (last
revised Feb. 2, 2004).
217.
In 198 1, as Congress debated extension of Section 5, a few legislators noted that an overly
stringent bailout mechanism could call into question the constitutionality of the statute:
[Tihe Act's constitutionality was upheld in the 1966 decision of Katzenbach v. South
Carolina,and last year in City of Rome, Georgia v. United States, on the presence of certain unique factors. One was the belief that the 1965 departure from historical tenets of
federalism was only "temporary", but necessary based on pre-1965 conduct in the covered jurisdictions. A great many things have changed in the South since 1965, as our
hearings demonstrated, and new, more progressive racial attitudes have begun to replace
the cultural bias of the past. This change is, as [we] have said, far from complete. It is
sufficient, though, to effectively dilute the force of the showing before the court in 1966.
Moreover, the language [we] have discussed, together with other limitations on
bailout incorporated into the amendment adopted by the Committee would make its availability highly unlikely, as a practical matter, thereby changing the temporary status of the
Act to a more constitutionally suspect permanent condition. In [our] judgment, such a
change can only survive constitutional scrutiny if the method of escape is reasonably
achievable.
H.R. REP. No. 97-227, at 57-58 (1981) (supplemental views of Reps. Hyde and Lungren).
218.
See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 168-69. Cities can only bail out if they are separately covered jurisdictions, but generally, cities are not separately covered. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
Victor Andres Rodriguez views the lack of bailout actions as evidence that "there have been
ongoing violations and thus a continued need for Section 5." Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 805.
Basically he seems to view the inaction of jurisdictions as a tacit admission of discrimination. But
Mr. Rodriguez fails to explain why jurisdictions who are apparently bent on discriminating against
minority voters would not, at the very least, try to escape the grip of Section 5 coverage and, thus,
make it even easier to carry out their discriminatory policies. It seems a more likely assumption that
the bailout standards are too difficult to meet, and Mr. Rodriguez seems to admit as much as he
appears to have arrived at his conclusions about the future of Section 5 based on the assumption that
Congress will revise the bailout standard to make it easier. Id. at 814.
Paul Winke recognizes the problem a strict bailout provision poses to the constitutionality of
Section 5. See Winke, supra note 20, at 111-12. However, he suggests that it is not constitutionally
suspect, in part, because each of the elements of the bailout formula relates to "a court's finding of
discrimination, or to a jurisdiction's willingness to abandon a challenged voting practice before a
judicial determination of whether the practice is discriminatory." Id. at 112. Yet the failure to submit
non-discriminatory voting changes for preclearance is a bar to bailout that involves no finding of
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(l)(D).
Mr. Winke focuses his concern on the affirmative steps necessary to bailout (e.g., the obligations to eliminate intimidation, harassment, and barriers to participation) as the primary potential
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In sum, the Court seems likely to allow Congress to enact a prophylactic remedy to protect minority voting rights. The long history of discrimination combined with the more recent problems will justify some
action on the part of Congress. However, because the problem of voting
discrimination has been reduced and because Section 5 amounts to such
a unique and stringent intrusion into the governing process of state and
local governments, an extension of Section 5 will face trouble. Another
way of putting this is as follows: on a scale of one to ten, with ten being
the highest, voting discrimination in 1965 was a ten, and in 1965 Congress chose a remedy that was a ten; however, in 2007, on that same
scale, voting discrimination is more like a five, so Congress has to
choose a remedy that is more like a five. Thus, the Court will likely reject Section 5 unless the congruence and proportionality test does not
even apply to the Voting Rights Act, or unless Congress revises Section
5 to comply with the test.
IV. A GLIMMER OF HOPE FOR SECTION 5: Is THERE AN IMPLICIT OR
WILL THERE BE AN EXPLICIT VOTING RIGHTS EXCEPTION TO THE
CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY TEST?
While an extension of Section 5 seems likely to fail the congruence
and proportionality test, it may never come to that. The congruence and
proportionality test may actually not be applicable to the statute as there
is a chance that a voting rights exception to the test, either implicit or
explicit, will be carved out by the Court. The implicit exception is evident from the Court's language in most of the congruence and proportionality cases in which it touts the Voting Rights Act generally, and
Section 5 specifically, as the paradigm of a remedy properly calibrated to
the scope of a problem. Indeed, in one opinion issued after development
of the congruence and proportionality test in which Section 5's constitutionality played a minor role, the Court did not even bother to apply the
test.219 An explicit exception to the test could be found in the fact that all
of the recent cases rejecting Congress's exercise of its enforcement
power have been decided under Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
power while previous cases involving Section 5 have always been resolved under Congress's Fifteenth Amendment power, perhaps indicatproblem for Section 5's constitutionality. But, in his view, the reason more bailouts have not been
achieved stems from jurisdictions' "lack of political will to remedy the discrimination that gives the
act its continuing relevance and constitutional validity." Winke, supra note 20, at 116. Mr. Winke
then cites evidence of discrimination from the 1982 congressional record as support for these affirmative obligations. Id. at 83.
Mr. Winke's arguments make sense inasmuch as they serve to justify the current extension of
Section 5 and the bailout provision. And that appears to be all Mr. Winke is trying to prove. This
argument, however, seems unlikely to add much to the case for extension beyond 2007. It seems
doubtful that evidence from the 1982 hearings will be enough to justify another extension of a stringent bailout provision and Mr. Winke admits that evidence of intentional discrimination will be
"increasingly hard to find" because there is less of it and jurisdictions have become more clever at
hiding it. Id. at 118-19.
See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (Lopez II).
219.

2003]

SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

269

ing a broader mandate for congressional remedies designed to enforce
the latter amendment.22 °
A. Will There Be An Implicit Voting Rights Exception?
Despite the fact that most federal statutes the Court has subjected to
the congruence and proportionality test have failed to pass the test, almost all these cases provide hope for the Voting Rights Act. In its discussion of the scope of congressional enforcement power in City of
Boerne v. Flores,the Court expended a considerable amount of language
on the appropriateness of the Voting Rights Act, specifically Section 5,
as a remedy, approvingly commenting upon its previous endorsement of
"new, unprecedented remedies" and "strong remedial and preventive
measures to respond to the widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional [voting] rights ....,, In addition, when subjecting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to the congruence and proportionality test, the Court's comparison between RFRA and the Voting
Rights Act implied the Court's continued approval of the remedies encompassed in the latter statute. 222 Moreover, these favorable sentiments
toward the Voting Rights Act have been echoed in nearly every subsequent case applying the congruence and proportionality test.223
220.
The congruence and proportionality test may not be the sole basis for a constitutional
challenge to the extension of Section 5. Presumably, it would be possible for the Court to find that
the extension of Section 5 amounts to a racial classification subject to strict scrutiny. See Michelle E.
O'Connor-Ratcliff, Colorblind Redistricting: Racial Proxies as a Solution to the Court's Voting
Rights Act Quandary, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 61, 71-74 (2001) (arguing that Section 5 would
flunk strict scrutiny). However, Section 5 is probably not the traditional type of race-based remedy
to which strict scrutiny has generally been applied.
That said, it soems difficult to determine where the Court will draw the line between congressional acts subject to strict scrutiny and congressional acts subject to the congruence and proportionality test, as Congress will often be forced to make racial distinctions to remedy racial discrimination. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230-31 (1995) (recognizing, but not
resolving, the tension between strict scrutiny and Congress's enforcement power); see also Ruth
Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 680 (2000) (recognizing that legislation
designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment could collide with Equal Protection rights).
Should the Court be forced to draw a line between when to apply the congruence and proportionality test and when to apply strict scrutiny, the Court may well end up distinguishing between
congressional acts providing a judicial or quasi-judicial remedy to prevent prospective racial discrimination (which would be subjected to the congruence and proportionality test) and congressional
acts conferring non-judicial benefits on particular minority groups as a remedy for past discrimination. Though, arguably, the boundaries of such a test would be inherently malleable and could perhaps properly be characterized as a distinction without a difference.
221.
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997). Boerne appeared to reiterate the
continued precedential value of previous decisions upholding the constitutionality of Section 5. See
id. at 526-27.
222.
See id. at 530-33. In Fla. Prepaid PostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999), the Court made its favorable view of the Voting Rights Act even more
explicit, remarking on how "City of Boerne discussed with approval the various limits that Congress
imposed in its voting rights measures ......
223. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1982-83 (2003) (comparing favorably the record of voting discrimination and the remedy chosen by Congress to solve voting
discrimination with the record of gender discrimination and the remedy chosen by Congress in the
Family and Medical Leave Act); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373-74
(2001) (looking unfavorably upon the record of unconstitutional behavior by the states as related to
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The Court provided even more direct support for Section 5 in Lopez
v.Monterey County (Lopez 1/)224 by reiterating its view of the current
extension of Section 5 as an appropriate exercise of Congress's enforcement power.225 In Lopez II, the Court considered whether voting changes
mandated in legislation enacted by the State of California, a jurisdiction
not covered by Section 5, needed preclearance when the legislation
caused a voting change to occur in Monterey County, a jurisdiction covered by Section 5.226 The Court held that California's legislation required
preclearance.227 In pressing for a different result, though, California made
several arguments, one of which was that if the preclearance requirement
applied in this context, Section 5 would be an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress's enforcement power.228 This, according to the state, was
because Congress's enforcement power could not "tread on rights constitutionally reserved to the States" when Congress had not directly "designated [California] as historical wrongdoers in the voting rights
sphere. 229
But the Court gave short shrift to California's argument by relying
heavily on precedent; namely, its previous decisions in South Carolinav.
Katzenbach and City of Rome v. United States in which it had found Sec-

disability discrimination in comparison to the record of voting-related discrimination); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000) (looking unfavorably upon the remedies encompassed in
the Violence Against Women Act as opposed to those in the Voting Rights Act). Of the Court's first
six applications of the congruence and proportionality test, only Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000), contains no substantial comparison to the Voting Rights Act.
224.
525 U.S. 266 (1999).
525 U.S. at 282-83.
225. Lopez 11,
Id. at 278. Lopez If involved quite a complicated fact pattern and this was the case's
226.
second trip to the Supreme Court. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9 (1996) (Lopez 1).
Lopez H involved numerous changes to Monterey County's trial court system and its method of
electing judges. Lopez 11,525 U.S. at 271. The changes were put into place both by ordinances
adopted at the county level and by statutes adopted at the state level, and almost none of the changes
were submitted for preclearance. See id. at 271-74.
Latino voters brought a Section 5 enforcement action and the district court ruled in their favor,
concluding that the changes were unenforceable until precleared. Id. at 274. The County then determined that the changes could not be proven to lack a discriminatory purpose or effect, so the County
and the Latino plaintiffs tried to devise a mutually agreeable plan to submit for preclearance. Id.
However, the State of California intervened and opposed the remedial electoral schemes proffered
by the County and the Latino plaintiffs. Id.
With this stalemate, the district court devised and implemented an interim electoral plan. Id. at
275. But soon after the interim plan's implementation, the district court became concerned that it had
ordered an unconstitutional plan. Id. The district court then ordered new elections under the unprecleared scheme initially challenged by the Latino plaintiffs. Id. This order became the subject of the
Supreme Court's first opinion, where it held that the district court erred in implementing an unprecleared plan. See Lopez , 519 U.S. at 20-25.
On remand, the district court held that the changes involved in the case were the product of action by the State of California and that a non-covered entity such as the state had no responsibility to
preclear its voting changes. Lopez HI,525 U.S. at 276-77. The district court held that the county was
not required to submit the changes because it "had no choice but to implement" the state legislation.
Id. at 277.
525 U.S. at 269.
227. Lopez 11,
Id. at 282.
228.
Id.
229.
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tion 5 to be a constitutional exercise of Congress's enforcement power.230
Thus, the Court initially remarked on its previous upholding of "the constitutionality of § 5 of the Act against a challenge that this provision
usurps the powers reserved to the States."23' Indeed, the power of precedent was so strong, the Court's Lopez II opinion did not even bother to
mention the words "congruence and proportionality," much less to apply
the test. 232 In rejecting California's contention, the Court reiterated its
view that Congress's enforcement power "contemplate[d] some intrusion
into areas traditionally reserved to the States, ' '233 while only citing City of
Boerne v. Flores for the proposition that "'[l]egislation which deters or
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress'
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is
not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into
legislative spheres of auton234
omy previously reserved to the States.'
Using this framework, the Court found "no merit in the claim that
Congress lacks Fifteenth Amendment authority to require federal approval before the implementation of a state law . . . in a covered
county. 2 35 The Court concluded that the state was burdened only to the
extent that its laws affected voting in a properly covered jurisdiction. 36
Moreover, the Court gave little weight to California's inability to bail out
of Section 5, finding that this inability resulted in a minimal increase 237
in
the burden on state law because Monterey County itself could bail OUt.
As the Court summarized: "In short, the Voting Rights Act, by its nature,
intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment permits this
intrusion, however, and our holding today adds nothing of constitutional
moment to the burdens that the Act imposes. 238 Thus, amazingly, just a
couple of years after developing the congruence and proportionality test,
the Court failed to apply the test in deciding whether Section 5, one of
the most stringent remedies ever adopted by Congress, remained a valid
exercise of Congress's enforcement power. 239
230. See generally John Matthew Guard, "Impotent Figureheads"? State Sovereignty,
Federalism,and the Constitutionalityof Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Lopez v. Monterey
County and City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REv. 329, 356-57 (1999) (discussing the importance of stare decisis to the Lopez I decision).
231.
Lopez 11, 525 U.S. at 283.
232. See Guard, supra note 230, at 350 (noting that the Lopez II Court did not conduct a congruence and proportionality analysis); see also Katz, supra note 4, at 1179, 1202 (noting how Lopez
II "easily upholds the constitutionality" of Section 5 while "pay[ing] little attention to the factors that
have become increasingly important to establishing congruence and proportionality").
233. Lopez 11,
525 U.S. at 282.
234. Id. at 282-83 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518).
235.
Id. at 283-84.
236. Id. at 284.
237.
Id.
238.
Id. at 284-85.
239. Justice Thomas dissented; he primarily objected to the majority's analysis of the statutory
language. See id. at 289 (Thomas, J., dissenting). More interestingly, without using the words "congruence and proportionality," Justice Thomas sketched the outlines of the test in a discussion that
implied the majority's statutory interpretation rendered Section 5 an unconstitutional exercise of
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With this failure to apply the congruence and proportionality test,
Lopez H might be read along with the Court's other praiseworthy statements in the congruence and proportionality line of cases, as providing
an implicit exception to the test for voting rights remedies based on wellestablished precedent. Thus, if faced with an extension of Section 5, one
could envision the Court relying heavily on its previous precedents without truly delving into a full-blown congruence and proportionality analysis. In this way, Section 5 and perhaps other core civil rights statutes may
have been grandfathered in under the congruence and proportionality
doctrine. 240
Yet some reasons remain to doubt whether an extension of the current Section 5 will receive the same platitudes that the previous enactments have received in the Court's applications of the congruence and
proportionality test. In some respects, an extension of Section 5 may
wipe the slate clean for constitutional challenges using the congruence
and proportionality test, freeing the Court from its previous precedents
upholding Section 5. A review of the standards of the congruence and
proportionality test itself shows how the Court might come to such a
conclusion. In its application of the test, the Court has looked approvingly on temporary remedies that include a sunset provision. 24' But, for
this aspect of the congruence and proportionality test to have any meaning, the Court cannot simply allow unfettered extensions of statutes previously upheld. Moreover, despite Lopez II, the Court's decisions regarding the scope of congressional enforcement power prior to development
of the congruence and proportionality test may have little future applicability.242
Congress's enforcement power. See id. at 289, 297-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority's interpretation of Section 5 raised "grave constitutional concerns").
In seeming to apply the test, Justice Thomas noted Section 5 exacted significant federalism
costs, but recognized it had twice been upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congress's enforcement
power. Id. at 293-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, citing Boerne, he noted that the Court had
"taken great care to emphasize that Congress's enforcement power is remedial in nature." Id. at 294
(Thomas, J., dissenting). He then chided the majority for overlooking "our warning in City of Boerne
that '[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented."'
Id. at 295 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530). Justice Thomas found that
there was paltry evidence of intentional discrimination by the State of California with respect to
voting and he saw little reason to presume California would adopt unconstitutional laws in the future. Id. at 296 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He noted that the majority's interpretation of the statute
raised the federalism costs associated with Section 5 because the state might be unable to develop a
uniform statewide voting policy and because the state would need to rely on its covered jurisdictions
to defend its interests before the federal government. Id.
240. Laycock, supra note 139, at 749 (noting a previous decision upholding voting rights
remedies may have been reaffirmed "under an implicit grandfather clause" and that the congruence
and proportionality test "is, in practice, prospective only"). Another potential reason to uphold
Section 5's extension would be the uniqueness of the Court finding a statute unconstitutional after it
had clearly upheld its constitutionality on a number of previous occasions.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
241.
As Professor Michael Gottesman has remarked: "[I]t is surely doubtful that the Court as
242.
presently constituted would have upheld the statutes in Katzenbach v. Morgan or City of Rome ....
One may wonder whether the Court is paying lip service to the earlier opinions while, as a practical
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The upholding of Section 5 as a constitutional exercise of Congress's enforcement power in Lopez H may well be best understood as a
tacit adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis243 and little else. The
Court's primary justification for denying California's challenge in Lopez
II seems to be its prior precedents. Thus, one might surmise that, armed
with the knowledge that the most recent extension of Section 5 had been
implemented for seventeen years and would expire in only a few more,
the Court decided to look the other way in the interest of preserving its
institutional integrity.244 There are also other lesser reasons to put a reduced value on the outcome of Lopez II. The case mostly involved an
issue of statutory interpretation with the constitutional issue acting as a
mere sidelight.245 In addition, and perhaps most simply, the State of California failed to argue for application of the congruence and proportionality test in its brief to the Court.24 6 For these reasons, Lopez II probably
should not provide unmitigated comfort to those who think the Court will
easily uphold the constitutionality of another extension of Section 5.
B. Will There Be An Explicit Voting Rights Exception?
Lopez II might, however, provide some additional comfort to Section 5's proponents as the case hints at the outline of a framework for
doctrinally synthesizing the Court's previous upholdings of Section 5
and its more recent congruence and proportionality cases. This framework would be based on the fact that in the more recent cases the Court
has rejected use of Congress's enforcement power in the Fourteenth
Amendment 247 context while in all of its reviews of Section 5 the Court
has upheld use of Congress's enforcement power in the Fifteenth
Amendment 248 context. So perhaps the Court will make an explicit

matter, relegating them to the junk pile." Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism,and a Court
With an Eccentric Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 60 (2001); see also Ana Maria Merico-Stephens,
United States v. Morrison and the Emperor's New Clothes, 27 J.C. & U.L. 735, 736, 742-43 (2001)
(criticizing the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions for failing to be candid in acknowledging that
previous precedents have basically been discarded).
243. For a discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis and the reasons the Court might choose to
abandon prior precedent, see Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
244. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (describing how stare decisis contributes to "actual and perceived integrity of the judicial power").
245. The Court framed the question presented as a statutory one: "whether a covered jurisdiction 'seeks to administer' a voting change when, without exercising any independent discretion, the
jurisdiction implements a change required by the superior law of a noncovered State." Lopez I1,525
U.S. at 278.
246. See Brief for Appellee at 31-34, Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (No. 971396).
247. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (listing cases decided under the Fourteenth
Amendment using the congruence and proportionality test).
248. See Lopez 11, 525 U.S. at 284-85; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180
(1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 324 (1966).
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distinction between the two enforcement powers, allowing Congress
broader powers in the Fifteenth Amendment context. 249
If the Court chooses to give Congress broader powers under the Fifteenth Amendment, such a standard could be rationalized in several
ways. First, the Court could reasonably carve out different levels of enforcement power because voting is such "a fundamental matter in a free
and democratic society. '
Thus, Congress should have broader power
to eradicate voting discrimination than, say, employment discrimination.
Second, the Court might be more willing to give Congress greater leeway
under the Fifteenth Amendment because that amendment has a much
more limited scope than the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 1 To put it another
way, the Court will grant more power to Congress because the Fifteenth

249.
Professor Peter Rubin has made a case for broader congressional enforcement power in
the districting context. He argues that, in passing voting rights remedies to prevent dilution of minority votes, Congress appropriately used its enforcement power because: (1) Congress judged dilutive
election systems to almost always be adopted with a dilutive intent; (2) politicians at the state and
local level will generally have the sophistication to hide dilutive intent; (3) divisiveness could be
created by requiring an inquiry into dilutive intent; and (4) dilution reflects discriminatory intent on
the part of the voters through racial bloc voting. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 132-34. For these
reasons, Professor Rubin concludes that voting rights remedies will meet the congruence and proportionality test as:
Congress's judgment in the exercise of its power under the Fifteenth Amendment is due
great deference. And indeed, its authority to prohibit discriminatory effects in the exercise of its power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment has been consistently upheld. Whatever the limits of congressional power to address discrimination under the
Civil War Amendments, where the exercise of that power raises only the relatively few
concerns presented in the districting context, Congress's judgment of what is appropriate
should be given effect.
Id. at 135 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Rubin's arguments make sense if the Court gives greater deference to Congress's
power under the Fifteenth Amendment. However, these arguments will likely carry little weight in a
strict congruence and proportionality analysis. After all, most of these same arguments could have
been made about the Religious Freedom Restoration Act which also represented Congress's judgment about a type of discrimination engaged in by local governments that could create divisiveness.
And, as previously discussed, racially polarized voting will likely be minimized as evidence of
unconstitutional activity when the Court conducts a congruence and proportionality analysis. See
supraPart I.B. i.c.
Finally, Professor Rubin only applies this analysis to vote dilution and not ballot
access.
250.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428, 433 (1992) ("It is beyond cavil that voting is of the most fundamental significance under our
constitutional structure." (internal quotes omitted)); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (holding that "any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.... because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the
foundation of our representative society"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) ("[T]he
political franchise of voting is . . . a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all
rights."); see also Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 382 (1879) (describing Congress's power to
regulate federal elections as "a most important power ... of a fundamental character. . . . [and]
necessary to the stability of our frame of government"); Caminker, supra note 102, at 1156 (speculating that Congress's enforcement power may be greater depending on the nature of the constitutional right being protected).
251.
See Day, supra note 88, at 368; see also D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Supreme Court, the
Franchise, and the Fifteenth Amendment: The First Sixty Years, 57 UMKC L. REV. 47, 49 (1988)
("By comparison with the single objectives of the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments, the fourteenth is actually five amendments rolled into one.").
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Amendment only implicates voting while the Fourteenth Amendment
implicates a vast number of constitutional norms.
While Lopez H and the congruence and proportionality line of cases
hint at a potential distinction between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement power, it bears noting that the Court recently
characterized Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment as no different from its enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment-seemingly indicating that the Court would grant
Congress no greater leeway under the latter amendment. The Court has,
on several recent occasions, noted that Congress's enforcement power
under the Fourteenth Amendment is "virtually identical" 252 and "parallel ' 2 53 to the power Congress may wield under the Fifteenth Amend-

ment. 254 Moreover, the enforcement clauses in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments contain nearly identical language, 255 though the
252.
Garrett,531 U.S. at 373 n.8.
253.
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
254.
For other statements of the coextensive nature of Congress's Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement powers, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (describing
Congress's power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment as "similar" to the power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Lopez I1, 525 U.S. at 294 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has "always treated the nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as coextensive"); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th
Cir. 1999) ("Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment mirrors Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
); Caminker,
.....
supra note 102, at 1191 (equating the standard for use of Congress's enforcement
power under the Fifteenth Amendment with that of the Fourteenth Amendment); Gottesman, supra
note 242, at 47 n.82 (same).
255.
See supra note 6. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV.
747, 818-27 (1999) (describing a theory in which the meaning of a constitutional provision should be
read in light of other constitutional provisions containing similar language and applying it to the
enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments).
Despite the similarity of language used in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement clauses, perhaps a case could be made that the subtle difference in language provides a basis
for reading Congress's enforcement power under the two amendments to be different. Such a case
would begin by examining the language of the enforcement clauses of all three Civil War Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery, enforcement clause reads: "Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
The Fourteenth Amendment enforcement clause reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Fifteenth Amendment enforcement clause reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
As can be seen, the ordering of the words in the Fifteenth Amendment more closely mirrors
that of the Thirteenth Amendment. In fact, the language would be identical but for the placement of
"The" at the beginning of the Fifteenth Amendment clause. So perhaps the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement clauses deserve the same reading-one different from the Fourteenth. And
since the Court has seemingly given Congress expansive authority in the Thirteenth Amendment
context, so should the Court give Congress the same expansive authority in the Fifteenth Amendment context. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (allowing Congress to
outlaw a private citizens' racially discriminatory refusal to sell property because Congress has broad
Thirteenth Amendment authority enforcement power to eliminate "all badges and incidents of slavery").
However, this assumes the legislative history would support such an interpretation and that the
Rehnquist Court would be willing to show an uncharacteristic fondness for Supreme Court precedent
from the 1960s. Moreover, even though the order of the words in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments differs from the Fourteenth, the same words are used-so perhaps all three enforcement clauses were intended to have the same meaning. See generally Amar, supra, at 822-26 (argu-
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Court has yet to explicitly hold that the scope of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers are identical.
Even if Congress has greater enforcement power under the Fifteenth
Amendment than under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is uncertain how
much voting-related activity falls under the umbrella of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Here, the vote dilution/vote denial dichotomy becomes
important because the Court has never definitively indicated where these
apparently two distinct rights should be placed in the constitutional
framework. The Court has clearly held that the Fourteenth Amendment
encompasses instances of vote dilution 25 6 and that the Fifteenth Amendment encompasses instances of the denial of access to the ballot.257 Yet
the Court has provided profoundly mixed signals as to whether there is a
Fifteenth Amendment constitutional right to not have a vote diluted.258
If the Fifteenth Amendment does not encompass vote dilution,
greater enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment may provide
little aid to upholding an extension of Section 5. However, even if this is
the case, the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power could be interpreted to allow Congress greater leeway to determine the types of
changes that are subject to Section 5 preclearance. In other words, even if
the Fifteenth Amendment itself does not cover vote dilution, Congress
may be able to use its enforcement power to expand the Amendment to
cover dilutive changes.25 9
While it seems possible that the Court will give an extension of Section 5 an implicit or explicit exemption from the rigors of the congruence
and proportionality test, such an exemption is not inevitable. 260 If Section
ing that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement clauses should be given the same
interpretation).
256. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment to a claim of vote dilution).
257. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 651-52, 663-64 (1944) (applying the Fifteenth
Amendment to denial of primary ballot to an African-American citizen).
258. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993) (noting that the Court has yet to
decide if the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote dilution claims); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 65, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion) (implying that vote dilution is not encompassed in the
Fifteenth Amendment); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342, 345 (1960) (implying that vote
dilution is encompassed in the Fifteenth Amendment). Compare Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275
(1939) (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded
modes of discrimination ....
hit[ting] onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap
exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race"), with Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 920 n.20 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment only implicates access to the ballot (citing Mobile, 446 U.S.
at 84 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring))).
259. See Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts,Minority Vote Dilution and
the Preservationof the Second Reconstruction, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 299 (1998); see also
Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 287 (upholding the constitutionality of Section 5 in a case involving changes
with the potential for vote dilution); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 187 (same).
260. It is interesting to consider the role Justice O'Connor, the Court's most prominent "swing"
vote, might play in deciding whether or not there is an exception to the congruence and proportionality test for voting rights remedies. See David S. Broder, O'Connor'sSpecial Role, WASH. POST, Oct.
1, 2003, at A23 (describing how Justice O'Connor holds the "swing vote" on the current Court). It is
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5 receives a free pass, no problem, but, if subjected to a genuine application of the congruence and proportionality test, an unamended extension
of Section 5 will likely encounter trouble. Thus, Congress may want to
consider amending Section 5 to ensure its conformance to Court doctrine.
V.

AMENDING SECTION

5

TO CONFORM TO THE CONGRUENCE AND

PROPORTIONALITY TEST

In the event the Court declines to adopt a voting rights exception to
the congruence and proportionality test, Section 5 could be amended so
as to meet the test while still providing an adequate prophylactic mechanism to preserve the gains achieved by minority voters since passage of
the Voting Rights Act. The lengthy history of voting-related discrimination, the more recent voting problems, and the deterrent effect of Section
5, provide enough justification for some federal scrutiny of state and
local election laws. 26 1 Moreover, many of the gains made in the elimination of practices that dilute minority votes have occurred more recently
and, in these places, a much greater likelihood exists for voting changes
to be made with the unconstitutional, intentional purpose of reverting to
previous systems known to dilute minority votes.

noteworthy that she has written the only congruence and proportionality majority opinion that makes
no reference or comparison with the Voting Rights Act. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66-92. Justice
O'Connor was also the author of Lopez I. Thus, she may be signaling that there is room to argue
that Congress has different and greater enforcement powers when it comes to voting rights.
Maybe, though, the focus should not be on Justice O'Connor but on Justice Scalia. In the
Court's most recent congruence and proportionality decision, Justice Scalia revoked his support for
the doctrine. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2007-09 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing his initial support for congruence and proportionality doctrine but then proposing a different
test for future cases). Justice Scalia stated that he will apply a relaxed rational basis standard whenever Congress enacts provisions that are "designed to remedy racial discrimination by the States."
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2011 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, this "relaxed" standard comes with some
significant baggage because Justice Scalia will only allow Congress to use its enforcement power
when it enacts a remedy that: (1) is imposed "only upon those particular States in which there has
been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations;" (2) is "directed against the States or
state actors rather than the public at large;" and (3) does not "violate other provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 2012-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
My suspicion is that Section 5 would run into trouble even under Justice Scalia's "relaxed"
standard. First, it seems likely that Justice Scalia would come to the conclusion that Section 5 so
upsets the federal/state balance that it violates another provision of the Constitution-the Tenth
Amendment. Even apart from that, one has to wonder how strict Justice Scalia will interpret his
requirement that the remedy apply only to states with an identified history of relevant constitutional
violations. This standard raises numerous questions: How many violations are needed? How recent
does the "history" of violations need to be? And how strict is the determination about what amounts
to a constitutional violation-is it "arguable" violations, anything Congress self-identifies as a violation, or only those violations found by the courts? Suffice it to say that Justice Scalia's "relaxed"
standard seems likely to be much tighter than the "relaxed" standard previously used to uphold a
number of voting rights remedies-cases which Justice Scalia cites as forming a major part of the
reasoning for his new test. Id. at 2012 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the implications of previous
Court decisions concerning voting rights). After all, Justice Scalia, in explicating the parameters of
his new test, approvingly cites a dissent from one of those cases. Id. (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 666-67, 669, 670-71 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
See discussion supra Part III.B.
261.
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A need still exists for Section 5, just, perhaps, in a more limited,
modem, and fine-tuned form because of changes to the landscape in
terms of the more recent problems with voting discrimination and in
terms of the Court's development of congruence and proportionality doctrine. By revising the coverage formula to apply to those areas where
voting-related problems have more recently been at issue, by limiting the
types of voting changes covered by Section 5, and by easing the restrictions for covered jurisdictions to bail out of Section 5, a revised, modem
preclearance mechanism would pass the congruence and proportionality
test. Moreover, a carefully revised Section 5 would still enable capture
and prevention of most changes harmful to minority voting strength, and
perhaps even result in a more effective, targeted tool in preventing voting-related discrimination.
A. Change the Coverage Formula
The first step in revising Section 5 to comport to the congruence
and proportionality test would be a revision of the coverage formula to
redefine those areas with a history of voting-related discrimination that
merit continuing closer scrutiny of their election laws. The current coverage formula targets those jurisdictions that used a literacy test or other
device to limit access to the franchise and where the effect of these devices was reflected in unusually low voter registration and turnout levels
in the 1960s and 1970s.262 But, as previously discussed, this coverage
formula needs an update.
A revised coverage formula might look to more recent history to determine which areas should be the target of increased federal scrutiny.
The best way to do so would be to cover jurisdictions where violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, and certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act have occurred since 1982. Basically, this
would cover any states or counties which, since the 1982 extension of
Section 5, have been found: (1) in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment
or Fourteenth Amendment as they relate to racial discrimination in voting; 263 (2) in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; (3) in violation of the obligation to gain preclearance of voting changes prior to implementation; 264 (4) to have had implementation of a voting change prevented by a federal authority--either by an objection interposed by the
262.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
263.
Coverage, however, would not be triggered by the mere failure of a jurisdiction to meet
the one person, one vote requirement of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963), and Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), because such a constitutional violation
does not necessarily equate with racial discrimination. See generally Barbara Y. Phillips, Reconsidering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its Basic Standard of Equality to Other Vote Dilution
Claims, 38 How. L.J. 561 (1995) (criticizing the one person, one vote standard for its failure to
account for the prospect of minority vote dilution).
264.
In other words, jurisdictions that have lost Section 5 enforcement actions. Thus, this
formula would not cover jurisdictions that merely failed to submit a change for preclearance.
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Department of Justice 265 or by the denial of a declaratory judgment by
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; (5) in violation of the minority-language provisions of Section 203; or (6) to need
monitoring by federal officials of their elections under Section 8266 of the
Voting Rights Act.267 In addition, federal courts could continue to have
discretion to subject jurisdictions to preclearance upon finding a constituauthority currently found in Sectional violation of the right to vote-an
268
tion 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act.
265. When the Department of Justice interposes an objection, the Attorney General can reconsider the decision to object, and occasionally, in light of changes in fact or law, the Department of
Justice has withdrawn an objection. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.46 (West 2003) (allowing for reconsideration
of an objection where "there appears to have been a substantial change in operative fact or relevant
law"); see also Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales, Texas Secretary of State (Oct. 21,
1998) (reconsidering and withdrawing a Section 5 objection), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec5/Iltr/l102198.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). In such an instance, coverage could not be
triggered if the Department of Justice initially objected but then withdrew the objection when presented with new circumstances that indicated the objection was wrongly interposed.
266. 42 U.S.C. § 1973f. This section reads, in part:
[T]he Director of the Office of Personnel Management may assign, at the request of the
Attorney General, one or more persons, who may be officers of the United States, (1) to
enter and attend at any place for holding an election in such subdivision for the purpose
of observing whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote, and (2)
to enter and attend at any place for tabulating the votes cast at any election held in such
subdivision for the purpose of observing whether votes cast by persons entitled to vote
are being properly tabulated.
Id.
During the November 2002 election, federal authorities monitored activity in twenty-six counties. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Observers and Justice Department Personnel
to Monitor General Election in States Across The Nation (Nov. 4, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2002/November/02 crt_640.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). For a discussion on how the
federal government chooses which elections to monitor, see generally Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn
Utrecht, Problems in America's Polling Places: How They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 401,416-18 (2002).
Many of the cases brought pursuant to Voting Rights Act Sections 2, 5, and 203 have been
267.
resolved by consent agreement. See THERNSTROM, supra note 12, at 9 (noting that "[flew voting
cases actually reach the courts" as most are "settled without litigation"); see also McCrary, supra
note 37, at 699 (describing how many Section 2 defendants "settled before trial"). Thus, the Section
5 coverage formula could be triggered by any consent agreement or court finding of a violation of
Section 2; any consent agreement or court finding pursuant to a Section 5 enforcement action; any
consent agreement or court denial of preclearance in a Section 5 declaratory judgment action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia; or any consent decree or court finding of a
violation of Section 203.
268. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a. Section 3(c) provides:
If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General or an aggrieved person under any
statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment in any
State or political subdivision the court finds that violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred within the territory of such State or
political subdivision, the court, in addition to such relief as it may grant, shall retain jurisdiction for such period as it may deem appropriate and during such period no voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting different from that in force or effect at the time the proceeding was commenced
shall be enforced unless and until the court finds that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of
the voting guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title: Provided, That such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the
chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attor-
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The coverage formula should also avoid "automatic" coverage of all
political subdivisions of a covered entity by adopting a two-tier level of
coverage. Initially, one would look to states that would fall within these
categories. These states would then have any enactments of statewide
application subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5, but "local legislation" targeted at particular counties or governing bodies would
be exempted. Then coverage would be examined at the level of government at which voter registration takes place-in most states at the county
level. Any county that falls into any one of the six previously mentioned
categories or any county that contains a political subdivision that falls
into one of these categories would become covered. Legislation adopted
at the state level that is aimed at these counties and their subjurisdictions
("local legislation") would also need to be submitted for preclearance.
Such a coverage formula is not flawless and still might not pass a
strict interpretation of the congruence and proportionality test. The most
obvious problem being that most jurisdictions will become covered because of violations of Sections 2 and 5 and such violations are generally
not premised on purposeful, unconstitutional voting-related discrimination-both appear to merely prohibit voting practices that have a discriminatory effect. 269 Another problem could be the Department of Justice's past administration of Section 5 that was later found to be erroneous by the Supreme Court.270 Finally, a very small number of jurisdicney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days
after such submission, except that neither the court's finding nor the Attorney General's
failure to object shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.
Id. § 1973a(c). For an example of a court ordering coverage under Section 3(c), see Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (ordering the State of Arkansas to submit practices
related to majority vote requirements for preclearance) (three-judge panel). Such coverage, however,
is relatively rare. See Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 600 (noting the lack of cases discussing standards for
imposing the Section 3(c) preclearance requirement).
There may be one pragmatic problem with my proposed coverage formula. Namely, who
would be responsible for determining which jurisdictions fall into one of the categories for coverage? It would probably make most sense for the Chief of the Voting Section of the Department of
Justice to make these determinations because: (1) the Voting Section probably has the most comprehensive records regarding voting rights enforcement and (2) this would leave the decision in the
hands of a non-political, career government official, thus eliminating any potential "gaming" of the
decisions by Democratic or Republican political appointees.
269.
A Section 5 enforcement action involves no finding of discriminatory conduct; it merely
indicates noncompliance with the obligation to seek preclearance. See United States v. Louisiana,
952 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (W.D. La. 1997) (holding that the only issues for the court to determine in a
Section 5 enforcement action are "'(i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change was
covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii) if the requirements were not
satisfied, what remedy [is] appropriate"' (quoting City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125,
129 n.3 (1983))).
270.
For many years the Department of Justice denied preclearance to nonretrogressive
changes that were determined to have been adopted with a discriminatory, but nonretrogressive
purpose. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 342 (2000) (Bossier 11) (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the longstanding Department of Justice practice
of refusing preclearance to changes made with an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose). The
Department also used to object to changes that resulted in a "clear" violation of Section 2 of the Act.
See 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (1996). The Supreme Court foreclosed these aspects of Section 5 enforce-
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tions may have entered consent agreements in Section 2 and Section 5
cases to avoid the expense of litigation.27' What all these potential problems with such a revised coverage formula address is the possibility of
overbreadth in the coverage of jurisdictions.
Yet most of these problems of overbreadth could be easily resolved
through revision to other portions of the statute. As will later be suggested in further detail, jurisdictions could be offered a streamlined process to bail out of Section 5 coverage. As part of the bailout process, jurisdictions could be allowed to present evidence to prove "wrongful"
coverage-either because spurious claims were settled to avoid litigation
costs or because the Department of Justice interposed an erroneous ob27
jection. 272 As for the failure of a violation of Section 2 or 5 to equate to
purposeful discrimination, the standards for proving such violations, especially in the case of Section 2, approximate those necessary for finding
273
a constitutional violation of the right to vote.
In addition to helping meet the congruence and proportionality test,
the proposed coverage formula would allow for better enforcement of
ment by the Department of Justice in Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 490 (1997)
(Bossier 1), and Bossier I1. In addition, the Department's administration of Section 5 was criticized
by the Supreme Court during the 1990s round of redistricting. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
924-27 (1995) (describing the Department of Justice's "policy of maximizing majority-black districts"); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 913 (1996) (same).
Voting rights litigation can be very expensive. See McDonald, supra note 2, at 1279 n.173
271.
(listing plaintiffs' litigation expenses in several voting rights cases); see also Michael E. Solimine,
The Three-JudgeDistrictCourt in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 93 (1996)
(remarking that modem voting rights cases are characterized by "growing sophistication" involving
lots of expert witness testimony and "intricate computer models to construct proposed districts").
This would not be the only factor to consider in a bailout hearing, and a jurisdiction would
272.
not be allowed an automatic bailout just because the Department of Justice may have wrongfully
interposed an objection. Rather, it would be only one part of a totality of the circumstances test for
bailout. See discussion infra Part V.C.
273. For a discussion of how Section 2 closely approximates the constitutional standard, see
supra note 171 and accompanying text. While the Section 5 non-retrogression standard does not
require a discriminatory purpose, non-retrogression would seemingly be a major factor in any analysis of the constitutionality of a change in election law. In Bossier I1,Justice Scalia described how the
term "abridged" is used in both Section 5 and in the Fifteenth Amendment, that the term "necessarily
entails a comparison," and that "[ilt makes no sense to suggest that a voting practice 'abridges' the
right to vote without some baseline with which to compare the practice." Bossier I1, 528 U.S. at 33334. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Priiciple in
ConstitutionalLaw, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1215-23 (1998) (describing how non-retrogression plays
a primary role in the Court's approach to constitutional law, especially in the race cases). But see
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 149-50 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing thai the retrogression standard has no constitutional basis).
The Court's most recent fine-tuning of the retrogression test seems to move it even closer to
the constitutional standard for voting discrimination. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2511
(2003). Prior to Georgia, the retrogression test seemed to be a "pure" effects test. In other words, if
minority voters were worse off under the change then federal preclearance had to be withheld. Georgia replaced this "pure" effects test with a totality of circumstances approach. See Georgia, 123 S.
Ct. at 2511. This approach requires "an examination of all the relevant circumstances, such as the
ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice, the extent of the minority group's opportunity to participate in the political process, and the feasability of creating a nonretrogressive plan."
Id. In this way, Section 5's retrogression test seems to be moving toward Section 2's results test; the
latter of which is relatively close to the constitutional standard for vote dilution. See supra note 171
and accompanying text.
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Section 5. It would target places where recent problems have occurred
and these places would seemingly be more likely to have future problems. It would also significantly reduce the number of covered jurisdictions where there is little chance of a change being implemented that
violates the nonretrogression principle of Section 5. For example, Georgia and Virginia are currently covered in their entirety, but both states
contain a number of counties with very low percentages of minority
population. 7 4 Yet these counties, and any cities, school districts, or other
governing bodies that conduct elections within these counties, must submit every single voting change enacted when, as a practical matter, federal authorities will likely never prevent implementation of a change
because it is impossible to retrogress minority voting strength when minority residents have very little, if any, voting strength to begin with.275
Conversely, there are also a number of counties where minority residents
constitute such a great proportion of the population, it is almost equally
impossible to retrogress minority voting strength.276 Thus, removing
these places from Section 5 coverage would allow the Department of
Justice to concentrate its Section 5 resources on those areas where violations more likely will occur.
B. Reduce the Number of Voting Changes Subject to Section 5 Coverage
Aside from changing the coverage formula, to further make Section
5 comply with the congruence and proportionality test, a reduction could
be made in the types of voting changes subjected to the preclearance
process. Currently, Section 5 applies to all facets of the election process,
no matter how minor,277 although many of these innocuous changes have
little chance to retrogress minority voting strength.278 As previously
274. For example, in northwest Georgia, the 2000 Census shows that Catoosa County has
53,282 residents, of whom only 669 are black; Dade County has 15,154 residents, of whom 96 are
black; and Fannin County has 19,798 residents, of whom 34 are black. See generally American
FactFinder,supra note 211. In southwest Virginia, Buchanan County has 26,978 residents, of whom
708 are black; Dickenson County has 16,395 residents, of whom 58 are black; and Scott County has
23,403 residents, of whom 139 are black. Id.
275. See John J. Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an Extraordinary FederalRemedy, 22 AM. U. L. REv. 111, 132 (1972) (discussing how "the reasonable expectancy of fifteenth amendment violations is very slight where the minority group constitutes such a
small percentage of the total population"). A lack of minority population also makes it unlikely that
local officials would enact changes with a retrogressive purpose.
276. A number of examples of this can be found in counties near the Texas-Mexico border. For
example, the 2000 Census shows Brooks County with a population of 7,976, of whom 7,304 are
Hispanic; Starr County has a population of 53,597, of whom 52,278 are Hispanic; and Zavala
County has 11,600 persons, of whom 10,582 are Hispanic. See generally American FactFinder,
supra note 211.
277. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph R. Rich, Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Gary 0. Bartlett, Executive Director, North Carolina State Board of Elections
(April 17, 2002) (preclearing a state law that "requires state and county election boards to notify
candidates for elective office of laws and rules prohibiting display of nonofficial signage on any
state traffic device or highway signage or electric power company structures") (on file with the
author).
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noted, the modern-day problem for minority voters tends to involve vote
dilution rather than vote denial.
For this reason, Section 5 could be extended to apply only to
changes with the opportunity to retrogress minority voting strength in
terms of vote dilution, not to changes that have the potential to retrogress
minority voters' access to the ballot. 279 Thus, changes in forms of government, methods of election, redistrictings, and annexations could not
be implemented without federal approval. But, changes in precinct lines,
polling places, methods of voting, and other aspects of the electoral
process that involve access to the ballot could be implemented without
federal approval.28 °
Such a change would help Section 5 comply with the congruence
and proportionality test and also better focus enforcement on the types of
changes most likely to violate Section 5. By eliminating many generally
non-problematic changes from the preclearance requirement, Section 5
coverage would sweep up less constitutional activity than it does currently-thus lessening the argument of overbreadth of coverage that Section 5 will face in application of the congruence and proportionality test.
The burden on federalism would also be reduced as state and local governments would need to submit far fewer changes for preclearance.
Moreover, the Department of Justice would no longer have to approve
every single voting change, but rather would be able to focus on those
changes that have proved the most likely to be objectionable. Importantly, such a scheme would not leave minority voters without a remedy
Admittedly, this is not a particularly novel idea as it was floated when Section 5 last came
279.
up for extension in 1982. See Drew S. Days, III & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 167, 173 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (describing a Reagan administration proposal to limit "the preclearance requirement to the types of changes
that had elicited the most objections from the Justice Department").
During the 1982 extension debate, the Reagan administration also proposed a "mandatory notice" provision under which jurisdictions would have to provide notice to the Department of Justice
about a voting change, but the Department would then have the burden of seeking a court injunction
to prevent implementation of the change. Id. at 173-74. This Article does not advocate such a revision because it would be a tremendous strain on the Department of Justice's resources, more timeconsuming, and too unprotective of minority voting rights as compared with the current sixty-day
preclearance process.
280. The November 2000 Presidential election provides evidence that aspects of the electoral
process such as voting machines may still have the potential to discriminate. See U.S. Comm'n Civil
Rights, Allan J. Lichtman, Report on the Racial Impact of the Rejection of Ballots Cast in the 2000
PresidentialElection in the State of Florida(June 2001) (attributing at least some of the disparity in
ballot rejection between African-Americans and whites to differences in voting methods used), at
http://www.usccr.gov./pubslvote2000/reportappendixllichtman/ltrpt.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
2003); Report of the Minority Staff, Special Investigations Div., Comm. on Gov't Reform, U.S.
House of Representatives, Income and Racial Disparitiesin the Undercount in the 2000 Presidential
Election (2001) (same), at http://www.house.gov/roybal-allard/undercountreport.pdf (last visited
Feb. 6, 2004). But the problem with methods of voting in the 2000 Presidential election was outdated equipment that had not been changed and Section 5 does nothing to impact the status quo.
Moreover, the recent adoption of the Help America Vote Act should alleviate problems with voting
machines. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1666-1730
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (establishing a commission to disburse funds to the
states to replace antiquated voting equipment).
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to challenge discriminatory rules that limit ballot access, as Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act 28 1 would still provide a remedy to address such
problems.28 2
Finally, a prophylactic remedy in the vote dilution context makes
the most sense, and thus is more congruent and proportional, because of
the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent in such changes.283 In the
redistricting context, for example, proving an unconstitutional racial purpose can be very onerous because race and ethnicity almost always plays
a part in the redistricting calculus. 284 And, if race is always a factor, it
becomes difficult to separate illicit racial motives from licit ones. Thus,
because of the recent history of problems in the vote dilution context and
the fact that race almost always plays a role in redistricting, which is
perhaps the most important vote dilution change reviewed under the preclearance requirement and the most likely to result in unconstitutional
discrimination, it remains congruent and proportional to require preclearance of changes with the potential for vote dilution.
C. Make "Bailout" Less Onerous
Section 5 currently allows states and counties to bail out of coverage.285 But, bailout remains difficult for a number of reasons. First, when
a state or county attempts to bail out, it also must bail out on behalf of all

281.
This Article presumes the constitutionality of Section 2. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
990-92 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (urging states to assume the constitutionality of Section 2
as lower federal courts have "unanimously affirmed its constitutionality").
282. See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586,
588 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Section 2 to a special district's landownership requirement); Ortiz v.
City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Section 2 to voter purge procedures);
Lowe v. Kansas City Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 752 F. Supp. 897, 900 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (applying
Section 2 to the use of term limits for city council positions); Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513,
1516-17 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (applying Section 2 to use of certain types of voting machines), rev'd on
other grounds, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502, 503 (D.R.I. 1982)
(applying Section 2 to the location of a polling place).
For an interesting theory on using Section 2 against practices that deny minority voters access
to the ballot, see generally Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal
Access Theory for Interesting Times, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1188-99 (2001) (arguing that
courts generally find voting practices to violate Section 2 when the policy justifying the practice is
tenuous, and advocating that "[t]he more severe the racial disparity of voting access that results from
a challenged practice, the more tenuous the justification should be seen to be, even if that justification is asserted to have nothing to do with race").
283. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003) (holding that the
FMLA meets the congruence and proportionality test in part because gender discrimination is "subtle" and "may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis"); see also Blumstein, supra note 200, at
648 ("Proof of discriminatory intent ... may be difficult to uncover.").
284. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) ("Redistricting legislatures will, for
example, almost always be aware of racial demographics . . . , [and] [t]he distinction between being
aware of racial considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to make."); see also
United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 176 n.4 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("It would be naive to suppose that racial considerations do not enter into apportionment
decisions."); Karlan & Levinson, supra note 191, at 1203 (arguing that legislators "always intend the
racial compositions of the districts they draw").
285.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b.
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28 6
its subjurisdictions (e.g., cities, school districts, water districts, etc.).
Second, to bail out, states and counties need to demonstrate compliance
with Section 5 for the past ten years.287 To do so, these entities must
show that every voting change, no matter how small or insignificant, has
been precleared.28 8 Third, to bail out, jurisdictions need to secure a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia.28 9

These requirements are difficult and burdensome to meet and do not
allow many subjurisdictions to even attempt a bailout. For example, a
county cannot bail out if one of its municipalities has adopted an annexation that has not been precleared, even if the annexation does not have a
negative impact on minority voting strength; and a municipality cannot
bail out, even if it has strictly complied with the provisions of Section 5,
unless its county decides to bail out and can meet the eligibility requirements as well. 290 Further, to undertake a bailout, a county must undergo
the expense of litigation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.2 9' It is no wonder then that bailouts have been few and
far between. 292
A revised Section 5 could broaden the number of jurisdictions eligible to bail out and streamline the bailout process. Every jurisdiction
would be eligible to bail out on its own. States, counties, cities, and
school districts could bail out on their own merits-regardless of what
had happened in other jurisdictions that happen to lie within its borders
or because it was subsumed in a covered jurisdiction. The standard could
also be changed to a totality of the circumstances test that would consider
the factors listed in the current bailout provision and any other evidence
the jurisdiction wishes to present to demonstrate that they were wrongly
286.
Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)-(F) (requiring jurisdictions seeking bailout to demonstrate that
certain violations of voting rights have not occurred "within its territory"); see also S. REP. No. 97417, at 56-58 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 234-36.
Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(D) (requiring a jurisdiction seeking bailout to show all government units
287.
within its territory have complied with Section 5, including the requirement that no change be enforced without preclearance and the repeal of all changes denied preclearance).
Perhaps a jurisdiction would not be denied a bailout for "technical" non-compliance with
288.
Section 5; for example, if some "minute, unsubmitted change" could be identified. See Hancock &
Tredway, supra note 215, at 418. However, the statute's plain language and legislative history would
seemingly indicate otherwise. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 48 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 226 (noting unintentional failures to seek preclearance should not be excused because jurisdictions had ample knowledge of the need for preclearance).
Victor Andres Rodriguez argues that non-compliance with the current version of Section 5
provides a justification for extending the statute. Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 808-09. One problem
with this, which he points out, is that there is no real way to measure non-compliance. Id. at 808. In
addition, it would be difficult to separate negligent non-compliance from non-compliance motivated
by bad intent, and the congruence and proportionality doctrine would seemingly require some modicum of proof that changes were not being submitted for the purpose of implementing discriminatory
voting practices.
Id. § 1973b(a)(l).
289.
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
290.
See § 1973b(a)(l).
291.
292.
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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covered or that voting discrimination no longer presents a threat requiring preclearance.
The Department of Justice could also be allowed to process bailouts
administratively as a surrogate for the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Much like the current Section 5 preclearance process, an administrative system could be created to review bailouts within a
particular time frame, say 120 days. If the Department of Justice disallowed bailout, a dissatisfied jurisdiction could then still bring an action in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In addition,
the bailout provision could allow for a probationary period of at least five
years in which a jurisdiction could be administratively recaptured by the
Department of Justice if found to have passed and implemented a retrogressive change or engaged in some other act of voting-related discrimination.
A streamlined bailout again would help make the Section 5 remedy
more congruent and proportional to the ill it seeks to curb and simultaneously make for better targeted enforcement of Section 5. No longer
would jurisdictions be permanently trapped in Section 5 because of what
occurred in another place that lies within its borders or because it was
lying within a covered jurisdiction. Bailout would not hinge on technical
compliance with Section 5, but rather would look at the real-world consequences of failure to comply. And the Department of Justice would
provide a quick yes or no answer for bailout. Such a bailout process
would also further streamline for the Department of Justice the number
of jurisdictions subject to coverage so that the Department could devote
more resources to those areas where problems most likely will occur.
Perhaps the greatest problem with using the Department of Justice
to process bailouts would be the potential drain on its resources. However, the Department of Justice typically faces a declining Section 5
workload as a decade progresses-mostly owing to the fact that the Department reviews the bulk of redistricting submissions soon after the
release of the decennial Census.293 Thus, the problem of a potential drain
on the Department of Justice's resources could be solved by providing
jurisdictions with specific time frames to submit bailouts. For example,
the Department of Justice could be limited to reviewing bailouts during
the five years immediately prior to the decennial Census. During years
when the Department of Justice does not review bailouts, jurisdictions
could still seek bailout in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia.

293.
See Section 5 Changes 1990s, supra note 159 (showing that from 1990-1994 the Department of Justice reviewed 2,890 redistricting submissions and that from 1995-1999, the Department
reviewed 566 redistricting submissions).
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In sum, making bailout more efficient and attainable would help an
extension of Section 5 pass the congruence and proportionality test because it would further reduce the potential for overbreadth, and a revised
bailout scheme could better focus Department of Justice enforcement of
the statute.
D. Some Concluding Thoughts on Revising Section 5
The three revisions suggested in this Article do not, by any means,
constitute the universe of proposals that might allow Section 5 to pass the
congruence and proportionality test. It could be argued that covered jurisdictions should no longer be saddled with the litigation burden of instituting a declaratory judgment action for preclearance in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and should be allowed to file
such cases in local federal district courts (though the current burden of
litigation in this venue seems minimal as most jurisdictions administraz94
tively preclear changes through the Department of Justice). It could
also be argued that the retrogression test should be eliminated in favor of
a standard under which a change would only be objectionable if it had
been adopted with an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose.
The basic point is that a minimum of changes may need to be made
to Section 5 to keep it a congruent and proportional remedy. To meet the
congruence and proportionality test, Congress will seemingly need to
find a means of: (1) ensuring that the coverage formula targets those
places where recent discrimination has occurred; (2) reducing the amount
of constitutional activity covered; and (3) streamlining the bailout process. 295 The Court has, in recent years, revived federalism concerns and
Congress, if it chooses to extend Section 5, would do well to pay some

The Court has recognized the litigation burden of bringing claims before the United States
294.
District Court for the District of Columbia. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 559-60
(1969).
Congress might also want to limit the length of the re-extension to, perhaps, fifteen years
295.
instead of twenty-five. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (approving of Congress's seven-year extension of Section 5).
Perhaps, though, the Court's entertainment of "as applied" challenges under the congruence
and proportionality doctrine negates the need for Congress to show any kind of restraint in enacting
prophylactic remedies. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (remarking that the
"as applied" approach could eliminate any incentive for Congress to pass narrowly crafted enforcement power legislation). It is unclear where the Court will go with this "as applied" rule. For example, it may only work with regard to legislation that touches upon a vast number of constitutional
rights rather than to legislation that only applies to a discrete type of constitutional rights. Id. at 1993
(distinguishing previous congruence and proportionality decisions that did not allow for as applied
challenges because these cases "concerned legislation that narrowly targeted the enforcement of a
single constitutional right"). Even so, it seems unlikely that an "as applied" rule could rescue Section
5 if Congress passes an overly broad coverage formula or an overly stringent bailout mechanism.
Why? Because crafting a totally different coverage formula or bailout standard would, even for an
activist Court, be too closely akin to abandoning a judicial role and assuming a legislative one. Id. at
2005-06 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing how an "as applied" rule "cannot be squared with.
. the proper role of the Judiciary").
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heed to this revival. Otherwise, the Court may find Section 5 to be outof-step with its recent precedents.29 6
CONCLUSION

Since its initial enactment in 1965, the remedy encompassed in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has helped prevent the erosion of gains
made by minority voters and, by providing a prophylactic remedy, has
significantly decreased the likelihood for the occurrence of voting-related
discrimination.297 Thus, the statute has been a major factor in a wholesale
shift, over the last three-plus decades, in the voting landscape from one
in which discrimination against minority citizens was routine, to one in
which discrimination against minority citizens has become less prevalent.
When Congress revisits the need for Section 5, recognition of this
shifting landscape may be required by recent Supreme Court decisions.
The Court, under the auspices of the congruence and proportionality test,
could strike down any attempt to continue implementation of the same
stringent Section 5 remedy initially imposed decades ago. Yet the potential for voting discrimination has not disappeared, and while it seems
unlikely that the situation will return to the days of Jim Crow, a need still
exists to protect the more recent gains achieved by minority voters. Thus,
Congress should carefully consider congruence and proportionality when
it extends Section 5 because different circumstances and different Supreme Court jurisprudence may require different remedies.
296.
A revision of Section 5 by Congress might make the Court more willing to carve out a
voting rights exception to the congruence and proportionality test. As some scholars have noted, the
scope of Congress's enforcement power may reflect a continuing dialogue between the Court and
Congress over which branch of the federal government has final authority to interpret the Constitution. See Carter, supra note 88, at 824, 851-53; McConnell, supra note 94, at 172. Through application of the congruence and proportionality test, the Court has staked out a position that reclaims
greater authority as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional norms. Put another way, the Court has sent a
message to Congress that, in effect, tells Congress to scale back its exercise of the enforcement
power. Thus, if Congress responds to the dialogue by indicating acceptance of the Court's authority
by slightly limiting the use of the enforcement power, then the Court may be willing to give Congress the benefit of the doubt when reviewing the extension of Section 5.
297.
McCrary, supra note 37, at 665-66 (describing how, by 1990, the inequality evident in
voting laws in 1960 had been "transformed beyond recognition"). As Professor Richard Pildes
recently observed:
Of course, like all laws, the Voting Rights Act reflects the problems that shaped its
creation. Last amended by Congress in 1982, the act was forged in a different America.
Forty years ago, blacks were not permitted to vote in much of the South, an inequity that
was the focus of the law.
The South of 2003 is vastly changed. The reign of the one-party [Democratic] monopoly has come to an end. Partly because of the success of the Voting Rights Act, a substantial number of black legislators now wield power, even in the Deep South. Moreover,
despite the persistence of racially polarized voting, white voters no longer abandon the
[Democratic] party when it nominates black candidates; strong black candidates regularly
get about a third of the white vote. The era of interracial harmony has not yet arrived, but
these are changes with cultural and legal consequence.
Richard H. Pildes, Less Power, More Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at A15.

THE REHNQUIST COURT AND HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM:
AN EVALUATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR MODERATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM
ScoTr FRUEHWALDt

"The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States."--Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase 1
"IT]he constitutional equality of the states is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme 2upon which the Republic was organized."-Justice Horace H. Lurton
Horizontal federalism is an essential part of our Constitution. Professor Steven G. Calabresi has observed, "[t]he constitutional text's overreaching concern is with questions of institutional competence, and its
main theme is the division and allocation of power with a focus on who
3
decides what questions and subject to what checks and balances., Part
of this division of power concerns federalism-the allocation of authority between the federal government and the states (vertical federalism)
and the allocation of authority among the states (horizontal federalism).
This allocation of authority protects both the individual and the states. As
James Madison declared:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the peoeach other, at the same
ple. The different governments will control
4
time that each will be controlled by itself.

t Instructor, Hofstra University School of Law. University of Louisville (B.M., 1977; J.D.,
1989); University of North Carolina (M.A., 1979); City University of New York (Ph.D., 1984);
University of Virginia (L.L.M., 1994; S.J.D., 2001).
1. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
2.
3. Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1998).
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Carl Van Doren ed., The Easton Press
4.
1979).
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Similarly, Professor John C. Yoo has asserted, "[s]overeignty is not
maintained for sovereignty's sake, but instead is necessary to check those
driven by power for power's sake."5
Vertical federalism has been a major concern of the Rehnquist
Court. In a series of cases, the Court has protected states' rights from
imposition by the federal government. 6 First, the Court has limited Congress' power to pass statutes that infringe upon state sovereignty under
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Second, the Court has enforced the "etiquette of federalism" 8 by forbidding Congress from "commandeer[ing]
the legislative processes of the States..."9 or commanding state officers
"to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." 10 Finally, the
Court has limited Congress' ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity. "
The Rehnquist Court has not been similarly concerned with horizontal federalism-the relations among the states. With the exception of
one limited area (due process limits on punitive damages), the Court has
not created new constraints, it has continued the minimal restrictions on
horizontal federalism from previous Courts, and, in one instance, it has
retreated from the constraints created by prior Courts. Three cases from
the 2002-2003 term, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell,12 which concerns due process limits on punitive damages
awards, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt,13 which involves the Full Faith
5.
John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REv.
27, 32 (1998).
6.
See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002); Bd. of Trs. of
the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 351 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627
(2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
709-10 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48
(1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 567-68 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (concluding that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
the Missouri Constitution's mandatory retirement provision for judges). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977, 1981 (2003) (holding that it was within Congress' authority to allow state employees to recover money damages in federal court where the state failed to
comply with the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), despite Eleventh Amendment immunity, because the FMLA provision was congruent and proportional to the
targeted gender discrimination).
7.
Morrison,529 U.S. at 627; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
8.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 964 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
9.
Id. at 963 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981)); New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
10.
Printz,521 U.S. at 935.
11.
See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 769; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 9192; Alden, 527 U.S. at 709-10; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691; Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 647-48;
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76; see also Gregory,501 U.S. at 473 (concluding that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit Missouri's mandatory retirement provision for judges).
12.
123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003).
13.
123 S.Ct. 1683 (2003).
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and Credit Clause, and Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of
America v. Walsh,14 which concerns dormant commerce clause limits,
vividly illustrate the Court's minimal and selective horizontal federalism
jurisprudence.
Michael Greve has criticized the Rehnquist Court's horizontal federalismjurisprudence that existed prior to the 2002-2003 term:
The Rehnquist Court has waged its federalism campaign on behalf of "states' rights" against national impositions, but the rehabilitation of a plausible, constitutional federalism is a two-front war. Federalism surely must limit the national government's powers over the
states and protect intergovernmental immunities .

. .

. However, it

must also protect states from aggression and exploitation by other
states; moreover, it must protect the common economic market from
regulatory balkanization.15
Before the New Deal Court, there were significant constitutional
constraints on state power. 16 That Court eliminated or limited restrictions
on state authority in the following areas: (1) the Court eliminated substantive due process; (2) the Court drastically scaled back the scope of
the dormant commerce clause; (3) the Court reduced the impact of federal statutes on the states by replacing the automatic preemption of state
law by federal law in the same area with a presumption against preemption; (4) the Court virtually halted the application of parts of the Bill of
Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) the Court
enhanced state judicial power through the Erie doctrine, which requires
the use of state law in diversity cases; and (6) the Court increased state
judicial power by creating federal court abstention, by expanding state
court territorial jurisdiction, and by significantly reducing constitutional
constraints on state choice of law.1 7 Although the Court created a balancing approach to the dormant commerce clause beginning with Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona 18 in 1945 and returned to a substantive due process analysis of fundamental rights in Griswold v. Connecticut'9 in 1965,
123 S.Ct. 1855 (2003).
14.
15. Michael S. Greve, Federalism'sFrontier,7 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 93, 95 (2002); see also
Scott Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels: The New JudicialActivism in Theory and Practice,83 MARQ.
L. REV. 435, 494 (1999) ("While previous cases have focused on vertical federalism, there is also a
great need to police the relation of the states.") [hereinafter Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels].
16. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 487 (1997). Some of these constraints are horizontal, such as constitutional
constraints on a state's choice of law, while others, such as substantive due process and federal
preemption are vertical.
Id. at 488-89.
17.
325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945); see Gradbaum, supra note 16, at 509-10, 529-30.
18.
By 1949 at the latest, and probably by 1945, a majority of the Court was persuaded to retreat from the full radicalism of 1938. Nonetheless, overall the "modem approach" to the
dormant Commerce Clause that was forged in these years reflects a significantly less nationalistic vision than the predominant one during the Lochner era.
Id. at 509.
19.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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most of the minimal constraints on state power from the New Deal Court
remain today.
This author believes that the Court should give as much attention to
horizontal federalism as it has given to vertical federalism. States can
interfere with state sovereignty almost as much as the federal government can interfere with state sovereignty. Equally important, an individual should not be subject to a state extending its laws beyond its authority. In addition, these greater constraints on horizontal federalism should
be created in a principled manner based on a neutral reading of the Constitution's structural provisions.
This Article will concentrate on three constitutional provisions that
regulate the relations among the states: 20 (1) the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; 21 (2) the Full Faith and Credit Clause; 22 and
(3) the dormant commerce clause.23 The Due Process Clause regulates
the relationship between the state and the individual, and it should prevent a state from applying its laws to an individual when that state has a
tenuous connection to the individual or controversy. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires that states recognize the laws and judgments of
other states, and it should preclude a state from extending its authority in
a way that interferes with the sovereignty of other states. Finally, the
dormant commerce clause protects the states as a whole, and it should
prohibit a state from regulating the market beyond its borders and discriminating against interstate commerce.
Part I of this Article will examine the strong due process constraints
the Court has placed on a state's authority to impose punitive damages in
torts cases based on conduct in other states. It will conclude that those
limits are proper under the Due Process Clause, but that the Court has not
properly stated the basis for those limits. Part II will discuss the Court's
Full Faith and Credit Clause cases concerning choice of law and judgments. Part I will conclude that the Court has given almost no content to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause in choice of law cases and it has improperly created exceptions to full faith and credit for judgments. It will
also propose a consistent standard for giving full faith and credit to another state's laws and judgments. Part II will evaluate the Court's ap20.
Other clauses that relate to horizontal federalism or regulation of the states include U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10; the Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art. IV, §§ 2, 3; the Supremacy Clause,
id. art. VI, cl. 2; amend. XIV. In addition, the structure of the Constitution, as a whole, supports
limits on horizontal federalism. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (11) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1885 (1987) ("The truth, I shall argue presently, is that the extraterritoriality
principle is not to be located in any particular clause. It is one of those foundational principles of our
federalism which we infer from the structure of the Constitution as a whole.") [hereinafter Regan,
Siamese Essays]. I will not discuss vertical constraints, such as federal preemption, in this Article.
21.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. Id. art. IV, § 1.
23.
Id. art. I, § 8.
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proach to the dormant commerce clause, and it will argue that the Court
has retreated from the proper dormant commerce clause analysis in its
latest important decision in this area, PharmaceuticalResearch & Manufacturers ofAmerica v. Walsh.
Finally, Part IV will examine the Court's horizontal federalism jurisprudence as a whole. It will contend that the Court has no consistent
approach to horizontal federalism; rather, it has used horizontal federalism to further its agenda in other areas, particularly concerning limits on
punitive damages awards. Specifically, the Court has placed strong due
process limits on punitive damages, it has given no content to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, and it has retreated from earlier constraints in its
latest dormant commerce clause decision. Part IV will then propose that
the Court adopt consistent, moderate constitutional constraints on horizontal federalism based on the Constitution's structural provisions that
limit a state's ability to extend its laws beyond its authority but that do
not interfere with a state's proper sovereignty.

I. DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON STATE'S ABILITY TO IMPOSE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Co.
A. Due ProcessLimits in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
25
v. Campbell 24 and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
The only area in which the Rehnquist Court has placed significant
limits on a state's authority to interfere with other states' powers involves whether state court punitive damages awards violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26 In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court struck down an Alabama court's award of
punitive damages against an automobile distributor for repainting a new
car without disclosing the repainting to the purchaser. 27 BMW had repainted the top, hood, trunk, and quarter panels of the car at a cost of
$601.37, which constituted approximately 1.5 percent of the suggested
retail price. 8 At that time, BMW had a nationwide policy that, if the
repair cost did not exceed three percent of the suggested retail price,
BMW sold the car as new without telling the dealer that repairs had been
24.
123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
25.
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
26. See Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1517, 1522-23, 1526; Gore, 517 U.S. at 567-68; see also
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (concluding that the
court of appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when reviewing a district court's determination of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 334 (1998) (concluding that a punitive forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause because it
was grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993) (holding that the punitive damages award did not violate due
process); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (recognizing that although the
punitive damages assessed were large in proportion to the compensatory damages, they did not
violate due process).
27.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 563, 585.
28.
Id. at 563-64, 563 n.1.

294

DENVER UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

made. 29 The jury returned a verdict against BMW for $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages. 3° The Alabama
Supreme Court reduced the punitive damages to $2,000,000. 3 1 The
United States Supreme Court reversed.32
Similarly, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, the Court held that a punitive damages award of $145,000,000
involving a $1,000,000 compensatory award in a Utah case against an
insurance company for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress violated the Due Process Clause.33 Campbell was involved
in an automobile accident in which one person was killed and another
was permanently disabled. 34 Although the parties reached an early consensus that Campbell was at fault, Campbell's insurance company, State
Farm, decided to contest liability and refused offers to settle for the policy limits. 35 The jury found against Campbell and awarded $185,849 to
the plaintiffs. State Farm refused to cover any excess liability, and it told
the Campbells, "[y]ou may want to put for sale signs on your property to
get things moving. ' 36 In addition, State Farm refused to post a supersedeas bond to allow Campbell to appeal.37
After the appellate court denied Campbell's appeal, State Farm paid
the entire amount, including the excess liability. 38 However, the Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.3 9 The trial court granted summary judgment for State
Farm because it had paid the excess amount, but an appellate court reversed.40 On remand, the trial court refused State Farm's motion to exclude evidence of alleged conduct that occurred in unrelated cases outside the state. 4' However, it reduced the jury award of $2,600,000 in
compensatory damages and $145,000,000 in punitive damages to
$1,000,000 and $25,000,000, respectively.42 Applying the test the United
States Supreme Court had developed in Gore, the Utah Supreme Court
reinstated the $145,000,000 punitive damages award.4 3 The United States
Supreme Court reversed on due process grounds. 44

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 563.
Id. at 565.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 621 (Ala. 1994).
Gore, 517 U.S. at 586.
Campbell, 123 S.Ct. at 1517-18, 1526.
Id. at 1517.
Id. at 1517-18.
Id. at 1518 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1519.
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1147-48 (Utah 2001).
Campbell, 123 S.Ct. at 1526.
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In punitive damages cases, the Court begins with the principle that
"[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition., 45 "Only when an award can fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness
46
that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. The Court's Due Process Test for Punitive Damages Cases
In determining a state's legitimate interest in imposing punitive
damages, the Court makes two due process inquiries: (1) whether a state
has exceeded its legislative authority 47 and (2) whether the defendant had
fair warning "'not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.'48
The first inquiry concerns horizontal federalism-a state's power to extend its laws into other states. The second inquiry involves fairnessnotice and the severity of the punishment in relation to the misconduct.
The Court begins the first inquiry by looking at a basic tenet of federalism-that states may reasonably differ in their policy judgments.49
For example, in Gore, the Court found "a patchwork of rules representing the diverse policy judgments of lawmakers in 50 States., 50 The Court
has stated the basic principle of state sovereignty: "No State can legislate
except with reference to its own jurisdiction .... Each State is independent of all the others in this particular.' If a uniform national policy is
desired, Congress has the power to enact such a policy, but "it is clear
that no single State could do so, or even impose its own policy choice on
neighboring States., 52 "While each State has ample power to protect its
own consumers, none may use the punitive damages deterrent as a means
of imposing its regulatory policies on the entire Nation. 5 3 Accordingly,

45. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568; see also Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1519-20 (noting that although
states have discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, there are procedural and substantive
constitutional limits on these awards).
46. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568; see also Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1519-20 (noting that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary awards).
47.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1521-23; Gore, 517 U.S. at 571.
48.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1520 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 574).
49. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
50. Id. at 570. For instance, some states have protected their citizens by requiring notice of
presale repairs that affect a car's value through legislation, while others have done so judicially. Id.
at 569. Other states may not have disclosure requirements if they believe they are unnecessary because of the automobile trade's self-interest in customer goodwill or if they believe the administrative costs of full disclosure would raise car prices. Id. at 570. Finally, other states may want some
disclosure requirements, but want to exempt minor repairs. Id.
51.
Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881).
52. Gore, 517 U.S. at 571.
53. Id. at 585.
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"[a] State cannot punish54 a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred.,
In addition, a state does not have a legitimate interest in imposing
punitive damages on a defendant for unlawful conduct outside that state,
and any such adjudication would require the inclusion of the affected
parties and the application of the relevant states' laws.55 Consequently, as
the Court stated in Gore, "one State's power to impose burdens on the
interstate market for automobiles is not only subordinate to the federal
power over interstate commerce, but is also constrained by the need to
respect the interests of other States." 56 The Court has declared: "We
think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that
a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with
the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States. 57
Punishing a person for doing what the' 58law allows him to do "is a due
process violation of the most basic sort.
In Gore, the plaintiff contended that the large punitive damages
award was needed to cause BMW to change its nationwide nondisclosure
policy. 59 However, the Court found that "by attempting to alter BMW's
nationwide policy, Alabama would be infringing on the policy choices of
other States., 60 Alabama can only further its interest in protecting its own
consumers and its own economy; it lacks the power to punish conduct
that was lawful where it occurred and that did not affect Alabama or its
residents.61 Similarly, in Campbell, the Court thought that the case "was
used as a platform to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of
State Farm's operations throughout the country. 62 The Court averred:
"From their opening statements onward the Campbells framed this case
as a chance to rebuke State Farm for its nationwide activities. 6 3
The second half of the due process inquiry regarding punitive damages involves fair warning and the prevention of the arbitrary deprivation
of property. 64 The Court opined: "Indeed, the point of due process-of
the law in general-is to allow citizens to order their behavior. A State
can have no legitimate interest in deliberately making the law so arbi-

54.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1522; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 572-73 (concluding that Alabama cannot punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred).
55.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1522.
56.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 571 (internal citations omitted).
57.
Id. at 572.
58.
Id. at 573 n. 19 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
59.
Id. at 572.
60.
Id.
61.
Id. at 572-73.
62.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
63. Id. at 1522.
64. Id. at 1520.
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trary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon
bias or whim." 65 Similarly, Justice Breyer has declared:
This constitutional concern, itself harkening back to the Magna
Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life,
liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal
processes, but of arbitrary coercion. Requiring the application of law,
rather than a decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide
citizens notice of what actions may subject them to punishment; it
also helps to assure the uniform general treatment
of similarly situ66
ated persons that is the essence of law itself.
He continued: "Legal standards need not be precise in order to satisfy
this constitutional concern. .

.

.But they must offer some kind of con-

straint upon a jury or court's discretion, and thus protection against
purely arbitrary behavior., 67 The imposition of punitive damages implicates such concerns when they are determined with vague jury instructions or evidence that has little bearing on the amount that should be
awarded.68
The fair notice inquiry used by the Rehnquist Court involves a
three-part test: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered
by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 69 Concerning the first factor, degree of reprehensibility, "exemplary damages imposed on a defendant should reflect 'the enormity of his offense"' and "the accepted view
that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others., 70 A court should
determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether:
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident; and the harm was71the result of intentional malice, trickery,
or deceit, or mere accident.

65.
Id. at 1520 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
66.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted); see Campbell,
123 S. Ct. at 1520.
67.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 588.
68.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1520.
69.
Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
70.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
71.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

The Court added: "The existence of any one of these factors weighing in
favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages
72
award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.
Concerning the second factor, the disparity between compensatory
and punitive damages, the Court declared, "[t]he principle that exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to compensatory
damages has a long pedigree."73 Although a court cannot draw a brightline with this factor, "[w]hen the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1, however, the award must surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow."'74 In
addition, when there are substantial compensatory damages, a lesser ratio
between punitive damages and compensatory damages may be required.75
Finally, concerning the third factor, sanctions for comparable misconduct, the Court has stated that courts should "'accord 'substantial
deference' to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for
the conduct at issue.', 76 Moreover, "[g]reat care must be taken to avoid
use of the civil process to access criminal penalties that can be imposed
been obonly after the heightened protections of a criminal trial have
77
proof.
of
standards
higher
its
course,
of
including,
served,
2. Application of the Court's Punitive Damages Test in Campbell
and Gore
The punitive damages in Campbell failed the three-part test. 78 First,
the Court held that the reprehensibility guidepost did not justify the imposition of such large punitive damages. 79 As stated above, the existence
of out-of-state conduct cannot support punitive damages, and much of
the award in this case was based on out-of-state conduct. 80 Moreover,
much of the alleged conduct was unrelated to the plaintiffs' harm. 8 The
Court asserted: "A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts
upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct that
82
harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business.
Furthermore, the Court felt that the Campbells had not presented sufficient evidence to establish that State Farm was a recidivist. 83 The Court
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
Inc., 492
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 580.
Id. at 583 (quoting TXO, 590 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
Id. at 1521.
Id.
Id. at 1521-22.
Id. at 1523.
Id.
Id.
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concluded: "The reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to
expand the scope of the case so that a defendant may be punished for any
malfeasance .... 8 4
Second, the Court believed there was a presumption against the
constitutionality of punitive damages with a "145-to-i" punitive to compensatory damages ratio. 85 The Court also thought the compensatory
damages in this case included a punitive element; the trial court had
awarded the Campbells $1,000,000 in damages for eighteen months of
emotional distress.86 The Court also rejected arguments that the damages
were justified because State Farm had significant assets.87 Finally, the
significant disparity between the punitive damages and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases failed the third factor.88 The
Court stated that "[t]he most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law
for the wrong done to the Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine for an
act of fraud, an amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages
award. 89
The punitive damages in Gore also failed the three-part test.90 First,
the Court held that there were no aggravating factors present that were
related to reprehensible conduct. 91 The harm was wholly economic; the
repainting had no effect on the car's performance or safety.92 The Court
asserted: "That conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to give rise to tort
liability, and even a modest award of exemplary damages does not establish the high degree of culpability that warrants a substantial punitive
damages award., 93 Second, the Court felt that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was excessive.94 The punitive damages
award was 500 times the compensatory damages award, and there was no
evidence that Gore or any other BMW buyer was subject to additional
harm by the nondisclosure. 95 Finally, concerning sanctions for comparable conduct, the $2,000,000 punitive damages award was substantially96
greater than statutory fines in Alabama or other states for this conduct.
Significantly, "at the time BMW's policy was first challenged, there does
not appear to have been any judicial decision in Alabama or elsewhere
indicating that application of that policy might give rise to such severe
84.
85.
86.
87.
punitive
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1524.
Id.
Id. at 1524-25.
Id. at 1525 ("The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional
damages award.").
Id. at 1526.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 580-83.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583-84.
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punishment., 97 The Court concluded: "We cannot... accept the conclusion of the Alabama Supreme Court that BMW's conduct was sufficiently egregious to justify a punitive sanction that is tantamount to a
severe criminal penalty. 98
B. Evaluation of the Court's Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages
There are obviously some due process limits on a state's ability to
impose punitive damages, 99 and the Court's three-part test is an effective
means of evaluating those restrictions. However, some of the Court's
reasoning in Campbell and Gore is faulty, especially concerning the reason the Due Process Clause constrains horizontal federalism.
Concerning the first part of the Court's due process analysiswhether a state has exceeded its legitimate authority under the Due Process Clause-the Court has wrongly stated that the due process test concerns whether a state has burdened interstate commerce, whether a state
has imposed its policy choice on neighboring states, and whether a state
has respected other states' interests.l°° As has been demonstrated in personal jurisdiction cases and choice of law scholarship, due process has
nothing to do with state interests,' 0 ' and it certainly has nothing to do
with interstate commerce.10 2 Rather, the Due Process Clause concerns the
relationship between the state and the individual. 0 3 The Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the Commerce Clause govern the relationship of the
states and interstate commerce, respectively.l°4
Nevertheless, the Court is correct in finding that the Due Process
Clause affects horizontal federalism. 0 5 However, it does so by its regulation of the relationship of the state and the individual. As Professor Terry
Kogan has declared: "In the context of legislative jurisdiction, the Constitution should be viewed as primarily concerned with protecting individuals, not states, from overreaching by other states."' 6 The Rehnquist
97. Id. at 584.
98. Id. at 585.
99.
See, e.g., id. at 562 (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 454) (noting that the "Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from imposing a 'grossly excessive' punishment on a
tortfeasor").
100.
Id. at 571; see supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
101.
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10
(1982); EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS: A
MULTILATERALIST METHOD 67-68 (2001) [hereinafter FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW]; see also

Martin H. Redish, Federalism, Due Process, and PersonalJurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation,
75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1113-14 (1981) (discussing the Due Process Clause as a shield against
individual injustices).
102.
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (explaining that the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause differ in several ways).
103.
See Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Choice of Law: The Priorityof Fairness
over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 694 n.230 (1987); Martin H. Redish, ProceduralDue Process
and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 18, 25 (1996).

104.
105.
106.

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; id. art. I,
See Gore, 517 U.S. at 572.
Kogan, supra note 103, at 694 n.230.
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Court has recognized this in cases that involved whether the court can
impose a tax on an individual or a corporation under the Due Process
Clause: "The Due Process Clause requires some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax, and that the income attributed to the State for tax
purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing
State."' 10 7 Concerning the first part of the above, the Court has asserted:
"[T]he due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an individual's connections with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the
State's exercise of power over him."'' 0 8 The Court has made similar
statements concerning due process in personal jurisdiction cases: "The
restriction on state sovereignty power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.... must be seen as ultimately a function
of the individual
' 9
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause."'
Viewed as a due process constraint on a state's ability to impose its
laws on an individual's conduct outside that state, the restrictions in
Campbell and Gore make sense. Under the Due Process Clause, the
statement that "[n]o state can legislate except with reference to its own
jurisdiction. . . . Each state is independent of all others in this particular" ' 0 is true because a state lacks the power to impose its law on an
individual when there is not a sufficient connection between the state and
that individual's conduct."' Accordingly, it is not that a state cannot impose its policy choices on another state under the Due Process Clause,12
but that a state lacks the power to hold a defendant liable for actions in
another state based on the first state improperly applying its laws to the
defendant's actions in the second state." 3 Moreover, the federal courts
must enforce this right because a state cannot determine disinterestedly
whether it has exceeded its authority.
A state obviously should lack the power to penalize an individual
for conduct that is lawful in another state by imposing punitive damages.
A state should also not be able to calculate punitive damages based on
conduct that is unlawful in another state under the Due Process Clause.
This is true partially because, as the Court noted in Campbell, such a
determination should require the inclusion of the affected parties and the
application of the relevant state's laws.' 14 Without the joinder of all affected parties, a defendant could be subject to multiple liability for the
same conduct and other parties' rights might be compromised. More
107.
108.
109.
110.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 312.
Ins. Corp. oflr., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 571 (quoting Bonaparte, 104 U.S. at 594).

111.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.

112.
113.
114.

But see Gore, 517 U.S. at 571.
See id. at 572-73.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1522 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-

22(1985)).
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fundamentally, calculating punitive damages based on conduct occurring
in other states allows a state to transfer resources belonging to citizens of
that state to its own citizens. Damages from wrongful conduct in a state
should go to the citizens of that state, not citizens in another state who
have no connection to that state. Certainly, a state has no interest-and
under the Due Process Clause, no power-to protect consumers in other
states,' 5 and it has no authority to bring damages from out-of-state misconduct into its jurisdiction to enrich its residents. Finally, because states
differ on their criteria for awarding punitive damages," 16 when a court
awards punitive damages based on unlawful conduct in another state, it
has usurped the other state's authority to set the rules for giving punitive
damages, 117 and, more importantly for due process, it has imposed the
wrong rules on an individual.
One might argue that, without a state's ability to impose punitive
damages on a tortfeasor's nationwide, wrongful conduct, proper deterrence will not occur. However, the Constitution has bestowed the power
to regulate nationwide conduct on Congress, not on the states, under the
Commerce Clause. 1 8 It is up to Congress to act when a nationwide solution is required.
Equally important, states can reasonably differ over policies. Allowing different state policies is one of the virtues of our federal system; it
permits an individual to move to a state that has laws that are most in
accord with his or her views. As Professor Barry Friedman has written:
"[Federalism enhances our lives by preserving and creating diversity."" 9 Professor Laycock has similarly observed: "Territorial bounda115.
Cf Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) ("A State does not acquire power of
supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its
own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State."); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
644 (1982) ("While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has no
legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders."). But see Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritorialitand PoliticalHeterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 891-96 (2002)
(arguing that Bigelow is limited "to mean that the Home State's police powers do not extend to the
extraterritorial regulation of matters that the Constitution prohibits Home States from banning").
As Margaret Meriwether Cordray has observed:
116.
Laws regulating the various aspects of punitive damages vary dramatically from state to
state. States employ different substantive tests for finding a defendant liable for punitive
damages, different standards of proof that must be met, and different procedures for determining whether to grant a punitive award. Some states have even prohibited punitive
damages almost entirely, and others have placed relatively strict caps on the amount that
may be awarded.
Margaret Meriwether Cordray, The Limits of State Sovereignty and the Issue of Multiple Punitive
Damages Awards,78 OR. L. REV. 275, 307 (1999).
117.
Gore,517 U.S. at 572.
Seeid.at571.
118.
119.
Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 402 (1997); see also United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In this circumstance, the
theory and utility of our [vertical] federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from
clear."); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest

2003]

HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM

ries between states and their law support the role of law as enforcer of
strongly held norms."'' 20 For example, Vermont has recently given gay
and lesbian couples that right to enter into domestic partnerships,' 2'
while no other state offers recognition to such relationships. Thus, gay
and lesbian couples who want to enter into domestic partnerships can
move to Vermont. Likewise, some individuals might want the freedom to
own guns, while others might want the protection of gun control laws.
Similarly, some states might want strong medical malpractice laws,
while other states might feel that some relief from high malpractice
awards improves healthcare by encouraging the best doctors to practice
in the state. Even when states agree on policies, they can disagree on
how those policies should be enforced. 122 For example, one jurisdiction
might want to control guns through prohibition; another through registration.
The other half of the Court's due process evaluation of punitive
damages awards-fair warning and the avoidance of arbitrariness-is
correct. It is the essence of due process that a person receive notice of
what conduct is forbidden and the penalty for violations so that he can
order his life and activities.123 As Justice Scalia has observed,
"[r]udimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have
the means of knowing what it prescribes."' 124 In most punitive damages
cases, there are few guidelines to restrict juries, and, thus, a defendant
has little warning of the extent of the damages.125 For example, as noted
above, when BMW's policy was first challenged in Gore, there did not
appear to be any judicial decision in Alabama or any state that suggested
26
that the use of the policy might subject BMW to severe punishment.
of the country."); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standardof Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 150 (2001). Professors Baker and Young similarly note: "[S]tate-bystate diversity generally will allow government to accommodate the preferences of a greater proportion of the electorate, as long as those preferences are unequally distributed geographically." Id.
They add that "[gliven the unpredictability of national elections over the long term, the rational and
risk-averse position, even for those who believe there are 'right answers' to important questions of
social policy, is to favor states' rights." Id. at 153; see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1503-04 (1987) ("The liberty that is
protected by federalism is not the liberty of the apodictic solution, but the liberty that comes from
diversity coupled with mobility.") [hereinafter McConnell, The Founders' Design].
120.
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 318 (1992).
121.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2003).
122.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("While it is doubtful that any State, or
indeed any reasonable person, would argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on
school premises, considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal.").
123.
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-40 (2d ed. 1969); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989).
124.
Scalia, supra note 123, at 1179.
125.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The standards the Alabama courts applied
here are vague and open ended to the point where they risk arbitrary results.... This is because the
standards, as the Alabama Supreme Court authoritatively interpreted them here, provided no significant constraints or protection against arbitrary results.").
126. Id. at 584.
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The fair warning requirement also helps assure that similarly situated
persons will be treated similarly. 27 As Justice Jackson stated, "there is
no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
officials
government than to require that the principles of law which
28
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally."'
At first glance, this second part of the due process inquiry regarding
punitive damages seems to have little to do with horizontal federalism.
However, fair warning and the avoidance of arbitrariness relate to horizontal federalism. As noted above, a state should not impose liability on
an individual without fair warning.129 When a state calculates punitive
damages based on conduct that is lawful in another state, the defendant
has not been given fair warning of potential liability. This is also true
when a court imposes punitive damages for unlawful conduct in another
state when the compensatory damages involve only conduct that occurred in the forum state. In such circumstances, a defendant is subject to
the whim of the court, and it cannot order its conduct with any certainty. 130
Moreover, arbitrary punitive damages awards-awards that exceed
a state's need to protect its interests and its citizens' interests-allows a
state to impose its views on other states and to reap benefits for its citizens beyond those to which they are entitled. Similarly, such awards
place unfair burdens on out-of-state defendants.' 3' Finally, such awards
force other states to adopt similarly aggressive schemes in "a race to the
bottom."
The three-part test effectively evaluates the above concerns, including those of horizontal federalism. First, evaluating the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct insures that a state is not reaping
damages that belong to other states and that it is not exploiting out-ofstate defendants for its unjustified benefit. This factor prevents punitive
damages from being based on out-of-state conduct, and it ensures that the
1 32 Second, conpunishment "reflect[s] 'the enormity of [the] offense."'
sidering the ratio between the punitive damages and the compensatory
damages serves a similar function. A too great ratio indicates that a state
is not just trying to further its legitimate interest but instead is attempting
to exploit benefits that belong to other states. Finally, it should be obvious that punitive damages in a civil suit should not exceed legislatively
mandated civil and criminal penalties.
127. Id. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring).
128. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Gore, 517 U.S. at 574.
129.
See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130.
Even unpopular defendants, such as corporations, deserve to be treated in a fair and con131.
stitutional manner.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,371 (1851)).
132.
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The Rehnquist Court has not extended its due process limits on punitive damages to other areas of the law, even areas where one might
argue that one state is imposing its policy on other states. 133 From this,
one can conclude that the Court's focus is on limiting the size of punitive
damages, not horizontal federalism. Thus, Campbell and Gore are
anomalies in horizontal federalism, with their results dictated by a purpose other than horizontal federalism. As discussed in more detail below,
this author rejects such inconsistency in constitutional adjudication. If
due process limits are justifiable in punitive damages cases, they are justifiable in other cases in which a state has unreasonably extended its laws
beyond its borders to burden individuals.
II. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT LIMITS ON HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM

Theoretically, the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects a state's
134
sovereignty by requiring other states to respect its laws and judgments.
However, the Rehnquist Court has given little content to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause concerning choice of law, and it has created confusing
exceptions to the full faith and credit due judgments.
A. The Rehnquist Court'sAnalysis of the Full Faith and CreditClause
1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause and Choice of Law
In Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt,135 the Court held that Nevada
could refuse to extend full faith and credit to California's sovereign immunity statute in a case involving alleged tortious acts in Nevada by the
California Franchise Tax Board (CFrB). 13 6 Hyatt had filed a part-year
resident income tax form with California for 1991, claiming that he had
ceased to be a California resident on October 1, 1991, shortly before he
received licensing fees for patents. 137 The CFTB performed an audit, and
it determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 3, 1992.138
The CFTB issued notices of proposed assessments 139
for income taxes for
1991 and 1992, and it imposed substantial penalties.
Hyatt filed an administrative protest in California and brought suit
in Nevada state court against the CFTB claiming invasion of privacy,
outrageous conduct, abuse of process, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. 140 The CFTB filed motions for summary judgment and, in the
alternative, for dismissal in the Nevada case for lack of subject matter

133. See infra Part IV.C.1 for a detailed discussion for other areas in which the Court should
apply greater due process constraints.
134.
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
135.
123 S. Ct. 1683 (2003).
136.
Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1685.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.

Id- at 16895-86
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jurisdiction, arguing that sovereign immunity, full faith and credit, choice
of law, comity, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies required
Nevada to apply California's sovereign immunity statute. 14' The trial
court denied the motion, and Hyatt filed a writ of mandamus with the
Nevada Supreme Court. 42 The Nevada Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the
CFTB. 143
On rehearing, however, the Nevada Supreme Court granted the petition in part and denied it in part, holding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the negligence claim under comity, 44 but that the intentional tort claims could be tried.' 45 The court noted that, while Nevada
had not conferred immunity on its state agencies for intentional torts
committed within the scope of employment, California had. 146 The court
held that giving California immunity for intentional torts contravened
Nevada public policy because Nevada does not afford such immunity
and Nevada has an interest in protecting its citizens from intentional torts
committed by sister state governmental employees. 147 Thus, according to
the court, Nevada's policy in protecting its citizens outweighed California's policy conferring sovereign immunity on its state taxation
agency.148
The United States Supreme Court evaluated the case under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, which provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."'' 49 The Court emphasized that "[w]hereas the
full faith and credit command 'is exacting' with respect to '[a] final
judgment . . . rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the
subject matter and persons governed by the judgment,'. . . it is less demanding with respect to choice of laws."' 150 The Court noted that "[w]e
have held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a
Id. at 1686. California's sovereign immunity statute reads:
141.
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by:
(a) Instituting any judicial or administrative proceeding or action for or incidental to the
assessment or collection of a tax.
(b) An act or omission in the interpretation or application of any law relating to a tax.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 860.2 (West 1995).
142. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1686.
Id.
143.
Id. at 1686-87 (stating that comity is "an accommodation policy, under which the courts
144.
of one state voluntarily give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state out of deference
" (internal quotations omitted)).
and respect, to promote harmonious interstate relations ....
Id. at 1686.
145.
Id.
146.
Id. at 1687 ("With respect to the intentional torts, however, the court held that 'affording
147.
[CFTB] statutory authority ... does contravene Nevada's policies and interests in this case."' (citation omitted)).
148.

Id.

149.
150.

Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
Id. (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998)).
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subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate." ' '5 The
Court then found that Nevada was competent to legislate with respect to
intentional torts occurring within its borders.15 2 Next, the Court reaffirmed the standard that earlier courts had applied to choice of law cases,
specifically: "'[F]or a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.""0 53 The
Court felt that Nevada had significant contacts to employ its law because
the alleged injury and54some of the conduct that caused that alleged injury
occurred in Nevada. 1
The CFTB had urged the Court "to adopt a 'new rule' mandating
that a state court extend full faith and credit to a sister State's statutorily
recaptured sovereign immunity from suit when a refusal to do so would
'interfer[e] with a State's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities."'" 55 The Court declined to adopt this rule. 156 It observed that it
had considered the question of whether full faith and credit requires the
courts of one state to recognize the sovereign immunity of another state
in Nevada v. Hall.157 In that case, a Nevada employee had been involved
in an automobile accident in California, and California had refused to
select a Nevada statute that capped damages against Nevada. 158 The
Court affirmed, holding that the Constitution does not confer sovereign
immunity on a state when sued in the courts of another state. 159 Hyatt had
not asked the Court to reexamine this ruling.16°
The Court then concentrated on the second aspect of Hall, that a
state does not have to respect another state's sovereign immunity when it
would violate the first state's legitimate public policy.' 6' The Court had
stated in a footnote in Hall:
California's exercise of jurisdiction in this case poses no substantial threat to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism.
151.
Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988)).
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)).
154. Id. at 1688.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1688-89 ("[A]cknowledging this shift, CFTB contends that this case demonstrates
the need for a new rule under the Full Faith and Credit Clause .... We disagree.").
157. Id. at 1689 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)).
158.
Hall, 440 U.S. at 411-12.
159.
Id. at 426-27.
160.
Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689. The Court declined the invitation of the amici states to do so. Id.
I believe the petitioner wrongly argued the case when it refused one of the justice's invitation to ask
the Court to overrule Hall. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 02-42),
available in 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 12, at *2-3 (Feb. 24, 2003). In his dissent in Hall, thenJustice Rehnquist had made a sovereign immunity argument very similar to the one the Court later
adopted in Alden and its progeny. Compare Hall, 440 U.S. at 432-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), with
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
161.
Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689.
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Suits involving traffic accidents occurring outside of Nevada could
hardly interfere with Nevada's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign
responsibilities. We have no occasion, in this case, to consider
whether different state policies, either of California162or of Nevada,
might require a different analysis or a different result.
The Court refused to adopt the CFTB's proposed rule primarily because of its past experience in balancing interests under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.' 6 The Court observed that it had abandoned a balancing of interests approach to conflict of laws under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause because of the lack of guiding standards.' 64 Instead, the
Court declared that "'it is frequently the case under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause that a court can lawfully
apply either the law of one State
65
or the contrary law of another.""
The Court thought that, since a suit against a state in another state's
court implicates the power of both sovereigns, "the question of which
sovereign interest should be deemed more weighty is not one that can be
easily answered."' 66 The Court also noted that in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan TransitAuthority'67 it had rejected a rule of state sovereign
immunity from federal regulation depending on whether the function was
"integral" or "traditional" on the ground that the rule was unsound and
unworkable. 68 The Court also believed that there was not a significant
distinction between Nevada's interest in tort claims arising out of its employee's automobile accident at issue in Hall, and California's interest in
tort claims arising out of its tax collection agency's audit in the instant
case. 169 The Court asserted that "[t]o the extent CFTB complains of the
burdens and expense of out-of-state litigation, and the diversion of state
resources away from the performance of important state functions, those
burdens do not distinguish this case from' 7 any other out-of-state lawsuit
against California or one of its agencies." 1 0
The Court observed:
States' sovereignty interests are not foreign to the full faith and
credit command. But we are not presented here with a case in which
a State has exhibited a policy of hostility to the public Acts of a sister
State. The Nevada Supreme Court sensitively applied principles of
comity with a healthy regard for California's sovereign status, relying

162.
163.
164.
opinion)).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Hall, 440 U.S. at 424 n.24.
Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689.
Id. at 1688 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (plurality
Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co., 486 U.S. at 727).
Id. at 1689.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689 (citing Garcia,469 U.S. at 546-47).
Id. at 1690.
Id.
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on the contours of Nevada's own sovereign immunity from suit as a
benchmark for its analysis. 7 '
The Court concluded that "[w]ithout a rudder to steer us, we decline
to embark on the constitutional course of balancing coordinate States'
to resolve conflicts of laws under the Full
competing sovereign interests
172
Clause."'
Credit
and
Faith
2. Exceptions to Full Faith and Credit for Judgments.
In addition to giving the Full Faith and Credit Clause little content
in Hyatt, the Court in Baker v. General Motors Corp. created an exception to full faith and credit for judgments. 173 The majority stated the issue
as "the authority of one State's court to order that a witness' testimony
shall not be heard in any court of the United States.'

74

In a Michigan lawsuit, which involved a wrongful discharge claim
by a "whistle blower," GM paid Ronald Elwell, a former GM employee,
an undisclosed sum of money for which the parties entered into a permanent injunction. 75 The injunction prohibited Elwell from "testifying,
without the prior written consent of [GM] ....

as ... a witness of any

kind ...in any litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future, involving [GM] as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer .... GM
also agreed that if Elwell were compelled to testify by a court, such testimony would not violate the injunction. 77 Thereafter, in a Missouri lawsuit (Baker), the plaintiffs, who were not parties to the Michigan lawsuit,
subpoenaed Elwell to testify in a product liability action.1 78 The Court
held that the Full Faith and Credit79Clause did not preclude Elwell's testimony before the Missouri court. 1
The Court stated that a final judgment, rendered with proper jurisdiction, "qualifies for recognition throughout the land."' 80 The Court also
noted that there is no public policy exception to the full faith and credit
due judgments.' 8' Moreover, the Court felt that full faith and credit applies to equity judgments (e.g., injunctions), as well as to money judgments.182 However, the Court thought that full faith and credit does not
require states to "adopt the practices of other States regarding the time,

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Id.
Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 226 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 233.

181.

Id.

182.

Id. at 234.
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manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments." 183 The Court noted
that the preclusive effects of a judgment are different from the enforcement measures for that judgment in that the latter are under the control of
the enforcing forum law.' 84 The Court noted:
Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish an official act within the exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation over which the ordering State had no authority.
Thus, a sister State's decree concerning land ownership in another
State has been held ineffective to transfer title .... 185
Similarly, antisuit injunctions do not control a86 second state court's actions concerning litigation in the second court.'
Concerning the current suit, the Court declared:
Michigan's judgment, however, cannot reach beyond the ElwellGM controversy to control proceedings against GM brought in other
States, by other parties, asserting claims the merits of which Michigan has not considered. Michigan has no power over those parties,
and no basis for commanding them to become intervenors in the Elwell-GM dispute. Most essentially, Michigan lacks authority to control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought by
strangers to the Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves
evidence is relevant
what witnesses are competent to testify and8 what
7
and admissible in their search for the truth.1
The Court stated, that while the Michigan injunction could prevent Elwell from volunteering to testify, it could not determine evidentiary issues in another state's courts. 188 The Court concluded by noting that
"Michigan has no authority to shield a witness from another jurisdiction's subpoena power in a case involving persons and causes outside
Michigan's governance .... [A] Michigan decree cannot command obedience elsewhere
on a matter the Michigan court lacks authority to re89
solve."1
B. Evaluationof the Rehnquist Court'sAnalysis of the Full Faithand
Credit Clause
In Hyatt, the Court gave little meaning to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause,' 90 and, in Baker, the Court created a confusing exception to the
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 238 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 239.
Id. at 240-41.
Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1687-90.
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full faith and credit rule for judgments.' 9 1 While this author agrees with
the outcomes in both cases for other reasons, the Court has reaffirmed
questionable precedent and gone beyond what was necessary to decide
both cases.
1. Evaluation of Full Faith and Credit Constraints on Choice of
Law in Hyatt
Hyatt continued the Court's questionable refusal to give the Full
Faith and Credit Clause any content in relation to choice of law. 192 This
approach dates back to the New Deal era when the Court generally rejected constraints on governmental regulation, adopting instead a philosophy of judicial restraint. 193 While most writers have stressed the New
Deal Court's restraint in the areas of substantive due process, federalism,
and delegation, it also occurred in connection with the full faith and
credit clause. 194 As the Court had previously done in other areas of law,
to choice of law and let the
the Court in Hyatt took a hands-off approach
95
state decide when its law should apply.
As noted above, the Court restated that it gives less full faith and
credit to a state's laws than it does to judgments. 96 The problem with
this declaration is that there is nothing in the Constitution that supports
this distinction. 197 The Full Faith and Credit Clause "shall" apply to
"public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings," without exception. 98
Several judges and authors, including the present author, have recently
advocated that all clauses of the Constitution should be given their full
content. 99 For example, Chief Judge Wilkinson has asserted:
Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41.
191.
See FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 101, at 70-71 (criticizing the Court's
192.
treatment of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in connection with choice of law).
193.

G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 155, 215-16 (1988).

194. See, e.g., FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 101, at 16-20.
195. See Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689-90.
196. Id. at 1687; see also Laycock, supra note 120, at 290-95 (arguing that there is no question
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to all types of state law, including statutes, case law,
and judgments).
197. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (making no distinction for judgments).
198. Id.
199. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 894-95 (4th Cir.
1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (finding it "patently inconsistent" for a court to place great
weight on one constitutional provision and little to no weight on others), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTURE 6-7 (1995) [hereinafter REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCTURE]; Baker & Young, supra note

119, at 77-78 ("The fact is that for much of the last century, the Supreme Court, with widespread
academic support, has behaved as if 'constitutional provisions are like the animals in George Orwell's barnyard: some are considerably more equal than others."' (quoting Sanford Levinson &
Ernest A. Young, Who's Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 944
(2001))); Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels, supra note 15, at 486-94 (discussing the inconsistent
enforcement of constitutional provisions associated with "new judicial activism"); Scott Fruehwald,

The Principled and Unprincipled Grounds of the New Federalism: A Callfor Detachment in the
Constitutional Adjudication of Federalism, 53 MERCER L. REV. 811, 825-26 (2002) [hereinafter
Fruehwald, The New Federalism]; Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
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[I]t is hard to understand how one can argue for giving capacious
meanings to some constitutional provisions while reading others out
of the document entirely.. . . It seems patently inconsistent to argue
for a Due Process Clause that means a great deal and a Commerce
Clause that means nothing. How one clause can be robust and the
other anemic 2is
a mystery when both clauses, after all, are part of our
00

Constitution.

Similarly, as Martin Redish has pointed out, "by choosing not to enforce a constitutional limitation on the majoritarian branches because of
disagreement with its social or political purpose or impact, the courts are
engaging in undue judicial activism., 20 1 Likewise, Professor Baker and
Professor Young have observed that "the Constitution does not come
with 'do not enforce' labels attached to some of its provisions. 202 This
principle of enforcement of all constitutional provisions should be applied to give the Full Faith and Credit Clause its full content with all possible applications, judgments, statutes, and case law.20 3
Hyatt has also continued the Court's questionable practice of refusing to balance interests under the Full Faith and Credit Clause or to make
some comparable determination concerning which state has the closest
connection to the case. 204 It is understandable that when two states' interests are nearly equal a court should not balance interests because it is
difficult to make such a determination and both states have a significant
stake in applying their laws. However, when one state's interest is significantly stronger than the other state's interest, the Court can and, as
will be argued below, should balance interests or undertake a similar
evaluation based on connections.0 5 The Court frequently makes fine
distinctions such as deciding whether Congress has acted properly under
its commerce clause powers and other structural clauses.20 6 There is no
and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1304-05 (2001) (discussing judicial construction of the privileges and immunities clause); Laycock, supra note 120, at 267 ("[Wle should
take the whole Constitution seriously. We cannot legitimately pick and choose the clauses we want
enforced."); William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously: A Call to Expand the
Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 154-59, 227-32 (2002) (arguing that the courts should
give effect to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
200. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 894-95 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
201.

REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCTURE, supra note 199, at 164.

202. Baker & Young, supra note 119, at 100.
203. See Laycock, supra note 120, at 290 (arguing that "[als a simple matter of constitutional
text, the Clause must have the same meaning with respect to rules of law [as it does to judgments]").
204. Hyatt, 123 S.Ct. at 1687-88.
205.
Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (making a
similar argument in connection with vertical federalism that "[a]lthough it is the obligation of all
officers of the Government to respect the constitutional design, the federal balance is too essential a
part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit
inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far" (intemal citations omitted)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (discussing the
intricacies and balance of sovereignty between federal and state power).
206. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Of the various structural elements in the Constitution, separation of powers, checks and balances,
judicial review, and federalism, only concerning the last does there seem to be much uncertainty
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reason why the Court cannot do so for the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
As Justice Kennedy has noted, "we are often called upon to resolve questions of constitutional law not susceptible to the mechanical application
of bright and clear lines., 20 7 Also, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
much clearer than other provisions the Court has used to create rights,
such as using the liberty part of the Due Process Clause to create a right
of privacy.20 Moreover, the federal courts need to make the determination of whether a state has exceeded its authority under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause because, as was mentioned earlier in connection with due
process determinations, a state cannot make a disinterested evaluation
concerning whether it has exceeded its authority. Finally, as will be
shown below, this refusal to balance interests was unnecessary because
Nevada had at least an equal, and maybe a greater, interest than California in applying its law to the controversy in Hyatt.
The Court also reaffirmed the questionable standard for evaluating a
state's choice of law from earlier cases, "'[flor a State's substantive law
to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. ' ' '20 9 Because the Court has interpreted "significant contact" to apply to almost anything, a state can (and usually does) apply its
law to a case even when it has a tenuous connection to that matter. For
example, in Allstate, the first case that stated this rule, the Court held that
Minnesota could apply its law to the question of whether uninsured motorist coverage under three automobile insurance policies could be
"stacked"-all three policies paid off to their limits, rather than limiting
recovery to the maximum under one policy. 210 The motorcycle accident
had occurred in Wisconsin, the policy was delivered in Wisconsin, and
all relevant parties lived in Wisconsin at the time of the accident. 2" The
connections with Minnesota were: (1) the decedent worked in Minnesota
and commuted from Wisconsin to Minnesota; (2) Allstate did business in
Minnesota; and (3) the widow moved to Wisconsin after the accident but
before the litigation.2 1 The connections with Minnesota were so weak
respecting the existence, and the content, of standards that allow the Judiciary to play a significant
role in maintaining the design contemplated by the Framers. Although the resolution of specific
cases has proved difficult, we have derived from the Constitution workable standards to assist in
preserving separation of powers and checks and balances.").
207.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Baker & Young, supra note
119, at 93-94 ("[T]he courts have a responsibility to exercise 'reasoned judgment' even when bright" (quoting Washington
line rules are not available to enforce particular constitutional principles ....
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 769 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring))).
208.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; id. amend. XIV; see also Laycock, supra note 120, at 334
(stating that "[tihe Court must make choices with respect to details, but the choices are guided by
concrete principles set forth in the Constitution and the federal structure").
209.
Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1687 (quoting PhillipsPetroleum, 472 U.S. at 818).
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 306-07, 319-20 (1981) (plurality opinion).
210.
Hague, 449 U.S. at 306.
211.
Id. at 313-14, 317-19.
212.
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that it should not have been able to apply its law to the controversy under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. First, all significant connections-the
place of the accident, the place of contracting and delivery, and the parties' domiciles at the time of the accident-were with Wisconsin.2 13 Second, the fact that the decedent worked in Minnesota is irrelevant to an
accident that occurred in another state and an insurance policy that was
entered into in that other state. Third, that Allstate did business in Minnesota is irrelevant; a state cannot apply its law to a party doing business in
a state when that controversy has no connection to that state. Finally, the
fact that a widow moved to another state after an occurrence should not
allow that state to apply its law to a case when it has no other connection
to the matter. With the irrelevant connections to Minnesota and the
strong connections to Wisconsin, the Court in Allstate should have held
that Minnesota adopting its law violated the Full Faith and Credit
Clause-that Minnesota had given no credit to Wisconsin law without
any justification.21 4 However, the Court failed to do so and Hyatt has
exacerbated the mistake by adhering to the Allstate standard.215
Despite the Court's questionable analytical framework, Hyatt's result was correct; Nevada should not have been forced to apply California's sovereign immunity statute in its courts when one of its citizens has
been injured.2 16 First, the Court properly rejected the Franchise Tax
Board's argument that the Court should adopt a new rule "mandating that
a state court extend full faith and credit to a sister State's statutorily recaptured sovereign immunity from suit when a refusal to do so would
interfere with a State's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities., 21 7 There is nothing in the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
support such a narrow rule.21 8 Rather, courts should evaluate full faith
and credit on a case-by-case basis, looking carefully at the laws that are
vying for application. As the Court pointed out, it is hard to say that one
state's interest in protecting its ability to tax with sovereign immunity is
any more
important than another state's interest in protecting its citi2 19
zens.
The main reason that Hyatt came to the correct conclusion was that
Nevada had as strong an interest in applying its law to the case as California did and, perhaps, even a stronger interest. 220 The conduct com213.
Id. at 306.
214.
One might argue that the Allstate outcome was the best decision from a normative viewpoint that an insured who had paid premiums on three policies received the full benefits of those
policies. However, ignoring the Constitution's structural provisions to achieve a socially advantageous outcome in one case is dangerous because it may lead to unprincipled judging in other areas.
215.
See Hyatt, 123 S.Ct. at 1687-88; Hague, 449 U.S. at 320.
216.
See Hyatt, 123 S.Ct. at 1688-89.
217.
Id. at 1688 (internal quotations omitted).
218.
See U.S. CONST.art. IV, § 1.
219.
See Hyatt, 123 S.Ct. at 1690.
220.
See id. at 1687-88 (noting the Nevada Supreme Court's discussion regarding competing
state interests).
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plained of occurred in Nevada.22' Obviously, Nevada should be able to
establish whether conduct occurring within its borders constitutes tortious conduct for which a plaintiff can recover damages. Less obvious,
but equally correct, a state should be able to determine when a government is immune for acts committed within its borders. California should
not be able to extend its sovereign immunity statute to encompass conduct occurring outside California.22 2 If the case had involved tortious
conduct occurring in California sued upon in a Nevada court, Nevada
should enforce the California sovereign immunity, even if the case involved a Nevada citizen, because the tort occurred in California and a
state (here, Nevada) should not be able to protect its citizens from liability for acts occurring outside its borders when that liability does not violate the Constitution. 2 3 But this case did not involve California conduct;
it involved Nevada conduct.224 Accordingly, the Court could have made
its decision without differentiating between law and judgments, refusing
to balance interests under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, or reaffirming
Allstate's questionable rule.
The Court could have dealt with the concerns it voiced in balancing
state interests but still could have given the Full Faith and Credit Clause
content if it had adopted a rule for the full faith and credit evaluation of
state choice of law where a state's choice of law violates the Full Faith
and Credit Clause when another state has a significantly closer connection to the matter. 225 This rule does not require careful evaluation of state
interests when they are virtually the same, but only when one state's
connection to a case is significantly closer than another state's connection. Thus, a state can protect its interests and still give full faith and
credit to other states' laws.
2. Evaluation of the Exceptions to Full Faith and Credit for Judgments in Baker
In Baker, the majority limited the ability of one state's courts to
control litigation in another state's courts through a confusing exception
to the full faith and credit rule for judgments.226 As Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Baker pointed out, the full faith and credit analysis in that
See id. at 1685-86.
221.
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975); see also Cordray, supra note 116, at
222.
293 ("[R]espect for the sovereignty of each individual state demands that all states limit the reach of
their laws and the exercise of their authority to govern within their own boundaries.").
See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824 ("A State does not acquire power or supervision over the
223.
internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be
affected when they travel to that State.").
224.
See Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1685-86.
This author has previously suggested this standard for the full faith and credit (and due
225.
process) evaluation of state choice of law. See, e.g., FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 101,
at 77. The Multistate Tax Commission referred to this standard in its amicus brief in Hyatt. See Brief
of Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Commission at 12 n.20, Hyatt 123 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 02-42).
See Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41.
226.
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case was unnecessary and unfortunate because the matter could have
been settled by establishing the preclusive effect of the Michigan judgment.227 After examining Michigan law, Justice Kennedy concluded:
"The simple fact is that the Bakers were not parties to the Michigan proceedings, and nothing indicates Michigan would make the novel assertion that its earlier injunction binds the Bakers or any other party not then
before it or subject to its jurisdiction. 22 8 He noted that the Michigan
Supreme Court had "twice rejected arguments that injunctions have preclusive effect in later litigation" based in part on the fact that the later
litigation involved new parties.229
In addition, as Justice Scalia observed in his concurrence, no execution may issue on a judgment in a second state until the enforcing party
brings a new suit in the enforcing state. 230 Although this was not done in
Baker, the injunction was not deemed unenforceable on this ground
alone.2 3
The majority opinion allows for the possibility of two significant
and confusing exceptions to the rule that a state must recognize the
judgments of another state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause: (1) a
court may "decline to enforce those judgments purporting to accomplish
an official act within the exclusive province of [a sister] State" and (2)
full faith and credit does not apply to "injunctions interfering with litigation over which the ordering State had no authority., 232 Concerning the
first exception, the Supreme Court acknowledged other cases that upheld
court orders requiring the conveyance of property in other states.233 The
Court had not used the second exception before Baker.234 As Justice
Kennedy argued, such "exceptions to full faith and credit have a potential
for disrupting judgments, and this ought to give us considerable
pause. 235
The question of whether one state must give full faith and credit to
the injunctions of another state's courts in general is unsettled.236 While
227. See id. at 243, 251 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 247 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Full Faith and Credit Clause 'did not make the
judgments of other States domestic judgments to all intents and purposes, but only gave a general
validity, faith, and credit to them, as evidence. No execution can issue upon such judgments without
a new suit in the tribunals of other States."' (quoting Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457,
462-63 (1873))); see also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (noting that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause "does not make a sister-State judgment a judgment in another State").
231.
See Baker, 522 U.S. at 237-41.
232. Id. at 243 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
233.
Id. at 244 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
234. Id.
235.
Id.
236. See generally Katherine C. Pearson, Common Law Preclusion, Full Faithand Credit, and
Consent Judgments: The Analytical Challenge, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 419 (1999) (discussing state
court recognition of consent judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Polly J. Price, Full
Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747 (1998) (discussing the authority of
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has not
the Court has said that the rule for judgments is exacting, 237 this hano
always been true in practice. First, the Supreme Court has not adjudicated all the questions that might arise in connection with the enforcement of judgments, especially equity judgments. As Professor Polly J.
Price has observed, the "expansive use of equitable remedies creates
significant potential for interstate conflict. '' 238 Second, the Supreme
Court has not always given full faith and credit to judgments, including
Baker,239 a consent decree that involved issue preclusion against the federal government, 24 and a case involving successive worker's compensation awards.24' Justice Stone has noted:
As this Court has often recognized, there are many judgments which
need not be given the same force and effect abroad which they have
at home, and there are some, though valid in the state where rendered, to which the full faith and credit clause gives no force elsewhere. In the assertion of rights, defined by a judgment of one state,
within the territory of another, there is often an inescapable conflict
of interest of the two states, and there comes a point beyond which
the imposition of the will of one state beyond its own borders ininfringement of some legitimate domestic interest
volves a forbidden
24 2
of the other.

Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states:
A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be
recognized or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the national policy of full faith and
an improper interference with imporcredit because it would involve243
tant interests of the sister State.
Third, giving exacting full faith and credit to all judgments would violate
the Due Process Clause in certain instances, such as when the judgment
binds persons who were not parties to the original action. 244 Thus, instead
of stating that the rule for full faith and credit is exacting and then creatstate courts to assert equitable remedies that extend beyond state and jurisdictional boundaries);
Stewart E. Sterk, The Muddy Boundaries Between Res Judicata and Full Faith and Credit, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 47 (2001) (discussing the state preclusion doctrine extending beyond state
and jurisdictional boundaries in light of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Chris Heikaus Weaver,
Binding the World: Full Faith & Credit of State CourtAntisuit Injunctions, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
993 (2003) (discussing unsettled question of preclusive effect of state court antisuit injunctions
across state lines).
237. See, e.g., Hyatt, 123 S.Ct. at 1687; Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. But see Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 214 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) (discussing how the "broad language [of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause] has never been applied without limitations").
238. Price, supra note 236, at 748.
239. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41.
240. See United States v. Int'l Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1953).
241.
See Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 286 (1980).
242.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 214-15 (Stone, J., dissenting).
243.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971).

244. The Bakers presented a similar argument to the Supreme Court. See Petitioner's Brief at
12-18, Baker, 522 U.S. 222 (No. 96-653).
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ing confusing exceptions, it might be better to re-examine when a state's
equity judgments should be accorded full faith and credit.
The best way to approach this issue is by asking questions of horizontal federalism. In issuing the injunction, has the court exceeded its
territorial authority? Does the underlying law have proper extraterritorial
effect or does enforcing the injunction involve enforcing another state's
laws? Has the court enjoined an action that is legal in another state? Does
a court in one state have the power to bind parties in another state that
were not parties in the original action? Is a court in one state dictating the
procedures of another state's courts? Does the injunction control activities in another state?
These questions can be combined into one inquiry: Does one state
have a significantly closer connection to the controversy than the other
state? 45 As this author argued above, acts and judgments should be given
the same full faith and credit, and a state should give another state's laws
full faith and credit when the other state has a significantly closer connection to the controversy. The same rule can be applied to judgments.2 46
This will not change the long-standing rule for money judgments-when
a money judgment has been properly rendered, the matter is settled, and
the rendering state has the closest connection to the controversy.247 On

245.
The "significantly" requirement allows for the possibility that two states may have close
connections to the controversy. In such an instance, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not implicated, unless the forum chooses its law because it is state law.
246. One might wonder what effect the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000),
has on the enforcement of judgments. The statute states:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.
Id. This statute obviously extends full faith and credit requirements to federal courts, territories, and
possessions. Whether greater substantive full faith and credit is required than under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause is unclear. If taken literally, the statute would require a state to give the laws or
"acts" of another state the same credit in its courts as it has in its own courts. This might mean that
the other state's law would trump the forum state's law. If taken less literally, the statute would not
allow the choice of law standard in Allstate discussed above. Thus, one can conclude that the modem
court does not seem to give the statute any substantive effect for choice of law beyond that required
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The statute's effect on judgments is also unclear based on recent Supreme Court cases. Although the majority opinions of Baker and Thomas mention the statute, the opinions do not give the
statute any different substantive effect than the constitutional clause. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 231-32;
Thomas, 448 U.S. at 264 n. 1. As Professor Brilmayer has noted, the "apparently clear command" of
the statute does not seem to have prevented courts from ignoring it on occasion. LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 307 (1995).
The real problem, of course, is the typical one of statutory analysis-that when Congress first
enacted the statute it probably did not consider its effect on equity judgments. For purposes of this
Article, I will assume that the full faith and credit statute has the same effect on equity judgments as
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
247.
Professor Sterk has argued that when a money judgment is involved, enforcing other
states' judgments "imposes only weak limits on the sovereign power of a state to control behavior
within its borders" because itinvolves past conduct. Sterk, supra note 236, at 49. In addition, Professor Brilmayer has noted: "Finality dictates that the losing party to a dispute not be able to reopen a
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the other hand, when an equity judgment has been rendered, on-going
conduct is involved, and, if the injunction involves conduct in the enforcing state, the enforcing state should have to give the judgment full faith
and credit only if the rendering state has a significantly closer connection
to the conduct. 48 When a forum refuses to recognize another state's injunction because the forum has the closest connection to the controversy,
it is not interfering with the rendering state's sovereignty because the
state that is refusing to enforce the judgment is regulating conduct within
its sovereignty.
Asking the above questions and applying the significantly closer
connection standard, Baker is an easy case, even if a Michigan court
would have enforced the injunction. First, enforcing the injunction would
bind persons who were not parties to the Michigan litigation. If this were
249
a simple contract, it would not be enforceable against third parties.
Second, Michigan cannot dictate to Missouri its rules of evidence. Third,
the Michigan injunction, if applied, would control activities in Missouri.
As Professor Pearson has observed, "[t]he ElwelI/GM consent judgment
represents a distinct instance in which at least one party intended to affect the important interests of nonparties across the nation ... .250 It
would allow a Michigan lawsuit to silence a whistle blower in Missouri,
as well as the rest of the world. Finally, Missouri has a significantly
closer connection to the questions of whether evidence is admissible and
whether it will enforce a confidentiality agreement in Missouri courts
than does Michigan. Thus, while Michigan does have an interest in enforcing its judgments, that interest does not extend into Missouri to control litigation involving persons not parties to the original action. In
short, Michigan cannot bind the world.
III. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITS ON HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM

A. Introduction
The principal method of regulating horizontal federalism since the
25
1940s has been through the dormant commerce clause. ' This limitation
decision without good reason." BRILMAYER, supra note 246, at 298. This principle of finality does
not apply to future conduct. Id. at 299.
Professor Sterk has argued that judgments should not be enforceable under the Full Faith
248.
and Credit Clause when they involve post-judgment behavior. Sterk, supra note 236, at 107. Judgments, in particular money judgments, usually adjudicate past behavior. Id. at 49. An injunction
judgment, because it controls future behavior, can control a sovereign's ability to regulate activity
within its territory. Id. at 50. Thus, an injunction judgment is like a sister-state act, to which the
courts traditionally give less full faith and credit. Id.
See Pearson, supra note 236, at 420 (noting that consent judgments, like the one involved
249.
in Baker, "are often little more than the parties' contracts, rubber-stamped by the court").
Id. at 451.
250.
The Commerce Clause reads, "[tihe Congress shall have the Power... To regulate Com251.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. "It is long established that,
merce ... among the several States ....
while a literal reading evinces a grant of power to Congress, the Commerce Clause also directly
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determines "[t]he scope of permissible state regulation in the absence of
congressional action. 25 2 It prevents a state from imposing economic
protections based on the concept that the Commerce Clause was intended
to create free trade among the states and eliminate trade barriers. 3 For
example, the Court has used the dormant commerce clause to strike
down a state law limiting the length of trains that pass through a state as
a part of interstate commerce, 254 a state safety regulation that required the
use of contour mud flaps on interstate trucks within the state,255 a state
regulation that set minimum milk prices that out-of-state dealers had to
pay to producers, 256 an Oklahoma statute that required Oklahoma electric
plants to burn a mixture of coal containing at least ten-percent Oklahoma-mined coal,257 and a local ordinance that required all solid waste
generated within the city to pass through that city's new treatment center.258
2 60
Healy v. The Beer Institute259 and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota

show how the Rehnquist Court has regulated horizontal federalism
through the dormant commerce clause. The Court in Healy held that a
limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce." Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992). Several judges and authors, however, have argued that the dormant commerce clause is not supported by the Constitution. E.g., Pharm. Research Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123
S. Ct. 1855, 1878 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("'[Tihe negative Commerce Clause has no basis
in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application."' (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatanna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting))); REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCTURE, supra note 199, at 97-98 ("The dormant
Commerce Clause lacks a foundation or justification in either the Constitution's text or history, and,
despite the efforts of respected constitutional scholars, the clause cannot be satisfactorily rationalized
outside the text of the Constitution."); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 428, 474-85 (1982) (arguing for a "radically diminished role for both the
dormant commerce clause and the Court as its interpreter"). While it is beyond the scope of this
article to consider these arguments in depth, Professor Donald H. Regan has made a convincing
argument concerning the validity of the dormant commerce clause:
There is much evidence that the main point of this grant [of the commerce power]...
was not to empower Congress, but rather to disable the states from regulating commerce
among themselves ....
The framers wanted commerce among the states to be free of
state-originated mercantilist impositions. Giving Congress the power to regulate internal
commerce was one way of denying states that power, under the view, much more natural
to the framers than to us, that granted regulatory powers were exclusive.
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1125 (1986).
252. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.1, at 309 (6th ed.
2000).
253. Id. at 310.
254.
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71, 783-84 (1945) (finding that
the burden on interstate commerce outweighed the state's questionable interest in safety).
255.
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 521-22, 529 (1959) (holding that the
Illinois mud flap law unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce where it conflicted with the
requirements of other jurisdictions).
256.
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 519-20, 527-28 (1935).
257.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 440.
258.
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994) ("[T]he town may
not employ discriminatory regulation to give [the new waste center] an advantage over rival businesses from out of State.").
259. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
260.
504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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Connecticut statute requiring "out-of-state shippers of beer to affirm that
their posted prices for products sold to Connecticut wholesalers are, as of
the moment of posting, no higher than the prices at which those products
are sold in the bordering States of Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode
Island" was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 26' The Court
noted "the Constitution's special concern both with the maintenance of a
national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within
their respective spheres. 26 2 Limits on the extraterritorial effect of state
economic regulation involves three propositions.26 3 First, the Commerce
Clause forbids "the application of a state statute to commerce that takes
place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce
has effects within the State. ' '2 6I In particular, a state may not enact legis265
lation that effectively establishes "'a scale of prices"' for other states.
Second, a statute that has the practical effect of directly controlling
commerce that occurs completely outside a state's borders exceeds the
limits of that state's power, even if the legislature did not intend for the
statute to reach beyond state boundaries.266 Finally, a court evaluates a
statute's effect not only by considering the statute's direct consequences,
but by determining how the statute interacts with legitimate laws of other
states as well. 267 The Commerce Clause "protects against inconsistent
legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into
the jurisdiction of another State," and it "dictates that no State may force
approval in one State before
an out-of-state merchant to seek regulatory
268
another."
in
transaction
a
undertaking
The Court concluded that the Connecticut statute effectively controlled commercial activity wholly outside Connecticut. 269 The Court
declared: "[T]he practical effect of this affirmation law, in conjunction
with the many other beer-pricing and affirmation laws that have been or
might be enacted throughout the country, is to create just the kind of
competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was meant to preclude., 270 Moreover, the statute on its face
bediscriminated against brewers and shippers in interstate commerce
271
beer.
of
or
shippers
brewers
to
interstate
cause it applied entirely

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Healy, 491 U.S. at 326.
Id. at 335-36 (internal footnotes omitted).
Id. at 336.
Id. (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
Id. (quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 528).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 340-41.
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Quill held unconstitutional North Dakota's "attempt to require an
out-of-state mail-order house that [had no] outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use
within the State., 272 In a 1967 case, the Court had held that a "seller
whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier
or the United States mail" lacked sufficient contacts with the state necessary to impose a similar tax requirement.2 73 The Court in Quill refused to
modify this rule despite the "tremendous social, economic, commercial,
and legal innovations" since 1967.274
The Court will uphold "a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge
so long as the 'tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State."' 275 The Court stated that "[t]he first and fourth
prongs, which require a substantial nexus and a relationship between the
tax and state-provided services, limit the reach of state taxing authority
so as to ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate
commerce. ' 276 Although the Court's rule that "a State may compel a
vendor to collect a sales or use tax" turns on the presence of "a small
sales force, plant, or office" in a taxing state may set a bright-line rule.277
Such a bright-line rule "firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate
state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces
litigation concerning those taxes. 278 In addition, if Congress disagrees
279
with this rule, it is free under the Commerce Clause to change it.
280
B. Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh

The Court's most recent dormant commerce clause decision, Walsh,
involved the "Maine Rx" program, enacted in 2000, which primarily
provided discounted drugs to Maine's uninsured, non-Medicaid citizens
through rebates from manufacturers to Maine pharmacies. 8' Under the
program, Maine would try to negotiate with drug manufacturers to provide rebates to fund reduced prices for drugs for program participants.2 82
If a manufacturer refused to enter into such an agreement, it would be
required to obtain prior authorization for its Medicaid sales.28 3 An organization of nonresident drug manufacturers challenged the program's
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 301.
Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
Quill, 504 U.S. at 301-02 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 311 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
Id. at 313.
ld. at 315.
Id.
Id.at 318.
123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003).
Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1860.
Id.
Id.
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constitutionality on the grounds that it was "pre-empted by the federal
284
Medicaid statute" and that it violated the dormant commerce clause.
Maine had created the program to enable its residents to obtain prescription drugs at a reduced price.285 The program's purpose was to enable non-Medicaid participants to purchase drugs at pharmacies discounted to an amount approximately equivalent to the after-rebate price
of Medicaid purchases. 2 The Court described the statute:
The statute provides that any manufacturer or "labeler" selling
drugs in Maine through any publicly supported financial assistance
program [i.e., Medicaid] "shall enter into a rebate agreement" with
the State Commissioner of Human Services (Commissioner). The
Commissioner is directed to use his best efforts to obtain a rebate that
is at least equal to the rebate calculated under the federal program
created pursuant to OBRA 1990. Rebates are to be paid into a fund
administered by the Commissioner, and then distributed to participatto compensate them for selling at discounted
ing pharmacies
287
prices.

Among the penalties for a manufacturer's failure to enter into a rebate
agreement was the imposition of "prior authorization requirements in the
drugs provided
of prescription ,,288
rr
Medicaid program ...for the
•
• • dispensing
proUnder
labelers.
and
by those [nonparticipating] manufacturers
a
not
have
do
who
posed rules, access would be limited to "individuals
289-in
other
comparable or superior prescription drug benefit plan"
words, mainly uninsured Maine citizens.
The trial court granted the manufacturer's motion for a preliminary
injunction on the grounds that "Maine had no power to regulate the
prices paid to drug manufacturers in transactions that occur out of the
State," and "the Medicaid Act pre-empted Maine's Rx Program insofar
as it threatened to impose a prior authorization requirement on nonpar29
ticipating manufacturers.,, 290 The Court of Appeals reversed. ' The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals on both the preemption and
the dormant commerce clause challenges.292
Concerning the dormant commerce clause argument, the manufacturers contended that "the rebate requirement constitutes impermissible
extraterritorial regulation, and second, that it discriminates against inter-

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (West Supp. 2002).
Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1862.
Id. at 1863 (internal citations omitted).
tit. 22, § 2681(7).
Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1863 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1865.
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 85 (1st Cir. 2001).
Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1870-71.
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state commerce in order to subsidize in-state retail sales., 293 The Court
rejected both arguments. 294 Concerning the first contention, the Court
declared, "unlike price control or price affirmation statutes, 'the Maine
Act does not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by
its express terms or by its inevitable effect.', 295 Maine neither requires
that drug manufacturers sell to wholesalers at a fixed price, nor is it tying
the price of Maine products to out-of-state prices.296 Concerning the second contention, the manufacturers relied on West Lynn Creamery,Inc. v.
Healy,297 which held that a state may not make an assessment on out-of-

state dairy farmers for the benefit of in-state dairy farmers that "effectively imposed a tax on out-of-state producers to subsidize production by
their in-state competitors. 298 The manufacturers contended that Maine's
Rx fund was similar to West Lynn in that it was created by rebates from
out-of-state manufacturers, and it was employed "to subsidize sales by
local pharmacists to local consumers., 299 The Court, however, found that
West Lynn was not applicable because the Maine program would "not
impose a disparate burden on any competitors." 3°° The Court added: "A
manufacturer could not avoid its rebate obligation by opening production
facilities in Maine and would receive no benefit from the rebates even if
it did so; the payments to the local pharmacists provide no special benefit
to competitors of rebate-paying manufacturers."'3'
C. Evaluationof Walsh
Walsh is a retreat from the dormant commerce clause analysis seen
in Healy and Quill. First, the Court is wrong that the statute does not
constitute external regulation. Maine does require manufacturers to sell
their drugs for a certain price; it is disingenuous to say that a rebate (a
price reduction) is not part of the price. Also, Maine is not controlling
retail sales that occur in Maine; it is regulating wholesale transactions
outside the state. Most of the wholesale sales happened out-of-state, and
the manufacturers had nothing to do with the drugs once they were sold
to the distributors.30 2 In other words, Maine is regulating prices paid in
out-of-state transactions; it is extending its authority outside its bor-

293.

Id. at 1870.

294.

Id.

295.

Id. at 1871 (quoting Concannon,249 F.3d at 81-82).

296.

Id.

297.
298.

512 U.S. 186 (1994).
Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1871.

299.
Id.
300.
Id.
301.
Id.
302.
See Petitioner's Brief at 29, Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (No. 01-188) ("Typically, both the
manufacturers and their customers (independent wholesalers and distributors) are located outside
Maine. The drugs are usually delivered at the manufacturers' facilities outside Maine .. . .The
wholesalers and distributors then sell the drugs to their customers, including pharmacies in Maine.").
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ders.3 °3 It is hard to understand how the Court could hold that imposing
taxes on an out-of-state retailer who sold products to state residents by
mail violated the dormant commerce clause, 3° 4 but that Maine regulating
out-of-state sales from a manufacturer to a wholesaler did not. Also, as in
Quill, Maine is violating the first and fourth prongs of the Complete Auto
Transit test. 30 5 First, the activity-out-of-state sales from manufacturers
to distributors--does not have a "substantial nexus" with Maine. Although the drugs eventually go into Maine, the relevant transactions occurred outside of Maine. Thus, the rebate is like a tax on an out-of-state
sale. Similarly, the out-of-state sales are not fairly related to services
provided by Maine since Maine provides no services in relation to the
transactions.
Second, the rebate program does have an external effect and an internal benefit-it burdens interstate commerce to subsidize in-state retail
sales. Manufacturers will have to raise the prices they sell their drugs for
in other states in order to make up for the Maine rebate. Also, Maine
pharmacies and citizens are being benefited at the expense of out-of-state
citizens who pay those higher prices. Thus, there has been a redistribution from out-of-state manufacturers and consumers to in-state pharmacists and consumers. 30 6 While such redistribution may be justifiable on
public policy grounds, redistribution from out-of-state citizens to in-state
citizens is the province of the federal government, not a state.30 7 As the
petitioner pointed out, Maine had constitutional alternatives to help
needy citizens buy drugs.30 8 The alternatives included subsidizing drug
purchases out of general revenues, giving state income tax credits for
drug purchases, or imposing a tax on retail pharmacy sales in Maine.3°
What Maine should not have been allowed to do is to fund its program
by burdening interstate commerce.

303. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642-63 ("The Commerce Clause also precludes the application of
a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the
commerce has effects within the State.").
304. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 301-02; Nat'l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
Brady, 430 U.S. at 279.
305.
306. As the Court pointed out, it is true that, unlike West Lynn, there has been no discrimination against out-of-state competitors. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1871. However, the dormant commerce
clause protects more than out-of-state competitors; it protects all those who operate in interstate
commerce. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 405 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]e have long recognized
that 'a burden imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the
statute imposing it applies alike to . . . the people of the State enacting such statute."' (quoting
Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 83 (1891))); see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y.
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986) ("Economic protectionism is not limited to attempts to
convey advantages on local merchants; it may include attempts to give local consumers an advantage
over consumers in other States.").
307. Of course state regulation often has externalities and all externalities cannot be avoided.
However, this externality seems more direct and substantial than many other ones.
308. Petitioner's Brief at 26, Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (No. 01-188).
309. Id.
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IV. THE REHNQUIST COURT'S HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE FUTURE OF HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM

A. Evaluation of the Rehnquist Court's HorizontalFederalism Cases

As one can see, the Rehnquist Court has been inconsistent in how it
has treated horizontal federalism. It has placed strong due process constraints on a state's ability to impose punitive damages based on conduct
in other states, it has continued the minimal full faith and credit constraints for choice of law that date back to the New Deal Court, and it has
cut back on constraints under the dormant commerce clause and created
confusing exceptions to the full faith and credit rule for judgments. In
viewing the Rehnquist Court's horizontal federalism cases as a whole,
one must conclude that the Court lacks any coherent jurisprudence concerning the relations of the states. Instead, the Court treats each area of
horizontal federalism separately, without considering what it is doing in
another area. In fact, one might argue that the Court is not thinking about
horizontal federalism at all, but rather that the results in horizontal federalism cases are due to other purposes that have nothing to do with horizontal federalism. How else can one explain the Court's due process rule
in punitive damages cases that a state cannot impose its policies on other
states in contrast to the Court's failure to give the Full Faith and Credit
Clause any content, when the Full Faith and Credit Clause's main purpose is to prevent the imposition of one state's policies on another?
Why has the Court given such attention to vertical federalism and
almost none to horizontal federalism? The answer lies partially in the
reasons behind the Court's vertical federalism. The main purpose behind
the new vertical federalism seems to be distrust of the national government and the related attempt to increase the authority and dignity of state
governments. 310 The New Deal saw the beginning of a "liberal" revolution that increased the power of the federal government and eliminated
the constraints on vertical federalism. 31' This bigger government, from
the 1930s to the present, has furthered liberal values at the expense of
conservative values. Thus, a way for a conservative Court to change this

310.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 195, 198 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) ("A cornerstone of
the Rehnquist Court's approach to constitutional law has been the protection of states from perceived
federal intrusions."); MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATrERS, How IT COULD
HAPPEN 80 (1999) ("[T]he core of the Supreme Court's federalism is not citizen choice and state
competition but the preservation of state and local sovereignty."); Greve, supra note 15, at 95; Rosalie Berger Levinson, FirstMonday-The Dark Side of Federalism in the Nineties: Restricting Rights
of Religious Minorities, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (1998) ("Although this term [federalism] refers
to maintaining a proper balance between state and federal power, to the Rehnquist Court it has meant
restoring power to the states."); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748-49 (1999) (recognizing
sovereign immunity as a means for preserving the dignity and respect owed to states).
311.
See Baker & Young, supra note 119, at 75 (stating that "[f]rom 1937 to 1995, federalism
was part of a Constitution in exile" (internal quotations omitted)).
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trend was to cut back on the power of the federal government in relation
to the states. This purpose does not carry over to horizontal federalism.
Other explanations for the new vertical federalism cannot completely support it. Some writers, including the present author, have advocated enforcing the Constitution's structural provisions (that allocate
power) as a basis for a new, principled federalism. 312 However, it is clear
that this reason, at best, is only secondary for the Rehnquist Court's vertical federalism. While cases that limit Congress' power to pass statutes,
such as Lopez and Morrison, are well-ground in Article I and the Tenth
Amendment, sovereign immunity cases such as Alden lack any textual
basis in the Constitution. Moreover, if the Court were giving greater attention to the Constitution's structural provisions, it would have given
greater content to the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Hyatt and applied
its due process constraints from punitive damages cases to other areas.
What has happened in horizontal federalism is that the Court has
mainly continued the principles from previous Courts without thinking
much about how horizontal federalism affects our national system and
without trying to come up with consistent jurisprudence for all areas of
federalism. 3 13 As noted earlier, when the Court did place greater constraints on punitive damages, it did so because of its concern with large
punitive damages, not a concern with horizontal federalism. Horizontal
federalism was not the purpose for these cases; it was the justification for
another purpose. Thus, horizontal federalism has developed in the
piecemeal fashion described earlier, with strong constraints in one area
and almost none in others.
B. Justificationsfor GreaterConstraintson Horizontal Federalism
As has been demonstrated above, horizontal federalism can be
firmly grounded in the constitutional text; 314 it does not depend for its
existence on normative views or conceptions outside the text, as state
sovereign immunity does in Alden and its progeny.3 15 Thus, all the Court
has to do is enforce the Constitution's Due Process Clause, Full Faith
and Credit Clause, dormant commerce clause, and other horizontal federalism provisions. As mentioned above, not enforcing those provisions
gives some parts of the Constitution meaning and other parts none at all.
312. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 895-96 (4th Cir.
1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
Fruehwald, The New Federalism, supra note 199, at 865-66; Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels, supra
note 15, at 444-51, 494-96; REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCrURE, supra note 199, at 6, 164.
313. See Greve, supra note 15, at 106 ("When it comes to the regulation of economic conduct,
the Supreme Court has sustained the regime established under the New Deal: a vast realm of virtually unlimited, concurrent powers, which both the states and the national government occupy.").
314.
See discussion supra Part 1.
315.
I will present several normative justifications for horizontal federalism below. However,
no matter how strong a normative justification is, to be valid, the policy must be supported by the
constitutional text.
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Does horizontal federalism matter? Policy reasons supporting horizontal federalism include: (1) a state should not be able to interfere with
the proper authority of another state; (2) the danger of interstate rivalry;
(3) a state should not be able to improperly externalize costs and internalize benefits; (4) the lack of political safeguards that prevents a state from
overextending its authority; (5) horizontal federalism allows for local
choice and experimentation, and it is often more efficient; and (6) horizontal federalism protects individuals.
The first justification for horizontal federalism is that a state should
not be able to interfere with the sovereignty of other states. As previously
noted, the New Deal Revolution not only removed constraints from the
federal government increasing federal power, it eliminated many of the
constraints on states increasing state power.316 The net result was that
governments on all levels had more regulatory power.317 Equally important, a state may be able to extend its authority beyond its borders, creating clashes with other states.31 8
While the question of whether increased government is good or bad
is complicated, the lack of horizontal constraints that allows one state to
319 A state
interfere with the authority of other states is a real problem.
should not be able to apply its law to a matter unless it is connected to an
event within the state's borders;320 a state should not be able to extend its
321
authority to interfere with the sovereignty of other states. Democracy
should be respected, but laws should be made by the proper democratic
institution. All states are equal in authority to the other states under our
Constitution; one state should not be able to decide the policies of another state.322 A state is not sovereign if another state can regulate within
the scope of its authority. If a state wants to adopt a policy that is different than the policies of all other states, that state should be able to do so
as long as the policy does not violate the Constitution. For example,
while one state may believe that strict liability is a proper basis for recovery in products liability cases, another state may feel that proof of
negligence should be required. Both positions have sound reasons supporting them, and a state should be able to choose which one it wants.
316. See Gardbaum, supranote 16, at 485-91; Greve, supranote 15, at 105-06.
317. See Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 485-91; Greve, supra note 15, at 105-06.
See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 550 (1935) (settling
318.
conflict of California and Alaska worker's compensation laws); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502, 504-05 (1939) (same).
See Greve, supra note 15, at 106-07 (noting that "[o]ne cannot unshackle the states with319.
out allowing them to exploit each other").
Laycock, supra note 120, at 251.
320.
See Greve, supra note 15, at 122 (observing that "[s]tate autonomy cannot possibly entail
321.
a license to aggress and exploit").
322. See id. at 99 ("Federalism rests on principles of state autonomy and equality: each state
governs its own territory and citizens but not, of course, the territory and citizens of sister states.");
Laycock, supra note 120, at 288 ("The Constitution assumes, without ever quite saying so, that the
several states are of equal authority.").
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The same applies to most decisions states make, such as gun control,
medical malpractice, and domestic relations law. Only when a state's
decision exceeds the Constitution or requires a nationwide solution
should an institution intrude. Those institutions should be the Supreme
Court and Congress, not co-equal states.
Second, interstate rivalry was a concern at the time of the Constitution's drafting.323 As Professor Richard B. Collins has stated, "[i]nterstate
rivalry was the Convention's greatest concern. Small states feared the
power of large, and the South feared commercial domination by the
North and federal interference with slavery. ' 32 4 As is well-known, James
Madison considered the Union as a check on factions, declaring "[t]he
influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular
States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the
other States .... , 32 5 In a letter to George Washington, he wrote:
Over and above this positive power, a negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by
the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely necessary, and
to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions.
Without this defensive power, every positive power that can be given
on paper will be evaded [and] defeated. The States will continue to
invade the national jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of nations [and] to harass each other with
rival and spiteful measures dic326
tated by mistaken views of interest.
Interstate rivalry is still a concern today. Professor Laycock has written:
"It is critical to the Union that we continue to think of ourselves as a single people, and it is important that we not knowingly create legitimate
interstate grievances. 327
Third, states should not be able to externalize costs and internalize
benefits, giving benefits to itself or its citizens, but placing part of the
cost on other states or their citizens. 328 An obvious example is the limit
323.
(1988).
324.
325.

Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 53
Id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Carl Van Doren ed., The Easton Press

1979).

326. 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 383-84 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
327. Laycock, supra note 120, at 264; see also Greve, supra note 15, at 95 ("[Federalism] must
also protect states from aggression and exploitation by other states; moreover, it must protect the
common economic market from regulatory balkanization.").
328.

See John S. Baker, Jr., Respecting a State's Tort Law, While Confining Its Reach to that

State, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 698, 699 (2001) ("Unfortunately, Supreme Court decisions regarding
personal jurisdiction and choice of law, premised on the Due Process Clause rather than the territorial structure of federalism, have had the unforeseen effect of allowing some states to impose their
laws and costs on other states."); Collins, supra note 323, at 67 (arguing that when states "impose
the cost of suppression on outsiders, they interfere in policy choices of other states or the federal
government, and judicial intervention may be warranted"); Greve, supra note 15, at 100 ("Manufacturers have no practical way of keeping their products out of particular jurisdictions. Plaintiffs, on
the other hand, get to choose their own forum and law. As a result, the most restrictive and plaintiff-
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on punitive damages in Campbell and Gore, which prevents states from
giving punitive damages to its citizens for injuries suffered by the citizens of other states. 329 Another example would be limiting a state's ability to impose its tort rules on an occurrence in another state that is completely connected to that other state except that the injured party is from
the first state. For instance, a New York citizen goes to Massachusetts for
330
an operation in a Massachusetts hospital by Massachusetts doctors.
The patient cannot obtain the operation in New York because New York
doctors do not perform that operation since it is new and the cost of malpractice insurance is high in New York. On the other hand, Massachusetts has put damages caps on medical malpractice recoveries in order to
encourage the best doctors to practice in Massachusetts and to provide
the best medical care for its citizens. The patient dies due to the surgeon's malpractice, and his widow files suit in a New York court to recover damages. If the New York court ignores the Massachusetts malpractice limit, it is giving its citizens unearned benefits, while unfairly
externalizing the cost on Massachusetts and its citizens. The New York
citizen is getting the benefit of New York law for an occurrence in Massachusetts, while not having to suffer the burdens of that benefitinferior health care in New York. Thus, New York has made a transfer of
wealth to one of its citizens by extending its law into Massachusetts. In
addition, New York has imposed its policies on Massachusetts. New
York has substituted its tort law for that of Massachusetts in a case that is
internal to Massachusetts; New York has applied its law to a matter that
has no connection to an event within its territory. As mentioned above,
the Court has declared that "[a] State does not acquire ...supervision
over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and
health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to that
State." 33 '
friendly jurisdiction will effectively impose its liability and product norms on the entire country and
redistribute income from out-of-state manufacturers (and their shareholders and workers) to in-state
plaintiffs in the process."); Laycock, supra note 120, at 251 ("[I]n deciding which things or events
control choice of law, a state's interests in enriching local citizens and extending the territorial reach
of its own law are illegitimate.").
Professor McConnell has posed a similar argument that the cost of a state's liability laws are
borne nationwide and that "consumers in states with less generous products-liability laws pay" part
of the recoveries received by plaintiffs in the more generous states. See Michael W. McConnell, A
Choice-of-Law Approach to ProductsLiability Reform, in NEW DIRECrIONS iN LIABILITY LAW 90,

92-93 (Walter Olson ed., 1988). He adds: "Each state can profit at the expense of the others by
expanding its scope of liability, at least until the others catch up." Id. at 92. "Under these conditions,
states no longer serve as laboratories for social experimentation." Id. at 97.
Itmay not always be possible to prevent some externalization of costs to other states. For example, when one state imposes large compensatory damages in a products liability suit, the cost of
the damages may be spread among consumers in other states. However, constraints on horizontal
federalism will help prevent externalization to a significant degree.
329.
See discussion supra Part .
330. This hypothetical is based on Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1973),
where the appellate court refused to apply Massachusetts's statutory damage limitation.
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975). As a New York court said over 140
331.
years ago, "[tihe position that a citizen carries with him, into every State into which he may go, the
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Fourth, political safeguards do not constrain a state from overextending its power. It has been argued (unsuccessfully) in recent vertical
federalism cases that "politics" should control the relationship between
the federal and state governments-that federal courts do not need to
protect states' rights because the political branches, Congress and the
Executive, can do so.332 The political branches, however, are not disinterested concerning whether the federal government has overstepped its
authority and interfered with states' rights. As Justice Kennedy has contended, "the absence of structural mechanisms to require those officials
[in the political branches] to undertake this principled task [of protecting
state authority], and the momentary political convenience often attendant
upon their failure to do so, argue against a complete renunciation of the
judicial role., 333 Further, "the federal balance is too essential a part of our
constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for
us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far. 334
It should be obvious that politics as a constraint is an even weaker
argument in horizontal federalism cases. There is no political safeguard
against a state overextending its legal authority against another state or
one of its citizens. Congress cannot protect a particular state because it
enacts uniform rules. In fact, when Congress is acting at the behest of the
states, it is imposing the majority state view on the minority of states.335
Moreover, in the area of choice of law, Congress has not intervened.
Thus, the federal courts need to regulate the relations of the states because they
are the only institution that can deal with the states neu33 6
trally.

Fifth, as pointed out in Part II, state lawmaking allows for local
choice and experimentation. It is also often more efficient. 337 As Professor Collins has pointed out:
Efficiency of local lawmaking is a basic justification for state
autonomy in the federal system. Local lawmaking can be more exactly tailored to particular problems and can more readily experiment
with different solutions. Competition among legal systems generates
legal institutions of the one in which he was born, cannot be supported." Lemon v. People, 20 N.Y.
562, 609 (N.Y. 1860).
332. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647-52 (Souter, J., dissenting); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) ("State sovereign interests ... are more properly
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power.").
333. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
334. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
335.
Baker & Young, supra note 119, at 117-18.
336. See Laycock, supra note 120, at 259 ("The results [in choice of law] have been predictably chaotic, because federal abdication leaves no disinterested umpire to resolve an important class
of interstate disputes. State law cannot supply the answers, because the questions are about interstate
relations and no state is empowered to answer for any other.").
337.
See Collins, supra note 323, at 68.

332
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efficiencies as jurisdictions compete to attract and retain people and
capital. Local lawmaking best serves these ends when people and reare mobile and when local laws do not export significant
sources
33 8
costs.

Finally and most importantly, horizontal federalism protects individuals from a state's overreaching. 339 A state should not be able to ex-

tend its laws to an individual who has no connection or a tenuous connection to that state. Moreover, an individual should not be subject to the
contrary laws of different states for a single transaction or occurrence. As
Professor Laycock has noted: "People cannot obey the law unless they
know it; they cannot know the law unless they know which law to
learn. 340 In the original Constitution (before the Bill of Rights), protection of individuals came from a division of power; 34' that protection
should not be diluted by permitting states to subject an individual to a
tug-of-war. In addition, when a state exploits its own citizens, those citizens can protect themselves through the right to vote. Foreigners to that
state lack such protection. In sum, it is hard to understand why the Court

has been enforcing individual rights under the due process and equal
protection clauses, while ignoring protections for individuals under horizontal federalism. Having a state's law applied to an individual when
another state's law should govern is just as wrong as equal protection or
due process violations. 42

Are there reasons not to regulate horizontal federalism? First, one
might argue that in striking down state action, a federal court is interferId.; see also McConnell, The Founders' Design, supra note 119, at 1493-1500 (setting
338.
forth three arguments in favor of decentralized, local decision making).
339.
Cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("The Constitution does not
protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.").
340.
Laycock, supra note 120, at 319.
See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 1373. Professor Steven G. Calabresi pointed out that until
341.
at least the 1950s, constitutional law was mainly concerned with division of authority, not personal
liberty. Id. Individual freedom was protected mainly through the Constitution's structural provisions.
Id. He also noted that "the text of our written Constitution devotes only fifty-two words to the protection of individual liberty from the depredations of state government in the Fourteenth Amendment, while devoting several thousand words to the subject of allocating and dividing power among
governmental institutions." Id. at 1376-77.
342.
One author has gone further and argued that a particular kind of factionalism justifies
constraints on horizontal federalism and state power. See Greve, supra note 15, at 123-26. Michael
Greve has written that without limitations on the states, "trial lawyers and activist state attorneys
general are launching assaults on sister states .... [T]he product liability crisis-as well as state
litigation campaigns against the tobacco, financial, and pharmaceutical industries--demonstrate that
state aggression presents an increasingly serious economic and constitutional problem." Id. at 96. He
continued: "Their initiatives ... are not simply an attack on corporate America (which may deserve
it); they are also, and inherently, an assault on the integrity, autonomy, and equality of sister states."
Id. He concluded that the Court has "brought us to the brink of being unable to preempt the trial
bar." Id. This author agrees that Mr. Greve has identified a problem; however, I believe that the
problem is not as serious as he asserts. In particular, I am not concerned by recent actions by state
attorneys general to protect their citizens.
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ing with democratic decisions of that state. However, there is no "countermajoritarian" difficulty here. The court is not overruling a proper democratic decision; it is saying that the state had no power to apply its law
to a situation. Thus, a court is acting "more as an umpire than as a lawmaker., 343 Second, one might contend that the federal courts are interfering with state sovereignty. However, a court cannot interfere with sovereignty that does not exist. Finally, one might wonder whether the enforcement of horizontal federalism is worth the cost. The reasons given
above, especially the protection of individuals, more than justify the cost.
C. The Future of HorizontalFederalism
What criteria should the Court use to regulate horizontal federalFirst, any regulation should respect each state's sovereignty. Any
constraint should restrict a state's ability to extend its laws beyond its
authority, but not interfere with its rightful sovereignty. Second, any
regulation should limit the reach of a state's laws and activities so as not
to intrude on the sovereignty of other states and not to impose improper
externalities on other states or bring improper benefits into the state.
Third, horizontal federalism should be based on pragmatic territorialism,
not strict territorialism, which would always limit the reach of a state's
laws to its borders.345 In other words, a state should be able to regulate
ism? 344

343.
Calabresi, supra note 3, at 1383. As Professor Calabresi has noted, "[miajority rule or
democracy presupposes that one knows and respects the relevant jurisdictional lines." Id. at 1391.
344.
While this author feels that courts should protect state sovereignty from encroachment by
other states through the Due Process Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the dormant
commerce clause, author Michael Greve believes that it can best be done by eliminating the presumption against federal preemption. See Greve, supra note 15, at 116-25. He has written:
Preemptive statutes, in contrast [to regulatory statutes], merely establish limits within
which states remain free to do as they wish. Preemptive statutes are inherently less intrusive than regulatory statutes. Thus, there is no functional justification for subjecting them
to a judicial test of the devastating force of the clear statement rule.
Id. at 117. The main reason that Mr. Greve emphasizes preemption rather than other doctrines is
because although he believes the other horizontal federalism doctrines are important, he has little
confidence in horizontal federalism doctrines succeeding at this time. See id. at 121-22.
I am not sure that eliminating the presumption against preemption would be a good thing because it would curtail the states' ability to create diverse policies. For example, regardless of the
legal basis, I do not think that the decision in LorillardTobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570-71
(2001), which preempted Massachusetts's stricter regulation on tobacco advertising, is good from a
normative viewpoint. States should be able to adopt stricter laws than the federal government when
they only apply internally. Also, I am more confident that the Court can change its horizontal federalism doctrines in light of Campbell and Gore. I am also hopeful that the Court will become convinced that enforcing the structural provisions of the Constitution is important in both vertical and
horizontal federalism. Finally, the Court has unanimously rejected challenges to state statutes and
common law on federal preemption grounds in two cases in the 2002-2003 term. See Ky. Ass'n of
Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51
(2002).
345.
Strict territorialism is where a state's laws always stop at its borders. See JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.1, at 19 (1834) ("[E]very nation possesses an
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory."). Strict territorialism was the basis of
the territorial personal jurisdiction rule in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878). "One of these
principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. "The other principle of public law follows
from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
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out-of-state conduct that has a significant effect in the state, such as outof-state defamation that causes injury to someone's reputation in the
state.346 Finally, any regulation should be principled; it should be firmly
ground in the Constitution's structural provisions, and it should be applied consistently and neutrally.
1. Due Process Constraints
The Court should continue its due process approach as seen in
Campbell and Gore, with the refinements in reasoning mentioned in Part
I.B. Further, the Court should extend its approach to other areas. It
should step in whenever a state has extended its laws beyond their proper
limits and applied them to individuals with which the state or those laws
do not have a proper connection. In particular, as this author has previously suggested, the Court should place due process limitations on a
state's choice of law.347 Prior to the New Deal Court, the Court had im348
posed significant due process limitations on a state's choice of law. As
was true of the Full Faith and Credit Clause limits on a state's choice of
law discussed in Part II, beginning in the mid-1930s, the Court began to
move to minimal due process constraints on choice of law that resulted in
the Allstate rule, which allows a state to apply its law when it has even a
tenuous connection to a case. 349 However, when a state applies its law to
a case when it has only a tenuous connection to an individual, a case, or
an issue in that case, it is violating the individual's due process rights in
the same way that it violates the defendant's due process rights in a punitive damages case when the punitive damages are based on conduct in
other states.
This author has previously suggested a two-part test to determine
whether a state's choice of law is proper under the Due Process
Clause. 350 First, the court should apply a rational basis test: is there a
reasonable relation between the law's reach and its legitimate purpose?
Second, when the laws of two or more states might apply under step one,
persons or property without its territory." Id.; see also JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.12, at 46 (1935) ("By its very nature law must apply to everything and must
exclusively apply to everything within the boundary of its jurisdiction."); id. at § 5.2, at 52 (stating
"[tihat the law is territorial, that there can be no law in a particular state except the law of that state.
. .11).

346.

See Allen Rostron, The Supreme Court, the Gun Industry, and the Misguided Revival of

Strict TerritorialLimits on the Reach of State Law, 2003 DETROIT COLL. L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV.

115, 124-25. Mr. Rostron has described the end of strict territorialism during the New Deal Court:
They did so, not by forsaking the notion that the fundamental limit on state power is territorial, but by adopting a more expansive view of what it means for a state to have authority over its territory. Courts began to recognize a state's authority to regulate conduct that
has effects within the state's borders, regardless of where the conduct occurs.
Id.
FRuEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 101, at 67-76.
347.
Id. at 12-14.
348.
Id. at 32-35.
349.
350.
Id. at 74.
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the Court should determine whether one of the state's laws has a significantly closer connection to the case. When a state has applied its law to a
controversy when another state has a closer connection to that controversy, the first state has violated the individual's due process rights. The
state has overreached by making conduct that is legal in the state that has
the closest connection to a case illegal. Thus, as was mentioned above in
connection with full faith and credit, a state should not be allowed to
apply its law to a matter when another state has a significantly closer
connection.
For example, assume that Georgia allows strict liability in products
liability cases against retailers, but California does not. A Georgia resident goes to California for a two-week vacation, and when he gets there
he buys a new car from a California retailer, which he intends to use on
his vacation, then drive back to Georgia. After he returns to Georgia, he
is seriously injured in an automobile accident. He sues the manufacturer
and retailer of the car under strict liability in a Georgia court. Assuming
there is no personal jurisdiction problem, should Georgia be able to apply
its strict liability law to the California retailer? While Georgia has an
interest in protecting its citizens for accidents that happen in Georgia,
Georgia should not be able to apply its law because California has a significantly closer connection to the case. The issue is whether a Georgia
defendant can sue a California retailer who has no connection to Georgia.
For this issue, California obviously has the closer connection. The transaction occurred in California. The retailer has no connection with Georgia. The Georgia resident bought the car in California. California should
be able to regulate the conduct of retailers who operate only in California; Georgia should not be able to extend its law to California to regulate
a California retailer. If the Georgia consumer had wanted the Georgia
protection, he could have bought the car in Georgia.
Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia351 illustrates the proper application of the
Court's due process standard from Gore by a state court to areas other
than punitive damages. In Yu, the Yus, California residents, filed a class
action in California against Signet Bank/Virginia and Capitol One Bank,
both Virginia corporations, for eight causes of action,352 including "distant forum abuse. 353 Although the parties' agreement said that it would
be governed by Virginia and federal law, the Yus never used the credit
card in Virginia or went to Virginia. 354 The Yus failed to make payments
on their account. 355 Signet dealt with out-of-state debtors who defaulted

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
Yu, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307-08.
Id. at 308. Signet spun off its accounts to Capitol One in 1995. Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
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35 6
on their accounts by filing suit in Virginia district trial courts. More
3 57
than ninety percent of the lawsuits ended in default judgments.

The Yus received a "Warrant in Debt," which was similar to a California summons and complaint but filed in Richmond, Virginia, claiming
358
that they owed Signet $2,191.38 plus interest. The Yus claimed they
359
did not understand the warrant's legal effect. After a default judgment
was obtained against the Yus, a garnishment summons was served on the
Virginia office of Mr. Yu's employer.
The Yus filed a class action suit in California against the banks, asserting: (1) tortious violation of California Code of Civil Procedure §
395(b); (2) abuse of process; (3) tortious violation of California Code of
Civil Procedure §§ 1710.10 et. seq. and 1913(a); (4) violation of due
process; (5) restitution and injunctive relief under California Business
and Professional Code § 17200; (6) violation of California Civil Code §
1788.15; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (8) intentional
36' The trial court granted the banks' moinfliction of emotional distress.
362
judgment.
tion for summary
After finding that the Virginia court had lacked personal jurisdiction
over the Yus, 363 the appellate court addressed the Yus' claim of "distant
365
forum abuse. '' 36 In Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, the Cali
fornia Supreme Court held that a creditor who "wilfully commenced
actions in improper [venues], with knowledge that such [venues] are
improper, and for the improper ulterior purpose of impairing its adversaries' ability to defend such suits," is guilty of "gross abuse of process"
and "unlawful ... business practice." 366 The Yu court felt that the distant
forum abuse was even worse than in Barquis because Barquis involved
the wrong venue within California, while Yu involved the wrong jurisdiction in another state altogether.36 7 Under California law, the suit should

Id.
356.
Id. The bank sent a "change of jurisdiction" letter to the debtors, which advised the debt357.
ors that the bank intended to file suit in Virginia and that, if they preferred trial in their state, they
must give notice within twenty-one days. Id. If the customer requested a change of jurisdiction, the
bank would dismiss the Virginia action. Id. The Yus disputed that they had received the letter. See
id.
Id. at 307-08.
358.
359. Id. at 308.
360. Id.
Id.
361.
Id.
362.
Id. at 311.
363.
364. See id. at 311-15.
496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972).
365.
Barquis, 496 P.2d at 820 (finding that this practice by creditors is prohibited under Cali366.
fornia statutes) (internal quotations omitted).
Yu, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312.
367.

2003]

HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM

have been filed in the county where the debtor lived, or the county where
the contract was formed or to be performed.36 8
As one of their defenses, the banks asserted that Gore barred the
claims because their program was lawful in Virginia and that "California
cannot 'regulate' conduct 'that is lawful in other states."'3 69 The court
responded that Gore supported the Yus' claim rather than the banks'
defense, stating:
The [Gore] case would thus prohibit an award of punitive damages herein to punish or deter respondents' conduct with respect to
consumers in states other than California. However, appellants are
not seeking any such award. [Gore] establishes that California may
indeed protect its own consumers, and punish the conduct of an outof-state defendant if it has an impact on
them regardless of whether
370
the conduct might be lawful elsewhere.
The court, however, found that four of the statutes sued upon by the
Yus involving California actions and California judgments could not
have out-of-state applicability. 37' In addition to the fact that the court

368.
369.
370.
371.
lows:

Id.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315-17. The court reviewed the statutes sued upon and the Yus' allegations as fol-

The first cause of action in appellants' complaint is for violation of Code of Civil
Procedure section 395, subdivision (b), which provides in relevant part: "Subject to the
power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, in an action
arising from an offer or provision of goods, services, loans or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family or household use.... the county in which the buyer
or lessee resided at the time the contract was entered into, or the county in which the
buyer or lessee resides at the commencement of the action is the proper county for the
trial thereof." Appellants contend that Signet violated this venue statute by suing them in
Virginia.
The third cause of action in the complaint is for violation of Code of Civil Procedure
section 1710.10, et seq., which set forth the procedures for entry of a California judgment
based on a sister state judgment, and Code of Civil Procedure section 1913, subdivision
(a), which provides in pertinent part that "the effect of a judicial record of a sister state is
the same in this state as in the state where it was made, except that it can only be enforced
in this state by an action or special proceeding." Appellants contend that Signet violated
these statutes when it enforced the Virginia judgment by serving a wage garnishment order in Virginia, rather than domesticating the judgment in California as provided in these
statutes.
The sixth cause of action is for violation of Civil Code section 1788.15, which states
that: "(a) No debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect a consumer debt by means
of judicial proceedings when the debt collector knows that service of process, where essential to jurisdiction over the debtor or his property, has not been legally effected. [1] (b)
No debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect a consumer debt, other than one reduced to judgment, by means of judicial proceedings in a county other than the county in
which the debtor has incurred the consumer debt or the county in which the debtor resides at the time such proceedings are instituted, or resided at the time the debt was incurred." (Civ.Code, § 1788.15.) Appellants contend that Signet violated these provisions
of the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civ.Code, § 1788 et seq.)
by suing them in Virginia before their debt was otherwise reduced to judgment," and by
improperly garnishing Mr. Yu's wages.
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thought that the statutes were not intended to have out-of-state
applicability, it believed that applying the statutes extraterritorially
would violate Gore's admonition that "no state can 'impose its own
policy choice'372on others, or 'legislate except with reference to its own
jurisdiction.' ,
In Yu, the court properly applied the horizontal federalism principles from Gore. It did not violate due process to extend the Barquis
abuse of process action to Virginia banks who filed suit in Virginia, even
if such actions are legal in Virginia, because the effect was felt in California. Thus, California had an interest in protecting its own consumers
and economy.373 It was not trying to regulate conduct that was legal in
Virginia; it was trying to protect California consumers from illegal outof-state conduct.
Under my refined due process analysis, Yu is also correct. It is not a
violation of the banks' due process rights to be left alone by a state that
has little or no connection to the banks or occurrence. Further, it does not
offend the Due Process Clause to have California law applied to them
when the consumers lived in California, the banks solicited the consumers by mail in California, they intended to collect a debt against California consumers, and the injury they caused was felt in California. In fact,
this author would argue that California had a significantly closer connection to the controversy than Virginia based on the above connections and
the Yus' lack of any connection to Virginia.
The court's holding that the California statutes concerning California actions and judgments could not be applied to violations in Virginia
was also correct because California cannot extend its procedural rules to
Virginia actions. California has no interest in governing Virginia actions
and judgments, even if its own residents are involved.
The [Robbins-Rosenthal] Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides for recovery in
an individual action of the debtor's actual damages, as well as reasonable attorney's fees
and costs, plus a fine of $100 to $1,000 if the creditor's violation is willful and knowing.
(Civ.Code, § 1788.30.) Appellants seek tort damages for the alleged violations of the
Code of Civil Procedure under the theory that "'[v]iolation of a statute embodying a public policy is generally actionable even though no specific remedy is provided in the statute; any injured member of the public for whose benefit the statute was enacted may
bring an action.' [] The effect of such statutes, in essence, is to create a duty or standard
of conduct, the breach of which, where it causes injury, gives rise to liability in tort."
(Castillo v. Friedman (1987) 243 Cal.Rptr. 206, 197 Cal.App.3d.Supp. 6, 14 [citations
omitted]; see Czap v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 1, 6, 86
Cal.Rptr. 417 [recognizing tort action for violation of former unfair debt collection practice statute]; Debt Collection Tort Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1971) pp. 84-86.) We need not
decide whether damages are recoverable under this theory because these statutes are inapplicable in appellants' case in any event.
Id. at 315-16.
372. Id. at 317 (quoting BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996)).
373. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 585 (holding that a state can further its interest in protecting its own
consumers, but lacks the power to punish conduct that was lawful where it occurred and did not
affect the state's residents).
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2. Full Faith and Credit Constraints
The Court should give the Full Faith and Credit Clause content.
First, statutes, laws, and judgments should receive equal full faith and
credit. As mentioned above, there is no textual basis to distinguish
among them. 374 Second, there should be no exceptions to full faith and
credit for judgments, as the Court created in Baker.375 Again, there is no
textual basis for such exceptions. As noted in Part II, the real problem is
the Court's failure to define what full faith and credit means for judgments and its failure to recognize the difference between money judgments and equity judgments.37 6 While exceptions may not be needed, an
enforcing court in each case needs to judge whether the rendering court
acted within its authority. This is already done in connection with personal jurisdiction; a court does not have to enforce a judgment if the
judgment court lacked personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 377 Thus,
when a court issues a judgment that purports to bind the courts of other
states, the enforcing court should ask whether the judgment court acted
within its power when it did so. In addition, for equity judgments, a court
should ask which state has the closest connection to the controversy. A
court should not have to enforce another court's injunction when it governs activity occurring in the forum when the forum has a significantly
closer connection to the conduct.
Most importantly, the Court should give content to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause as it applies to other states' laws. As Professor Laycock has pointed out, "[c]hoice-of-law questions are about the allocation
of authority among the several states. 378 He has also noted that the Full
Faith and
Credit Clause "provides for the equal authority of each state's
379
law.,

First, the Court should eliminate the public policy exception that allows a state not to apply foreign law when its selection would violate
state policy. 380 If a state's law should govern because that state has the
closest connection to the controversy (or the greatest interest in applying
its laws), then another state should not be able to refuse to apply that law
because it contravenes the forum's public policy. If another state is more
closely connected to a controversy, then applying its laws does not violate the forum's public policy. In addition, if a state refuses to employ the
law of a state that is more closely connected to the controversy because
374.
See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
375.
See discussion supra Part H.A.2.
376.
See discussion supra Part JIB.2.
377.
See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
378.
Laycock, supra note 120, at 250.
379.
Id. at 289.
380.
See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the UnconstitutionalPublic
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1966-67 (1997); see also Laycock, supra note 120, at 313
("The public-policy exception is a relic carried over from international law without reflection on the
changes in interstate relations wrought by the Constitution.").
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the case is being heard in its courts, it is imposing its law on other states.
If a court applies its state's laws when it has the closest connection to the
controversy and another state's laws when that other state has the closest
connection, then both states' policies are satisfied.
The Court should also give content to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause by applying it to choice of law in general. As Professor Laycock
has argued: "[T]he clause is most plausibly read as requiring each state to
give the law of every other state the same faith and credit it gives its own
,,381
law-to treat the law of sister states as equal in authority to its own.
Moreover, it is inconsistent to say that a state cannot impose its policies
on another state through punitive damages, but that it can through choice
of law. Therefore, as mentioned above, a court should not be able to apply its law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to a controversy or
issue when another state has a closer connection to the controversy or
issue. Thus, in the Georgia-California hypothetical from above, the result
would be the same under the Full Faith and Credit Clause as it was under
the Due Process Clause. California law should apply because California
has an interest in regulating California retailers, while Georgia does not.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause mandates that California law govern
because California is the proper sovereign and because Georgia should
not be able to impose its law on California. Further, the Due Process
Clause requires that Georgia not be able to extend its law to govern a
California retailer acting in California with no connection with Georgia.
3. Dormant Commerce Clause Constraints
The Court should also retreat from its position in Walsh. It should
prevent a state from placing externalities on other states, reaping benefits
that belong to other states, extending its laws to control commerce outside its borders, and interfering with commerce when a national solution
is needed. As Michael Greve has pointed out, "[t]he prevention of aggression and exploitation among the states is the central, irreducible purpose of the Commerce Clause., 382 Moreover, as James Wilson declared
at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, "whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bound[aries] of a
particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of
the United States. 3 83
Several lower courts have properly applied the dormant commerce
clause rules that were in place before Walsh. For example, Kentucky
refused to apply its civil rights statute to a claim for employment discrimination that took place outside the state against a corporation with its
Laycock, supra note 120, at 296.
Greve, supra note 15, at 105.
2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 424 (2d ed. 1907).
381.
382.
383.

STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
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headquarters in Kentucky.38 4 Similarly, a California court refused to employ California's Fair Employment and Housing Act in a case involving
a sexual harassment claim against a California company for conduct that
occurred outside California. 385 Lower courts have also used the dormant
commerce clause rules in situations where some of the conduct was instate but other conduct was out-of-state. For instance, Shearson Lehman
38 6 held that a California statute could not be emBros. Inc. v. Greenberg
ployed "to impose a nationwide permanent injunction" against a securities dealer to change its business practices, including changing the format
of its internal account forms and monthly statements and altering its
communications with its customers, because it improperly regulated interstate commerce.387 Similarly, in Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Ser388
vices,
refused
to extend
Illinois's
anti-dilution
to 389
conduct that the
did court
not affect
Illinois
on dormant
commerce
clausestatute
grounds.
In all these cases, application of state law to out-of-state occurrences that did not have a significant in-state effect would violate the
dormant commerce clause. A state cannot apply its civil rights laws to
out-of-state conduct just because the company's headquarters is in that
state. In such an instance, a state would be extending its laws beyond its
borders to cover activities in other states. This is also true in cases where
some of the conduct is in-state, such as when a state court issues an injunction that covers in-state and out-of-state activities, as in Shearson
Lehman and Hyatt Legal.390 In such instances, the injunction is valid
concerning in-state activity, but the injunction cannot apply to out-ofstate conduct under the dormant commerce clause (or due process) because a state is extending its laws to govern conduct in another state that
does not have an effect in-state.
However, the dormant commerce clause should not be taken so far
as to preclude a state from regulating injuries from products used within
its borders. 391 The main reason that a strict dormant commerce clause
rule should not apply to products liability cases is that the state is not
regulating interstate commerce when it applies its torts law to a manufacturer; it is regulating safety within its borders. When a person is injured
by a product within a state, that state has the strongest interest in making
384.
Union Underwear Co. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188, 189, 193 (Ky. 2001).
385.
Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626, 629, 632-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
386.
No. 93-55535, 1995 WL 392028 (9th Cir. July 3, 1995).
387.
Greenberg, 1995 WL 392028, at *3.
388.
610 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. 11. 1985).
389.
Hyatt Corp., 610 F. Supp. at 385.
390.
See Greenberg, 1995 WL 392028, at *3; Hyatt Corp., 610 F. Supp. at 385.
391.
Gun manufacturers have recently posed the opposite argument. See Rostron, supra note
346, at 117 ("The gun companies have seized upon the Supreme Court's recent decisions striking
down extraterritorial applications of state law and have argued that those rulings should have a far
broader impact than anyone previously imagined. [Similar to] most products .... most gun injuries
do not occur in the state in which the manufacturer produced and sold the gun, and many occur in a
state in which no distributor or dealer ever sold the gun.").
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sure that the person is compensated for his or her injury. Moreover, regulation of injuries from products in a state can be distinguished from the
regulation of mud flaps on interstate trucks in Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc.39 2 and the length of interstate trains in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona 393 on the ground that the product is no longer traveling in interstate commerce and a state's purely internal safety regulations cannot
burden interstate commerce. In Bibb, a truck would have to change its
mud flaps at the state border, 394 and, in Southern Pacific, a train would
have to change its length at the border. 395 There is no comparable burden
concerning products liability.
4. Constraints on a State's Ability to Regulate Its Citizens' Out-ofState Conduct
Finally, considering horizontal federalism in relation to a state's
ability to regulate its citizens' out-of-state activities will illustrate how
the parts of horizontal federalism work together. Professor Rosen has
argued that "Home States indeed have a presumptive power to regulate
their citizens' out-of-state activities to avoid travel-evasion. ,,396 In contrast, I do not think that states can control their citizens when they are
outside the state to the extent that Professor Rosen does. First, a person
in the United States is both a federal citizen and a citizen of the state in
which they reside.397 Thus, a state lacks complete sovereignty over its
citizens, and it must respect the federal Constitution. A state citizen is not
a child of that state. Second, Professor Rosen understates the importance
of territoriality in connection with state sovereignty. 398 The authority of
392. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
393. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
394. See Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524.
395. See S. Pac., 325 U.S. at 774.
396. Rosen, supra note 115, at 896. Rosen states that "[s]uch 'travel-evasion,' which in effect
gives citizens the power to choose which state's laws are to govern them on an issue-by-issue basis,
can cripple the ability of states to accomplish constitutional objectives." Id. at 856-57; see also
ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 42 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing a state's
ability to punish its citizens' extraterritorial activities that violate state criminal laws); C. Steven
Bradford, What Happens if Roe Is Overruled? ExtraterritorialRegulation of Abortion by the States,
35 ARiz. L. REV. 87, 170 (1993) (discussing the extraterritorial effects of regulating abortion if Roe
v. Wade were overturned); Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to
Life, and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 876 (1993) (discussing state regulation of its
citizens abroad); Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893, 907 n.94
(1988) (discussing states' ability to regulate and punish extraterritorial acts except abortion); Seth F.
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial
Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 462 (1992) (discussing "efforts by
states to punish their citizens for conduct that is protected in [a] sister state where it occurs"); Regan,
Siamese Essays, supra note 20, at 1912 (discussing state regulation of its citizens' extraterritorial
activities); William W. Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of ConstitutionalReview from Griswold v.
Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1677, 1684-85 (discussing evasion of state abortion laws and the ability of states to enforce such
laws extraterritorially on its citizens).
397. U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1.
398. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 964 n.455 ("Finally, I would like to say that I, like Professor
Kreimer, believe that states' physical boundaries are very important. I believe, however, that careful
consideration shows that they are only imperfect surrogates for demarcating where a polity's legiti-
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the states is defined by their borders. 399 In addition, as Professor Seth F.
Kreimer has observed, "[tihe Constitution was framed on the premise
that each state's sovereignty over activities within its boundaries excluded the sovereignty of other states." 4°° While domicile might give a
state power over a person in limited circumstances, the most important
source of power for a state over a person is that the person is within a
state's borders. One state simply cannot invade another state's territory
and dictate what is legal in that state. Third, Professor Rosen overstates
the extent of concurrent jurisdiction. Two states may apply their laws to
the same matter when the occurrence significantly involves both states.
However, the fact that a person is domiciled in a state does not generally
make that person's activities in another state a multi-state matter, invoking concurrent jurisdiction. Finally, Professor Rosen ignores Gore's dictate that one state cannot impose its policy on another state. In fact, Professor Rosen does not mention Gore at all. Thus, as Professor Kreimer
has written: "The tradition of American federalism stands squarely
against efforts by states to punish their citizens for conduct that is protected in the sister state where it occurs." '
Consider two examples: one in which a state does not have an interest in regulating its citizens' out-of-state activities and another where it
does have an interest, at least in part. State X believes that gambling is
mate interests end. This mismatch between physical boundaries and legitimate interests has grown
over time due to various technological revolutions that increase the frequency of cross-border activities and, in the process, provide citizens ever greater opportunities to structure their activities so as to
free themselves of their Home State's regulations.").
399. See Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 20, at 1887 (stating "[i]n short, territoriality is
presupposed as the relevant criterion of legislative jurisdiction").
The main cases that Professor Rosen uses to support his position are weak. Professor Rosen relies heavily on Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). Rosen, supra note 115, at 865. In this case,
the Supreme Court held that Florida could prohibit its citizens from sponge fishing in an area outside
its territorial waters. Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 79. This case was decided in 1941 at the height of the
Court's hands off approach to state regulation, and before the Court started to impose greater dormant commerce clause regulations on a state's ability to regulate outside its borders. More importantly, Florida was regulating the high seas, not within the borders of another state; there was no
clash between state sovereigns. Id. at 77.
Professor Rosen also relies on Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion), particularly for the fact that the Court allowed jurisdiction partly on the ground that the widow
lived in Minnesota at the time of the lawsuit. Rosen, supra note 115, at 872-73 ("In short, Hague
suggests that bona fide residence on its own is virtually, if not wholly, a sufficient basis for empowering a state to regulate that person's out-of-state activities."). As I stated above, allowing a state to
choose its law solely because a person has moved to a state after an occurrence is a gross violation of
due process and full faith and credit. A state has no interest in what happened to one of its citizens
before he or she moved to that state.
Finally, Professor Rosen cites to In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App.
Mar. 5, 1991). Rosen, supra note 115, at 878-79. In this case, a Missouri court prohibited a father
from moving his daughter, who was in a persistent vegetative state, out-of-state, so he could have
her feeding tube removed. Busalacchi, 1991 WL 26851, at *1, *5.However, in this case, the court
was not regulating out-of-state conduct. The court did not prohibit an act from taking place outside
the state. Rather, it prevented the daughter's removal from the nursing home she was currently in
inside Missouri. Id.
Kreimer, supra note 396, at 464.
400.
Id. at 462.
401.
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immoral, and it wants to protect its citizens who are addicted to gambling, so it passes a law that makes gambling illegal. Can State X extend
its law to cover its citizens' gambling in other states? The answer to this
question should be no. A state should not be able to control its citizens'
conduct beyond its borders when that activity is legal in the other state.
Allowing a state to extend its laws beyond its borders in such an instance
ignores the fact that the person is a federal citizen and offends the person's due process rights by making conduct that is legal in a jurisdiction
illegal.
On the other hand, assume that a same-sex couple wants to get married, but that marriages by same-sex couples are illegal in their domicile.
However, marriages of same-sex couples are legal in State Y, so the couple goes to State Y and gets married. They then come back to their domicile and want it to recognize their marriage and give them the same benefits as other married couples. Does the domicile have to recognize the
marriage? The answer should be no because the domicile has the authority to control marriage status within its territory by its citizens.4 °2
In both the gambling hypothetical and the marriage hypothetical,
state citizens have gone out-of-state to avoid state laws they dislike. The
difference is, in the gambling hypothetical, the activity is wholly out-ofstate, while in the marriage hypothetical, the couple is asking for recognition of their marriage status in their domicile. Obviously, the domicile
could not forbid the couple to get married in another state because it is an
extraterritorial act, but it can refuse to allow any consequences from that
marriage in its territory.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the Rehnquist Court has been inconsistent in its adjudication of horizontal federalism, creating strong
constraints in the limited area of the effect of the Due Process Clause on
state punitive damages awards, but giving little meaning to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and cutting back on the scope of the dormant commerce clause. It has also suggested that the Court should place greater
constraints on a state's ability to extend its laws to interfere with other
states' sovereignty or to unduly burden individuals. This can be accomplished by applying the due process principles it used in punitive damages cases to other types of cases, by giving the Full Faith and Credit
Clause significant content, and by not limiting the scope of the dormant
commerce clause.
402.
See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1945) (holding that North Carolina
could prosecute a couple for bigamous cohabitation when the North Carolina residents divorced and
remarried in Nevada, then returned to live together in North Carolina). The issue of the recognition
of same-sex marriages is complicated. I believe that in some instances states will have to recognize
same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere. See generally Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and SameSex Marriage,51 FLA. L. REv. 799 (1999).

2003]

HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM

The analysis of the Rehnquist Court's horizontal federalism cases
and this Article's suggestions for constraints on horizontal federalism
4 °3
come from a moderate, pragmatic reading of the constitutional text.
This Article has advocated giving meaning to all the structural provisions
of the Constitution 4°4 and reading these provisions in a detached, valuefree manner.40 5 The suggestions for greater constraints on horizontal federalism are an attempt to allocate authority to the proper sovereign, not to
further a political agenda.

See REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCTURE, supra note 199, at 9-10. Professor Redish asserts his
403.
concept of pragmatic formalism:
One may legitimately accept that the nature of a constitutional system imposes on the judiciary an obligation to engage in principled, consistent analysis and to make decisions
that are capable of rational reconciliation with governing textual directives, yet simultaneously recognize that within those confines there exists room for the judiciary to take at
least some account of pragmatic concerns.
Id.
404. I strongly agree with Professor Redish's declaration that "in our form of constitutional
democracy the Court's role requires that its constitutional pronouncements not contravene the unambiguous directives contained in the text of the document that the Court interprets and enforces,
regardless of the Court's assessment of the political or social merits of those directives." Id. at 6. He
added: "Unless the unaccountable judiciary is constrained by the outer boundaries of constitutional
text in invalidating majoritarian action, it is effectively transformed into a philosopher king, sitting in
judgment on the wisdom and morality of all of society's social policy choices." Id. at 8.
Cf Fruehwald, The New Federalism,supra note 199, at 865-66 (arguing for similar de405.
tachment in the area of vertical federalism).

WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS: RECONCILING THE PURPORTED CONFLICTS
BETWEEN STATE LAW, FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW, AND
EQUAL PROTECTION TO PREVENT THE CREATION OF A
DISPOSABLE WORKFORCE
ROBERT I. CORREALESt

"I came to America because I heard the streets were paved with
gold. When I got here, I found out three things: first, the streets were not
paved with gold; second, they weren't paved at all; and third, I was expected to pave them." -Old Italian saying'
INTRODUCTION

For more than a century, undocumented migration to the United
States has provided a steady stream of workers to industries in which the
jobs are not attractive to citizens or other legal residents because of unpleasant or dangerous working conditions and low wages. Undocumented workers are concentrated in high-risk, low-pay occupations such
as construction, agriculture, landscaping, meatpacking, hotel service, and
restaurant work. Their willingness to work unpleasant jobs for low
wages, the perception that they possess a superior work ethic, and the
minimal possibility that employers will be prosecuted for employing
them, combine to make undocumented immigrants particularly attractive
to employers desperate to find workers. Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions they are welcome only as long as they are physically able to work.
State workers' compensation systems have adjusted in part to the
presence of this often critical and virtually permanent group of uninvited
guests. Indeed, a large number of state courts and legislatures have
awarded workers' compensation benefits to that group.2 Of the states that
t
Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I wish to thank Professors Lynne Henderson, Annette Appell, Joan Howarth, Carl Tobias,
and Steve Johnson for all their help and encouragement in the writing of this Article and for their
constant and selfless mentoring. I also thank Mr. James Rogers for his unyielding support of this law
school and for making much of our research possible. Many thanks also to my research assistants,
Christopher Carson and Amanda Yen (L'2005), for their hard work and dedication.
1.

GEORGE BROWN TINDALL & DAVID E. SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 942

(1984).
2. See Champion Auto Body v. Indus. Claim Appeal Office, 950 P.2d 671, 673 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1997); Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396, 409 (Conn. 1998); Gene's Harvesting v. Rodriguez,
421 So. 2d 701, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Dynasty Sample Co. v. Beltran, 479 S.E.2d 773, 775
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Artiga v. M.A. Patout & Son, 671 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Ruiz
v. Belk Masonry Co., 559 S.E.2d 249, 251 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Gayton v. Gage Carolina Metals
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have considered this problem, only Wyoming continues to deny com-3
pletely workers' compensation benefits to undocumented workers.
However, this virtual unanimity in the workers' compensation field does
not extend to vocational rehabilitation services. Those services are generally provided to workers who cannot return to their original job after a
severe injury but who can work in a limited capacity or in other occupations after retraining. While several influential states have decided in
favor of disabled undocumented workers,4 others continue to deny them
those benefits. 5 Those states completely disavow any obligation to provide vocational rehabilitation services to undocumented workers, even
where work-related accidents result in life-long disabilities.
Inc., 560 S.E.2d 870, 872 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Femandez-Lopez v. Jose Cervino, Inc., 671 A.2d
1051, 1056 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d
221, 224 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Lang v. Landeros, 918 P.2d 404, 406 (Okla. Ct. App.
1996); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 749 A.2d 1036, 1041 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000); Villa v. E. Wire Prods. Co., 554 A.2d 644, 646 (R.I. 1989); Commercial Standard Fire &
Marine Co. v. Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). Many states include "aliens" in
the definition of "employees." See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 23-901(5)(b) (2003); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3351(a) (Deering 2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 440.02(15)(a) (2003); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. §§
401.011(4), 406.092 (Vernon 2003); see also Fernandez-Lopez, 671 A.2d at 1053 (holding that an
illegal alien's inclusion is "self-evident" from the statutory definition of employee); Brambila v.
Chase-Walton Elastomers, Inc., Bd. No. 6734092, 1997 WL 487359, at *5 (Mass. Dept. Indus.
Accidents Aug. 22, 1997) (holding that illegal aliens are included under the definition "employee").
However, as the Virginia experience demonstrates, coverage of undocumented immigrants does not
necessarily follow. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. The term "aliens" is commonly
applied to authorized immigrants, who do not always enjoy the same rights as citizens. Thus, states
that include "aliens" in their workers' compensation statutes without differentiating between legal
and undocumented immigrants, may mean legal resident or may simply not have encountered situations involving undocumented workers.
3. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) (Michie 2002) ("'Employee' ...
includes
legally employed minors and aliens authorized to work [in the Unites States] by the United States
department of justice immigration and naturalization service."); see also Felix v. State ex rel. Wyo.
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 986 P.2d 161, 164 (Wyo. 1999) (holding expressly that the definition of "employee" in §27-14-102(a)(vii) does not include illegal aliens). Though the subject is
beyond the reach of this article, Wyoming is also behind the times in its refusal to cover illegally
employed minors under its workers' compensation laws. § 27-14-102(a)(vii). For the protection of
the children and for public policy reasons, that issue has been decided in favor of the minors in most
other jurisdictions. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW § 66.02 (2003) (citing forty states whose workers' compensation statutes cover illegally employed minors). Larson's treatise on workers' compensation identifies Idaho as another jurisdiction
that prohibits coverage of undocumented workers under its workers' compensation statute. Id. §
66.03 (citing IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(19)(a) (Michie 2002)). However, a closer look at the statute
reveals that the benefit prohibited is unemployment compensation, not workers' compensation.
Unemployment compensation is generally dependent on the worker's availability to work. IDAHO
CODE § 72-1366(5) (Michie 2003). In 1976, Congress passed a law denying certification to any state
unemployment compensation program that awards those benefits to undocumented workers. 26
U.S.C. §§ 3304(a)(14)(A), (c) (2000).
4. See, e.g., Foodmaker, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 767, 775
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Ruiz, 559 S.E.2d at 251, 254; Gayton, 560 S.E.2d at 874; Garcia v. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 939 P.2d 704, 704-06 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (noting implicitly that vocational
rehabilitation benefits are payable to illegal aliens, but suspending employee's benefits for other
reasons).
5.
See, e.g., Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175, 183 (Nev. 2001) (holding that
undocumented workers may receive workers' compensation, but not vocational rehabilitation).
Virginia provides workers' compensation but denies vocational rehabilitation by statute. See infra
notes 11-12 and accompanying text. Louisiana provides workers' compensation but denies vocational rehabilitation by administrative regulation. See infra note 13.
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In many jurisdictions, undocumented workers who can work without restrictions after medical treatment are simply returned to their jobs,
where they have become virtually indispensable. However, those who
without vocational rehabilitation are unable to return to work due to
permanent disabilities are systematically discarded without recourse.
This shortsighted practice contradicts traditional American notions of
justice and ignores important economic and social factors by creating
disposable workers who can be discarded after their useful lives have
accidentally expired. These workers are of the most vulnerable populations in the United States because they have the least political and economic power of any group and enjoy virtually no safety nets.
This shadow population is primarily employed in high-risk occupations. Therefore, the economic windfall to private providers of workers'
compensation insurance coverage and self-insurers is quite significant.
Laws in some states enable those providers, or self-insurers, to save up to
$16,000 for every claim denied. 6 In stark contrast, the real human consequences of those policies can be devastating, not only to the undocumented immigrants themselves, but to legal residents and citizens as
well.
Martha Gomez's case is typical. 7 Mrs. Gomez, a pregnant 28 yearold, was brutally attacked by a stranger in a laundry room where she was
working as a maid for a Las Vegas hotel. As the attacker hit and kicked
Mrs. Gomez's abdomen, head, and back, she kept herself in a fetal position to protect her pregnancy. Fortunately, Mrs. Gomez was able to save
her pregnancy and delivered her child (an American citizen) 8 on February 15, 1999. In March of 1999, after experiencing numbness and weakness on the left side of her body, memory loss, and depression, Mrs.
Gomez was given a medical examination. The doctor concluded that
Mrs. Gomez had not received appropriate medical attention since her
attack. The doctor diagnosed limited range of motion in her spine and on
the left side of her body, and hemiparesis on the left side of her body.
The physician recommended extensive diagnostic work-ups including
MRI studies of the brain, cervical spine, and left shoulder, in addition to
a psychological evaluation. Ms. Gomez was declared totally and temporarily disabled pending results of the diagnostic work-ups. The doctor
also recommended vocational rehabilitation, but Mrs. Gomez was denied
that treatment because of her undocumented status.

6. The cost of vocational rehabilitation can be significant. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§
23.30.041(k)-(I) (Michie 2003) (authorizing vocational rehabilitation costs up to $13,300 for two
years); NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.580(2)(b) (2003) (authorizing lump sum of up to $20,000 in lieu of
vocational rehabilitation services available to injured employees who reside outside the state).
7. The three stories in this section are actual cases that took place in Nevada. The names of
the claimants have been changed. Records from their cases are on file with the author.
8.
All children born in the U.S. are citizens of the country at birth. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471
U.S. 444,446 (1985).
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Another example is the case of Antonio Gutierrez, who suffered the
amputation of his left arm at the shoulder in a work-related accident. Mr.
Gutierrez's arm was severed at the shoulder by the blades of a cement
mixer. As a result of the accident, Mr. Gutierrez was determined to have
a permanent disability rating of fifty nine percent. Mr. Gutierrez was
restricted to light duty labor with a weight lifting limit of ten to twenty
pounds when he was released from care. Mr. Gutierrez was initially issued a prosthesis with a hook. Later, he was given a "cosmetic" prosthesis, but it was not functional with respect to employment. The employer
did not provide light duty employment within the restrictions established
by Mr. Gutierrez's physician, thus, pursuant to Nevada law, Employers'
Insurance Company of Nevada (EICN) (the state's provider of workers'
compensation insurance) became obligated to provide vocational rehabilitation services. However, on October 18, 1995, EICN determined that
because of Mr. Gutierrez's failure to supply "proof of his right to work,"
all vocational rehabilitation benefits would be suspended, and Permanent
Total Disability (PTD) would not be offered. The Appeals Officer agreed
with EICN's argument that the Immigration Reform Control Act of 1986
(IRCA) preempted state law and prohibited vocational rehabilitation services or payments for permanent total disability. 9
In another case, Roberto Chavez sustained a severe back injury
when he fell fifteen feet to the ground from a scaffold while installing
sheetrock for a drywall company. After receiving treatment, Mr. Chavez
was released from medical care with physical restrictions of thirty
pounds maximum lifting and fifteen pounds repetitive lifting. Because
his former employer could not accommodate his restrictions, Mr. Chavez
became eligible for vocational rehabilitation services. In fact, Mr.
Chavez was initially offered vocational rehabilitation services, but on
September 2, 1997, EICN determined that Mr. Chavez was not eligible to
receive those services because of his inability to provide certification of
U.S. residency. That decision was upheld twice on appeal within the Department of Administration of the State of Nevada. The District court
denied judicial review of the administrative decision.
These cases are typical in Nevada. However, disabled undocumented workers have received similar treatment in other states, and
every jurisdiction is likely to eventually confront this issue. Virginia is
illustrative of jurisdictions that have experienced a recent influx of undocumented immigrants. After many years of confusing and internally
inconsistent legal holdings denying coverage to undocumented workers, 10 the Virginia general assembly recently amended the workers' com9. The District Court later reversed the appeals officer, finding that Mr. Gutierrez was entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
10.
Compare Manis Constr. Co. v. Arellano, 411 S.E.2d 233, 234 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (ratifying the principle that an employer who knowingly hires an undocumented worker cannot then assert
the worker's immigration status as a defense to an "otherwise valid claim" under workers' compen-
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1
pensation statute to include "aliens" whether documented or not. However, the statute continues to deny undocumented workers access to the
state's vocational rehabilitation services, even in cases of severe and
12
lingering disabilities resulting from work-related accidents. Undocu3 Maryland, 4 and
mented workers face similar situations in Louisiana,1
the District of Columbia, 15 three jurisdictions with growing numbers of

sation and "benefit from its own illegal act" (internal quotations omitted)), with Granados v. Windson Dev. Corp., 509 S.E.2d 290, 292-93 (Va. 1999) (holding that a claimant's false representation of
his immigration status did not bar recovery under the state workers' compensation laws, but also
holding that a claimant who was an "illegal alien" was not an "employee" under the workers' compensation laws, despite the fact that the Virginia statute defined employee as "[e]very person, including a minor, in the service of another under any contract of hire," because IRCA renders their purported contracts of hire void and unenforceable (internal quotations omitted)), and Mendoza-Garcia
v. Cho Yeon Hwi/Best Cleaners, No. 1257-00-4, 2001 WL 292316, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 27,
2001) (denying a remedy under the state's workers' compensation statute to a worker knowingly
hired by an employer who had not purchased workers' compensation insurance, although Granados
had not foreclosed a remedy under those facts). In contrast, most other states that had considered the
issue did not find a conflict between IRCA and the states' workers' compensation laws. See, e.g.,
Dowling, 712 A.2d at 409-11 (reasoning that the question of whether the person's undocumented
status taints the employment relationship so as to render contracts for employment null and void
hinges on whether enforcement of the employment contract would contravene the public policy
underlying IRCA; finding that the primary purpose of IRCA is to "establish procedures that inhibit
the employment of undocumented workers and to punish employers who knowingly offer jobs to
those workers," the court reasoned that to "[permit] employers to avoid liability under the Workers'
Compensation Act, therefore, would ... provide unscrupulous employers with an incentive to employ undocumented workers" and thereby violate the Immigration Reform Act); see also supra note
2 (listing many jurisdictions that have considered the issue).
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Michie 2003) (including "aliens . . . whether lawfully or
11.
unlawfully employed" within its definition of "employee").
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-603(A)(3) (Michie 2003), states in relevant part: "The employer
shall also furnish or cause to be furnished . . . reasonable and necessary vocational rehabilitation
services; however, the employer shall not be required to furnish, or cause to be furnished, services
under this subdivision to any injured employee not eligible for lawful employment."
13. See Artiga, 671 So. 2d at 1139 (concluding that, "The Louisiana Workers' Compensation
Act ... does not exclude illegal aliens from securing workers' compensation benefits when justified"). However, the Louisiana Administrative Code denies vocational rehabilitation services to
undocumented immigrants. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 67, § 109(E)(1)(d) (2003) (stating that "Louisiana Rehabilitation Services does not impose a residence requirement. Illegal aliens, however,
cannot be served").
14. In Maryland no statute prohibits vocational rehabilitation services to undocumented
workers. It appears that the state's workers' compensation agency simply assumes that such services
are not available to that group. See infra note 17.
15. An article in the Washington Post discussed the situation faced by undocumented workers
in the Virginia/ Maryland/D.C. area. The author tells the stories of Pedro Velazquez, an undocumented construction worker who fell from a roof, suffering a broken leg, a smashed wrist, and a
fractured spine; Mario Perez, another undocumented worker whose right pinkie tendon was sliced by
a falling piece of plasterboard; and Luis Enrique Bonta, a Peruvian undocumented immigrant who
lost three fingers in a printing press accident. Though they could have benefited from vocational
rehabilitation, none of these workers were eligible to receive those services because of their undocumented status. See Nurith C. Aizenman, Harsh Reward for Hard Labor; For Many Hispanic
Immigrants, Work Injuries End Dreams of a New Life, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2002, at C1. In contrast, legal residents throughout the U.S. are routinely retrained even where the resulting disabilities
are not as severe as those mentioned above. See City of Miami v. Mercer, 513 So. 2d 149, 150-51
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (approving a lump sum award to pay for aviation training); Towne v.
Bates File Co., 497 So. 2d 967, 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing denial of vocational rehabilitation request to allow worker with twenty-five percent impairment to temporarily relocate to Las
Vegas while enrolled in a casino gambling dealer's school); Johnson v. Shaw's Distribution Ctr.,
760 A.2d 1057, 1059-62 (Me. 2000) (upholding a rehabilitation award to help the claimant obtain a
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undocumented immigrants. Wyoming alone denies every kind of workers' compensation service by statute.' 6 The laws in many other states do
not seem to address whether undocumented workers are eligible for vocational rehabilitation.
Many jurisdictions have not yet had occasion to
17
consider the issue.
The denial of vocational rehabilitation to undocumented workers
raises two issues. The first involves the nature of available vocational
rehabilitation services, and whether they conflict with IRCA. The second
issue is whether state action denying those services is constitutional.
This Article argues that sound public policy supports states providing vocational rehabilitation services to undocumented workers who
have been injured in work-related accidents. Part I of the Article provides
context by analyzing some of the complexities of undocumented immigrants' lives in the United States. Part II discusses the history and economics of vocational rehabilitation programs established by workers'
compensation systems. Part HI discusses ways in which immigration law
and enforcement contribute to the formation of this shadow population.
Part IV analyzes purported conflicts between vocational rehabilitation
programs and IRCA as they arose in Tarango v. State Industrial Commission,18 a Nevada case that denied an undocumented worker access to
those services. Part V examines preemption of state law by IRCA, concluding that IRCA does not preempt the most crucial parts of those statutes. Part VI explores the constitutional issues that can arise when states
act to deny undocumented workers access to those services, suggesting
that such denial may be unconstitutional. Part VI also explores exceptions to deferential rational basis review, the continued viability of those
exceptions, and application of the exceptions to this issue. Part VII
briefly discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB,1 9 and argues that Hoffman should not result in denial of
masters degree in psychology despite the fact that the claimant retained the ability to work full time
as a security guard and was found capable of earning more than half of his pre-injury wages).
16. See Felix, 986 P.2d at 163-64. Little legislative history exists regarding the passage of the
Wyoming statute. However, it is interesting to note that the statute became effective January 1, 1996,
around the same time that California was struggling with the passage of Proposition 187, a law
designed to deny many state benefits to undocumented immigrants. Initiative Statute, Proposition
187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. (1994). Prior to 1996, the Wyoming statute included "aliens" within the
definition of covered employees, without regard to immigration status. See Felix, 986 P.2d at 164
(citing 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 121, §§ 2, 4).
17. Telephone inquiries in June of 2003 to a number of state workers' compensation agencies
revealed the following: Arizona (no retraining available since the agency would not be able to get
undocumented workers a job); Colorado (state does not allow it); Connecticut (workers' compensation available, but do not know about vocational rehabilitation); Florida (undocumented workers
qualify for workers' compensation, but cannot return to work without a permit; no vocational rehabilitation); Illinois (undocumented workers are eligible for retraining through workers' compensation, but there is no statute or case law on the issue); Maryland (department assumes undocumented
workers are not eligible for vocational rehabilitation); New Mexico (worker must be a resident and
have a valid social security number to qualify for vocational rehabilitation).
18.
25 P.3d 175 (Nev. 2001).
19.
535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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those services. Because vocational rehabilitation is a subset of workers'
compensation and parallels other workers' rights legislation, it is hoped
that this Article will also help to clarify the availability of workplace
protections for undocumented immigrants in other areas.
I.

UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The undocumented immigrant population in the United States currently numbers around 8.5 million. 20 Approximately five million undocumented immigrants 2 1 work in low-paid, menial jobs where the risk
of physical injury is high.22 Many industries consider them "essential
workers." 3 These are generally industries where the jobs do not attract
20. An estimate by Jeffrey Passel of the Urban Institute, based on 2000 census and INS data
placed the number of undocumented immigrants who live in the United States at 8.5 million. Michael E. Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, Urban Institute, U.S. hnmigration at the Beginning of the 21st
Century: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Hearing on "The U.S.
Populationand Immigration" Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives, (Aug. 2,
2001), at http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=7321 (last visited February 12, 2004).
Most undocumented workers are concentrated in low-wage industries, where the dangers
21.
of severe injuries are high, such as agriculture, food processing, meatpacking, garment manufacturing, and construction. A study by the Pew Hispanic Center found that approximately five million
undocumented immigrants work in low-wage, high-risk occupations. The manufacturing sector
employs approximately 1.2 million undocumented workers; the service industries employ nearly 1.3
million; agriculture employs 1 to 1.4 million; the construction industry employs nearly 600,000; and
700,000 are employed by restaurants. B. Lindsay Lowell & Roberto Suro, Pew Hispanic Center,
How Many Undocumented: The Numbers Behind the U.S.-Mexico Migration Talks, at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/howmanyundocumented.pdf (last visited February 12,
2004); see also U.S Dep't of Labor, Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey
(NAWS) 1997-1998, at 5, 22 (Mar. 2000) (finding that at least half of the agricultural workforce in
the United States is not authorized to work in this country).
22.
In a recent article in the New York Times, Steven Greenhouse, relying on figures from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, found that Hispanics are much more likely than Whites or Blacks to work
at dangerous, low-level jobs. The article also found that Hispanics are twenty percent more likely
than Whites or African Americans to die from work-related injuries. The article attributed the differences in death rates to the fact that Hispanic immigrants are over-represented in dangerous occupations because "they will accept ... poorer working conditions than U.S.-born workers [i.e., legal
residents]." Steven Greenhouse, Hispanic Workers Die at Higher Rate, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2001,
at Al I (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The differences in death rates were also
attributed to the fact that Hispanic immigrants are "more likely to be employed by fly-by-night
contractors," and to fear of speaking up about dangerous things on the job. Id. Of course, the same
can be said for other racial or ethnic groups that share characteristics, such as language deficiencies,
and fear of deportation with undocumented Hispanics. A Government Accounting Office (GAO)
report on meatpacking plants in Iowa and Nebraska describes the dangerous work conditions in the
plants thusly: "The work in meatpacking plants is often hard and can be hazardous. The use of
knives, hooks, and saws in hot and cold areas on wet floors presents the risk of cuts, lacerations, and
slips; and the work presents the risk of repetitive stress injuries." See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT-CHANGES IN NEBRASKA'S AND IOWA'S COUNTIES WITH
LARGE MEATPACKING PLANT WORKFORCES 3 (1998). That report also found that "[a]ccording to
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, about 22.7 of every 100 full-time meatpacking
plant workers were injured during 1995." Id. The exceedingly low wages in many of these industries
have been documented by the federal government. A survey by the U.S. Department of Labor found
that in 2000, 100 percent of all poultry processing plants were not in compliance with federal wage
and hour laws. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, POULTRY PROCESSING COMPLIANCE SURVEY FACT
SHEET (2001). Similar findings were made for garment manufacturing. See Labor Department: Close
to Half of Garment Contractors Violating FLSA, According to DOL Report, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 87, at A-7 to A-8 (May 6, 1996).
23. The Essential Worker Immigration Coalition (EWIC), a group that represents many laborintensive industries before the U.S. Congress, and advocates for immigration reform, predicts a
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legal residents, because of low wages, and because the work is unpleasant, physically demanding, or dangerous.24
An understanding of the reality of the lives and interactions of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. is crucial to the analysis of whether
vocational rehabilitation and other workplace protections should be made
available to undocumented workers. Undocumented immigrants occupy
the lowest rung on the United States' social ladder. During difficult economic times they are easy targets for nativist forces looking for scapegoats, condemned for taking jobs and social services away from American citizens and other legal residents. Undocumented immigrants are not
eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 25 Medicaid,26 Food Stamps, 27 and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).28 However, despite the fact that they are ineligible for public benefits,29 and that
they tend to avoid contact with most state agencies fearing detection,
undocumented immigrants also present an easy target for those looking
for abusers of public services.3 °
Undocumented immigrants are often depicted as lonesome adventurers who venture into the United States randomly, in search of any kind
of work. They are also depicted as criminals who, by definition, embody
a violation of the sacredness of the nation's borders, and its sovereignty.
Those depictions often serve to depersonalize legal decisions or policies
detrimental to that group, and help to avoid consideration of the real human consequences of those decisions. 3'

shortage of labor in the next decade. Citing figures from the various industries it represents, EWIC
projects that in the next decade there will be a need for an additional 700,000 workers in the lodging
and hotel industry; 540,000 workers in the meat processing industry; more than 2 million workers in
general construction; 200,000 in home construction; 2 million workers in restaurant work; and
50,000 in roofing. In addition, 99% of chambers of commerce around the country point to the shortage of workers as a priority issue among employers. Essential Worker Immigration Coalition
(EWIC), Documenting the Labor Shortage, (March 2002), at http://www.ewic.org/pdf/
EWIC_Documentingl.abor_.Shortage_%203_02.pdf (last visited February 12, 2004).
24.
See supranote 21.
25.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
26.
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(1) (2000).
27.
7 U.S.C. § 2015(0 (2000).
28.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(l)(B)(i) (2000).
29.
See Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol & Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights, Local
Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International Human Rights Critique of Immigration and Welfare
"Reform," 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 560 (1998) (describing federal welfare restrictions on aliens as
"a replay of the historically recurrent theme of safeguarding national resources from alien freeloaders"). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (1995) (analyzing undocumented immigrants' ineligibility to major federal public assistance programs).
30.
See Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 265-66, 269-70, 283 (1997)
(analyzing the stereotypes that control the debate over unauthorized immigration).
31.
See Chicas v. Hott & Son Excavating, LLC, VWC File No. 191-21-91, 2000 VA Wrk.
Comp. LEXIS 651, at * 6 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Feb. 29, 2000) (remarking, after denying
benefits to an injured undocumented worker, that "we would find no inequity in failing to reward the
claimant for his ongoing illegal acts").
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The most common explanation for unauthorized immigration into
the U.S. is the "push" and "pull" mechanism. That is, undocumented
immigrants are "pushed" toward the U.S. by poverty and dismal economic prospects, and "pulled" to the U.S. by an abundance of low-wage,
low-skill jobs that American employers cannot fill. While that explanation helps to understand some of the picture, it is far from complete. The
reasons for undocumented immigration to the U.S. are much more complex.
Undocumented immigrants generally arrive in the United States to
find well-developed social and economic networks composed of family,
32
friends, and, in many cases, willing employers. Those networks compose a formidable, yet partially hidden segment of the United States'
34
economy. 33 Their members work, study, shop, and pay taxes. Those
networks are only partially hidden because, in addition to the undocumented immigrants themselves, they also contain legal residents and
citizens, many of whom are related by blood or marriage to members of
this shadow population.35 The existence of those relationships has
prompted a number of prominent commentators to urge decision makers
to consider carefully the effect of their decisions upon that vulnerable
group. 36 Consideration of those relationships is especially important in
the area of workers' compensation. While United States' immigration
policy has paid little attention to the interests of citizen children born to

32. See Michael Fix et al., Immigration Studies: The Integrationof Immigrant Families in the
United States 7 (The Urban Institute, July 2001), at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immig_
integration.pdf (last visited February, 12 2004); see also Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187:
Undocumented Immigrants and the NationalImagination, 28 CoNN. L. REV. 555, 615 (1996) [hereinafter Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187].
33. See, e.g., Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the
Need for Strengthening Worker ProtectionLegislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2180-81 (1994) (analyzing the underground economy, which is driven in large part by undocumented immigrants).
34. See Peter L. Reich, JurisprudentialTradition and Undocumented Alien Entitlements, 6
GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1-5 (1992) (discussing the contributions to the economy made by undocumented immigrants, who pay taxes but are ineligible for social services).
35. Fix et al., supra note 32, at 14-17, is a demographic study of recent immigrant patterns in
the U.S. The study found that one-half of all undocumented immigrant-headed households in the
State of New York contain children, most of them citizens. Id. at 14. According to the study, eightyfive percent of immigrant families with children are mixed-status families, that is, families where at
lest one parent is a noncitizen and one child is a citizen. Id. at 15. Other findings include:
[1] Nationwide, 1in 10 U.S. children lives in a mixed status family;
[2] Seventy-five percent of all children in immigrant families (those headed by a noncitizen) are citizens;
[3] Twenty-seven percent of all children in New York City, and 47 percent of all children
in Los Angeles, live in mixed status families;
[4] In the state of New York, 70 percent of families with children headed by undocumented immigrants contain citizen children;
[5] Sixty percent of the poor children in Los Angeles, and 30 percent of New York's poor
children live in mixed status families ....
Id. at 15-16.
36. Id. at 17.
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illegal immigrants when considering deportation of their parents, 37 workers' compensation
law has retained those relationships as a central fo38
cus.

In a growing number of cases, courts and state legislatures have
come to realize that the everyday lives of undocumented immigrants in
the United States do not differ much from the lives of many legal residents, including citizens. 39 Thus, the United States legal system, particularly the federal system, has adjusted to this permanent presence by creating a series of compromises that enable undocumented immigrants and
their children to participate to some extent in American society, even
while they retain the status of outsiders under United States' immigration
law.40 Some of these compromises are forward-looking 41 or based on
principles of fairness reflecting traditional American values, 42 while others, particularly in the area of workers' rights, also reflect a need to protect the integrity of American laws for the benefit of all workers.43
Workers' compensation systems in many states have managed to
navigate IRCA without much difficulty. However, problems with immigration status often arise when undocumented workers are injured and
cannot return to work because the resulting disability is too severe, and
where the worker can only perform modified work or needs vocational
37. See Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States
Deportation of Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 492 (1995); Bill Piatt, Born as
Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
35, 36 (1988) (analyzing the constructive deportation of citizen children of undocumented immigrants when their parents are deported).
38. See, e.g., Turner v. Sunbelt Mfg., 763 So. 2d 770, 777 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
supplemental earnings benefits under workers' compensation was not forfeited during claimant's
period of incarceration given that claimant had two children who were dependent upon her); Jurado
v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669, 674 (Kan. 1993) (holding that worker's compensation death
benefits serve a dual purpose: first, they serve the employee's interest in assuring that his or her
family is protected against the loss of the worker's income (citing Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 503-04 (1923)); they also serve the dependent's interests, but the
dependent's rights are derived from and dependent upon the employee's right); Garner v. Shulte Co.,
259 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (holding that the humanitarian purposes of the workers' compensation laws extended to the protection of dependents, granting benefits to dependents
after father has become incarcerated and declared "civilly dead"); Thomas Refuse Serv. v. Flood,
515 S.E.2d 315, 317 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (same).
39.
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.17 (1982) (noting the U.S. Attorney General's statement to Congress that the federal government had "neither the resources, the capability,
nor the motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of whom have become, in
effect, members of the community" (internal quotations omitted)).
40.
Plyler,457 U.S. at 218 n.17.
41.
Id. at 207-08 ("[U]nder current laws and practices the illegal alien of today may well be
the legal alien of tomorrow, and that without an education, these undocumented children, already
disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial prejudices....
will become permanently locked into the lowest socio-economic class." (internal citations
and quotes omitted)).
42. See Jurado, 853 P.2d at 674 (demonstrating that death benefits from workers' compensation reflect a traditional American concern for the workers' families).
43. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11 th Cir. 1988) (finding that if the
Fair Labor Standards Act did not cover undocumented workers, employers might find them economically advantageous to hire them to the detriment of legal resident workers).
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rehabilitation to regain earning capacity. Those situations represent the
most delicate interaction between systems designed to restore workers'
earning capacity, seemingly unforgiving immigration law, and the reality
of immigration enforcement. As Nevada demonstrates, the inability to
reconcile those apparent conflicting interests can create a disposable
workforce.
Nevada depends heavily upon the work of undocumented immigrants. The popularity of the state as a tourist destination has fueled tremendous economic growth in the recent past, creating an insatiable demand for workers in the service and construction industries. 44 Jobs in the
mammoth tourism-driven service industry include maid service, kitchen,
and custodial work. Those jobs are generally physically demanding with
little intellectual or economic reward. Similarly, construction jobs in
Nevada call for individuals to spend countless hours working outdoors in
extremely high temperatures throughout much of the year. While readily
available, these jobs are not always attractive to legal residents or citizens. An Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") inspection of
eighty-nine construction firms in Las Vegas found that thirty-nine percent of the employees appeared to be unauthorized to work in the United
States.45

Nevada readily provides medical coverage and lost wages to undocumented employees under its workers' compensation laws, 46 but denies vocational rehabilitation even in cases involving catastrophic workrelated injuries that result in severe lingering physical or mental disabilities. Though not required by federal law or state statute, all injured workers in Nevada are required by insurance providers to produce proof of
their ability to work in the United States, in the form of an 1-9 form, prior
to receiving vocational rehabilitation services.4 7 Curiously, this check is
not made before regular medical care is provided under the state's work44.
A recent study by the Urban Institute tends to show that immigrants are not driven to
migrate by the existence of generous public benefits programs. They instead tend to migrate to areas
known for economic opportunity. California, a state with generous social assistance programs, for
example, experienced a reduction in the number of new arrivals in the 1990s. In contrast, the Southeast, Midwest, and Rocky Mountain Regions, all new growth areas, have experienced a rapid increase in immigrant population. See Urban Institute, The Dispersal of Immigrants in the 1990s,
(Nov. 2002), at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410589 (last visited February 13, 2004).
RICHARD M. STANA, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS-SIGNIFICANT
45.
OBSTACLES TO REDUCING UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT EXIST 4 (1999).

46.
See NEV. REV. STAT. 616A. 105 (2003) ("Employee" includes "every person in the service
of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral
or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes, but not exclusively: 1. Aliens
and minors.").
47.
See infra Part IV for an analysis of Tarango, 25 P.3d at 175. Professor Linda Bosniak
noticed that after the passage of IRCA, private insurance providers began asking injured workers for
INS 1-9 forms before they would provide job retraining benefits. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and
Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis.

L. REV. 955, 1033-34 (1988) [hereinafter Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership]. Thus, to many
insurance providers and self-insurers, IRCA presented an opportunity to save significant amounts of
money by providing a reason to deny vocational rehabilitation benefits.
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ers' compensation statute. But, demonstrating that vocational rehabilitation services are inconsistent with the mandates of IRCA, Nevada
stopped providing vocational rehabilitation after passage of that statute,
even in cases resulting in catastrophic disabilities. In other words, Nevada's workers' compensation system filters out undocumented workers
who are no longer productive, while facilitating able-bodied individuals'
return to work.
Thus, the most capable among the injured undocumented workers,
those whose injuries do not result in total disability and who do not require vocational rehabilitation services, are readily provided medical
attention, and are able to return to work where they are sorely needed.
And the most vulnerable among them, those whose lingering disabilities
rendered them incapable of returning to their former job, and who require
vocational rehabilitation in the form of retraining, education, or workhardening physical therapy, are denied the means to regain their former
earning capacity.
An effective examination of the issues that arise in this area depends, in large part, upon a clear understanding of the nature of state
vocational rehabilitation programs under workers' compensation, and a
clear understanding of IRCA.
II. THE NATURE OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION UNDER STATE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEMS

A. History and Economics of Workers' Compensationand Vocational
Rehabilitation
Vocational rehabilitation benefits are a subset of workers' compensation. Vocational rehabilitation of injured workers who cannot return to
their former occupations after a work accident is mandated by statute in
just about every jurisdiction. 48 As is the case with workers' compensation, the employer is required by statute to provide vocational rehabilitation through an insurance provider (which in some jurisdictions is a state
fund) or through self-insurance. 49 Thus, although embedded in state statutes, neither workers' compensation nor vocational rehabilitation benefits are publicly funded welfare programs.50 They are instead substitutes
48.
The State of Texas does not mandate employers to provide worker's compensation benefits. Employees may instead elect to reject workers' compensation benefits and retain their common
law rights of action. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.034 (Vernon 2003).
49. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (Deering 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 616B.650 (2003).
50. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58-60 (1999) (reasoning that medical treatment under workers' compensation is not a public benefit, but a private insurance obligation); Mclnnis v. Town of Bar Harbor, 387 A.2d 739, 743 (Me. 1978) (noting that "rehabilitation is
not a publicly funded program for retraining the handicapped," it is a cost imposed entirely on the
employer). But see Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits for Undocumented Aliens: State Law into the
Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REV. 219 (1991) (referring consistently to workers' compensation
benefits as "state benefits" in its advocacy in favor of making such benefits available to undocumented workers).
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for tort remedies for personal injuries incurred on the job. Ordinary tort
remedies
are available to everyone, including undocumented immi51
grants.
State workers' compensation statutes were adopted in the United
States around the turn of the twentieth century amidst an enormous tide
of work-related accidents caused by rapid industrialization.52 Prior to that
time, the traditional defenses of contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk doctrines had effectively shielded employers from liability. 53 In the face of these formidable defenses, even
victims of catastrophic accidents caused primarily by the negligence of
the employer were routinely left without a remedy.54 Joining a national
call for reform, President Roosevelt stated in 1907: "[lIt is neither just,
expedient, nor humane; it is revolting to judgment and sentiment alike
that the financial burden of accidents occurring because of the necessary
exigencies of their daily occupation
should be thrust upon those sufferers
55
who were least able to bear it."
Since its inception, workers' compensation law has been predicated
on the no-fault principle. That is, employees forego the opportunity to
pursue tort remedies for work-related injuries in exchange for a quick
and certain resolution of their claims, even though the recovery in some
cases would be greater in tort. Under this no-fault scheme employees
need only prove: (1) the existence of an employer/employee relationship;
(2) that the injury arose during the course of employment; and (3) that
the injury is causally related to the employment. 56 The defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule are
explicitly abolished by statute in most states.57 This compromise between
employers and employees means that workers' compensation statutes are
generally interpreted liberally for the protection of the injured worker. 58
51.
E.g., Maldonado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 464,470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that undocumented alien had right to no-fault automobile insurance benefits as "resident" under
state statutes); Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 1103-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979) (recognizing a body of case law upholding undocumented immigrants' right to access to the
courts to enforce an insurance contract that provided coverage for automobile accidents); Arteaga v.
Literski, 265 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Wis. 1978) (holding that undocumented aliens have a right to sue in
tort).
52.
Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistence of
Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. L. REv. 119, 162-63 (1994) (crediting real catastrophes like the
deaths of 361 miners in a coal mining explosion in West Virginia and of 164 women in New York
City in the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, for helping to jolt social consciousness to the need for reform).
53. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50 (1967) (analyzing the historical origin of workers compensation).
54. See Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers'
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775 (1982).
55.
Spieler, supra note 52, at 166.
56. Riddle v. Brevard County Bd., 286 So. 2d 557, 561 (Fla. 1973).
57. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917); City of
Hammond v. Biedron, 652 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
58. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932) (Workers'
compensation operates "to relieve persons suffering such misfortunates of a part of the burden and to
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Significantly, this compromise received overwhelming support from
employers, employees, labor unions, and the insurance industry. 59 The
support by employers for workers' compensation has been attributed in
part to the need to ensure labor peace, but most commonly to the fact that
it essentially cost employers nothing. Initially, the cost to employers of
workers' compensation insurance was practically eliminated by reductions in wages paid to employees, and by passing some of the cost to
consumers. Workers, on the other hand, did not oppose a reduction in
wages because, in return, they received the certainty of recovery for
work-related injuries and avoided the uncertainty of tort litigation. Presently, most states require employers to purchase insurance from private
insurance companies or to qualify as self-insurers. 61 Employers are free
to pass the cost of workers' compensation insurance on to consumers of
products or services in the form of increased prices. 62 Of course, workers' wages are also susceptible to manipulation to reflect the cost of doing business. Workers' compensation, therefore, continues to be privately funded.
B. Vocational RehabilitationServices
Vocational rehabilitation programs are crucial components of state
workers' compensation systems. After medical treatment for the workrelated injury, vocational rehabilitation programs can help workers and
their families avoid life sentences of disability and unemployment. In
addition, by helping to restore the injured worker's earning capacity,

distribute it to the industries and mediately to those served by them. They are deemed to be in the
public interest and should be construed liberally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were
enacted and, if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results."); Dep't of Indus. Relations v.
Circus Circus Enters. Inc, 705 P.2d 645, 648-49 (Nev. 1985) (Nevada's "previous decisions have
stressed the need for worker's compensation determinations to be consistent with Nevada's public
policy of favoring the injured worker, who gives up his or her right to a tort remedy against an
employer in exchange for the protections of the worker's compensation system."); Virden v. Smith,
210 P. 129, .130 (Nev. 1922) (stating Workmen's Compensation Act, being remedial in nature,
should be given a liberal construction to accomplish the purpose intended).
59.
See Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers' Compensation
in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 308-11 (1998).
60.
White, 243 U.S. at 201-02 ("[J]ust as the employee's assumption of ordinary risks at
common law presumably was taken into account in fixing the rate of wages, so the fixed responsibility of the employer, and the modified assumption of risk by the employee under the new system,
presumably will be reflected in the wage scale.").
61.
See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 3, § 2.08.
62.
Professors Larson and Larson described the purpose of workers' compensation thusly:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom of
providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial and
medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of
allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the
consumer of the product.
Id. § 103[2]. This position is consistent with the opinions of state supreme courts that have decided
to award benefits to undocumented immigrant workers. See Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling
Corp., 672 A.2d 221,223-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).

2003]

BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS

361

those services relieve pressure from state workers' compensation systems.6 3

The purpose of workers' compensation systems is the return of injured workers to gainful employment, whenever feasible (i.e., rehabilitation). In every state system rehabilitation is based on the employee's
ability to engage in an occupation earning wages similar to the employee's former occupation. 64 Rehabilitation is composed of two phases:
a medical phase and a vocational phase. Once the worker has reached
maximum medical recovery or improvement, state vocational rehabilitation statutes mandate a determination of the individual's capacity to
work. Permanently disabled individuals returning in a light-duty capacity
or after retraining are deemed eligible for vocational rehabilitation. Vocational rehabilitation generally comes in three forms: (1) modified, or
light duty work with the same employer; (2) job placement assistance to
secure a job with a different employer; or (3) retraining in the form of an
educational program. 65 The principal focus of all three types of rehabilitation is restoration of the worker's earning capacity. That is, the eligible
worker is entitled to any of the three forms of assistance to enable him to
return to work earning a salary similar or substantially similar to the
wages he earned in his former job.66
To qualify for vocational rehabilitation, the worker must first demonstrate the existence of a permanent disability that has diminished the
worker's earning capacity. The disability must manifest itself as a vocational disability. That is, the extent of the worker's disability must be
measured by the extent to which the worker's ability to earn wages compares to his former employment. Once the employee has demonstrated
the existence of a lingering disability, most vocational rehabilitation statutes require an individualized assessment of the worker's potential to
return to gainful employment. The assessment includes an evaluation of
the worker's disability, his remaining skills and education, and a deter-

63.
The objectives of rehabilitation are not restricted to helping injured workers. Rehabilitation also serves to enable employers to avoid making further compensation by assisting the injured
employee to regain his earning capacity. See Lancaster v. Cooper Indus., 387 A.2d 5, 9 (Me. 1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-08.1-05 (2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-701 (Michie 2003).
64.
See Ex parte Beaver Valley Corp. v. Priola, 477 So. 2d 408, 412 (Ala. 1985) (In "choosing the form of vocational rehabilitation which is most likely to restore the employee to suitable
gainful employment," consideration should be given to programs "reasonably calculated to restore
the employee to suitable employment providing an income comparable to that earned prior to the
injury."); Owens Country Sausage v. Crane, 594 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (granting a
former truck driver rehabilitation services in the form of an educational program that would give him
"instrument rating" and thus enable him to earn as much as he had as a truck driver; the claimant had
earned $275 a week prior to his injury and $175 a week after the injury); Norby v. Arctic Enters.,
Inc., 232 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Minn. 1975) (determining that the test is whether retraining will materially assist in restoring the employee's earning capacity); Seader v. Clark County Risk Mgmt., 906
P.2d 255, 256 (Nev. 1995) (stating that a worker's acceptance of lump sum payment for permanent
partial disability did not waive his right to receive vocational rehabilitation benefits).
65.
E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.530 (2000).
66.
See UPS v. Godwin, 418 S.E.2d 910, 912-13 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
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mination of whether retraining would help the employee regain an earning capacity similar to the one he formerly possessed. Many statutes require the employer to pay additional maintenance during retraining.67
Many statutes also require that the employer provide an allowance for
necessary travel.68
III. THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL REFORM ACT OF 1986 (IRCA) AND
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION

IRCA was designed to address the problem of unauthorized immigration to the U.S. by two principal means: (1) a massive regularization
process for eligible immigrants who had arrived in the country before
January 1, 1982; and (2) a mechanism of employer sanctions to deter the
knowing employment of undocumented immigrants.69 IRCA imposes
upon employers the duty to verify workers' immigration status, through
the INS form 1_9,7 0 and to keep records of the documents produced to
establish eligibility to work. Employers who fail to check workers' immigration status or to keep records expose themselves to civil fines.7'
Those who engage in a pattern or practice of violations by knowingly
employing undocumented immigrants can be charged criminally for their
conduct.72
Since its inception, IRCA has been criticized for turning U.S. employers into immigration deputies. However, in reality, even while prohibiting the hiring of undocumented immigrants and threatening sanctions against employers who hire them, the statute imposed only minimal
responsibilities upon employers. Though employers are required to verify the validity of documents presented to establish job applicants' authorization to work, they are not expected to become experts in the inspection of immigration documents. Documents that appear valid on
their face suffice to discharge the employers' obligations under the statute.73 Therefore, employers charged with violations often invoke the
"good faith" defense with great success.74 Employers are further protected by a number of provisions in the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which excuse "tech67. E.g., CAL. LAB.CODE § 139.5(a)(5) (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.555.2 (2001);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-17 (Michie 2003).
68. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.315 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-17(G); WIS. STAT.
§ 102.61(c) (2003).
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (2000).
70. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(ii) (2003).
71.
8 U.S.C. § 1324(e)(4)(A) (listing fine range from $250 to $10,000).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(f).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (2000).
74. Between October 1996 and May 1998, 2,100 employers were able to escape sanctions
under IRCA because the INS determined that the unauthorized aliens used fraudulent documents to
get hired. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS
UNDERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION SYSTEM 2 (1999). Signifi-

cantly, the INS is required to give employers three days' notice before it can inspect the employers'
premises. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2.
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nical or procedural" failures to verify documents as long as those failures
resulted from a "good faith" effort." IIRIRA also requires INS investigators to notify employers of violations they have encountered and to give
employers ten days to correct the problems.76 That reality is not lost on
many employers, particularly those who operate businesses that cannot
attract a steady supply of legal resident workers because of the nature of
the job or the level of pay."
Employees, on the other hand, do not enjoy an equivalent presumption of compliance with the statute once they establish that they are "eligible" to work. Though the statute does not impose continuing obligations upon employers to ensure workers' eligibility, neither does it prohibit further inquiries into their status. The statute prohibits discrimina78
tory immigration-related employment practices. However, any risk of
discrimination can be avoided by requiring that all employees, regardless
of immigration status, re-establish eligibility to work prior to receiving
vocational rehabilitation services. At that time, the insurance provider
can perform a more careful inquiry into the worker's immigration status
by examining the supporting documents more closely to sort out employees deemed ineligible.
Employers also are able to exploit the unenforceability of the employer sanctions provisions of the statute. For many reasons, workplace
enforcement has been used only sparingly since the passage of the statute. Besides the inherent difficulty in prosecuting employers presented
by the good faith defense, the task of inspecting every workplace for
potential violations of immigration law is enormous. Historically, the
INS simply has not had the resources, staffing, or time required for such
a task. 79 Because of these factors, immigration enforcement is largely
75.
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6).
76.
Id.
Professor Kitty Calavita conducted a survey of employers who routinely relied upon
77.
undocumented workers to fill unattractive jobs in Southern California. Kitty Calavita, Employer
Sanctions Violations: Toward a DialecticalModel of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
1041, 1051-53 (1990). Many of the employers revealed that though they knew they were hiring
undocumented workers and they appreciated the risk of sanctions, their need for workers drove their
hiring decisions. Id. The work ethic of undocumented workers was characterized by the employers
as superior to that of Americans. Id. Many of the employers recognized that the jobs they were
offering were not particularly desirable and would be difficult to fill were it not for undocumented
workers. Id. One employer described the work at his plant and the difficulty of filling positions with
a domestic work force thusly:
These girls come in at four o'clock in the morning, and it's cold out there in the room that
they're working in. There's chicken meat all over the place, and it's not real desirable
work.... It's hard to find people that will do that. All the girls that we have out there are
either resident aliens or of Mexican heritage, and ... ah. .. they're willing to do it. Consequently, if that's the type of people we have to get to do that type of work ... we would
have to hire them to get the work done.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
78.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2000).
79.
See Gerald P. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration
Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 669-72 (1981) (discussing the historical under funding of
the border patrol).
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restricted to border control. It is therefore widely understood among
employers that the odds of a workplace inspection, let alone a workplace
raid, or a successful conviction for violations of immigration law are
rather small. 8'
In many instances these advantages can translate into economic leverage in the marketplace for unscrupulous employers. Given all the protections offered by federal law, employers can create advantages over
their lawful competitors by relying on falsified documents to shield
themselves from IRCA liability, and then inquire more carefully into the
immigration status of their workers only once they become injured.82
That tactic can have an effect even in states that allow for workers' compensation benefits. It can be even more pronounced in states that do not
provide for such benefits.
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE LAW AND THE IMMIGRATION REFORM

CONTROL ACT OF

1986

The question of whether state vocational rehabilitation programs
conflict with IRCA was addressed directly by the Nevada Supreme Court
in Tarango v. State IndustrialInsurance System. 83 The Tarango decision
illustrates the confusion that can be created by the interaction of a system
80. Immigration enforcement takes place primarily at the border. Of the 1,714,035 apprehensions by the INS in fiscal year 1999, 97% were made along the Southwest Border. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 201, March 2002), at http://uscis.gov/graphics/
shared/aboutus/statistics/FY99Yearbook.pdf (last visited February 14, 2004). Similarly, in the year

2000, the INS dedicated most of its resources to border enforcement and the removal of criminal
immigrants. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ENFORCEMENT,
2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 2-4, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ENFOOyrbk/ENF200O.pdf (last visited February
14, 2004). Southwest border apprehensions were 1,643,679, a record high. Id. at 173. Removals of
criminal immigrants totaled over 71,000 while workplace removals totaled only 1,966. Id. For a
more detailed study of the impediments placed on the INS to engage in workplace enforcement, see
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: STATUS OF SOUTHWEST BORDER STRATEGY
IMPLEMENTATION (1999).

See Calavita, supra note 77, at 1064. A more recent example of IRCA's "good faith"
81.
defense is a case involving Tyson Food Inc. Bill Poovey, Tyson Just the Beginning,
Apr. 2, 2003, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fFREEREPUBLIC.COM,
news/88301 I/posts (last visited February 14, 2004). In an elaborate sting operation, agents for the
Justice Department delivered 136 undocumented employees to Tyson Foods. The Company was
charged with conspiracy to smuggle undocumented workers. Id. The government also charged top
company executives with knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. In defense of Tyson, its attorney
told jurors that the company could be hiring a "refugee from the North Pole or the man from Mars"
if the documents presented by the worker looked genuine. Id. (internal quotations omitted). After
deliberating for seven hours the jury found for Tyson. Id. One juror commented that there is "too
much gray area" for employers to determine who is legal, suggesting that there ought to be "stricter
guidelines" than requiring two identifying documents that look genuine. Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
Professor Linda S. Bosniak has explained the shield enjoyed by employers thusly: "In
82.
effect, employers who are willing to alter their practices just enough to avoid appearing to disregard
the law totally, but who in fact continue to rely on undocumented labor, are insulated from the law's
sanctions provisions." See Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership, supra note 47, at 1017.

83.

25 P.3d 175 (Nev. 2001).
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designed to assist the worker to return to gainful employment and a
largely unenforceable (and at times purposely unenforced) federal statute
that prohibits employing undocumented workers. At first glance the two
systems would appear to be in direct conflict. However, much complexity is lurking just beneath the surface. Many of these complexities were
manifested in Tarango. Thus, the case offers an effective vehicle to examine vocational rehabilitation principles in operation and to analyze this
problem.
Tarango, an undocumented worker, injured his back when he fell
from an eight-foot ladder while installing sheetrock at a construction
site. 84 As a result of the accident Tarango sustained a permanent partial
disability.85 After receiving medical treatment, Tarango was cleared to
return to the workforce. 86 However, Tarango's treating physician limited
him to permanent medium duty work in which he was to lift no more
than fifty pounds.8 7 Before his injury, Tarango was a drywall installer.8 8
That position required him to handle unwieldy sheets of drywall measuring four feet wide by eight feet long and weighing eighty pounds or
more. In a normal day a drywall hanger can install between thirty and
forty sheets of drywall on walls and ceilings.
Since Tarango's occupation required more vigorous activity than
Tarango's medical clearance would allow, his physician recommended
vocational rehabilitation. 89 The employer did not offer Tarango a lightduty job.90 Though it awarded payment for a ten percent permanent partial disability, the State Industrial Insurance System (SIS) denied
Tarango all vocational rehabilitation benefits, absent proof of a legal
right to work. 9' SIS's determinations were affirmed twice by a hearing
examiner, and once again by a Nevada district court. 92 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. 93
To support its denial of vocational rehabilitation services the court
relied on a Nevada statute that mandates:
84. Tarango, 25 P.3d at 177.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90.
See id. Light duty work is one of the options available in vocational rehabilitation programs.
91.
Id. While employers are essentially presumed innocent as long as they review workers'
documents in "good faith," employees do not enjoy an equivalent presumption. Beyond the initial
review of documents and keeping of records, IRCA does not require employers to reconfirm workers' authorization. However, the state does not prohibit the practice. Therefore, employers or insurance providers are free to revisit the issue of a person's authorization to work at any time. Aware
that IRCA prohibits discrimination in its administration against individuals who may "look or
sound" foreign, providers require that every applicant provide proof of authorization to work to
determine whether the person is eligible for benefits and to what extent.
92.
Id. at 178.
93.
Id. at 177.
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[T]he following priorities in returning an injured employee to work:
1. Return the employee to the job he had before his injury.
2. Return the injured employee to a job with the employer he worked
for before his accident that accommodates any limitation imposed by
his injury.
3. Return the injured employee to employment with another employer in a job that uses his existing skills.
4. Provide training for the injured employee while he is working in
another vocation.
5. Provide formal94training or education for the injured employee in
another vocation.

The court found that Tarango was not incapacitated by his inability
to lift more than fifty pounds.95 According to the court, that situation
presented SI1S with three options, "[flirst, SI1S could have returned
Tarango to the workforce" as provided by NRS 616C.530 (3), and
thereby cause an employer to violate IRCA by hiring Tarango. 96 "Second, SI1S could have ignored the priority scheme established by the legislature in the vocational rehabilitation statute and awarded Tarango formal training based solely on his illegal status., 97 "[T]hird, SIIS could
have denied all vocational rehabilitation benefits. 9 8
Though the Court purported to base its denial of services to Tarango
on state law, IRCA was crucial to its analysis. Concluding that denying
Tarango vocational rehabilitation benefits was the only logical choice,
the court noted that because Tarango was unable to return to his former
job due to his disability, the first priority option was never at issue. 99
However, according to the court, Tarango's ability to return to work in a
limited capacity implicated the second and third priorities, 0 ° which were
that the injured employee be returned to work, with the same employer if
the disability can be accommodated, or with a different employer in a job
that uses his existing skills. Accordingly, in the court's opinion, were
SUS to exercise either of these choices, it would expose employers to
sanctions for knowing violations of IRCA.

Id. at 179 (quoting NEV. REV STAT. 616C.530).
94.
95.
Id. at 180.
96. Id.
Id. This distinction was also drawn by Rivera v. United Masonry, Inc., 948 F.2d 774 (D.C.
97.
Cir. 1991). However, in Rivera the court was careful to note that when the lack of "suitable alternate
employment" was a prerequisite to certain workers' compensation benefits, judges should consider
whether someone of like age, education, work experience, or physical disability could find employment. Rivera, 948 F.2d at 775.
98.
Tarango, 25 P.3d at 180.
99.
Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.530 (establishes the return of the injured employee to the
same employer as the first priority).
100.
Tarango, 25 P.3d at 180; NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.530(2) (establishing the second priority,
which is the return to work to the same employer if the disability can be accommodated, while
subsection (3) establishes the third priority, which is the return of the injured employee to employment with another employer in a job that uses his existing skills).
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An alternative posed by the court would require SIIS to ignore the
priority scheme established by the statute, and to provide Tarango vocational rehabilitation training based solely on his unauthorized immigration status by jumping directly to the lowest priority options of the statute. 0 1 However, according to the court, subsection (4) "necessitates providing Tarango with formal vocational training that runs concurrent with
his employment.'' 1 2 And, because IRCA prohibits Tarango's employment in the U.S., "SIS would be required to provide training outside of
Nevada,"' 0 3 which the court refused because "[t]he NIA was not intended as a means to expand the agency's powers to award vocational
benefits beyond the borders of Nevada-let alone the borders of the
United States."' 4 In conclusion, the court maintained that Tarango
wanted a better career, not the one he left behind.'0 5
Importantly, the court based its denial of vocational rehabilitation to
10 6
Tarango principally on its disbelief that Tarango was incapacitated.
Though the court observed that Tarango's ability to return to the job
market was limited by his injury, the court emphasized that Tarango
could lift up to fifty pounds. 0 7 The court's focus on Tarango's ability to
lift fifty pounds to support its conclusion that he was not incapacitated
ignores a crucial element of vocational rehabilitation programs. The
question of whether incapacity exists is dependent on the nature of the
job and not some arbitrary measure of a person's strength. Indeed, the
court's observation that Tarango could participate in the job market in a
limited capacity is closer to the mark. While a lifting capacity of fifty
pounds may appear considerable in sedentary occupations, that limitation
essentially precluded Tarango from employment in the physically de08
manding construction industry. 1
As stated above, drywall installers must be able to carry and manipulate unwieldy sheets of material throughout the day. Those sheets
range in dimensions from four feet wide by twelve feet long, to four feet
wide by eight feet long, and, depending on the thickness, can weigh
eighty pounds or more. Sheetrock is generally installed on walls and ceil101.

Tarango,25 P.3d at 180.

102. Id. at 181.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.580 which states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this section, vocational rehabilitation services must not be provided outside of [Nevada]").
105.
Id. at 180.
106.
See id. ("[1]f Tarango was a documented worker, he clearly could have returned to similar
employment in the United States. Tarango was not incapacitated. Rather, the record indicates that
the only limitation on Tarango's abilities was that he should lift no more than fifty pounds.").
107.
Id.

108.
For purposes of this analysis, it is helpful to compare the work Tarango did prior to his
injury to work that he may be able to perform afterwards. An interview with Rafael Gomez, an
organizer for the Nevada Carpenters' Union, in November of 2002, revealed that a person with
Tarango's limitations would leave great difficulty finding a job in the construction industry that
would equal installing sheetrock. According to Mr. Gomez, Tarango's lifting limitation of fifty
pounds would render him virtually unemployable in construction.
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ings. In an eight-hour workday, a drywall hanger can install between
thirty and forty sheets of that material. The work of a drywall hanger
does not only require a great deal of strength, it also requires a great deal
of stamina and precision under tremendous physical stress. The Department of Labor (DOL) classifies the job of drywall applicator as "very
heavy work."'1 9 That category is the most demanding in a list produced
by DOL, which is the source used by vocational rehabilitation experts to
10
determine the extent of an injured person's vocational disability.
Given his limitations, Tarango can no longer install drywall. The
best job Tarango could hope for in the construction industry would be a
clean-up job. However, even that job would require Tarango to lift large
amounts of weight numerous times a day. In addition, the pay rate for
construction clean up would fall well short of the rate payable for installing drywall. The decision thus ignores the well-established principle that
Tarango and workers in his situation are generally entitled to assistance
to help them return to an occupation earning substantially similar wages
as their pre-injury position. Generally, "[a]n injured worker is not successfully rehabilitated when he or she reaches maximum medical recovery or improvement if the residuals of the injury, however well healed,
prevent re-entry into the job market in a position1 paying as well as, or
I
nearly as well as, his or her former employment."'
That principle is consistent with Nevada's workers' compensation
law. 1 2 It is also a principle that is routinely followed in other jurisdictions. Under Nevada law an injured worker is eligible for vocational rehabilitation if he does not have "existing marketable skills."" 3 Workers
with job-related injuries who do not possess existing marketable skills
are entitled to participate in programs designed to train or educate them
and to receive job placement assistance.1 14 Existing marketable skills are
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Dictionary of Occupational
109.
Titles, at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/dot/REFRNCIDOT08B.HTM (last visited February 14,
2004).
110. See id. at Appendix C. The Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles
organizes work into four categories. A synopsis of the more general requirements of each category
follows: (1) sedentary work requires the exertion of ten pounds of force occasionally, and is generally performed from a sitting position; (2) light work requires an exertion of up to twenty pounds of
force occasionally, and/or up to ten pounds of work frequently with some other motion; (3) medium
work requires an exertion of twenty to fifty pounds of force occasionally, and/or ten to twenty-five
pounds frequently, and/or greater than negligible up to ten pounds of force constantly to move objects; (4) heavy work requires the exertion of fifty to 100 pounds of force occasionally, and/or
twenty-five to fifty pounds of force frequently, and/or ten to twenty pounds of force constantly to
move objects; and (5) very heavy work requires an exertion in excess of 100 pounds of force occasionally, and/or in excess of fifty pounds of force frequently, and/or in excess of twenty pounds of
force constantly to move objects. Id.
Jane M. Draper, Workers' Compensation: Vocational Rehabilitation Statutes, 67 A.L.R.
111.
4th 612, at § 2(a) (1989).
NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.555 (2003).
112.
Id.
113.
Id. In Nevada "existing marketable skills" include but are not limited to completion of an
114.
educational program "if the program or course of study provided the skills and training necessary for
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defined as skills that would enable the injured worker to obtain employment at the same or substantially similar wages to those he enjoyed prior
to the injury. As the Tarango court observed, those skills can be put to
use elsewhere.' 15
When injured employees possess existing "marketable skills," Nevada law restricts the services available under vocational rehabilitation to
job placement assistance. One of the most important measures of the
existence of "marketable skills" is whether the employee can earn wages
equal to or close to pre-injury wages." 16 Though the Nevada statute does
not set a threshold of post-injury wages under which a worker will not be
considered to possess "marketable skills," it does establish a goal in job
placement assistance, which is "to aid the employee in finding a position
which pays a gross wage that is equal to or greater than 80
percent of the
' 17
gross wage that he was earning at the time of his injury."
The court's reliance on Tarango's ability to perform work in a limited capacity as a disqualifier for vocational rehabilitation services is
inconsistent with the principal purpose of vocational rehabilitation programs, which is restoration of disabled workers' earning capacity. The
test used to determine eligibility is whether the employee is vocationally
incapacitated, not whether the worker is totally incapacitated in a medical sense. To require that the worker have no remaining work capacity to
qualify for vocational rehabilitation would fundamentally alter that principle. A test requiring that the worker establish a total medical incapacity
before becoming eligible for vocational rehabilitation would result in the
denial of services to most injured workers. Such a result could not have
been what the Nevada Supreme Court had in mind when ruling against
Tarango.
Significantly, the court also ignored the fact that Tarango's employer did not tender a light duty offer, nor did it make an offer of proof
that another job would have been available to Tarango absent his immigration status. 1 8 Section 2 of the statute is triggered only after the employer has tendered an offer of light-duty employment. 1 9 To satisfy the
the injured employee to be gainfully employed on a reasonably continuous basis in an occupation
that is reasonably available in this state." Id. Marketable skills also include completion of a two or
four year program at a college or a university, which results in a degree, completion of any portion
of a graduate program, or skills acquired in previous employment, including those acquired during
an apprenticeship or a program for on-the-job training. Id. The statute further states that "[tihe skills
set forth in paragraphs (a) to (d), inclusive, must have been acquired within the preceding 7 years
and be compatible with the physical limitations of the injured employee to be considered existing
marketable skills." Id.
115.
Tarango, 25 P.3d at 178, 180.
116.
See, e.g., Variano v. Dial Corp., 589 N.W.2d 845 (Neb. 1999); Peabody v. Home Ins. Co.,
751 A.2d 783 (Vt. 2000).
117.

NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.555.2.

118.
See generally Tarango, 25 P.3d at 175. An offer of proof that a light duty job existed for
Tarango would have been the subject of intense scrutiny by Tarango's counsel.
119.

NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.530.
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statute, light duty employment must be similar or substantially similar,
wage-wise, to the injured employee's former job. 120 Though Tarango's
medical incapacity was not as compelling as one involving a more severely disabled worker, he was not at maximum physical and vocational
capacity. 121 That analysis was supported by the dissenting judge, who
argued that the proper method to determine whether benefits should be
granted to Tarango consisted of an individualized assessment of
Tarango's incapacity.122
As precedent, the Tarango opinion provides little guidance regarding the proper way to decide cases involving the right of undocumented
workers to vocational rehabilitation. Much of the case seems to concede
that those services can be properly awarded under the right circumstances. First, the court posed the question presented as whether "formal
vocational training must be denied if that training is required solely because of immigration status,"' 123 suggesting that if training were required
because of the worker's inability to regain his earning capacity without
retraining, the answer may be in the affirmative. Second, the court also
conceded that the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act ("NIIA") covers undocumented workers because it applies to "every person in the service of
an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship,
express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed."'124 Third, the court added with respect to providing vocational
rehabilitation services to undocumented workers, "it is our view that
although SIIS would be facilitating future employment for an unauthorized alien by providing vocational rehabilitation benefits, there is no indication that SRS is prohibited or would be punished under the IRCA for
its involvement.' 25 Finally, the court also seemed to contemplate that
vocational rehabilitation training could be put to use elsewhere. 126 However, despite those features, Tarango has been consistently interpreted as
a complete bar to vocational rehabilitation services for undocumented
workers. 127
Importantly, the court's sharp focus on Tarango's ability to lift up to
fifty pounds as evidence that he was not incapacitated128 appears to indicate that the court sought to limit its decision to the facts before the tribunal. As stated above, Tarango contains several strong suggestions that
120. Id. 616C.555.
12i. Tarango, 25 P.3d at 177.
122. Id. at 184 (Maupin, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 177.
123.
124. Id. at 179.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. For example, the Nevada Attorney for Injured Workers reads the opinion as denying all
access to vocational rehabilitation to undocumented workers. Interview with the Nevada Attorney
for Injured Workers (Jan. 22, 2003) (on file with author).
128.
Tarango,25 P.3d at 180.
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the court was speaking strictly about a case where it did not believe the
29
claimant was incapacitated because he could lift up to fifty pounds.
Given the court's sharp focus on Tarango's lack of incapacitation, a more
plausible reading of the case as legal precedent would allow for vocational rehabilitation if: (1) the worker had become incapacitated and
could benefit from retraining-though the retraining would be put to use
elsewhere; (2) if the need for rehabilitation was not due to the worker's
undocumented status; and (3) if the worker intended to return to the same
or similar occupation, not a better occupation than the one he left behind.
For example, a more compelling case would exist if the undocumented
construction worker was rendered physically incapable of lifting more
than twenty pounds due to a work-related injury.
V. ARE STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION LAWS PREEMPTED BY

IRCA?

A. State Workers' CompensationLaws and IRCA
The question of whether IRCA preempts states' workers' compensation or vocational rehabilitation statutes that award benefits to undocumented workers will likely continue to cause confusion. The Nevada
Supreme Court's analysis of the preemption issue was incomplete. After
outlining the federal government's plenary power over immigration, the
Court concluded that "because of the federal government's plenary
power in the area of alienage, any legislation created by Congress-such
as IRCA-preempts Nevada's workers' compensation laws as those laws
have an effect on aliens in this state."1 30 As will be shown, a reasonable
reading of the Court's analysis would lead to the conclusion that IRCA
preempts Nevada's workers' compensation laws only to the extent that
they conflict with the federal statute. However, such a reading has not
been the case. Tarango has been consistently interpreted to hold that all
vocational rehabilitation benefits are preempted by IRCA. 131 That interpretation of Tarango is inconsistent with traditional
federal preemption
32
doctrine and holdings of several state courts.
Generally, under principles of federal preemption, when a state law
is in actual conflict with a federal statute the state law must yield to the

129.
See id.
130.
Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175, 179 (Nev. 2001).
131.
See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 3, at § 66.03. The leading treatise on the subject,
LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, has interpreted the holding in the case to deny all
access to vocational rehabilitation benefits on the basis of preemption by IRCA because vocational
rehabilitation programs contain job placement components. Id. That reading of the case is also
shared by the Nevada Attorney for Injured Workers. See Interview with the Nevada Attorney for
Injured Workers, supra note 127. However, as will be shown, the critical component of vocational
rehabilitation services-retraining-is not preempted by IRCA.
132.
See., e.g., Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 749 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Pa.
Commw.Ct. 2000).
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federal scheme. 133 Whether state law is preempted depends on the intent
of Congress. 34 Congressional intent may be either express or implied. 35
Express intent to preempt state law is generally contained in preemption
clauses within the federal statute. 136 The question of whether implied
intent exists to preempt state law37 is dependent on Congressional intent,
as manifested in several sources.'
To determine whether Congress has impliedly preempted state law
courts can consider the wording of the federal statute itself and its legislative history. 138 Courts may also consider the comprehensiveness of the
federal regulatory scheme.139 In addition, they may consider whether the
act of Congress has touched on "a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."' 4 Finally, courts may consider
a result inconsistent with the objective of
whether the state law
4 produces
the federal statute.' '
Courts having analyzed the potential conflict between IRCA and
state workers' compensation laws have consistently concluded that such
laws are not preempted. 142 The most careful preemption analysis to date
involving potential conflicts between IRCA and workers' compensation
was performed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Dowling v. Slotnik.143 In Dowling the claimant, who had been hired as a live-in housekeeper, severely injured her arm when she slipped on ice that had accumulated on the defendants' driveway while walking to the defendants'
mailbox. 44 The claimant's injuries rendered her totally disabled for over
one year. 145 Though the defendants had been informed of the claimant's
2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
133.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .
134.
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
135.
Jones, 430 U.S. at 525 (The intent of Congress may be "explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.").
See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002).
136.
137. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 525.
138. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251-56 (1984) (relying primarily on the
text of the statute and its legislative history to hold that a state personal injury claim for based on
strict liability and negligence for the escape of plutonium was not preempted by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954).
139. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("The scheme of federal
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it.").
140. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
141.
Id.; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
142. Reinforced Earth Co., 749 A.2d at 1038. The defendant argued that IRCA preempts state
workers' compensation statutes and required the court to find that the claimant was not an "employee" under state law. Id. The court held that it does not. Id.; see also Dowling v. Slotnik, 712
A.2d 396 (Conn. 1998) (holding that the Immigration Reform Act does not preempt, either expressly
or impliedly, the authority of states to award workers' compensation benefits to undocumented
aliens).
143.
712 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1998).
Dowling, 712 A.2d at 399.
144.
Id.
145.
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undocumented status, they nevertheless agreed to hire her, provide her
with health insurance, and pay her a salary of $400.00 per week. 146 In
violation of Connecticut law, the defendants never obtained workers'
compensation insurance. 47 The workers' compensation commissioner
found that the claimant's injuries had arisen out of and during the course
148
of her employment, and therefore were compensable under state law.
The defendants were ordered to pay the claimant disability benefits for
the period of total disability, prospective disability benefits subject to
and
medical documentation, interest on the past due disability benefits,
49
1
fall.
the
of
result
a
as
incurred
expenses
medical
reasonable
any
On appeal the defendants argued that the commissioner's authority
was either expressly or impliedly preempted by IRCA.150 Ruling against
express preemption, the Connecticut Supreme Court reasoned that the
purposes behind its workers' compensation laws and federal immigration
law were not at odds when injured undocumented workers were provided
benefits. 15 1 The defendants argued that the requirement that they pay the
cost of medical care for their injured employee in the absence of a workers' compensation policy amounted to a fine for hiring an unauthorized
worker and that such a "fine" was the equivalent of the state sanctions
preempted by IRCA's express preemption provision. 5 2 Noting that
workers compensation benefits are compensatory in nature rather than
"sanctions," the Connecticut Supreme Court swiftly rejected that argu53
ment.
Whether IRCA implicitly preempts the provision of benefits under
state workers' compensation is another matter. Regarding workers' compensation in general, the court found that benefits under those statutes are
not implicitly preempted by IRCA. 154 Reasoning that "'a federal statute
implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of a statue indicates
that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively ...

or

when state law is in actual conflict with federal law, ' "1 55 the court noted
146.
147.
148.
149.
available,

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 399-400. Prospective disability benefits for undocumented workers are generally
but recent decisions in Michigan and Pennsylvania may raise questions in other jurisdic-

tions regarding those benefits. For a discussion of the issues raised in those cases, see infra notes
481-83 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 400. The defendants also made three other arguments: (1) that "the commission
lacked jurisdiction over the.., claim because [undocumented workers] are not included in the group
of 'persons' eligible for workers' compensation benefits;" (2) that the commission lacked jurisdiction over the claim because the claimant's illegality had tainted the employment agreement, rendering it void; and (3) that the claimant's misrepresentations in her employment application regarding
her qualifications invalidated the employment agreement. Id. Those issues were also decided in
favor of the plaintiff. Id.
Id. at 408-09.
151.
Id. at 403.
152.
153.
Id.
Id. at 403-04.
154.
155. Id. at 403 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
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that the United States Supreme Court has found implied conflict preemption "'where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state
and federal requirements ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
the accomplishment
' ' 156
Congress.
Taking notice of the "strong presumption against federal preemption of state and local legislation," 157 the court pointed out that "[t]his
presumption is especially strong in areas traditionally occupied by the
states, such as public health and safety."15 8 Noting that nothing in the Act
gave any indication "that Congress intended the act to preempt state laws
whenever state laws operate to benefit undocumented aliens,"' 159 the court
further explained that,
'it is clear from [the] legislative history [of the Immigration Reform
Act] that Congress anticipated some conflict between the new statute
...and various state.., statutes.... As explained in the House Report: 'It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any
way labor protections in existing law ... ' 160
As the Dowling court observed, IRCA's legislative history demonstrates that the statute was not intended to deny labor protections to undocumented immigrants when such protections are not in conflict with
the statute. In passing IRCA, Congress considered the consequences of
maintaining a permanent underclass of people without labor protections.
Congress recognized that denying labor protections would make employees without rights more desirable to unscrupulous employers, to the detriment of law-abiding competitors and legal residents, thus promoting
unauthorized immigration. Indeed, while addressing this problem, the
House Education and Labor Committee made clear that:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any
way labor protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor relations boards, labor standards agencies, or labor
arbitrators to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights before161such agencies or
for engaging in activities protected by existing law.
By safeguarding workers' protections for undocumented workers,
the committee sought to protect employment opportunities for legal residents and to ensure the ability of lawful employers to compete fairly in
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. (quoting FreightlinerCorp., 514 U.S. at 287).
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1997)).
H.R. REp. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662.
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the U.S. labor market. Indeed, the committee added that it sought "the
wages and employment conditions of lawful residents [not be] adversely
affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to the standard terms of employment."'' 62 Congress further expressed
its desire to deter unauthorized immigration by protecting the rights of
undocumented workers when it authorized funds to the Wage and Hour
Division of the U.S. Department of Labor
to enforce wage and hour laws
63
on behalf of undocumented workers. 1
B. Can Vocational RehabilitationLaws Be Reconciled With IRCA?
Though the Dowling preemption analysis is useful, it is important to
note that the Dowling court did not have to analyze the full complexity of
workers' compensation under state law to decide that case. As stated
above, vocational rehabilitation contains a number of components that
raise more of a conflict with IRCA, such as modified employment and
job referral assistance. However, the crucial component of vocational
rehabilitation programs is the restoration of the injured worker's earning
capacity. Modified employment and job placement assistance (two practices that would violate IRCA) can easily be separated from those services. Job retraining, perhaps the most critical component because it is
generally available in cases where the worker is seriously impaired, does
not conflict with the immigration statute.
The doctrine of partial preemption provides the best possible resolution to cases that involve partial conflicts between state and federal law.
When Congress has not entirely displaced state law over a particular
field, the state law is preempted only to the extent that it conflicts with
federal law.164 Silence within a detailed statute is usually interpreted to
mean that no federal rule on the matter was intended. 65 Consistent with
the doctrine of partial preemption California and North Carolina have
been able to navigate the conflicts between vocational rehabilitation and
IRCA by carefully separating the components of vocational rehabilitation
into job placement programs and training programs. 166 Foodmaker, Inc.
v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board involved an undocumented
worker who injured her lower back while attempting to pick up a sixty

162.
ld.
163. See §111(d) of The Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). IRCA § 111(d) reads:
There are authorized to be appropriated ... such sums as may be necessary to the Department of Labor for enforcement activities of the Wage and Hour Division ...inorder
to deter the employment of unauthorized aliens and remove the economic incentive for
employers to exploit and use such aliens.
Id.
164. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
165. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1994).
166. See Foodmaker, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 767, 769 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998); Gayton v. Gage Carolina Metals Inc., 560 S.E.2d 870, 873 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Ruiz
v. Belk Masonry Co., 559 S.E.2d 249, 251 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
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pound box of lettuce while working for Jack-in-the-Box.1 67 The employee was awarded workers compensation benefits, which were settled
by way of a "compromise and release."'' 68 The issue in the case was
whether the undocumented worker was eligible for vocational rehabilitation benefits, although an offer of proof by the employer indicated that
the worker would have been offered a light-duty job absent her undocumented status.1 69 Finding against the claimant on this very narrow question, the Foodmaker court analyzed the question of whether vocational
rehabilitation benefits are generally available
to undocumented workers
170
and the effect of IRCA on their availability.
First, following the result in many other states, the court noted that,
in general, workers compensation benefits are available to undocumented
workers in California17 1 because "[t]he act defines 'employee' as 'every
person in the service of an employer ...whether lawfully or unlawfully
employed, and includes: ... aliens .... Second, the court noted that
vocational rehabilitation plans are generally designed to return injured
employees to gainful employment. 173 However, separating vocational
rehabilitation plans into: "(1) plans in which the employee is immediately employable; (2) training plans; and (3) self-employment plans," the
court determined that undocumented workers who fall into the second
category should be eligible for vocational rehabilitation. 174
According to the court, providing vocational rehabilitation services
to injured undocumented workers in the first category would clearly violate IRCA. 175 However, the court concluded that training plans for vocationally feasible individuals (the second category) do not violate the immigration statute.176 In response to an argument that unauthorized workers are "not vocationally feasible" because of their unauthorized immigration status, the court held that nothing in the statute restricted "an
injured employee's potential job market to this country."' 177 Thus, undocumented workers can "market" their work capacity in their country of
167.
Foodmaker, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769.
168.
id. at 770.
169.
Id. at 770-71.
170.
Id. at 775.
171.
Id. at 771.
172.
Id. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 335 1(a)); Royal Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.,
48 Cal. Comp. Cases 104, 105 (Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Feb, 9, 1982) (declaring that illegal
immigrants are entitled to rehabilitation services); Cabral v. State Bd. of Control, 112 Cal. App. 3d
1012, 1018 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (Allport, J., dissenting) (stating that illegal immigrants are
covered by workers' compensation). Significantly, courts in other states whose statutes do not specifically cover undocumented workers (with the exception of Virginia) have nevertheless found that
they are covered as "persons." See Dowling, 712 A.2d at 409; Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers'
Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 102 (Pa. 2002).
173.
Foodmaker, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772.
174.
Id. at 773.
175.
Id. at 777.
176.
Id. at 775 n.13.
177.
Id.
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origin. That statement is consistent with many observations made by the
Nevada Supreme Court in Tarango, and the decisions of other jurisdictions. 78
Generally, the Supreme Court is especially reluctant to find preemption of state law when the case involves the compensation of victims of
tortuous conduct. For example, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,179
holding that state tort law was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, the Court stated that when there is no indication that Congress
intended to preclude a state remedy, "[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for
handed down by
those injured by illegal conduct."'' 80 A similar result18 was
1
Company.
Electric
General
v.
the Court in English
Importantly, though IRCA is designed to occupy the field of employment within the undocumented immigration context, contrary to the
potential implications of the opinion of the Nevada Supreme Court in
Tarango,182 the statute does not speak to workers' health, safety, or ability to recover for work-related injuries. Courts that have considered this
issue have concluded that denying undocumented immigrants who suffer
work-related injuries access to the state workers' compensation system
contradicts the intent of the statute's employment sanctions provisions.
The intent behind those provisions is to discourage employers from hiring undocumented immigrants. Denying workers' compensation coverage to those workers essentially makes them cheaper to hire, thus making
them more attractive to employers who are well aware of the low risk
involved in hiring from that group. Such a reading of the statute would
also produce negative consequences for legal residents who work alongside undocumented workers. Taking away the obligation to provide
workers' compensation benefits to a class of workers also creates a disincentive to provide safe working conditions, ultimately producing a
detriment to all workers.
The intent of Congress regarding benefits available to undocumented workers is further informed by the passage of the Illegal Immi-

178. See, e.g., Garcia v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 939 P.2d 704 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (awarding a vocational rehabilitation lump sum a to worker who was injured in the U.S. but returned to his
dairy farm in Mexico).
179. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
180.
181.
496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (rejecting preemption of a state common law claim protecting
whistleblowers, even though the federal government occupies the field of nuclear safety, and cautioning the court against seeking out conflicts between state and federal laws where none exists).
Though the Tarango court did not state explicitly that Congress had prohibited all manner
182.
of vocational rehabilitation for undocumented workers, it appeared to suggest that was the case when
it noted that the power of Congress to regulate the conditions of entry and residency of aliens extends not only to the admission and naturalization of aliens, but also to the .'regulation of their
conduct before naturalization."' Tarango, 25 P.3d at 179 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)).
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gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IRIRA). 183
In that statute, Congress limited public benefits made available to legal
resident immigrants and also prohibited a number of public services to
undocumented immigrants. 184 Nowhere in that statute did Congress mention that workers' compensation benefits should be denied to unauthorized workers.1 85 Except for modified work and job placement assistance,
there is no indication that IRCA was designed to prevent undocumented
workers from receiving workers' compensation benefits, including retraining under vocational rehabilitation programs. Indeed, to deny those
benefits would contradict the intent of Congress in passing that legislation.
VI. ARE STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS CONSTITUTIONAL?

Moving beyond the questions of IRCA preemption of state statutes,
some states have attempted to explicitly prevent undocumented workers
from obtaining workers' compensation benefits by statute. However,
state laws designed to deny worker's compensation benefits, including
vocational rehabilitation benefits, to undocumented workers may be vulnerable to equal protection and perhaps due process challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Unlike prior
attempts to protect the rights of undocumented immigrants by arguing for
a heightened level of scrutiny of state action designed to discriminate
against this vulnerable population, this Article argues that, at least in the
context of workers' compensation, rational basis analysis provides the
most powerful defense of this group's rights.
The Supreme Court precedent that is commonly invoked by lower
courts and commentators to protect this group against discriminatory
state action is generally humanitarian and forward-looking, and the arguments have been quite powerful and compelling. 186 However, the cases
cited appear either constitutionally vulnerable or incapable of being extended further to protect the rights of undocumented workers. Despite the
existence of conflicts between IRCA and some services provided for in
vocational rehabilitation statutes, and despite the fact that workers compensation benefits are mandated by statute in most jurisdictions, the private nature of workers' compensation benefits lends itself to a different

183.
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
184.
See Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part,252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001).
185.
See Lewis, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 157 (analyzing the federal welfare benefit restrictions imposed upon immigrants by iIRIRA).
186.
See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (supporting equal protection claims in favor of this group).
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kind of analysis than other benefits that are truly "public," and which
may constitutionally be denied to undocumented immigrants.
This analysis will assume, as it must, that workers' compensation
benefits and retraining under vocational rehabilitation programs are two
integrated components of rehabilitation. Therefore, the phrase "workers'
compensation benefits" includes all benefits that do not directly conflict
with IRCA.
A. Equal Protectionand Immigration Status
The equal protection doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution is made up of two distinct strands.' 87 One strand
focuses on the nature of the right at stake, and the other focuses on the
status of the group whose rights are being infringed upon. 188 The level of
judicial scrutiny of state action grows in accordance with the importance
of the right at stake or with the status of the group affected.1 89 State statutes that infringe upon fundamental rights receive the strictest level of
judicial scrutiny.' 90 Strict scrutiny requires that the government demonstrate that its action is necessary or narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.' 9' Among other things, fundamental rights include
the right to travel 192 and the right to privacy. 93 Strict scrutiny is also applied to state action that classifies on the basis of "suspect classifications" such as race, color, and national origin, and, in a limited number
State action reviewed under the strict scrutiny stanof cases, alienage. 194 95
dard rarely survives. 1
On the other extreme exists the rational basis test, which generally
applies when neither a suspect class nor a fundamental interest is involved. In general, that test simply asks whether the government classifi187. See Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal ProtectionJurisprudence:Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1210 (1999)
(recognizing that "[m]ost Supreme Court decisions invalidating governmental discrimination have
depended on the Court's finding a 'suspect class' or a 'fundamental right').
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
that strict scrutiny applies to classifications affecting fundamental rights).
191.
E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that all racial
classifications, including benign ones, are subject to strict scrutiny).
192. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
193. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (declaring a Connecticut law that
prohibited the use of distribution of contraceptives unconstitutional as "repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marital relationship"); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)
(affirming the right to abortion and describing the right to personal privacy as encompassing certain
"activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education" (internal citations omitted)).
194. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that rational
basis "gives way.., when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin").
195. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (commenting that strict scrutiny
is often "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
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cation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, calling for the
most lenient review of state action. 196 The third level of equal protection
analysis falls somewhere in between the two extremes, in what is referred to as "intermediate scrutiny." The intermediate scrutiny test requires that the state classification bear a substantial relationship to an
important state interest to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 197 Intermediate scrutiny has been applied most commonly to state classifications involving gender1 98 and legitimacy. 199 It has also been applied in a limited
way to a mix of interests involving the education of undocumented children.2°° Significantly, several state courts have held that equal protection
principles under the Fourteenth Amendment protect undocumented immigrants' employment rights. 20 1 However, those decisions have not
elaborated on the proper standard of review.
Though it is well established that undocumented immigrants are not
devoid of constitutional protection, they are not considered a "suspect
class. 202 However, a coherent constitutional doctrine defining exactly
what level of protection is afforded that group based on its status has not
been developed. The United States Supreme Court has spoken a great
deal to the constitutional rights of immigrants, but its analysis has not
been neatly compartmentalized as the above categories suggest, and has
rarely included the rights of undocumented immigrants.
Historically, undocumented immigrants have been considered trespassing outsiders with no claim to membership in the U.S. community.
Though not completely ignored, they receive much less constitutional
protection than legal resident immigrants. Resident immigrants, in turn,
do not enjoy full rights until they attain citizenship. 0 3 Thus, a sliding
scale clearly exists with undocumented immigrants at the bottom. However, undocumented immigrants' position at the bottom of the scale does
not mean that government actors are free to treat them arbitrarily.

196.
197.
198.
199.

See, e.g.,
See, e.g.,
See, e.g.,
See, e.g.,

200.

See Plyler,457 U.S. at 223.

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Craig,429 U.S. at 197.
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-62 (1988).

201.
E.g., Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Dezsofi v. Jacoby, 36 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
202.

Plyler,457 U.S. at 223.

203. Though the Constitution does not bar lawfully admitted non-citizen immigrants from
voting, no state allows them to vote. In addition, not all citizens are equal. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, recognizes two kinds of citizenship-citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization. The
only, but perhaps most symbolically powerful, difference between the two kinds of citizenship is
eligibility for the presidency. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW § 5-18,

at 969 n.20 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that the inability of naturalized citizens to gain the presidency as
the "lone constitutional distinction between native-born and other citizens"). U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,
cl.
5, provides that "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the
time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President .. "
204. In Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), the Court invoked the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to prohibit the punishment of unauthorized Chinese immigrants by imprisonment

2003]

BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS

381

The sliding scale of constitutional protection, and its link to membership status, was highlighted in Mathews v. Diaz,205 where the Court
observed that "[t]here are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 2 °6 Indeed, the
Court held that "[e]ven one whose presence in this country is unlawful,
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. 2 °7
However, in spite of that pronouncement, Mathews did not abolish distinctions between aliens and citizens, or even among classes of aliens.
That reality was highlighted by the Court's observation that:
The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected
by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion
that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship
aliens must be placed in a single
or, indeed, to the conclusion that all
2 8
homogeneous legal classification. 0
The issue in Mathews was whether federal Medicare benefits that
are awarded to citizens can be constitutionally denied to legal resident
aliens. 20 9 Ruling against the resident aliens, the Court drew a distinction
between citizens and aliens by observing that:
In particular, the fact that Congress has provided some welfare benefits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for All
aliens. Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile
foreign power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in the bounty
that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and
Some of its guests. The decision to share that bounty with our guests
may take into account the character of the relationship between the
alien and this country .... 210
Therefore, while noncitizens and even undocumented immigrants enjoy
some protections under the Due Process Clause, and under the Four-

at hard labor without a judicial trial for violating U.S. immigration law. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
The Court held that all aliens, whether legally or illegally present in the United States, are persons
entitled to the protection of due process under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
205.
426 U.S. 67 (1976).
206. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51
(1950); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238); see also Johnson v. Eisentranger, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)
(noting that aliens develop an ascending scale of rights as they increase their identity with U.S.
society). See generally A Theory of Alien's Rights, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1292 (1983) (describing the
sliding scale of constitutional protections available to immigrants depending on their status).
207. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.
208. Id. at 78.
209. Id. at 69.
210. Id. at 80.
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teenth Amendment, depending on the matter involved, they are not
awarded the same protections available to citizens in every case.21'
Despite its negative result, the Mathews decision reinforced the
principle that all immigrants within the territories of the United States are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.21 2 That observation was partly
responsible for the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe.213 Still,
the extent to which the Constitution protects undocumented immigrants
continues to be a difficult puzzle. Except for the very general observation
made in Mathews that undocumented immigrants are not devoid of some
protection under the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has not spoken in depth to the constitutional protections available to undocumented
immigrant adults. The Supreme Court's alienage jurisprudence has been
developed primarily in cases involving authorized resident aliens. Those
decisions have provided some guidance to courts and commentators in
cases or initiatives involving undocumented aliens, but have left many
unanswered questions.
The Supreme Court's alienage jurisprudence has been the subject of
much study. However, despite the many attempts to explain the Court's
approaches in a consistent and coherent manner, exceptions to what appear to be lines of consistent opinions continue to be created. A number
of scholars have attempted to explain the Supreme Court's alienage doctrine in terms of two strands.21 4 According to these scholars, one strand is
represented by Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2t 5 Graham v. Richardson,z16 and a
line of cases where the Court relied on strict scrutiny to strike down state
statutes denying access to economic benefits or limiting participation in
private sector economic activity on the basis of alienage.21 7 This juris211.
Professor Linda S. Bosniak has described that duality thusly:
Undocumented immigrants live at the boundary of the national membership community.
They have long occupied a unique, deeply ambivalent place in the United States. Despite
their vital place in the American economy, this country has deprived them of recognition
as members in most contexts, but it has also extended them such recognition in others.
The law has both created and reflected this ambivalence, according a dual legal identity
to the undocumented. They are both outsiders and members, regulated objects of immigration control and subjects of membership in limited but important respects.
Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership, supra note 47, at 956.
212. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78.
213.
457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler, the Court reaffirmed the principle that undocumented
immigrants are "persons" under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215. For a more in depth discussion of Plyler see
infra notes 231-306 and accompanying text.
214.
See generally Michael Scaperlanda, PartialMembership: Aliens and the Constitutional
Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996); see also Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187, supra note 32, at
615; Gilbert Paul Carrasco, CongressionalArrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy
of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 601-16 (1994).

215.
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
216. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
217.
Graham,403 U.S. at 376, 380 (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a state statute limiting
access to welfare benefits for lawfully admitted immigrants); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12
(1977) (finding a statute barring resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education
invalid under strict scrutiny); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-02

2003]

BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS

383

tradition has been characterized as the "personhood paraprudential
digm. 218 The personhood paradigm presumes that citizens and nonciti2 19
zens share the same rights outside the immigration context. Thus,
[t]he Constitution assures [the alien] a large measure of equal economic opportunity; he may invoke the writ of habeas corpus to protect his personal liberty; in criminal proceedings against him he must
be accorded the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; and,
his property cannot be taken without just
unless an enemy
220 alien,
compensation.
The second strand is represented by dicta in Sugarman v. Douwhere the Court, while striking down a New York law prohibiting access to state civil service positions to noncitizens, nevertheless
noted the "State's interest in establishing its own form of government,
and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within
222 The second strand
'the basic conception of a political community.'
22 3
The membership
has been described as the "membership paradigm.,
gall,22 1

paradigm holds that, "[tihe Court will not employ strict scrutiny ...

in

cases where the state, by the challenged classification, is merely engagcommunity.' 224
ing in the ongoing process of 'defin[ing] its political
That principle, best known as the "political function" doctrine, is based
on the idea that the state has a legitimate interest in reserving positions in
5
the self-governance process for U.S. citizens.22 Thus, a person must attain full membership status as a condition of eligibility to participate in
the formation of the political community. An example is Foley v. Connelie,226 where the Court, applying a rational basis analysis, let stand a state
27
statute prohibiting noncitizens from working as state police officers.
Alienage-based classifications created by federal law represent the
more rigid component of the second strand. Because the federal government enjoys plenary power over immigration, federal classifications are
22 8
subjected to little or no scrutiny under a rational basis review.
(1976) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate statutes prohibiting noncitizens from the practice of
licensed professions); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 646 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny
to invalidate exclusion of noncitizens from state civil service positions); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 721-22 (1973) (finding alienage to be a suspect classification).
Scaperlanda, supra note 214, at 712-13.
218.
Id. at 739.
219.
Id. (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.9 (1952)).
220.
413 U.S. 634 (1973).
221.
222. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
Scaperlanda, supra note 214, at 712-13.
223.
Id. at 736-37 (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 643).
224.
225. See id. at 737.
226. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
Foley, 435 U.S. at 299-300.
227.
See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84 (noting that illegal or temporary resident aliens could present
228.
no substantial claims to participation in a federal medical insurance program); see also Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (noting that in cases of federal alienage classifications the
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Though the concept of "personhood" continues to be invoked at
least implicitly from time to time, the "political function" exception to
strict scrutiny for state alienage classifications affecting resident immigrants' economic opportunity has been broadened so much as to hardly
resemble its original form. 229 This erosion has created serious doubts
regarding the viability of strict scrutiny for this class.2
Relying strongly on principles of personhood, the Supreme Court
extended the reach of the equal protection doctrine to the most vulnerable subset of the undocumented immigrant population in Plyler v.
Doe.23t In Plyler, the Court invalidated a Texas statute that withheld
funding for primary and secondary education to undocumented children. 23 The Court found the predicament of undocumented children particularly compelling, largely because their presence in the United States
was through no fault of their own.2 33 Observing that undocumented children denied an education would grow up to become members of a permanent underclass, the Court subjected the state statute to a heightened
level of scrutiny. 234 The Court held that the Texas law, which not only
withheld funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States, but also authorized local school districts
to deny enrollment to such children, violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 235 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stressed, "even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful,
have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 2 36 Importantly, the purpose of
the Texas statute was not to deny the children an elementary and secondary education. Undocumented children who wanted to attend school

Court would presume that "any interest which might rationally be served by the rule did in fact give
rise to its adoption"). For an article making a strong case for a heightened standard of review for
federal alienage classifications, see Tamra M. Boyd, Keeping the Constitution'sPromise: An Argument for Greater Judicial Scrutiny of FederalAlienage Classifications,54 STAN. L. REV. 319, 321
(2001).
229. See Frederick D. Unger, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection--Cabell v. ChavezSalido, 31 EMORY L.J. 707, 739-40, 742 (1982) (tracing the expansion of the "political function"
exception to strict scrutiny in alienage classification, and concluding that suspect classification for
alienage is waning); Elizabeth Hull, Resident Aliens and The Equal Protection Clause: The Burger
Court's Retreatfrom Graham v. Richardson, 47 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 41-42 (1980).
230. Unger, supra note 229, at 739-40, 742.
231.
Plyler,457 U.S. at 219-20.
232. Id. at 230.
233.
Id. at 220 ("[TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN.] § 21.031 is directed against children, and imposes
its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little
control.").
234. Id. at 222.
235. Id. at 221-22.
236. Id.at 210.
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the Texas law, but the cost would be $1,000 per pupil
could do23so
7 under
year.
per
The Plyler Court did not rely on strict scrutiny to review the Texas
statute because the case did not involve a "suspect class" or affect a fundamental right.238 Though the Court did not specifically articulate the
level of scrutiny applied to the case, a concurring opinion by Justice
Powell clarified that the Court had relied on intermediate scrutiny. According to Justice Powell:
A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an underclass
of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the
fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these unique
circumstances, the Court properly may require that the State's interthe means bear a "fair and substantial reests be substantial and that
239
interests.
these
to
lation"
The Court's focus on the narrow issue of education of undocumented
children was highlighted by its care to distinguish education from other
24
forms of governmental social welfare legislation. 0 Justice Powell, too,
was careful to keep the interests of undocumented young children separate from those of undocumented mature children and undocumented
adults. 24 1
Importantly, the Court, including the dissenters, emphatically rejected an argument by the State of Texas that undocumented aliens, because of their status, are not "persons within the jurisdiction" of the state,
242
That
and therefore have no right to the equal protection of the law.
finding is one of the Plyler Court's most overlooked statements, but perhaps one of the most important. Despite the fact that the statement had
been made in the past, 243 it clearly confirmed that the equal protection
doctrine "was intended to protect all persons . . . within the territorial
boundaries" of the United States, and rejected any notion that they could
be treated arbitrarily or invidiously. 24

Of course, the $1,000 cost of tuition essentially denied the students an education. See Doe
237.
v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 575 (E.D. Tex. 1978). Because of their poverty, none of the parents of
the children could afford that tuition. Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 575.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
238.
Id. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
239.
412, 415 (1920)).
Id. at 221.
240.

Id. at 240 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring) ("A different case would be presented in the
241.
unlikely event that a minor, old enough to be responsible for illegal entry and yet still of school age,
entered this country illegally on his own volition.").
Id. at 210 (internal quotations omitted).
242.
See, e.g., Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.
243.
244.

Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of

Constitutional Theory: Reflections On, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 329, 331
(1983).
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Unlike other oppressed minority groups in the United States, such
as African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Mexican-Americans, undocumented immigrants have never been able to advocate for equal
treatment on the basis of membership in the national community.245
Thus, many of their small legal victories have been based on the need to
protect the integrity of the law, not on their ability to claim the existence
of "rights" based on their own worth as human beings. Therefore, the
Plyler Court's declaration that they are protected by the Constitution,
though limited by the phrase that undocumented status is "not a 'constitutional irrelevancy,' '' 246 represents a step forward for this class of "outsiders." It enables them to avoid the label of non-persons and recognizes
their right to participate in a partial, but meaningful, rights-based discourse.
The Court established that undocumented immigrant adults enjoy
some protection under the equal protection and due process doctrines of
the Fourteenth Amendment, although the question remains: How much
protection? In his Plyler dissent, Chief Justice Burger, though agreeing
with the spirit of the decision,247 nevertheless stated unequivocally that
the issue at hand was most appropriately reviewed under the rationality
test, suggesting strongly that his answer to the question stated above is,
"not much., 248 Despite the compelling nature of the undocumented children's education, the denial of which may lead to the formation of a
permanent underclass, Justice Burger would have deferred to the judgment of the Texas Legislature under that standard.2 49 In fact, Justice Burger predicted that Plyler would likely stand for little beyond its facts because of the "unique confluence of theories and rationales" 250 manipulated by the majority to arrive at the "right decision." So far, Chief Justice Burger's prediction has largely come to pass.
Fearful of the almost certainly negative impact of rational basis
analysis on undocumented immigrants, a number of scholars have argued
for an extension of Plyler's intermediate scrutiny test to state laws de-

245.
Professor Linda Bosniak has explained this oddity in American civil rights activism by
pointing out that even progressive scholars must confront the fact that the undocumented population
does not quite "fit" into traditional civil rights paradigms. See Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187, supra
note 32, at 594. That is, even the most progressive civil rights advocates tend to have a national
identity from which all claims to equal membership are derived. See id.
246.
Plyler,457 U.S. at 223.
247.
Justice Burger prefaced his analysis of the proper role of the Court in this case thusly:
Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children-including illegal aliens--of an elementary education. I fully agree that it would be folly-and wrongto tolerate creation of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a
limited or no command of our language.
Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
248.
Id. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
249.
Id. at 249-53 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
250.
Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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signed to discriminate against that group.251 Scholars' fear of rational
basis review of discriminatory state legislation aimed at undocumented
immigrants is well founded. The Plyler dissent, and changes in the
Court since that case was decided, have contributed to that
makeup of the
2
pessimism.
Undocumented immigrants' vulnerability to discriminatory state
legislation is particularly evident during periods of economic distress.2S 3
One recent example of their vulnerability was the passage of Cali ornia's
Proposition 187. 54 That law sought to deny all public social services,
256
and publicly funded
public elementary and secondary education,
25 7
health care to undocumented immigrants. The law, rather awkwardly,
also enlisted the state's law enforcement agencies to verify the status of
"suspected" undocumented immigrants, to notify them of their apparent
status and to inform them that they must either obtain legal status or
leave the United States.2 58 Public social services agencies 259 and primary
and secondary schools2 60 were assigned similar responsibilities. In addition, the law also required school officials to verify the immigration
261
status of the parents of all school children.
Alarmed by Proposition 187, several prominent scholars accurately
pointed out that despite the neutral language of the legislation, supporters
See Randall Kyle Hawes, CaliforniaProposition 187: Will the Populist Mandate Survive
251.
ConstitutionalScrutiny?, 37 S. TEx. L. REV. 1391, 1398-1411 (1996) (arguing for the application of
Plyler's intermediate scrutiny analysis to several sections of California's Proposition 187, with the
exclusion of public social services); Stuart Biegel, The Wisdom of Plyler v. Doe, 17 CHICANOLATINO L. REV. 46, 63 (1995) (suggesting that Plyler's intermediate scrutiny analysis would be
critical in a legal battle to challenge Proposition 187); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 1425, 1425-26 (1995) (arguing for the application of intermediate scrutiny for state action
designed to deny a basic level of governmental services to undocumented immigrants); Mitchell
Kurfis, The Constitutionality of California's Proposition 187: An Equal Protection Analysis, 32
CAL. W. L. REV. 129, 159 (1995) (arguing for the application of Plyler's intermediate scrutiny
analysis to the denial of health care and social services benefits).
252. Of the majority that decided Plyler, only Justice Stevens remains on the Court. Supreme
Court of the United States, Biographies of Current Members of the Supreme Court, at
www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
253. See LEO R. CHAVEZ, SHADOWED LIVES: UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 15 (1992) (discussing that waves of anti-immigrant sentiment tend to follow economic
downturns).
254. A copy of Proposition 187 can be found in the Appendix to Lolita K. Buckner Inniss,
California'sProposition 187-Does It Mean What It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual
and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 577, 617-22 (1996). California's Proposition 187
was passed by that state's voters in 1994. Id.; see also Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration
Politics, PopularDemocracy, and California'sProposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal
Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 633 (1995). The statute was enjoined in Gregorio T. v.
Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1995).
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West 1994).
255.
256.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West 1994).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (West 1994).
257.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 824b (West 1994).
258.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5.
259.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215.
260.
Id.
261.
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of Proposition 187 were driven by racial animus toward immigrants of
color, in particular, immigrants from Mexico.262 The invidious racial
discrimination present in Proposition 187 led a number of commentators
to argue for a heightened level of scrutiny for certain types of state action
directed at undocumented immigrants.263 Proposing a heightened standard for state laws designed to deny basic governmental services to illegal aliens, Professor Gerald L. Neuman warned that even laws as invidious as Proposition 187 would stand up to rational basis review. 264 Contending that both Plyler and Graham were correctly decided,265 Professor
Neuman argued for a limited extension of Plyler that applies a heightened level of scrutiny to state classifications designed to exclude illegal
aliens from a minimal level of government services.266
Professor Neuman argued that "the formal equal protection reasoning of the Plyler dissent would enable a state to declare 'illegal' aliens as
de facto outlaws, persons beyond the effective protection of the law. 267
According to Professor Neuman, under a rational basis analysis, in order
to drive out unlawful residents, "the state could withhold constitutionally
optional affirmative government services, that is, those services that the
Constitution does not oblige the states to provide in the first place. 268 At
that point, the only constitutional objection would take place in the realm
of equal protection, where, according to Chief Justice Burger, "'the state
may reasonably.., elect not to provide [undocumented aliens] with governmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully in the
state.', 269 Professor Neuman therefore warned that a traditional rational
basis analysis "would deny [undocumented immigrants] the minimal
respect for their humanity that the state owes even to criminals-and
even to criminals whose crimes are more serious than the immigration
violations of which 'illegal' aliens may be guilty. '270 Similarly, in response to other state laws that discriminate against undocumented immigrants, various commentators have argued for heightened scrutiny, or
even strict scrutiny, as the appropriate standard. 7 '
262. See, e.g., Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187, supra note 32, at nn.7-10 (documenting the antiMexican rhetoric of proponents of Proposition 187).
263. E.g., Hawes, supra note 251, at 1399-1400 (arguing that a heightened level of analysis
should be applied to Proposition 187).
264. Neuman, supra note 251, at 1445-48.
265. Id. at 1425.
266. Id. at 1425-26.
267. Id. at 1447-48.
268. Id. at 1446. Professor Neuman noted that "[miost government services are constitutionally
optional," listing education, police protection, fire protection, rescue services, emergency medical
care, public transportation, subsistence benefits, and mental health services as examples. Id.
269.
Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 250).
270.
Id. at 1448.
271.
See, e.g., Mary K. Shannon, Jurado v. Popejoy Construction Co.: Determining the Constitutionality of DisparateAwards of Workers' Compensation Death Benefits to Nonresident Alien
Dependents, 39 VILL. L. REv. 705, 736 (1994) (urging courts who have not yet ruled on the
constitutionality of disparate death benefit awards to nonresident alien dependents to follow Jurado
v. Popejoy Construction Co., 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993), which applied strict scrutiny to such
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Driven by similar concerns, two state supreme courts, also taking
27 2 Yick Wo v. Hopkins,27 3 Graham v.
their lead from Bernal v. Fainter,
Richardson,27 4 and Plyler v. Doe,275 have concluded that strict scrutiny is

the appropriate standard against which state action discriminating against
undocumented workers should be measured.27 6 The Kansas Supreme
Court, relying strongly on principles of personhood, invoked strict scrutiny to invalidate a Kansas workers' compensation statute that treated
nonresident alien dependents differently from other dependents for purposes of death benefits.277
In Jurado, the Kansas Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
statute that provided for payment of no more than $750 to nonresident
alien dependents, but up to $200,000 for every other dependent, including resident alien dependents.2 78 The Kansas Supreme Court also noted
that, "[a]s early as the 1920's, the United States Supreme Court recognized that death benefits serve an employee's interest in providing for his
or her family., 279 Reasoning that all workers' compensation benefits
arise out of the employment contract and workers' compensation laws
that preexist a worker's death, the Kansas court ruled that "[t]he dependents' right of action is derivative of and dependent upon the employee's
contract of employment," so that "[a]ll considerations focus upon the
employee and the rights and laws preexisting the employee's death...
,280 The court therefore found it completely appropriate to "approach a
determination of constitutionality upon our consideration of the constitutional rights of the employee ....

The deceased employee in Jurado was a resident alien, meaning he
was an authorized immigrant.282 Analyzing briefly the three levels of
scrutiny used by the United States Supreme Court in equal protection
cases, the Kansas court concluded that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
test because the Kansas statute classified on the basis of alienage.283 Although the statute referred to the alienage of the nonresident dependents,
Popejoy Construction Co., 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993), which applied strict scrutiny to such classifications); Carrasco, supra note 214, at 607-08 (relying partially on Graham, 403 U.S. at 372, to argue
that state alienage classifications, including both authorized and unauthorized immigrants, must be
reviewed under strict scrutiny because aliens compose a "'discrete and insular' minority" (quoting
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
272. 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
273. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
274. Graham,403 U.S. at 371-72.
275. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17.
276. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 676; De Ayala v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 207
(Fla. 1989).
277. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 676.
278. Id. at 676-78.
279. Id. at 674 (referencing Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499,
503-04 (1923)).
280. Id. at 675.
281.
Id.
282. Id. at 672.
283. Id. at 675-76.
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while the court centered its equal protection analysis on the rights of the
resident decedent, the court still had no trouble finding that the statute
created an alienage-based classification. 284 The court reasoned that because the statute provided less protection to an employee's dependents
on the basis of the dependents' alienage, "[b]y doing so, it creates a classification of employees based on alienage even though the classification
is not based on the employee's alienage. 28 5 Relying on Bernal v.
2 86 and Graham
Fainter
v. Richardson,287 the court concluded that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate test.288 Significantly, the court strongly suggested that the result would have been the same, even if the deceased
worker had been undocumented, when it cited Plyler for the proposition
that such scrutiny applies even to residents who are in this country illegally.2 89
In reaching its conclusion in favor of nonresident families of resident alien workers, the Kansas Supreme Court was obviously moved by
notions of fundamental fairness, fair play, and personhood embedded in
United States Supreme Court cases.2 9 Indeed, the court noted that when
it was first enacted in 1911, the Kansas workers' compensation statute
provided a death benefit of $3,600 to the deceased worker's dependents
and a death benefit of $750 for nonresident alien dependents. 291 The
court also noted with some dismay that, over the last eighty-one years,
amendments to the statute had raised the death benefit to $200,000, but
the $750 ceiling for nonresident alien dependents had remained static. 92
A similar situation arose in Florida in the case of De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. where the Florida Supreme
Court found that a statute that provided up to $100,000 in death benefits
to U.S. resident dependents, and nonresident Canadian dependents, but
that limited death benefits available to all other nonresident alien dependents to $1,000, violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.29 3 The $100,000 benefit was available to Canadians even if
they were in the country illegally. 294 The De Ayala court, again taking a
broad view of the meaning of "alienage" classification, found that
alienage is "one of the ... suspect classes. 295 The court therefore rea-

284. Id. at 676.
285. Id.
286. 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
287. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
288. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 676.
289. Id. (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17).
290. See id. at 675; see also Shannon, supra note 271, at 733-35 (recognizing that the Kansas
court viewed Mr. Jurado's situation as "unfair").
291.
Jurado, 853 P.2d at 676-77.
292.
Id. at 677.
293.
De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 205-08.
294.
Id. at 207.
295.
Id.
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soned that state alienage classifications are subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.2 96
Despite the fundamental fairness of the Jurado and De Ayala decisions, their reasoning is vulnerable to attack because the U.S. Supreme
Court has never held that "alienage" covers every category of immigrant,
and has never held that state action affecting nonresident immigrants
(i.e., undocumented or unauthorized immigrants) must withstand strict
judicial scrutiny to constitute a valid exercise of state power. In fact, the
Court has held to the contrary.297 The Kansas court's analysis is directly
contradicted by Justice Brennan's declaration in Plyler that undocumented immigrants do not compose a discrete and insular minority, 98
and ignores Mathews v. Diaz, which placed undocumented immigrants as
a class at the bottom of the sliding scale of judicial scrutiny of state action.

299

Reliance on Plyler and Graham to argue that state action involving
undocumented immigrant adults must be analyzed under heightened
scrutiny must be tempered. Despite its wisdom and humaneness, Plyler
has been repeatedly criticized as lacking a solid constitutional foundation.3 °° Chief Justice Burger's prediction that Plyler would be essentially
limited to its facts appears to be coming true.3 ° ' Indeed, the Court has
refused to extend the holding of that case to other situations involving
rather compelling facts.30 2

One of the major weaknesses of Plyler is that even though the Court
did not identify undocumented children as a suspect class, or identify
education as a fundamental right, it nevertheless used heightened scrutiny to invalidate the Texas statute because the children involved found
themselves in their condition through no fault of their own.30 3 Indeed, if
that were enough of a justification to invalidate the statute, why not apply the same reasoning to school financing cases? After all, poor children
have absolutely no influence over the financing of their school district.
And, like the children in Plyler, many poor children find themselves in
grossly under-funded schools through no fault of their own, resulting in a

296. Id.
297. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
298. Id. at 219 n. 19.
299. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78-79, 82.
300. See Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free PublicEducation: An Analysis ofPlyler v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 409, 428 (1983) (arguing that in order to achieve the result
it wanted in Plyler, the Supreme Court "did in fact play havoc with traditional equal protection
doctrine"); Perry, supra note 244, at 341 ("Resolving the issues in Plyler by introducing a more
activist standard of review out of solicitude for the principle of equal protection made no sense.").
301.
See Hull, supra note 300, at 428.
302. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988); Martinez v. Bynum, 461
U.S. 321, 327-28 (1983).
303. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24, 226, 230.
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constructive denial of an education.3 ° Moreover, unlike the case of undocumented immigrants, the law has not labeled the parents of poor
school children "criminals., 30 5 However, the Court has consistently refused to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to state action discriminating against those children, applying instead the rational basis test, even
when it results in a substantial detriment to that vulnerable population. 306
B. TraditionalRational Basis Analysis
The substantial degree of deference generally given to run-of-themill economic or social welfare legislation under rational basis analysis
should raise a flag of caution to anyone urging its application to state
action that discriminates against undocumented workers.30 7 Indeed, in
most cases, mounting an equal protection challenge on the theory that a
court will find the classification constitutionally irrational would be considered unrealistic. 30 8 After all, under the rational basis test, a state need
only show that the classification has a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest to comply with equal protection requirements.309
The formidable barrier to a successful challenge to state action
posed by the rational basis test was described by Chief Justice Rehnquist
in City of Dallas v. Stanglin.310 In that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that, "rational-basis scrutiny ... is the most relaxed and tolerant
form of judicial scrutiny . . . ."" Citing New Orleans v. Dukes for the
proposition that "'in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious
discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment, ' ' 31 2 the Court upheld a city ordinance
setting age limits on attendance to dance halls. 313 An even narrower ver304.
See Amy J. Schmitz, Providing an Escape for Inner-City Children: Creating a Federal
Remedy for EducationalIlls of Poor Urban Schools, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1639, 1662 (1994) (arguing
that the issue of unequal educational opportunities for poor urban children should return to the federal courts based on the theory that the Supreme Court adopted a novel equal protection approach in
Plyler).
305.
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20 (noting, with respect to the parents of the children denied
public education, that "those who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law
should be prepared to bear the consequences").
306.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973).
307.
Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Clebume
Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L.J. 591, 603 (1999-2000) (recognizing that, under rational basis review,
"judicial invalidation of social and economic legislation should be an exceptional event").
308.
Id. at 599.
309.
Id. at 624.
310.
490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989).
311.
City of Dallas,490 U.S. at 26 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
In Dandridge,the Court stated:
[A] State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does
not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'
Dandridge,397 U.S. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
312.
City of Dallas,490 U.S. at 27 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 30304 (1976)).
313.
Id.
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sion of rational basis analysis was described by Justice Thomas in FCC
v. Beach Communications, Inc., where he stated: "In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. ' 314 Justice Thomas added further that "those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden 'to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it.' '

315

Moreover, according to

Justice Thomas, "because we never require a legislature to articulate its
reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional
purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction
actually motivated the legislature

.

,3

6 Completing a grim picture,

Thomas added: "In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to
on rational speculation unsupcourtroom fact-finding and may be based
317
ported by evidence or empirical data.,
C. Exceptions to TraditionalRational Basis Review
The descriptions of rational basis review by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas depict accurately the period from 1937 to 1976,
when virtually every state classification subjected to the rational basis
test was upheld.3 18 Indeed, it may be said that they reflect much of the
work of today's Court. 319 However, reflecting an evolving sense of a
need to develop a meaningful rationality analysis, in a small but growing
number of cases since 1976, the Court has deviated from traditional rational basis deference to perform a more searching inquiry into the legitimacy of the justifications for discriminatory classifications not involving a suspect class or a fundamental interest. 320 Contrary to Justice
Thomas's suggestion that under rational basis analysis the Court will not
look into the motivation of the legislation, the Court has, on several occasions, searched the record of the case to determine the legitimacy of
the relationship between the classification and the stated purpose of the

314.
315.

508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto

Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
Id.
316.
317.
Id.
318.
See Mark D. Perison, Equal Protection and Medical Malpractice Damage Caps: The
Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1991, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 397,
415 (1991-1992) (asking, rhetorically, whether rational basis review is "any more than a mere judicial rubber stamp").
Saphire, supra note 307, at 606-08. One of the most dramatic demonstrations of rational
319.
basis deference can be found in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), where the court
hypothesized the possible goals of the legislature in enacting a statute--essentially denying the
plaintiff any meaningful review of the statute. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 490. A restrictive view of
rational basis analysis was demonstrated more recently in Heller, 509 U.S. at 320.
320.
See Saphire, supra note 307, at 608-09.
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statute.2 1 In fact, in some of those cases, the Court has virtually ignored
justifications that appeared to be legitimate governmental concerns.32 2
Of course, any challenge to state laws denying workers' compensation benefits to undocumented workers on the basis of rational basis
analysis could face the formidable wall described by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 323 However, an argument based on a
heightened level of scrutiny, let alone strict scrutiny, will not see the light
of day.324 Plyer represents a historical anomaly, and it is very unlikely
that the Court will continue to stretch an already constitutionally unsteady holding.325 In addition, the application of strict scrutiny to the
rights of undocumented individuals as a class, even under compelling
circumstances, would be unprecedented.32 6 It would mean that the distinction between citizens and non-citizens is beginning to disappear, a
327
development that even progressive scholars seldom seek to achieve.
However, a number of developments in modern equal protection doctrine
indicate that undocumented immigrants may sometimes have a chance
against state power, even under rational basis analysis.328
Harmonizing the Court's exceptions to traditional rationality deference into some sort of predictable doctrine has been the subject of much
frustration for legal scholars. 329 However, a pattern has been discerned by
at least one commentator.33 ° Professor Richard B. Saphire has noted that
the more significant exceptions to rational basis deference can be catego-

321.
See id. at 608.
322. See id.
See City of Dallas, 490 U.S. at 26; Beach Communications,Inc., 508 U.S. at 315.
323.
324. See Scaperlanda, supra note 214, at 771 (suggesting that in future attempts to exclude
noncitizens from state benefits "the Court might overrule Plyler or distinguish it").
325. Id. at 749.
326. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
327. Most civil rights discourse involves rights that belong to all members of a national community. Advocates generally argue that denial of those rights essentially denies membership, or
benefits thereof, to the person affected. That argument is seldom made with respect to undocumented
immigrants. Instead, a more common argument is that the privilege of membership in the national
community would be devalued if all rights were made available to non-members. See Peter H.
Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 GEo.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 13 (1989). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and 'Community
Ties': A Response to Martin, 44 U. Pr-r. L. REV. 237, 244 (1983) (making a case for an expansive
definition of "community").
328. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71 (1982) (holding that newer residents are
entitled to the same full benefits as long-term natives of Alaska); Song v. INS, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1133 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that an INS provision rendering a legal alien convicted of an aggravated felony as ineligible for relief from deportation violates the Equal Protection Clause since
illegal aliens are eligible for relief).
329.
See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Courtfrom
the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357-58 (1999) (discussing the ten
successful rational basis challenges to state action in the U.S. Supreme Court since 1971, and
concluding that the cases have largely stood on their own and did not result in changes to traditional
rational basis analysis).
Saphire, supra note 307, at 608 (identifying the various deviations from traditional ra330.
tional basis analysis in the U.S. Supreme Court).
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rized into three types of cases. 331 The first category announces the adoption of a new standard of review. 332 The second is a category of cases
that, in addition to implicating the equality concerns of the Fourteenth
Amendment, also implicate other constitutional values.333 The third, and
most important category for purposes of this Article, is composed of
cases where the Court has concluded that the challenged classification
334
could not possibly have served a legitimate public purpose.
In several cases, the Court has concluded that the only plausible
reason for the passage of the statute is to disadvantage a particular group
because of animosity or prejudice toward its members. United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,335 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center,336 and Romer v. Evans337 form the core of that category. In
each of those cases, the Court set aside the traditional deferential rational
basis analysis in favor of a more searching review of discriminatory governmental action, while professing reliance on rational basis analysis.338
Significantly, the results in those cases cannot be predicted on the basis
of the Justices' political affiliations or perceived legal philosophy.339
Even Justices who advocate for a restrictive view of rational basis analysis have joined some of the most controversial opinions in that category. 340 Though there is much evidence that those cases have not resulted
in a wholesale modification of traditional rational basis review at the
United States Supreme Court level,34 1 the cases have had a significant
impact on lower courts.
Though those cases may be described as anomalies, they do reveal a
continued struggle within the Court to define a meaning of "rationality"
that reflects a growing understanding of human dignity and values.342
The cases are only "outliers" because the people in the targeted categories have largely lived outside of Unites States society, not by their own
choice, but because of misconceptions and prejudices that denied their
essence as human beings.

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
complete
U.S. 312

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
See Farrell, supra note 329, at 374, 398-99, 409.
Id. at 414.
Id.
See Saphire, supra note 307, at 623-25 (asserting that the Court underwent an almost
retrenchment to traditional rational basis deference when it decided Helter v. Doe, 509
(1993)).

342.

See Allison Moore, Loving's Legacy: The Other Antidiscrimination Principles,34 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 163, 197 (1999) (noting that Moreno, Cleburne,and Romer expanded the conventional rational basis framework).
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1. UnitedStates Department of Agriculture v. Moreno
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno involved
amendment of the Food Stamp Act. 343 The statute itself identified two
purposes: the stimulation of the agricultural economy and the alleviation
of hunger and malnutrition. 344 As the means to accomplish those goals,
Congress chose to exclude from the food stamp program any household
containing unrelated individuals. 345 Relying on rational basis review, the
Court determined that whether a person is related to other members of a
household was clearly irrelevant to those purposes.346 The Court found
evidence of other purposes in the legislative history of the statute, pointing to a Conference Report and a statement on the floor of the Senate
revealing that the purpose of the amendment was to exclude "hippies"
and "hippie communes" from the food stamp program. 347 Finding that
purpose impermissible, the Court declared that "a bare congressional
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitidesire to harm a politically 348
interest."
governmental
mate
Importantly, the Court also dismissed the government's argument
that the statute was designed to minimize fraud in the food stamp program.34 9 In support of that position, the government had argued that
households with unrelated individuals were more likely to contain persons who would fail to report sources than -hose households where every
member was related, and that those households were "relatively unstable," thus making it difficult to detect fraud.35 ° In response, the Court
focused on the statute's definition of household, which included homes
with a single individual, and the ease with which a person could avoid
accusations of fraud by simply changing his or her living arrangements. 351 Taking that into account, the Court focused on the worst-case
scenario, where people so desperate for help could not afford the relatively simple act of changing their living arrangements to become eligible for food stamps, and found the statute unconstitutional.35 2
2. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court
unanimously invalidated a zoning ordinance that required a special permit for a group home for people with mental retardation, but not for simi343. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
344. Id. at 533.
345. Id. at 530.
346.
Id. at 533-34.
347.
Id. at 534 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 91-1793, at 8 (1970), and 116 CONG. REC. 44,439
(1970) (statement of Sen. Holland)).
Id.
348.
349.
Id. at 535-37.
350. Id. at 535.
351.
Id. at 537.
352.
Id. at 538.
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lar housing for other groups.353 Writing for the majority, Justice White
rejected the application of heightened scrutiny by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, emphasizing that different treatment based on mental
retardation may be justified in some cases because of the reduced
abilities and differing special needs of members of that class.35 4 Stressing
that its refusal to recognize the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class
did not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination,
the Court relied on Zobel v. Williams 355 and United States Departmentof
Agriculture v. Moreno356 to hold that the "State may not rely on a
classification whose relationship" is so attenuated to its asserted goal "as
to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. 35 7
Importantly the Court also agreed with Zobel and Moreno that some
objectives, such as "'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group' ... are not legitimate state interests. 358 However, its search of the
record did not appear to reveal such a "bare desire" to harm people with
mental retardation, at least not outwardly.35 9 Instead, the Court found that
the justifications offered by the City Council for requiring a special use
permit for a group home for mentally retarded people and not for other
similar uses were based on stereotypes of people with mental retardation,
paternalism, an unsupported concern about safety in a floodplain, and an
unsupported concern regarding overcrowding. 360 Finding that such negative attitudes and fears do not provide legitimate reasons for treating
classes of people differently, the Court concluded that the ordinance violated equal protection, even under the rational basis test. 36 1 In addition,
the Court also dismissed concerns over concentration of population, congestion of the streets, worries about fire hazards, and the avoidance of
danger to other residents, concluding that requiring the permit in this
case appeared to be based
on nothing more than irrational prejudice
3 62
against the targeted group.
Concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, Justice Marshall
reminded the Court that its rational basis analysis was "most assuredly
not the rational-basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc.," but was, instead, a much more searching inquiry into the legiti363
macy of the justifications given by the state for its classifications.
Sharing the Court's opinion of the overly broad lines drawn by the city's
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447.
Id. at 442.
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61-63.
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535-36.
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
Id. at 447 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
See id.
Id. at 448-49.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 458-60 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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ordinance, Justice Marshall reminded the Court that despite similar imprecision the Court had held other ordinances to be constitutional under
rational basis. 364 Justice Marshall therefore urged the Court to characterize its analysis as heightened scrutiny.365
3. Romer v. Evans
In Romer v. Evans, the Court declared unconstitutional an amendment to the Colorado Constitution prohibiting all state and local government offices from enacting laws designed to protect people from disAmendment 2, as the
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
legislation was called, was the result of a statewide referendum undertaken as a response to a number of recently enacted city ordinances banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and welfare
services. 367
Amendment 2 not only repealed the ordinances, but also prohibited
all legislative, executive, and judicial action at any state level designed to
protect the class.368 Relying primarily on voting rights cases, the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed Amendment 2 under the strict scrutiny
test, finding that the law violated equal protection by depriving gays and
369
lesbians the opportunity to participate in the political process. On remand, the state failed to convince the trial court that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. 370 The trial court enjoined Amendment 2, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the ruling.37 1
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that Amendment 2 violated equal
protection.3 72 However, unlike the Colorado Supreme Court, the Court
relied on a rational basis analysis.373 In support of the measure, the state
had argued that all it sought was to place gays and lesbians in the same

Id. at 459 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
364.
Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
365.
366.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36.
367.
Id. at 623-24.
Amendment 2 read as follows:
368.
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)).
369.
Id. at 625-26.
370.
Id. at 626 (citing Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994)).
371.
Id.
372.
Id. at 635.
373.
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position as all other persons.3 74 To do that, the state argued that the
measure did "no more than deny homosexuals special rights." 3 " Finding
such a reading implausible, the Court pointed out the sweeping nature of
Amendment 2.376 The amendment was not only intended to nullify specific legal protections but was also designed to forbid reinstatement of
those laws and policies, putting gays and lesbians "in a solitary class. 377
Importantly, the Court recognized a modern trend in antidiscrimination laws that reflected Congress' inability to protect individuals against some types of discrimination.3 78 Noting that Colorado's state
and local governments had passed many public accommodations laws
prohibiting discrimination

against non-suspect groups,379 the Court

stressed that Amendment 2 not only barred homosexuals from securing
protection under the public accommodations laws, but also nullified specific legal protections for the class in all transactions in housing, sale of
real estate, insurance, health and welfare services, private education, and
381
employment. 380 The provision had the same effect in the public sector.
To demonstrate the extreme nature of the measure, the Court noted
that the amendment could also be read to deprive gays and lesbians the
protection of more general laws that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in
the public and private sectors. 382 As the Court explained, in the systematic administration of such laws, "an official must determine whether
homosexuality is an arbitrary" basis for a decision. 383 Such a decision
would itself constitute a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
homosexuality under the amendment, denying homosexuals safe harbor
even in laws of general application. 384 Rejecting the state's position that
the law did nothing more than deny homosexuals "special rights," 385 the
Court found "nothing special" in the rights denied by the amendment.3 86
Instead, the Court pointed out that the amendment withdrew from homosexuals basic protections taken for granted by most people.3 87 The
amendment
thus created a class of outsiders, with few basic protec38 8
tions.
374.
Id. at 626.
375.
Id.
376.
Id. at 626-27.
377.
Id. at 627.
378.
Id. at 627-28.
379.
Id. at 628-29 (listing non-suspect categories that had been the subject of nondiscrimination measures like age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a
minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental disability, and sexual orientation).
380. Id. at 629.
381.
Id.
382. Id. at 630.
383. Id.
384.
Id.
385. Id. at 631.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.at 635.
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The Court based its conclusion that Amendment 2 did not satisfy
even rational basis analysis on two points. First, the amendment imposed
"a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group ....389
And, "[s]econd, the shear breath [of the amendment was] so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seem[ed] inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class ....
With regard to the first point, the Court seemed to announce a new
approach to rational basis analysis when it stressed that even in the most
mundane of cases calling for the most deferential standard the Court "insist[s] on knowing the relation[ship] between the classification adopted
and the object to be attained."'3 9' Citing a number of cases that upheld
classifications under the rationality test because they were narrowly
drawn and "grounded in . . . sufficient factual context[s] ' '392 that enabled
the Court to "ascertain some relation between the classification and the
purpose it served," the Court stated that such an inquiry "ensure[s] that
drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
classifications are not 393
law."
the
by
burdened
Despite a characterization that did not conform to the traditional rational basis test, the Court's analysis provided some insight into a number of factors that might provoke a more searching inquiry under that
test. The Court noted that Amendment 2 was both narrow and broad in
its identification of people by a single trait and its blanket denial of protection to that group.394 Characterizing the amendment as unprecedented,
or rare, the Court explained that discrimination of such an unusual character requires special consideration to determine whether it is "'obnoxious to the constitutional provision.' ' 395 Stressing that laws that purport
to achieve equal protection "'through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities' '' 396 run contrary to our constitutional tradition of equal protection, the Court concluded that a law making it "more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
"1397
itself a denial of equal protection ....
On the second point, the Court concluded that Amendment 2, and
laws like it, "raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed
is born of animosity toward the class" targeted.398 In support of Amendment 2 the state offered two justifications. First, was respect for others'
freedom of association, in particular "landlords or employers who have
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 632.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 633 (citing U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980)).
Id. at 633.
Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
Id. (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950)).
Id.
Id. at 634.
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personal or religious objections to homosexuality., 399 Second, was the
state's "interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against
other groups., 400 Focusing on the severity of the harm inflicted upon
homosexuals, and stressing that the extreme breadth of the measure was
"so far removed from [those] ... justifications," the Court found it "im-

possible to credit" the justifications offered for the amendment. 40 ,
A recent United States Supreme Court opinion added a measure of
vitality to searching rational basis analysis. Lawrence v. Texas, 40 2 involved a challenge to a state statute banning same-sex sodomy .4 3 Finding for the petitioners and against the state, the Court overruled Bowers
v. Hardwick40 4 and held that the statute violated the petitioners' liberty
interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 5 Concurring in the judgment, but declining to join the Court in overruling Bowers, Justice
O'Connor argued that the case was more properly decided under the
equal protection doctrine.

Relying on Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer,

Justice O'Connor reminded the Court that, "some objectives, such as 'a
bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group,' are not legitimate
state interests."40 7 Noting that the state's justification was the promotion
of morality, Justice O'Connor argued that moral disapproval by itself
does not constitute the legitimate state interest required to justify a ban
on homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy. 40 8 Scrutinizing the
justifications offered by the state, Justice O'Connor reasoned that because the law was so seldom enforced with respect to private, consensual
acts, "the law serv[ed] more as a statement of dislike and disapproval
against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior, ' '4°9 raising
"'the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.' 4 10 Justice O'Connor, therefore, reached the same result, but with a completely different analysis,
confirming the viability of the exceptions to deferential rational basis
review reflected in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer.

399.
Id. at 635.
400.
Id.
401.
Id.
402.
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
403.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
404.
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (declining to recognize constitutionally protected right to engage in
homosexual sex).
405.
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484.
406.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
407.
Id. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
408.
Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
409.
Id.
410.
Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634).
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D. Adding Meaning to "Legitimate State Purpose" Under Rational Basis
Analysis
Instances when the Court will invalidate a state law designed to discriminate against an unpopular but non-suspect group are rare. However,
Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Lawrence demonstrate that there are times when the Court will act to
protect unpopular groups, even when indicia of the need for heightened
review are not present.
Those cases also demonstrate an evolution, albeit a slow one, of the
Court's understanding of modem notions of morality and fair play, and
of a related need to critically analyze the legitimateness of state action
when it harms politically unpopular yet non-suspect groups. Each of the
cases involved attempts to legislate against a perceived moral or character flaw that does not generally exist in the realm of "traditional" (but
sadly uninformed) societal values. The decisions reveal that many of the
negative attitudes about those groups are based on prejudice and stereotypes, which have been largely discredited by modem society. The cases
demonstrate the Court's insistence that society adjust its attitudes and
treat those groups with respect and dignity, reflecting an evolving sense
of morality and fair play. At their core, all three cases reject the state's
irrational disapproval of the moral worth of an unpopular group.
A major key in the decisions is the Court's rejection of unsupported
explanations for the discriminatory state action. An amorphous religious
objection to homosexuals in Romer was not enough to justify state action
that, not only denied protections, but also allowed invidious discrimination against that group. 411 An unsupported belief that people with mental
illness were dangerous did not suffice to support state discrimination in
Cleburne.4 12 And the stereotypical image of the moral superiority of a
nuclear family versus a household composed partly of unrelated people
did not support denying food stamps in Moreno.4 13 In each of the three
cases, the nature of the discrimination, and the magnitude of the harm,
provided the Court early notice that it should engage in a searching inquiry of the justifications offered by the state. Those factors also put the
Court on notice that it should not engage in making up unsupported justifications on behalf of the state. Instead, when indicia of invidious discrimination are present, courts must "insist on knowing the relation[ship]
between the classification adopted and the objective to be attained. '" 414 If,
as in Romer, the statute is "a status-based enactment divorced from any
factual context from which [courts] could discern a relationship to le-

411.
412.
413.
414.

See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47.
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
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gitimate state interests, 41 5 the statute must be found to violate the rationality test under equal protection. 1 6
Given the randomness of the three cases and the Court's reluctance
or unwillingness to follow them with similar decisions in other compelling areas, some may fairly argue that the Court has been inconsistent in
its function as America's conscience. While that may be partly true, it
does not mean that the cases have lost their vitality. One of the true
strengths of the decisions, and a sign that they may endure and continue
to evolve, is that they were not the result of the usual five to four split
along ideological or political lines. Most significantly, lower courts' reliance on these cases has resulted in a growing array of lower court decisions consistent with those principles.4 17
The theme of Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer that the bare desire to
harm a politically unpopular group does not constitute a rational basis is
fully applicable to efforts to deny undocumented immigrants workers'
compensation benefits, including rehabilitation services. The Moreno,
Cleburne, and Romer line of equal protection cases would have been
aptly applied to California's Proposition 187, except that the close fit
with Plyler essentially ended the equal protection analysis.
Although there have been several episodes of state-sponsored discrimination against undocumented immigrants in the nation's history,
Proposition 187 may be the most egregious example of state action
against that group in modern times. Most of Proposition 187 was defeated on the basis of federal preemption. 41 8 Only the section of Proposition 187 that prohibited primary and secondary education to undocumented children was subjected to what appeared to be equal protection

415.
Id. at 635.
416.
Id. at 631 (stating that the Court has "attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality
by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [it] will
uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end").
417.
The following cases relied on the combination of Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer to justify
a searching rational basis analysis: Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1997)
(selective prosecution on the basis of sexual orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause);
Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, Cause No. SA-98-CA-0696-OG, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6259, at *87-* 103 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (invalidating a decision by the City of San Antonio to remove funding to the plaintiff because of its support of gay and lesbian issues); Weaver v.
Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1287-88 (D. Utah 1998) (finding that retaliation against a
teacher-coach's public expression of her sexual orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause);
Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering & Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp. 1260, 1276 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Baker
v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 872 (Vt. 1999). A KeyCite® search of the three cases separately revealed
that Moreno has been cited negatively ten times, and has been referenced positively 426 times;
Cleburne has been referenced negatively thirty-one times and positively 1,983 times; and Romer has
been cited negatively fourteen times, and positively 278 times. Search of WESTLAW, KeyCite
Service (Nov. 1, 2003). Though a careful analysis of those trends is beyond the scope of this Article,
they tend to suggesting strongly that, contrary to some scholars' pessimism, searching rational basis
review is alive and growing in the lower courts.
418.
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 771 (S.D. Cal.
1995).
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analysis. 41 9 That section was overturned when the court invoked the
Plyler standard without much discussion.420 Therefore, one might reasonably conclude that Plyler's heightened standard of review was crucial
to the Court's decision. However, a close reading of Section 7 reveals
that California's law was far more egregious than the Texas statute at
play in Plyler.4 2 1 Proposition 187, therefore, may have been a likely subject for a more searching rational basis analysis even in the absence of a
case such as Plyler.
Much like those who advocated the deportation of Mexican citizens
in the early part of the twentieth century,422 the proponents of Proposition
187 did not consider the high degree of harm that would be inflicted on
Americans. The Texas statute at play in Plyler amounted to the functional denial of an education to young children because of the prohibitive
cost and the typically small incomes of the undocumented children's
parents. 423 However, unlike Proposition 187, the Texas statute was not
designed to force the undocumented children to self-deport.4 24 Also,
unlike the Texas statute, Proposition 187 required citizen children to
report the immigration status of their parents to facilitate their deportation.425 It further required untrained civilian teachers and school administrators to report "suspected" undocumented children, parents, or guardians, while failing to provide any standards to determine legal status.426
The statute also presumed that the state could arrange an orderly transition to the school in the child's country of origin within a period of
ninety days but made no provision for the administration of its mandates. 427 Implementation of Proposition 187 would have been devastating
to undocumented children, and many citizen children.428 The choice for
undocumented children and their families would have been obvious-the
children would have been kept from attending school.4 29 Implementation
of Proposition 187 would have also resulted in the same treatment for
many citizen children of undocumented parents. 430 The creation of a cornered, unprotected, and easily exploited underclass would have had a
419.
Wilson, 908 F. Supp. at 774.
See id. at 774, 785 (invalidating Section 7 of Prop. 187, Exclusion of Illegal Aliens From
420.
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, on the basis of a conflict with Plyler).
421.
See id. at 785.
422.

See generally JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION

OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980) (discussing in great detail the repatriation
of Mexican immigrants in 1954 by the U.S. government, which included many American citizens).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228.
423.
424.
Wilson, 908 F. Supp. at 785 n.36.
425. Id. at 786.
426. Id.
Id. at 774, 790 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215(d), (f)).
427.
Id. at 774. Section 7 of Proposition 187 required schools to verify the immigration status
428.
of children for "purposes of denying access to public elementary and secondary education." Id.
429. Id.
Id. Section 7, subsection (d) required the verification of the immigration status of un430.
documented parents rather than children, which defeats the purpose of Section 7 "because the state
has no need to know the immigration status of parents in order to deny benefits to children." I&
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devastating societal impact, creating an even worse situation than that
which the Court sought to prevent in Plyler. Moreover, the potential savings associated with that initiative would have been much less than the
costs the state would have incurred to implement it,43 1 suggesting
strongly that the initiative was driven by a strong animus toward a defenseless, politically unpopular group, rather than a desire to conserve
state resources. Such a result would have been inconsistent with the
searching rational basis review espoused in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer.
E. Searching RationalBasis Analysis Invalidates State Laws Denying
Workers' Compensation and Vocational RehabilitationServices to
Undocumented Workers
Significantly, though misstating the appropriate degree of scrutiny
in cases involving undocumented workers, the Kansas decision in Jurado
and the Florida decision in De Ayala offer powerful hints as to the proper
constitutional analysis in workers' compensation cases involving that
group. The De Ayala court suggested the proper analysis when it noted
that "[i]t is apparent from the face of the statute that it cannot pass a rational basis test, much less the heightened scrutiny applicable when official discrimination occurs based on alienage. 432 Perhaps hinting that the
motive behind the statute was race-based, the court stated with some
frustration: "What possible state purpose would justify giving a benefit to
nonresident Canadians that is denied Mexicans?,, 4 33 The court found that
the proffered explanation, that "this is not an unreasonable distinction
given the fact that the U.S. and Canada share one of the largest unprotected borders in the entire world," did not satisfy the rational basis
test.434
The Jurado court's analysis of the constitutional issues provides a
more careful dissection of the critical factors that should control judicial
review of state laws designed to deny workers' compensation benefits to
undocumented workers. In Jurado, the defendants, a construction company and the workers' compensation insurance provider, argued that the
statute in question would withstand "even the strictest scrutiny., 435 In
support, the defendants cited the "insurmountable task" that the state
would be forced to face of "administering benefits to citizens of foreign
countries, dealing with foreign governments, ascertaining choice of law
rules with regard to issues such as marriage and paternity, and insuring
dependents received the benefits to which they are entitled., 436 In addi431.

Professor Kevin Johnson revealed that the savings derived from Proposition 187 were far

less than the costs of implementation. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1568.
De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 207.
432.

433.
434.
435.
436.

Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Jurado, 853 P.2d at 677.
Id.
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tion, the defendants cited the "prevention of fraud and extreme financial
hardship on the citizens, employers, and insurance carriers of Kansas as
compelling interests that justify the statute's classification.37
In response, the court showed little sympathy for claims of administrative efficiency, noting that the workers' compensation system already
awarded some benefits to people in situations similar to Jurado's family. 438 The court also noted that the burden of proof regarding the need
for workers' compensation benefits was on the claimant, dismissing
many of the defendant's concerns over the difficulties of administering
the system's requirements to people in a foreign country.439 In addition,
reflecting the private nature of workers' compensation coverage, the
court emphasized that the interests represented were those of the em44
ployer and the insurance provider and not those of the State of Kansas. 0
The most common characteristics shared by Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer are the Court's refusal to accept mere animosity against an unpopular group as a legitimate state interest and the Court's willingness to
review the justifications offered by the state once it has been alerted that
the classification affects a politically unpopular group. Because of the
group's inability to defend itself in the political process, mere animosity
has driven many government initiatives against undocumented immigrants.
1. Animus
Whether state action is driven by antipathy and a bare desire to
harm a politically unpopular group is difficult to determine by a literal
reading of legislation. However, the Court has demonstrated that animus
toward a politically unpopular group can also be identified by analyzing
societal attitudes and conduct toward the targeted group. Unlike the homophobic tone of the initiative campaign against homosexuals in Romer,
and the revealing statements against "hippies" in the legislative history of
the Food Stamp Act in Moreno, the Court in Cleburne could not point to
a "smoking gun" to demonstrate that the zoning ordinance in the case
was specifically designed to ostracize people with mental retardation.44 1
The Cleburne Court instead focused almost entirely on the negative attitudes toward people with mental retardation held by a number of groups
437.
Id.
438.
Id.
439. Id.
440.
Id.
441.
City of Clebume, 473 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
Clebume's ordinance sweeps too broadly to dispel the suspicion that it rests on a bare desire to treat the retarded as outsiders, pariahs who do not belong in the community. The
Court, while disclaiming that special scrutiny is necessary or warranted, reaches the same
conclusion. Rather than striking the ordinance down, however, the Court invalidates it
merely as applied to respondents.
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such as neighboring property owners and elderly residents, as well as
concerns over possible harassment of the residents by students, and concerns over legal responsibility and overcrowding, demonstrating that
animus toward a politically unpopular group can take on many forms,
and can come from different directions." 2
Today, few groups can claim to be closer to the bottom than undocumented immigrants. No other group faces more barriers to participation in the political process. They cannot vote, and political mobilization
only exposes them to detection and possible separation from friends,
family, and jobs. 443 They are especially vulnerable when they are perceived to be benefiting from social programs while draining resources
that should only be made available to citizens. 4" As Proposition 187
demonstrated, even though they are ineligible for most public services
and benefits, and they pay taxes, undocumented immigrants have been
easy targets for those looking for "scapegoats" for states' economic troubles.445
As recently as 1982, the State of Texas argued that undocumented
immigrants were not persons "within its jurisdiction."" 6 While it is difficult to imagine that the State of Texas sought the full consequences of
such a finding, such as the ability to discriminate arbitrarily or even invidiously against that segment of the population, the state's willingness
to raise that argument demonstrated its low opinion of the group. A similar observation can be made about Proposition 187. That law was passed
while its proponents were fully aware that much of the initiative conflicted with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Plyler. In fact, the initiative may be fairly interpreted as a challenge to the Plyler Court based
on the idea that states should be free to legislate against this unpopular
group, notwithstanding the invidiousness of that discrimination.
2. Legitimate State Purpose?
Determining whether a legitimate state purpose is involved when
undocumented workers are denied access to workers' compensation
benefits requires a careful review of the economics of workers' compensation. As previously explained, workers' compensation benefits are private benefits." 7 Although they are embedded in state statutes, those
benefits, unlike education, food stamps, or Medicare, are not public
benefits. 448 The state's economic interests are not implicated when workers' compensation benefits are provided. The cost of workers' compensa442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

Id. at 448-49.
Johnson, supra note 30, at1514.
Id. at 1512-13.
Id. at 1571.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 211 (internal quotations omitted).
See supra note 50.
Id.
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tion reflects the employers' cost of doing business. That cost can both be
passed to the consumer and reflected in workers' wages. 449 Every claim
denied represents a potential windfall for the insurance provider or selfinsurer and a potential rebate of premiums to the employer.45 °
The private nature of state workers' compensation systems was
highlighted in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan.4 51 In that case, the plaintiff attempted to establish that denial of
benefits by the private insurer was attributable to state action in an equal
protection claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.4 52 The plaintiff
argued that "workers' compensation benefits are state-mandated 'public
benefits,' and that the State has delegated the provision of these 'public
benefits' to private insurers. ' 4 53 The Federal District Court disagreed,
dismissing the private insurers from the case because they were not state
actors.454
Despite the longstanding view that state workers' compensation
benefits are private obligations, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that insurers "'providing public benefits
which honor State entitlements ...become an arm of the State, fulfilling
a uniquely governmental obligation .... , The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, rejecting the authority offered by the Third Circuit because the
case cited involved the delegation to private physicians of a constitutional obligation to provide treatment to injured inmates. 456 In contrast,
according to the Court, nothing in the Pennsylvania Constitution obligated the state to provide medical treatment or workers' compensation
benefits to injured workers. 57 Instead, the state "workers' compensation
law impose[d] that obligation on employers. ' 5 8

449.
See supra note 60.
450.
Workers' compensation policies are generally experience-rated. Their cost rises or drops
dependent on the number of accidents reported. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 3, at § 150.06.
451.
526 U.S. 40 (1999).
452.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 47-48.
453.
Id. at 55 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).
454.
Id. at 48.
455.
Id. at 55 (quoting Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 168 (3d Cir. 1998)). Curiously, the
belief that workers' compensation payments are public benefits continues to be held by a number of
jurists. See Alvarez Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n,720 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1986) (concerning death
benefits, where the court erroneously characterized workers' compensation benefits as "part of
several interrelated social welfare enactments"). Alvarez Martinez involved the Utah workers' compensation statute, which treated U.S. and Canadian residents the same but provided for one-half the
death benefit for residents of any other country. See Alvarez Martinez, 720 P.2d at 417 (citing to
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-72 (1953)). The statute applies to citizens of all countries unless a treaty
overrides it. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-72. The court found that equal protection principles are
not violated by the statute because the equal protection clause does not reach outside of U.S. territory. Alvarez Martinez, 720 P.2d at 418; see also Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal
Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 102 (Pa. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that a Pennsylvania statute
should yield to IRCA, and that benefits for illegal aliens were not intended by the legislature).
456.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 55.
457.
Id. at 55-56.
458.
Id. at 56.
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Workers' compensation benefits and services are generally provided
through privately funded insurance, paid for by employers who may then
pass the cost on to the consumers of products or services, or to their employees through adjustments in wages. 459 Therefore, state action denying
workers' compensation benefits (including vocational rehabilitation) to
undocumented employees does not protect the state's economic interests.
It protects strictly private interests. In fact, denying workers' compensation coverage to undocumented workers may implicate the state's interest in a negative way. Private responsibility for workers' compensation
benefits has been deemed to serve the important purpose of encouraging
employers to take steps to promote workplace safety for all workers.
Given the large numbers of undocumented immigrants in the country
who are willing to work in high-risk occupations that many legal residents find undesirable, denying this benefit effectively acts as a disincentive to promote safe working conditions for everyone. In addition to that,
the unavailability of this remedy effectively reduces the cost of undocumented labor, creating incentives to hire more undocumented immigrants, in violation of U. S. immigration policy. 46°
3. A Fate Worse Than Civil Death
The situation faced by undocumented workers who are injured on
a parallel in the now largely discredited doctrine of
the job may' 4find
"civil death. 6t Civil death is a vestige of early English law.462 It originated from the practice of "outlawry," which divested convicted crimi63
nals of all civil and proprietary rights, rendering them "civilly dead.'
As a result of their conviction and incarceration, individuals were
deemed to stand outside of the reach of most laws, losing the right to the
most basic protections. Outlawry was a kind of moral condemnation that
was imposed upon convicted criminals in addition to the punishment
meted by the criminal courts. The practice of "outlawry" was adopted in
459.
stated:

In De Ayala where speaking about a deceased worker's right to compensation, the court

One of the primary benefits that an employee works for is the satisfaction and wellbeing of providing for his or her family. The law did not afford petitioner's deceased
husband different treatment while he was alive and working. He shared the same "burdens" as his fellow employees. He paid taxes and contributed to the growth of his company and the general economy. His labor, along with that of his American or Canadian
co-workers, helped pay for the employer's insurance premiums required under the
worker's compensation law. Common sense dictates that he should be entitled to the
same "benefits," regardless of the residence or status of his dependents.
De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 207.
See Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396, 404 (Conn. 1988) (stating that if employers realize
460.
they could be relieved of the burden of providing workers' compensation coverage with an illegal
alien workforce, they would have strong incentives to hire such workers); Femandez-Lopez v. Jose
Cervino, Inc., 671 A.2d 1051, 1055-56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (same).
Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project-The CollateralConsequences of a Crimi461.
nal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 943 (1970).
Id. at 942-43.
462.
Id. at 942.
463.
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the United States early in its history without much deliberation. 4 4 The
practice evolved along two lines.
One line involved specific civil disabilities as a consequence for a
criminal conviction, like the loss of the right to vote, the right to hold
public office, the right to serve as a juror, and the denial of professional
or occupational licenses.465 Many of those laws continue to exist today.
The other line involved a more comprehensive loss of civil rights, or
what has come to be known as "civil death," which deprived the individual convicted of a crime of rights while he was serving a prison sentence. 466 Early in the history of the U.S. the legislatures of every state
enacted some sort of civil disability statute.467 By 1970, only thirteen
states retained civil death statutes.468 By 1996, only four such statutes
remained. Three of these remaining statutes only apply to felons sentenced to life in prison.469
Civil death statutes denying access to workers' compensation benefits have been found unconstitutional in a variety of contexts. In Delorme
v. Pierce FreightlinesCo.,470 the court held that a civil death statute suspending the civil rights of people convicted of a felony violated the
Equal Protection Clause.471 In that case a person convicted of a felony
requested a hearing before the Workmen's Compensation Board to argue
that an award for a pre-incarceration injury was inadequate. 472 The federal district court found that the Oregon civil death statute, which suspended the right of a convicted felon to litigate his legal claims, violated
the Equal Protection Clause even under rational basis analysis.47 3 The
court found the state's justification, which consisted of preventing pointless or frivolous litigation, was not rationally related to the suspension of
a prisoner's right to litigate legal claims.474 Importantly, the court found
464. Id.
465.
Id. at 951-52.
466. Id. at 950.
467.
Id.
468.
Id.
469.
See Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A
National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10, 13-14 (1996). Importantly, even states that maintained a civil death statute sometimes found a way to separate the moral
consequences of incarceration for a crime from the real world consequences of work-related injuries.
See Garner v. Shulte Co., 259 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (holding that the humanitarian purposes of the workers' compensation laws extended to the protection of dependents, granting
benefits to dependents after their father has become incarcerated and declared "civilly dead"). In
other jurisdictions, imprisonment of the claimant has not required suspension of benefits, as long as
the claimants were able to establish the wages they could have earned had they not been incarcerated. See United Riggers Erectors v. Indus. Comm'n, 640 P.2d 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); King v.
McClanahan, 3 La. App. 117 (La. Ct. App. 1925); Sims v. R. D Brooks, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 139
(Mich. 1973).
470.
353 F. Supp. 258 (D. Or. 1973).
471.
Delorme, 353 F. Supp. at 259-60 (referring to OR. REV. STAT. § 137.240 (1973)).
472.
Id. at 259.
473.
Id. at 260 (referring to OR. REV. STAT. § 137.240) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971)).
474.
Id.
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that delays attendant to the suspension of a prisoner's right to litigate
legal claims often resulted in a complete denial of legitimate
475 claims, a
result that could not be supported by the state's justifications.
The criminalization of labor under U. S. immigration law, the unenforceability of the laws, the need for low-wage workers, and the protections available to U. S. employers who rely on these workers have combined to produce a class of workers who occupy not only an inferior political status but also an inferior moral status. That status denies the
workers the dignity of their labor, and in many cases, is used to deny
them the very fruit of their work. Given the unpopularity and vulnerability of undocumented immigrants, Professor Neuman's warning that reliance on the rational basis analysis of the Plyler dissent could result in
denial of protections provided even to criminals continues to have great
force.4 76 Though they make important contributions to the United States
economy and add to the public treasury, undocumented immigrants have
historically been viewed with a level of contempt reserved only for the
most morally reprehensible criminals. Fortunately, as many jurisdictions
have shown, it is possible to separate the moral blame that attaches to the
commission of a felonious crime from the very real world consequences
involved in the denial of workers' compensation. Even in cases where
individuals are convicted of violent crimes, many states have managed to
safeguard access to workers' compensation benefits in the interest of the
workers and their dependents. Importantly, many of those cases have
involved crimes far more serious than crossing a border without authorization in search of a job.
Reliance on the power of the state to deny a private property interest
to this vulnerable population, its effect on the workers' health and safety
and on the well-being of even more vulnerable dependents, as well as the
potential windfall to insurers and employers resulting from that practice
should put courts on notice that a more searching review under the rational basis test is required.
VII. A NOTE ABOUT HOFFMANPLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC. V. NLRB
The issues raised in this Article, and many more involving the question of the extent to which workers' rights legislation protects undocumented immigrants, may soon become more complicated as a result of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.
v. NLRB.4 77 In Hoffman, the Supreme Court ruled that undocumented
workers who are illegally discharged in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) for engaging in protected concerted activity can-

475.
476.
477.

Id.
See Neuman, supra note 251, at 1448.
535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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not be awarded backpay. 47 8 Conceding that undocumented workers are
covered by the NLRA, the Court nevertheless denied backpay remedies
to the illegally discharged employees. 47 9 Ignoring the fact that undocumented immigrants are valued in many industries, and perform essential
functions in the U.S. economy, the Court simply refused to provide a
remedy for "years of work not performed, [and] for wages that could not
lawfully have been earned ....,480 By focusing strictly on the workers'
violation of immigration law, while ignoring the employers' violation of
labor law, Hoffman may have already contributed to the perpetuation of
this disposable workforce.
Though Hoffman may appear to be limited to the denial of backpay
remedies in the labor relations context, the decision has already created
confusion in the area of workers' compensation, and may soon influence
other areas. Relying partly on Hoffman, a Michigan court of appeals recently decided to limit workers' compensation benefits for undocumented workers to medical care, eliminating crucial wage-loss benefits. 48 1 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that a person's undocumented status may cause disability benefits to be suspended.482 Though both cases purport to merely suspend benefits while
the workers are undocumented, the practical implications of immigration
law generally mean that the benefits are permanently denied.48 3
Hoffman should not cause any confusion in the area of workers'
compensation. If that case stands for anything positive, it stands for the
proposition that employers and insurance providers cannot withhold from
undocumented workers wages and other employment benefits that they
have earned. Much like earned wages, workers' compensation benefits
accrue at the time of the work-related injury. So far, lower courts have
limited Hoffman such that those benefits are not precluded by the Court's
reasoning in that case. That case should have no effect on whether un484
documented workers are eligible for workers' compensation benefits.

478.
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 150-52.
479.
Id. at 144, 151.
480.
Id. at 149.
481.
See Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (involving two
consolidated cases, in which the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that undocumented workers are
not eligible for wage-loss remedies under the Michigan workers' compensation statute, which prohibits payment to individuals who have committed a crime).
482.
Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 109 (Pa. 2002).
483.
For example, immigrants who have entered the country without authorization and wish to
regularize their status must go to the U.S. Consulates in their country to file their immigration documents. Pursuant to IIRIRA, however, those who have been unlawfully present in the U.S. for six
months to a year may not return for three years, and those who have been in the U.S. for one year or
more may not return for ten years. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2000). This government-enforced
separation creates a strong disincentive to file for permanent residency.
484.
For a thorough analysis of Hoffman and its impact beyond labor law, see Robert L.
Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L.J. 103 (2003).
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CONCLUSION

This Article has demonstrated that workers' compensation benefits
and vocational rehabilitation services that do not conflict with IRCA's
prohibitions against hiring undocumented workers should be made available to those workers. Workers' compensation statutes are designed to be
construed liberally for the benefit of employees who give up their right to
seek tort remedies in exchange for the opportunity for a quick and easy
resolution to their claims. The nation's public policy is not promoted by
denying those services to undocumented workers. Undocumented immigrants do not live their lives in isolation, and policy decision involving
workplace rights must take into account the fact that the real social and
economic consequences are not restricted to the workers but will also
affect their families. Moreover, in the area of workers' compensation,
denial of coverage poses not only a detriment to the worker, but also a
potential windfall to employers and insurance providers. That dynamic
will act not only as an economic incentive but also as an incentive to
485
avoid costs of doing business by skirting workplace safety standards.
Worker's compensation benefits cannot be treated as state funded
public benefits programs. They are private insurance commitments paid
for by employers, who can not only pass on the cost of the benefit, but
also enjoy the certainty of a reduced recovery for work-related injuries
while avoiding potentially greater liability in tort. Courts must take those
factors into account as they consider state action designed to deny this
crucial safety net. Courts must also take into account the real human consequences to the workers and to their families that result from the denial
of medical treatment or vocational rehabilitation for work-related injuries. Finally, courts must consider the social and economic realities present in this shadow population's everyday lives, and the economies to
which they contribute.

See Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d 221, 248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
485.
Div. 1996) (concluding that denying compensation to undocumented workers may have the effect of
encouraging employers to hire undocumented workers and take less care to provide safe workplaces).

TRANSITIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
FATE OF DEPOSED DESPOTS
WALTER F. MURPHYt
INTRODUCTION

This Article is taken from a chapter of a book in progress. It is entitled Constitutional Democracy and deals with a bevy of questions that
include: What is constitutional democracy? Why would a people want it
instead of a simpler political system? How do they go about establishing
such a polity? Having established it, how do they maintain it? Moreover,
what limits, if any, are there to how that system can be changed? The
chapter from which this piece is taken addresses questions of constitutional maintenance, such as problems of reconstructing a system of civil
governance after the overthrow of a ruthless regime. The specific question confronted here is, what should the leaders of a neonatal constitutional democracy do with the officials of the previous oppressive regime?
The underlying issues are both practical and normative-for power and
duty may not be independent of each other. I try to show some of the
twisted connections among, on the one hand, political power, public outrage, and the need for a ravaged society to reconstitute itself with more
than a mere modicum of mutual trust among its citizens, and, on the
other hand, competing conceptions of justice, revenge, and the purposes
of punishment. I argue that justice and prudence do not allow public officials to center solely on negative policies designed as retaliation for
abuses committed in the past. I stress that leaders must also look to the
future in order to construct positive policies that will enhance the capacity of their citizens to pursue happiness in a civil society.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE PRINCIPAL OPTIONS

In an odd way, the happiest solution for leaders of the new political
order may be that all the former leaders and their chief minions who
abused their subjects escape into exile. That event, of course, is improbable. Even if the dictator and his immediate entourage manage to escape,
the hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of people who operated within the
top echelons of the government are not likely to get away. Stay-behinds
pose a serious and difficult problem for the new leaders, especially if
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they face widespread impassioned demands for retributive justice, and
are also truly committed to constitutionalist norms of procedural fairness.
Several options, some of which can be used in combination, are obvious: (1) Through formal decree or inaction, let the ghosts (and the
criminals) of the recent past fade into history; (2) expose the old oppressors to the community's scorn; (3) offer amnesty on condition of full and
public confessions; and (4) initiate criminal prosecutions.
A. Blanket Amnesty and Social Shame
Ex-officials may have forced the first option on the new leaders as
the price of a peaceful surrender of power. It might also happen, as it did
to a great extent in Hungary,' somewhat so in Poland, and more so in the
Russian Federation, that the budding constitutional democracy may decide on its own to ignore former oppressors. The chief security personnel
can be fired (although few KGB were immediately discharged) and offenders left to social sanctions.2 The rationale is that it is more important
to build unity for the future than to wallow in divisive hatred. However
wise such a policy might seem to outside observers, its success would
depend in large part on the willingness of citizens to move on and the
capacity of the leaders of the new governmental system to persuade their
people that this course was the most promising.
Lustration, used as a form of political vetting and social shaming,
offers a second alternative. The term originally referred to the ritual purification ancient Romans underwent after each census. Christians later
applied it to any sacramental cleansing from sin, such as, for instance,
baptism. 3 Popular for a time in Eastern and Central Europe after 1989,
the policy involved opening the archives of the secret police and allowing information about who had been doing what to whom to become
public knowledge. The objective was not merely to shame people who
had helped the secret police, but, more broadly, to facilitate ousting
communist functionaries, devout or hypercritical, from administrative
posts and to allow voters to reject electoral candidates who had collaborated with the old regime.4

1. See Gdbor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Living Well Is the Best Revenge: The Hungarian Approach to Judging the Past, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 155, 160 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997).
2. Indeed, it has been reported that under President Vladimir Putin, "The security services
have swelled and their alumni are now filling government posts at all levels." Putin Power, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at 15. Additionally, "Russian democracy is a cynical joke." Id.
3. Before the 1990s, lustration had probably become more common in discussions of witchcraft than in moral theology or politics, a usage not too far removed from what would be experienced
in Central and Eastern Europe.
4. See Herman Schwartz, Lustration in Eastern Europe, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 461, 461 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995);

Andrzej Rzeplinski, A Lesser Evil?, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 33, 33 (Fall 1992).

20031

DEALING WITH DEPOSED DESPOTS

In Poland, the former East Germany, and the Czech and Slovak Republic, lustration's results were scattered, exposing not only many invidious acts and actors but also producing much social and political
chaos. Husbands and wives, for instance, discovered their mates had
spied on them, and patients learned about their doctors.5 In addition,
6
leaders of the resistance, even Vdclav Havel and Lech Walesa, were
accused of having collaborated with the secret police. Part of the confusion occurred because the former regimes, with totalitarian aspirations,
had no respect for marriage or the doctor-patient relationship. Another
cause of confusion was simpler: much of the information in the government's files was bogus. Secret agents must constantly prove they are
diligent; reporting contacts with and rumors from fictional informants
shows diligence; and security officials are seldom troubled by qualms of
conscience in falsifying records to further their own careers.
Making matters worse, some people striving for power during the
transitional period were quite ready to use falsified data to ruin competitors. As a result, lustration soon lost its luster. The German government
quickly restricted access to the Stasi's files. Besides, after the first post
re-unification election, most East Germans who had meaningful ties with
the old regime dropped out of politics, either voluntarily or because of
imprisonment, defeat at the polls, or having been fired. The Czechs allowed their lustration law to lapse, and the Polish constitutional court
declared their law unconstitutional as a violation of the basic concepts of
"a democratic state ruled by law" and "human dignity" as well as the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.1
B. ConditionalAmnesty
Conditional amnesty offers a third alternative, one that can partake
both of amnesty's remission of physical punishment and lustration's public shaming. At least seventeen countries, including Argentina and Chile,
have set up truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) to find out exactly what happened during their periods of authoritarian rule. Some,
perhaps most, of these have been rather feeble, little more than factfinding bodies, lacking authority to compel witnesses to appear and tesThis kind of informing on relatives, clients, and even parishioners was hardly a commu5.
nist creation. In Czarist Russia, the secret police "turned" some Orthodox priests, persuading them to
report any politically dangerous acts they heard under the seal of the confessional.
6. See Wiktor Osiatynski, Agent Walesa?, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 28, 28-29 (Summer
1992).
7. After this decision, the Polish parliament watered down the statute. See Andrzej S.
Walicki,

Transitional Justice and the

Political Struggles of Post-Communist Poland, in

185, 198 (A. James
McAdams ed., 1997); see also generally Jacek Kurczewski, The Rule of Law in Poland, in THE
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

RULE OF LAW IN CENTRAL EUROPE: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEGALITY, CONSTITUTIONALISM

AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 181 (Jiif Ptibsll & James Young eds.,

1999) (discussing what legal problems were faced and how they were dealt with by post-communist
Poland law).
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tify under oath. South Africa provides the most famous example of a
vigorous TRC. It invited victims and their relatives to tell their stories
and, if they could, identify their tormentors. This TRC was authorized to
offer amnesty to people implicated either by this testimony or the independent investigations of its own staff. Suspects included both officials
who had allegedly used heinous methods to maintain apartheid, and private citizens, who were mostly members of the African National Congress, believed to have committed crimes during its struggle with other
black groups to control the campaign against apartheid. If not satisfied
with the testimony of supplicants for amnesty, the Commission could,
and did, recommend criminal prosecution in more than a hundred instances. 8 Essentially, the TRC required those seeking absolution to meet
three basic conditions: to confess their offenses fully, honestly, and publicly; to demonstrate that they had committed these crimes for political
rather than personal reasons; and to submit to cross-examination by
prosecutors, members of the Commission, and victims or their relatives.
The Commission then judged each petition on its individual merits.
Both the immunity from prosecution that leaders of outgoing authoritarian regimes negotiate for themselves, and the immunity that a
truth and reconciliation commission offers raise grave moral problems.
Do such agreements and procedures violate fundamental norms of justice? The implications of such issues are also practical for a new constitutional democracy, generating serious questions about the new polity's
commitment to the values it claims to further. The following sections of
this chapter grope with these civic and moral difficulties.
Several other issues carry moral implications but are essentially
practical in nature. In the short run, to what extent can such a commission produce truth, and what can be accepted as truth? It is unlikely that a
report, produced as it must be if it is to serve as a catalyst for change
soon after the collapse of the old regime, can constitute a definitive historical analysis. Lurking in the shadows is a more basic question: Will
knowing the truth, assuming the Commission can produce the truth, lead
to reconciliation? "You shall know the truth," the author of John's Gospel asserts, "and the truth will set you free." The Indo-European root of
the word "free" is the same as "to love." 9 If we understand "free" in this
broader sense, it would include release from hate, from a desire for
vengeance, impregnating the words John reported with heavy political
and theological cargo. Indeed, a modest version of this broader concep8.
Among the more notable instances were the TRC's refusal to absolve Eugene de Kock,
one of the most sadistic leaders of a security force not noted for tender regard for due process, and
the five policemen implicated in the murder of Steve Bilko. Although de Kock was convicted,
prosecutors dropped the charges against the five police because of insufficient evidence.
9.
ERIC PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH
235 (2nd ed. 1959); see THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 375-76 (C.T. Onions

ed., 1966) (stating that the primary sense of "free" in old German is "dear").
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tion must underlie such commissions. Empirical evidence for such effects is, however, less than virile.
To have a politically meaningful effect, the report of a TRC cannot
merely target dispassionate and disinterested scholars who are open to
persuasion about the sins and virtues of the immediate past. Rather, that
message would have to reach, and persuade, two audiences, who if not
deaf, are apt to be "hearing impaired." First would be those people, quite
possibly a rather large number, who during the period of authoritarian
rule had enjoyed moderately happy lives, having chosen, in exchange for
the government's leaving them alone, to accept their own loss of liberty
and ignore the suffering of others. A TRC would have to convince these
quietists to peep outside their private shells, recognize the evils of the old
regime, and support fundamental political change. An additional audience that might be trickier to persuade would be those people and the
families of those people who had been imprisoned, tortured, or murdered.' 0 They would need no convincing about the old system's evils or
the need for change, but might well be cynical about the necessity of
following the norms of constitutional democracy, both in dealing with
offenders and in re-crafting the constitutional order.
Embedded here is the problem of how much truth, with or without
love, people really want. Each of us has a self-image that only partly
corresponds to reality. The gift the giver might give us is not one that
most of us crave, nor are we likely to allow others the full truth about
ourselves-precisely why Justice Louis D. Brandeis called the right to be
let alone, or privacy, "the right most valued by civilized men."' So, too,
every ethnic group and every nation has its self-serving myths, founding
and continuing, stories that may be true, false, or synthesize both fact and
fiction. Only if the past can be accepted for what it is, a saga of mixed
themes, some cause for pride, others for shame, can "the truth" facilitate
political reconciliation. The truth that matters, Michael Ignatieff says, is
"interpretive truth," the past as refracted through one's personal and
group myths, a truth that only insiders can grasp, not the factual truth that
might, if its members are dispassionate and
an investigatory commission
12
produce.
skilled,
The French Revolution was not the only radical change of regimes
that produced a reign of terror. "Now it's our turn!" is a very human reIdeally, that message should also reach at least some of the people who profited from the
10.
old constitutional order. Complete acceptance, however, would be beyond reasonable hope. Officials
and families of officials of authoritarian regimes have not been noted, at least not for very long, for
living in monastic simplicity, and it is improbable that they could be persuaded by reason alone not
only to surrender the power, money, and prestige of their official positions but also to accept guilt
for assorted felonies.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11.
12. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN
CONSCIENCE 175 (1998).
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action. It is little short of remarkable that this sort of murderous orgy did
not occur after the end of apartheid in South Africa. Much of the peaceful nature of the exchange of power is due to Nelson Mandela and
Archbishop Desmond Tutu's persuading their followers to work for the
future rather than avenge the past. The TRC played an active role during
the later stages of this peaceful transition, but its impact is disputed. After conducting a large survey in 2000-2001 regarding public reactions to
the TRC's work, James L. Gibson concluded that the process contributed
to acceptance among whites, coloreds, and Asians of the ugly truth about
apartheid. 13 Even though three times as many blacks as whites said they
placed confidence in the TRC's findings, Gibson found "no clear evidence" that the TRC had shaped blacks' views about apartheid. 14 Most
likely, they had no need for further instruction in the evils of the old order. More importantly, however, interracial trust remained low. A Nielsen survey taken in 1998, while the Commission's work was still in progress, reported that two-thirds of those asked believed that the TRC's
investigations led to a deterioration of race relations. 15 After publication
of the final report, Gibson found that a majority of whites still believed
blacks were likely to commit crimes and forty-one percent of blacks believed whites were likely to do so; one-third of whites thought blacks
were untrustworthy, and about one-fifth of blacks deemed whites deserving of trust. 16 Standing alone, these data do not indicate that the TRC
furthered reconciliation, at least in the short run, 17 a result that should not
have come as a shock. In the United States, bitter memories among
southern whites about Reconstruction lingered well into the twentieth
century, and African Americans' folk memory of slavery and Jim Crow
remains sharply alive in the twenty-first century.
The question of whether to establish a TRC cannot be intelligently
decided by looking only at these commissions. It is crucial to judge their
likely effectiveness in comparison with that of alternative institutions and
processes. Martha Minow argues that a truth commission's exposure of
atrocities can be more effective than criminal prosecutions in bringing
people together.18 She offers no hard evidence to support her argument
13.
See generally JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A
DIVIDED NATION? (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author).

14.
15.

Id.
See Robert 1. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Rec-

onciliation, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 3, 19 (Robert I. Rotberg
& Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
16.
GIBSON, supra note 13; see also JAMES L. GIBSON & AMANDA GouwS, OVERCOMING
INTOLERANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC PERSUASION 15-38 (2003).

17.

The South African government's decision to pay $3,900 to the family of each victim of

apartheid who testified, or whose family testified before the TRC, may or may not have furthered
reconciliation. Although the average income of a black family there was only $3,000, some critics
attacked the amount as paltry and insulting to the victims. Ginger Thompson, South Africa to Pay
$3,900 to Each Family of Apartheid Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at A7.

18.

See Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?, in TRUTH

V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 235, 235-36 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis
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for South Africa or any other nation. In any event, after analyzing respondents' answers to his survey, Gibson concludes that the Commission
made important contributions toward creating a civil society in South
Africa.' 9 If his insights, gained from much time and research in South
Africa, point toward this conclusion, his data do not offer muscular support for it.
As in much analysis of political causation, reasoning post hoc,
propter hoc is a present, if not always clear, danger, as is the difficulty of
unsnarling the many threads that have tangled together to create a multicausal effect. The problem is one of multicollinearity: South Africa's
most respected leaders urged forgiveness; the chief revolutionary party,
the African National Congress, was tainted with the blood of rival black
organizations; people were tired of a long, seemingly escalating, guerrilla
war; and the new government did not rely exclusively on the Commission but also prosecuted some of the worst offenders.
The most positive assessment one can confidently make is that, as
the white supremacist regime was collapsing, it had not been clear that
the new republic would avoid civil war and the sort of brutal dictatorship
that had taken over most Sub-Saharan countries. In this precarious context, the TRC carried out its mandate fairly and spread what its members
deemed to be the truth about an ugly past, excoriating some leaders of
the African National Congress (which probably angered many blacks)
along with white rulers and their minions (which probably angered many
whites). The Commission tried to lay the base for a political culture that
values human rights and recognizes the importance of due process of law
in protecting those rights. This mission is of critical importance for a
constitutional democracy that will endure. Most obviously, it is likely
that the decision of a government, dominated by black survivors of
apartheid, to choose magnanimity over revenge, taught whites, blacks,
coloreds, and Asians something about the prudence of forgiveness. That
decision certainly enhanced South Africa's status as a responsible nation
with powerful ambitions to become a constitutional democracy.
Despite Gibson's excellent empirical work, we still have only a series of shrewd but conflicting guesses. Against Martha Minow's claim
that full and open confessions elicited by a TRC are more healing than
punishment inflicted by the criminal law, we have Hannah Arendt's assertion that human beings cannot forgive what they cannot punish.2 °
Supporting data for either claim are sparse. Neither forgiveness nor amnesia, however, is necessary for reconciliation. If either were, healing
would be impossible. Great Christians, like Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
Thompson eds., 2000); see also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
GIBSON, supra note 13.
19.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 241 (1958).
20.
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may be able to forgive and urge others to join them, but some Christian
21
moral theologians understand that forgetting wrongs is impossible.
What is necessary for reconciliation is a willingness to put aside hatred
for a particular sector of the population. That is, black South Africans
could continue to despise Afrikaner leaders such as Daniel Malan, John
Vorster, Frederick W. de Klerk, and certainly Eugene de Kock; Ulster
Catholics to revile Ian Paisley (and, having notoriously long memories,
Oliver Cromwell); Jews who returned to Germany to detest Hitler and
Himmler; Palestinians to hate Ariel Sharon, Benjamin Netanyahu, and all
Mosad agents; and Israelis to revile Yasir Arafat and all members of
Hamas and Hizbollah. Yet, if these people were not willing to try to accept whites, Protestants, Germans, Jews, and Arabs as fellow citizens,
civil governance would be impossible in such multiethnic societies.
C. CriminalProsecutions
The extent to which the success of South Africa's TRC (if it really
was a success) could be duplicated elsewhere is problematic. Without
doubt, the appearance of a leader with the political skill, charisma, and
righteous forbearance of Nelson Mandela is not a frequent happening.
Furthermore, it may be that new leaders do not, as a practical matter,
have the option of pretending to absolve offenders after they suffer only
the humiliation that comes from public confessions.22 Demands for retributive justice, often difficult to differentiate from plain old-fashioned
revenge, may echo so loudly throughout the community so as to force the
government to take more punitive action. This means choosing a fourth
option: criminal prosecution. That course, however, does not necessarily
offer a series of surgical strikes unless leaders can create crystalline distinctions both among state-sanctioned crimes and degrees of guilt. Even
in "normal" criminal prosecutions, distinctions between felonies and
misdemeanors are sometimes arbitrary. Where we deal with mass felonies committed by public officials, emotions are likely to bubble over,
and the number of both victims and tormentors may be huge.
In the People's Republic of Germany, for example, the Stasi directly employed almost 100,000 men and women and, indirectly, perhaps
as many as a quarter of a million more. 23 Even those numbers, however,
seem tiny when we recall that the Hutus in Rwanda hacked to death
21.
See STANLEY HAUERWAS, A BETTER HOPE: RESOURCES FOR A CHURCH CONFRONTING
CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND POSTMODERNITY 139-54 (2000). I should note a distinction here:
morality is concerned with the duties that human beings owe to each other; moral theology focuses
on these mutual obligations as derived from the duties that humans owe to the Deity.
22.
Of course, offenders may experience no remorse for their crimes on behalf of the old
constitutional order and thus suffer no humiliation. Indeed, their admissions may gain them a certain
6clat within their reference group.
23.
The figure of "official" Stasi employees was 97,000, with an additional 150,000 "unofficial collaborators." See JENNIFER A. YODER, FROM EAST GERMANS TO GERMANS?: THE NEW
POSTCOMMUNIST ELITES 97 (1999).
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about 800,000 Tutsis, and the government later arrested more than
120,000 alleged genocidaires. Exempting clerks and secretaries from
legal sanctions may be easy, but deciding whom to punish at operational
and command levels is far more difficult. Should, for instance, Rwanda
have limited prosecution to the chiefs who urged their people to commit
mayhem, or was it proper to include those who did the bloody chopping? 24 In Latin America and the former Soviet satellites, should the new
governments have prosecuted only the senior officials who ordered murder and torture, or included those who shot prisoners, tore out fingernails,
crushed testicles, or participated in gang rapes? Should the new leaders
also have tried police who did the arresting and jailers who kept the victims imprisoned? In addition, what about informers, especially paid informers, without whose perfidy prisoners might not have been arrested at
all?
Furthermore, serious questions of ex post facto laws may arise.
Some of the most brutal acts of security officials were probably not
criminal under the laws of the old regime, or shielded by statutes of limitations. Hungary's new government met this situation by criminalizing
the more oppressive acts committed by officials of the old regime and
amending statutes of limitations for acts that had been criminal. In 1992,
however, the Hungarian constitutional court invalidated these efforts. 25 It
may well be that security officials violated international law, but the
reach of such law might raise difficult questions of applicability if the old
government had not been party to relevant international agreements regarding human rights.26
24.
Faced with such an enormous burden of investigating and trying so many accused, the
Rwandan government established a series of very informal tribunals called Gacca courts (gacca
means piece of grass), which sat in the open near a village, so that all people in the area could attend
and, if they wished, give evidence. These proceedings partook of the atmosphere of "both the Salem

witch trials and a Mississippi Christian revival." Samantha Power, Rwanda: The Two Faces of
Justice, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 16, 2003, at 1. The proceedings of the Gacca courts also bore
some resemblance to the grand jury in late medieval England in that they officially accused many of
the defendants. The Hutus complained that they were getting victors' justice. Eventually the government freed about 80,000 of the accused without trials.
25.
Alajos Dombach, Retroactivity Law Overturned in Hungary, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 7, 8
(Spring 1992); see also Halmai & Scheppele, supra note 1, at 160. The United States Supreme
Court, though only by a 5-4 vote, also held that extending a statute of limitations to punish an alleged sex offender against whom the original limitations had already run, violated the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2452 (2003). For the
majority, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote: "[T]o resurrect a prosecution after the relevant statute of
limitations has expired is to eliminate a currently existing conclusive presumption forbidding prosecution, and thereby to permit conviction on a quantum of evidence where that quantum, at the time
the new law is enacted, would have been legally insufficient." Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2452. Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 2461.
26.
It remains a legal possibility, though a politically remote one, that some officials, both of
the old South African government and of the African National Congress, could be prosecuted, at
least outside of South Africa. The new constitutional text forbids conviction for "an act or omission
that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time it was committed or
omitted .... " S. AFR. CONST. ch. 11, § 35(3)(1). Many of the acts to which people confessed before
the TRC may have been, at the time of commission, offenses against international law. See John
Dugard, Retrospective Justice: InternationalLaw and the South African Model, in TRANSITIONAL
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It may also be difficult to find prosecutors and judges with clean
hands. Many of these officials may have been intimately linked to oppression. Fresh judicial personnel might soon be in place; but they, having possibly been victims or relatives of victims of the authoritarian regime, might appear to be less than disinterested. This problem is not trivial if the new government is trying to teach its citizens the norms of constitutional democracy. Thus, if leaders choose criminal prosecution, they
may wish to ask for the help of the UN, or utilize some other international arrangement for a tribunal to try political offenses.27 In 1993, the
UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, providing a forum in which to try leaders of all
sides for atrocities committed before and during the civil wars in Bosnia
and Kosovo.2 8 Slobodan Milosevic, sometime president of Serbia, was
the most notorious defendant to grace that court's docket. A similar resolution created a tribunal to try people accused of genocide in Rwanda. To
maintain an aura of objectivity, the judges sat in Tanzania. The permanent establishment of the International Criminal Court, located at the
Hague and associated with, but not part of, the UN, offers a forum to
prosecute former officials accused of violating human rights and to do so
without the aroma of victors' justice and with less danger of exacerbating
ethnic hatreds.
II. FAIRNESS, VENGEANCE, AND PRUDENCE
Any compromise that includes amnesty for the military, secret police, and/or civilian autocrats of the old regime will sit bitterly in the
mouths of victims and their families. These people are apt to believe it is
dreadfully wrong that their oppressors not stand trial for their crimes.
Nevertheless, before public officials can bring a criminal action, they
must have the will, power, and authority to do so. In Poland and Hungary, for example, the new governments had the two latter but chose to
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 269, 273 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997).

For a more complete analysis of the international law relevant here, see Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J.
2537, 2551-2612 (1991).
Belgian law allows prosecution of crimes against humanity in Belgian courts, no matter in
27.
which venue the acts were committed. Early in 2003, Belgium narrowed its code to allow such
prosecutions by non-Belgians only where they themselves were directly injured. Later in 2003, the
Belgian prime minister announced that his government would amend the law to allow only Belgians
to file suit. The law now permits prosecutors to transfer cases to the International Criminal Court in
the Hague. During the summer of 2003, Belgian courts threw out private suits against Israeli Prime
Minister Aial Sharon and General Amos Yaron, as well as against George W. Bush and General
Tommy Franks. See Too Embarrassing:Why Belgium Is Changing Its Law Against Genocide, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 2003, at 43. American courts have civil jurisdiction over offenses under international law, though even if successful, litigants are not likely to collect from defendants.
The official title is "The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
28.
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991." For an analysis of the UN Security Council's efforts to establish such
courts under Article 41 of the UN Charter, see Faiza Patel King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia
Tribunal'sDevelopment of Limits on the Security Council's Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 509 (1996).
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be carefully selective in their prosecutions, relying more heavily on what
Eric Lincoln calls "no-fault reconciliation. 29
In other situations, new leaders may have the will and authority, but
lack the power to impose punishment. It is probable, for instance, that the
Uruguayan army would have resumed military rule had the civilians tried
to repeal the amnesty the junta had conferred on itself and its subordinates before yielding power.3 ° In 1984, Argentina's civilian government
under President Radil Alfonsfn repealed this grant of amnesty and began
to bring army officers as well as commanders of leftist guerrillas to trial
for assorted violations of human rights. Several legal obstacles immediately arose. One was an existing statutory requirement that trials of military personnel begin in military tribunals, whose officers were not anxious to try their brothers. The other was the doctrine of "due obedience"-the obligation of junior officers to presume the legitimacy of
orders from senior officers.
Eventually, the government was able to convict some of the principals in the "Dirty War," including Galtieri, though for malfeasance in
conducting the so-called Malvinas War against Britain rather than for
kidnapping, torture, and murder. It soon became evident, however, that
the civilian government's control of the military was shaky, and prosecutions stopped after several outbreaks of mutiny. In 1989, President Carlos
Menem, Alfonsfn's successor and a member of the Per6nista party, an
organization that had launched a goodly share of Argentina's military
coups, pardoned all those who had been convicted. 3' Fourteen years later,
more prosecutions became possible when the legislature again repealed
previous grants of amnesty. Yet it was Spanish rather than local prosecutors who moved first, and Argentina's President Nestor Kirchner, who
had himself briefly been one of the junta's guests, nullified an earlier
decree that had forbidden extradition of military personnel.
In Chile, the new civilian government was less willing and no more
able to bring Pinochet's pack to trial. Initially, the General's retaining
both his military status and the loyalty of a large portion of his troops
gave him de facto immunity. During the early stages of the common law,
no writ could run against the king because he supposedly controlled the
physical force of the realm. For the same reason, no writ can run against
29.

C. ERIC LINCOLN, COMING THROUGH THE FIRE: SURVIVING RACE AND PLACE IN

AMERICA 157 (1996).
30. This grant was later confirmed by a public referendum. Apparently, the Uruguayans
understood the price to be paid for return to civilian rule.
31.
Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The
Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2621 (1991). Because of the pardon, Galtieri, noted more
for his overindulgence in alcohol than for his intellectual power, served only five of the twelve years
of his sentence. Some years later, police placed him under house arrest while the courts adjudicated a
claim that the grant of amnesty for his participation in numerous murders was unconstitutional. He
died in 2003, before the issue was settled. See Obituary: Leopoldo Galtieri,THE ECONOMIST, Jan.
18, 2003.
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a modern general who commands an army ready to protect him. In 2001,
when Spain tried to extradite Pinochet from Britain, where he was seeking medical treatment, to try him for murdering Spanish citizens, the
Chilean government claimed that its own tribunals should mete out
whatever punishment was due. After winning in British courts, however,
Chilean officials continued to let sleeping generals lie.32 In 2003, the
civilian government announced plans to try several dozen of the junta's
security officials. Even then, however, prosecutors were apparently planning to let the top echelon of the old regime alone, in part out of fear of
the army's reaction and in part out of a desire not to pick at the scabs of
healing wounds.
The practical issues surrounding decisions to prosecute are hardly
simple, but the moral issues are even more tangled, as the following section of this Article indicates. These events and nonevents, like the conditional amnesty offered by TRCs that follow the strong model of South
Africa, raise grave questions about the relationships among punishment,
justice, and constitutionalist values. 33 Beyond stirring deep anger, immunity raises issues of equality before the law and the commitment of the
new constitutional order to this ideal. It would not be unreasonable for a
people new to constitutional democracy to harbor suspicions of hypocrisy were the government to imprison a man who, while drunk, assaulted
another patron in a barroom brawl and yet refuse to prosecute men who
had ordered the murder of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of political dissidents.
It is certain, however, that if the ghouls who dominated the old regime believe surrendering power will lead them straight to the gibbet,
they will have a huge incentive to fight with all their resources. More32. In 2000, Chile's highest court had removed the General's immunity and ordered him to
stand trial for murder. A year later, the case was dismissed on grounds that Pinochet was mentally
incompetent to stand trial. In addition to having diabetes, he had suffered several strokes and was
experiencing difficulty walking. Nevertheless, in 2003, he gave a talk at a meeting of retired generals, and various human rights groups went to court arguing that the General was now mentally competent to stand trial on other charges of murder and should be stripped of the immunity. The court of
appeals dismissed the case.
Those questions may seem more serious in some countries than in others. Pardons are part
33.
of every system of law, but immunity from prosecution differs from system to system. Americans
are accustomed to reading about bargains in which prosecutors and accused criminals swap guilty
pleas on lesser charges for shorter prison terms. Sometimes, prosecutors even offer complete amnesty to major felons in exchange for help in convicting their bosses. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA
BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 16 (2003); JULIA RONDA,

PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1995). On the other hand, the

civil law denies the legitimacy of such negotiations. Procurators and judges prefer to pretend that
they even-handedly enforce the black letter of the law. It is, therefore, not at all unlikely that an
agreement not to prosecute the predators who ran the old regime would incite even greater anger in
countries in which the official legal myth denied plea bargaining. But see Abraham S. Goldstein &
Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy,
and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977) (claiming that prosecutorial discretion in these three civil
law countries differed more in candor than in fact from that in the United States. Their article triggered a long debate.).
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over, an internal war is likely to cause heavy casualties among civilians.
Such a conflict may not be the greatest evil that can befall a people; in
fact, it may affect much good, as for instance, freeing slaves or releasing
an entire people from political bondage. Yet, whatever their positive results, civil wars are always savagely divisive. They may begin as binary
battles over principle, but they often mutate into conflicts among tribes
or even within neighborhoods, involving jealousy, greed, and alleged
personal insults, fueling hatreds that can endure for generations. 34 In
short, a civil war can do to a nation what cross-cut shredders did to Enron's ledgers. Thus, leaders who recall the free-falls into near anarchy
and oppression that occurred in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chechnya,
Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, and
Zaire must discount the enormity of these evils by their probabilitywhich is a matter of practical judgment.
Additionally, there may be serious doubt as to who would win a
civil war. Authoritarian governments may teeter without falling, as illustrated by failed revolts in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968,
and the tragic fate of China's Democracy Movement in 1989. Each produced its share of corpses without yielding either democracy or constitutionalism. 35 For all the frustration amnesty generates, following Huntington's advice may be the price of avoiding butchery: "[D]o not prosecute,
36
do not punish, do not forgive, and, above all, do not forget.,
Whether frightened tyrants will begin a civil war is also a matter for
practical judgment for them as well as for the leaders of a movement for
constitutional democracy. The old elite may choose instead to run, a possibility that fogs decisions. As Justice Brandeis once wrote, the "great
difficulty of all group action . . . is when and what concession to
make., 37 Seldom is the choice between a clear good and a clear evil.
Typically, it is between evils, when doing nothing will itself produce
evil. "Every decision of consequence," Hilaire Belloc said, "has grave
evils attached to it-or grave risk of evil. 38 Multiplying that difficulty is
the fact that leaders frequently must make critically important judgments
under conditions of uncertainty, sometimes extreme uncertainty. They
34. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Ontology of "PoliticalViolence": Action and Identity in Civil
Wars, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 475, 475 (2003) (arguing that "[clivil wars are not binary conflicts, but
complex and ambiguous processes that foster" an apparently massive, though variable, mix of identities and actions).
35.
On the other hand, one might contend that, although the Hungarian and Czechoslovak
uprisings immediately produced only bloody repression, the anger they revealed soon moved officials, especially in Hungary, to modify the harshness of their rule. What effect, if any, China's Democracy Movement had still remains to be seen a decade and a half later.
36.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 231 (1991).
37. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 18

(1957) (internal citations omitted).
38.

Letter from Hilaire Belloc to Lady Lovat (Aug. 8, 1930), in LETTERS FROM HILAIRE

BELLOC 214, 215 (Robert Speaight ed., 1958).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

cannot be sure of the effects of their choices or the reactions of opponents or even allies. Nor can they be certain that what they perceive as
the range of possibilities is not skewed by their own political myopia.
Thus, they may be obliged to select among partially informed guesses
about the relative probability that a particular course, rather than any of
several others, will guide their country to what is good. Being forced to
choose between tolerating what seems to be a smaller evil to avoid what
seems to be a much larger evil-and to hope, but not be certain, that their
decision will yield the least evil-is itself one of the costs leaders must
pay for having fallible judgment and blurred visions of the future.
In such situations, hurling moral blame may itself be morally reckless. It would take large globs of information about evil goals and ignored information-in short, convincing evidence of criminal stupidity,
criminal negligence, or criminal purposes-to confidently brand as morally wrong a decision to exchange amnesty for a peaceful exit. Philosophers in the safety of their proverbial armchairs may deem a civil war's
cost in human lives to be irrelevant to questions of abstract justice, but
that price cannot be irrelevant to public officials who are responsible for
those lives. Leaders of the new constitutional order could shout, "Fiat
justitia, ruat coelum!" That cry, however, is more likely to send souls to
hell ahead of schedule than to bring peace on earth or cause the heavens
to tumble. If the best judgment of the leaders of the new constitutional
order sees the options as civil war or amnesty, then the pleasure of inflicting on tyrants the punishment they have earned will have to take
second place to saving lives. In any event, the new leaders will have a
massive task convincing the new citizens that their choice among public
policies was the best possible under the circumstances.39
The situation the new constitutional order faces when it considers
establishing a commission of truth and reconciliation may be quite different from that which existed before the old regime surrendered
power.4n (In South Africa, the apartheid government apparently insisted
on such a procedure as a condition of peaceful exit from office.) Although civil war might well remain a possibility when the government's
authority, if not all of its power, has moved into the hands of the new
leaders, open warfare is not as likely to occur, and if it does, it is less

39. One palliative on which new leaders can insist is the restriction of amnesty to past acts.
These pacts should not extend any immunity beyond the date of the agreement, lest the old leaders,
as they exit from power, continue to commit criminal deeds. Absolution for past felonies should not
become license for future crimes.
40. There are also tricky procedural issues. John Dugard argues that the decisions to set up
such a commission and the rules under which it will operate should proceed not from political compromises, but from legal principles and historic experience. Dugard, supra note 26, at 287. Dugard
makes a strong, but ultimately unconvincing argument-unconvincing because the problem of what
to do about past public crimes is eminently political in Aristotle's sense of the word. The real questions center around the issues of what compromises should be accepted.
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likely to cause the slaughter civil war could have wreaked when the old
officials fully controlled the state's instruments.4 1
A dogging practical question that leaders of a fledgling constitutional democracy must face is whether criminal prosecutions will accelerate or slow reconciliation, bringing the citizens of a new constitutional
democracy together into a just society. To what extent would establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission facilitate or impede that
process? Forgoing the sweetness of retaliation against predators can be a
cost worth paying.
On the other hand, the quality of mercy has often been strained,
Portia to the contrary notwithstanding. The case for amnesty, conditional
or absolute, may not be convincing. The new government might be able
to follow a punitive policy, assuming its officials, again operating under
conditions of imperfect knowledge, correctly judge such a course prudent. Important here will be considerations of whom the old regime, if
only virtually, represented. If the rulers constituted a rather small group,
say a clique of military officers who had managed to come to power by
controlling the military and security forces, then perhaps imprisoning or
executing them and their principal henchmen might not produce enduring social disruptions. If, however, as in the remnants of old Yugoslavia,
South Africa, or Rwanda, those responsible for criminal atrocities were
representative of a larger social or ethnic group, or were so perceived by
large segments of such a group, then the result might tear the nation
apart, beyond the power of the current or even the next generation to
stitch together. If such leaders were to be punished, any hope for restored
social unity would allow punishment only by outside force, as actually
happened to many leaders who organized massacres in the Balkan wars
of the 1980s and 1990s.
The new government might find it perilous to offer amnesty if the
popular demand for revenge were so strong that the alternative to criminal trials was widespread private vengeance. Mob rule is more likely to
provoke anarchy (and perhaps make another coup welcome) than it is to
further any system of civil governance. There are no assurances that the
new government could control its people, punish the oppressors, or even
remain in power. Older Europeans had vivid memories of mobs battling
in the streets of Weimar Germany and the political system that resulted
from public yearnings for order. A dismal drama may well play out:
lynchings followed by preventive indictments, which incite mobs and
41.
Even so, the dangers might not be trivial. In South Africa, Archbishop Desmond Tutu
warned his countrymen that many true believers in apartheid "are still in the security forces and part
of the civil service. These people have the capacity of destroying this land.... If there were not the
possibility of amnesty, then the option of a military upheaval [would be] a very real one." Amy
Guttman & Dennis Thompson, The Moral Foundationsof Truth Commissions, in TRUTH V.JUSTICE:
THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 22, 39 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000)
(internal quotations omitted).
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mutinies, which lead to a coup and a return to authoritarian government.
Fearing these kinds of effects, the new leaders might refuse to agree to
blanket amnesty or, having so agreed, renege on their promise. A clever
casuist (or an ordinary attorney) could construct a plausible argument
that neither murderers nor torturers have a right to the truth, or that the
promise of amnesty was made under duress. In either situation, so a wily
casuist could contend, breaking a promise made to criminals does not
really constitute lying.
Whatever the outcome, a cry for revenge is a typical human reaction
to cruel rule. One moral theologian has compared the driving force of
righteous indignation to that of sex.42 Individual men and women may
believe that keeping faith with their dead and wounded requires retaliation in kind, and most legal systems incorporate an understanding both of
this felt individual need to strike back and a social need for the state to
control vengeance. Islamic law, the shari'a, clearly recognizes retaliation, allowing, for instance, relatives of a murdered man to serve as executioners for the government.43 (More civilized American states merely
permit relatives to witness the prisoner's final writhing.) More subtly, the
civil and common law also acknowledge a legitimate role for revenge in
the operations of criminal processes. Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
the Archangel of Legal Realism, claimed "not only that the law does, but
that it ought to, make the gratification of revenge an object." 44 He then
went on to quote Sir James Stephen: "The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite.",45 Three-quarters of a century later, a former Lord Chief Justice of
the United Kingdom told the House of Lords that 46it was "praiseworthy
that the country should be willing to avenge crime.
III. JUSTICE AND PRUDENCE: A CLASH OF VIRTUES?
In the years immediately before and after a constitutional democracy replaces a brutal authoritarian regime, justice and prudence may
seem to make competing, even conflicting, demands. Let us begin by
eliminating two relatively easy problems. First is the justice in punishing
the predators who had been operating an oppressive regime. It could
42.
JAMES TUNSTEAD BURTCHAELL, PHILEMON'S PROBLEM: THE DAILY DILEMMA OF THE
CHRISTIAN 102 (1973).
Islam does not distinguish between church and state in a fashion comparable to that of
43.
western nations. Therefore, the shari'ais both religious, and where adopted by civil authority (usually in a modified form), secular law. Over the centuries, Islamic jurists/moral theologians have
deduced the shari'a'sprecepts from sacred texts and scholarly commentaries. Thus, this body of law
is derivative and even more "unwritten" than the common law was during its early centuries. Nevertheless, many, perhaps most, devout Muslims consider it morally binding.
44.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap

Press 1963) (1881).
Id. Holmes was a bachelor when he quoted Stephen.
45.
46.
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 61 (1963) (internal quotations omitted)
(discussing capital punishment-he approved).
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hardly be unjust for the new regime to hold these people to account under the criminal law, assuming they were accorded the functional equivalent of due process. The argument would run along such lines as: These
officials seized or accepted power and claimed to act in the name of the
nation and for the good of that nation and its citizens/denizens. Having
reaped the rewards of the power their offices bestowed, they assumed an
obligation to govern for the benefit of their people. It is hardly unfair that
they pay for abuses of power so gross that they are major felonies under
the laws of all civilized states.
A second easy problem concerns a decision not to punish the tyrants
who are willing to surrender the governmental apparatus controlling the
military and internal security forces, only on the condition of being excused from punishment. The previous section dealt with these issues. We
need only add that new leaders would exchange what they do not have,
the power to punish, for what they also do not (yet) have, the power to
help build decent lives for their fellow citizens. Far from Faustian, this
bargain would promote justice by facilitating the creation of a civil society. Even Diane F. Orentlicher, who constructs a very careful argument
that an assortment of international agreements imposes a duty on successor governments to prosecute tyrants,47 concedes that "international law
does not require governments to commit political suicide. ' '4
The truly difficult moral question is whether justice imposes on a
constitutional democracy a moral obligation to punish the criminals who
ran the old regime. To address that issue, let us first assume that leaders
who wish to peacefully change political systems and stabilize the new
constitutional democracy decide it is prudent to negotiate absolute or
conditional amnesty for the chiefs of the old regime and their henchmen.
Even granting this assumption, Guttman and Thompson assert, the "stability of a political regime itself is not a moral good or a sufficient reason
to sacrifice justice for individuals." 49 The Final Report of South Africa's
Truth and Reconciliation commission expressed a similar concern, noting that victims of apartheid voiced a common refrain: "We've heard the
truth. There is even talk about reconciliation. But where's the justice?" 50

47. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 26.
48. Diane F. Orentlicher, A Reply to ProfessorNino, 100 YALE L.J. 2641, 2641 (1991).
49. Guttman & Thompson, supra note 41, at 23. Similarly, when Charles Taylor, the sometime President-Dictator of Liberia who had been brutally fighting efforts to depose him and had been
indicted for terrorist acts by Sierra Leone, was allowed to go peacefully (and splendidly) into exile in
Nigeria, two journalists protested, "Peace cannot be bought at the price of justice." Donna E. Arzt &
Lucille M. Rignanese, West Lets Liberia's Taylor Escape, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Aug. 8, 2003.
Alas, peace has often been bought at the cost ofjustice-and every other virtue, for that matter.
50.
1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 104 (2d ed.
1999) (internal quotations omitted) [hereinafter TRC REPORT]. For an excellent discussion, see
Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond PoliticalConstraints: Reflections on Restorative
Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 68 (Robert 1.Rotberg &

Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
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At the heart of most of the moral arguments for the necessity of
punishment lies a belief that punishing criminals is essential to victims'
realizing justice. This assumption seems to underlie what Guttman and
Thompson, as well as millions of less learned people, feel. The claim
would have to be that retributive justice is a victim's right, a claim that
would surely be emotionally gratifying to those who suffered from the
old regime's brutalities. There are three bases for such a belief: Victims
have a right grounded in (1) the positive law of the state; (2) international
law; or (3) justice itself.
A. Positive Law
An argument from positive law is that victims have a right, which
the state has implicitly or explicitly contracted to enforce, that public
officials who viciously abuse their fellow nationals be punished. In some
legal systems victims may, in fact, have some such positive legal right.
Certainly, in countries that apply the shari'a, a man (less probably, a
woman) would have a right to take private action, including killing a
family member, usually a woman, who has offended the family's honor.
Furthermore, as we have seen, members of a victim's family have a right
to participate in executing a murderer. It is significant, however, that the
putative right here runs only against other private citizens/denizens. In
most Islamic countries, individuals have as little as three remedies
against abusive officials: (1) informal political pressure exerted through
an influential patron; (2) assassination; or (3) joining a terrorist or revolutionary organization.5 1
Both the civil and common law, as Holmes explained, recognize a
human inclination toward retaliation. Because outside of Africa and
Latin America these two legal systems operate in (sometimes struggling)
representative or constitutional democracies, they allow aggrieved citizens significant political remedies that encourage officials to pursue
criminal charges. Nevertheless, these two legal systems substitute state
action for private retaliation. Civil suits, perhaps including petitions for
injunctions and challenges to the basic constitutionality of the official's
action, are the principal legal remedies. On the one hand, constitutional
democracies deny private citizens a right to exact personal vengeance
and also restrict the capacity of individual citizens to institute criminal
proceedings. The rationale for state-imposed punishment, Carlos S. Nino
argued, is not based on a "recognition that the victims or their relatives
have a right to that punishment., 5 2 Instead, "[i]t is the consequence of a
Pakistan occasionally had a form of judicial review, and several Arab countries, most
51.
notably Egypt, have the beginnings of such an institutional arrangement. So far, however, no constitutional court has intervened to try to block official policies that utilize such methods as arbitrary
imprisonment or torture. For an analysis of the real, but fragile, growth of constitutionalism in the
Arab world, see NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB
BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT (2002).

52.

Nino, supra note 31, at 2621.
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collective3 goal imposed by the policy of protecting human rights for the
5
future.
B. InternationalLaw
In many countries, international law may provide another remedy.
Citing numerous international agreements, judicial opinions, and memoranda by international commissions, Orentlichter makes an eloquent argument that international agreements obligate successor governments to
punish the people who organized and commanded systematic atrocities.54
Two points detract from her conclusion. First, these agreements have
loopholes that allow signatories some, if limited, discretion. Second, and
more importantly, a decision to prosecute for a high crime against the
state is essentially a political, not merely a legal, matter. It is political,
not in the journalistic usage of the term as referring to things petty, partisan, or expedient, but in the Aristotelian sense of politics as most truly
the master art, being concerned with virtue above all things, in an effort
to make citizens good and obedient to the laws.55 Politics, thus understood, looks to the long and short term good of citizens, which often lies
beyond satisfying immediate desires. Enhancing the chances of citizens
to live free and decent lives must take precedence over punishing criminals, however gratifying such punishment may be. Distinguishing between what is merely expedient and what is necessary is, again, a matter
of practical judgment.
C. The Basic Concept of Justice
The third basis for what Nino called "mandatory retribution" is justice itself.56 Defining this notion is a necessary first step toward discovering its demands. The answer to the question, "What is justice?" is hardly
self-evident. Even Socrates was better at exploding false understandings
of the concept than in exposing its true essence.57 For public officials and
political theorists who are pure pragmatists or consequentialists, 58 the
53.

Id. In distinguishing between "rights established by principles and collective goals im-

posed by policies," id., Nino was following RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100

(1977).
54.
Orentlicher, supra note 26, at 2612-13.
55.
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 95-6, Bk. I, ch. 2, 1094b, ch. 13, 1002a (Christopher
Rowe, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, ETHICS].
56.
Nino, supra note 31, at 2620.
57.
Socrates's claim that only the just man is happy, does not, I believe, entitle one to conclude, as Hans Kelsen did, that Socrates equated justice and happiness. See HANS KELSEN, What Is
Justice?, in WHAT IS JUSTICE?: JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE 1, 2

(1971).
58. The philosophy (or philosophies) of pragmatism, as formulated somewhat differently by
Williams James (a psychologist of sorts) and Charles Peirce (a mathematician of sorts), is complex,
based on a metaphysics and epistemology that challenged traditional thought of the late nineteenth
century. Its overriding concern for consequences originated, bo Peirce believed, in Kant's assertion
that once "an end is proposed, then the conditions for attaining it are hypothetically necessary."
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 686 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood trans. & eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). For good introductory essays, see Louis MENAND, THE
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question of justice is much less important than whether policies of amnesty or criminal prosecution would produce the desired goal(s), which
in this context mean furthering the peaceful transition and political stability of a constitutional democracy. In fact, the question of justice is one
that a consistent pragmatist or consequentialist would consider trivial
unless he or she believed that other significant political actors would use
it to stir up public opposition. The solution would then be to give enough
lip service to the prevalent conception of justice, whatever it might be, to
weaken opponents. It is, however, difficult to find a pure pragmatist or
consequentialist in the real world. Even Judge Richard A. Posner is not
always doctrinally orthodox, though he comes close to being what Max
Weber termed an "ideal type." 59 It is equally, if not more difficult, to find
someone who is totally indifferent to the effects of decisions. Indeed, it is
almost impossible to conceive of a system of morality that did not factor
likely effects into its calculus. Thus, almost every decision maker is
pragmatic in the limited sense of being seriously concerned about consequences.
For intellectually consistent moral relativists (i.e., moral conventionalists), the task of defining justice should not pose moral or philosophical problems much more difficult than what pragmatists would face.
Moral relativism denies that universal standards of morality or justice
exist or, if they do exist, they are not demonstrable. (An offshoot of this
belief is that all values are equal-itself a value judgment-and therefore
clashes among them are not resolvable through intellectual analyses.)
Because, so says the relativist, judgments about justice and morality are
either idiosyncratic or culture-bound, the most a government need do to
settle the legitimacy of an agreement with exiting officials is to discover
what constitutes "a moral good" or "justice" according to the particular
standards and conventions dominant within a particular community at a
201-34, 337-76 (2001); and HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN
MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880'S, at 91-107
METAPHYSICAL CLUB

(1950). In its extreme form, consequentialism, a close ally of pragmatism, also looks primarily to
results: The end justifies, if not any means, certainly almost any. Judge Richard A. Posner tries to
distinguish pragmatism and consequentialism, at least in the context of adjudication. RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59-71 (2003). Posner states: "I do not know of any
pragmatists who have considered themselves consequentialists, but two notable precursors, Bentham
and John Stuart Mill, did, and there is no doubt that pragmatism is closer to consequentialism than it
is to deontology (duty-based as distinct from consequence-based ethics)." Id. at 65.
Indeed, it is doubtful that anyone can be a consistent pragmatist or consequentialist, at
59.
least insofar as these "philosophies" would not use moral considerations in decision making. The
essential difficulty in using results as the criterion of choice is that one must still evaluate results by
some standard. Posner, for example, wants to maximize economic efficiency. But why? There are
competing values. One has to give convincing reasons why an individual or a society should prefer
economic efficiency over other values or would be better off by opting for economic efficiency--or
any of its competitors. Offering economic efficiency itself as the reason would be circular. It remains
unclear how a pragmatist can, with intellectual consistency, justify any particular goal. For a somewhat similar critique, see Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism:Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1447 (1990) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(1990)).
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particular time. For example, if an overwhelming majority of the people
in an Islamic society accept the shari'a and deem it a grievous moral
wrong for an infidel to convert a Muslim to another religion, an intellectually consistent relativist would have to concede that an agreement giving amnesty to old rulers who had rigidly enforced the shari'a'sprescription of death for such deeds 60 is not unjust for that society. Quite the contrary, punishing these rulers would be unjust. For moral relativists, freedom of religion, as well as other "rights," such as the equality of men and
women, can only be conventions. In addition, the reach, content, and
authority of mere conventions vary from society to society.
To be sure, determining what data are relevant, then gathering and
analyzing them, can present enormous difficulties. These, however, are
largely problems for experts in such fields as political sociology, polling
public opinion, and quantitative analysis. Except insofar as the methodology of the social sciences raises epistemological issues, moral relativism can have little to say that is interesting or fundamentally important
about justice as a concept. In effect, moral relativism transforms issues of
morality into empirical questions about the customs, attitudes, and opinions that prevail in a given society at a given time. In this analytical context, Guttman and Thompson could be correct. If the moral opinion
dominant in South Africa was that it was unjust to give conditional amnesty to officials who viciously enforced61 apartheid, then the government's so acting was, by definition, unjust.
For certain kinds of analytical jurisprudence, the problem is even
easier than for its kissing cousin, moral relativism. Justice, according to
modem legal positivism's prophet, Hans Kelsen, "is not ascertainable by
rational knowledge at all ....
Justice is an irrational ideal. 62 By "irrational," Kelsen meant that justice is one of society's more or less arbitrary choices among values, rather than a conclusion that can be justified
by tightly logical deductions from lexically prior principles or induced
from empirical evidence according to the commands and procedure
specified by what he calls "the basic norm. ' ' 63 For a consistent positivist,
60.
Deuteronomy 13:9-10, commanded a person who was tempted by another Israelite to
worship false gods to identify the tempter, even if a brother or son, and have him stoned to death.
61.
Gutmann and Thompson explicitly refer to punishment as being necessary to "criminal
justice as it is commonly understood." Guttman & Thompson, supra note 41, at 25. They do not
specify whether this common understanding is that of South Africa alone, or, rather, that of most or
some nations. They are probably right that this is the common understanding of all nations, although
they offer no data. The data that Gibson reports in OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH
RECONCILE A DIVIDED NATION?, supra note 13, and as Gibson and Gouws report in OVERCOMING
INTOLERANCE N SOUTH AFRICA: EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC PERSUASION, supra note 16,
neither demonstrate nor deny the existence of a dominant moral judgment that amnesty was unjust.

62.

Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law. Its Method and Fundamental Concepts., 50 LAW

Q. REV. 474, 482 (1934) (Charles H. Wilson trans.).
63.
See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1945). For an heroic effort to restate (and rescue) legal positivism, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998). Sebok's excellent book discusses justice only
indirectly, however, and the word justice does not even appear in the index.
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there can be only particular justice for a particular legal system. What the
law says is just is to be treated as just, at least within that jurisdiction at
that time. Res ipsa loquitur: The "thing," the nation's law, speaks for
itself, and its word is final. If the explicit terms of relevant statutes do not
provide a determinate answer, careful analysis should do so.
Of course, doctrinal chastity no more estops legal positivists from
having a deep concern for justice within any given legal system than
moral relativism prevents conventionalists from being concerned about
how their own society practices its values. 64 Analytical jurisprudes such
as H.L.A. Hart have been very sensitive about justice within common
law systems, especially about what they call "formal justice," the rules
that judges should apply and how they should find those rules. 65 In fact,
one serious legal scholar claims that Hart's brand of legal positivism is
not incompatible with the universalism of natural law: Hart and his colleagues merely ask questions different from those that moral realists or
natural-law theorists would pose.66
Yet, other people manage to proclaim universal moral truths on issues dear to them while asserting moral relativism on lesser matters. On
the one hand, they reject the possibility of universalistic moral judgments; on the other, they pay tribute to certain rights they baptize as
"human." 67 The most famous effort of the twentieth century to make
sense of such a bifurcation was John Rawls's restatement of the theory of
social contract.6 8 As he used the term, justice equals fairness, a usage that
comes close to Aristotle's equating "the just" with "the lawful and the
fair., 6 9 Despite this venerable intellectual provenance, fairness carries its
64. A moral relativist might apply Kelsen's methodology and try to arrange a society's values
in hierarchical order and argue that endorsement of a basic value, for example, human equality,
logically requires that society to accept derivative values, such as sexual and racial equality. To the
extent that the mass of that society also accepts logical consistency as a value, such an argument
could both fit within moral relativism's parameters and even convince others. It is, however, also
possible that most members of a society are perfectly willing to accept exceptions to their general
principles or to interpret those principles in particularistic ways. For instance, a society may construe
"all men are created equal" to mean "all white males are created equal." If, however, that society
accepts the exceptions or particularistic interpretations----"facts" not always any more easy to establish than that the society truly accepts the general principle-then a consistent moral relativist must
also accept the exceptions and/or interpretations. Relativists deny the existence of universal moral
principles that trump a society's conventions.
65. See inter alia, H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593 (1958); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); HART, supra note 46; see also B.

E. King, The Basic Concept of ProfessorHart's Jurisprudence: The Norm out of the Bottle, 1963
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 270; NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981).
66.
ROBERT N. MOLES, DEFINrrION AND RULE IN LEGAL THEORY: A REASSESSMENT OF
H.L.A. HART AND THE POSITIvIST TRADITION (1987). Moles believes that Hart and Ronald Dworkin
were unaware of the absence of conflict because they did not understand the history of legal theorizing.
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN,
67.
LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
68.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM]; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
69.
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 55, at 158-59, Bk. V, ch. 1, 1129a-b.
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own ambiguity.7 ° In addition, Rawls's description of the original position
carefully, perhaps wisely, and surely deliberately, excluded from discussion of the background of his fictional social covenant one of the most
basic moral issues: Do "normal" humans possess an innate capacity to
reason about the nature of good and evil-a capacity that would precede,
make possible, and shape the content of an original covenant? In any
event, Rawls used as a model "the original position" in which people
operating under a "veil of ignorance" manage to agree on a set of basic
(constitutional) rules for a "well-ordered society., 7 1 Not knowing who
they will be in the new society, rich or poor, male or female, white,
brown, or yellow, they seek rules that are just in the sense of being fair to
all members of society.72
Rawls makes much of justice's requiring reciprocity. Justice as reciprocal fairness does carry more intuitive meaning than justice simply as
fairness. Aristotle's notion of justice as proportionality fits that intuition.
Moreover, the Philosopher says, justice differs from the other virtues in
that it is concerned with the good of other people. Thomists, philosophic
disciples, though seldom blind followers of Thomas Aquinas, tend to
agree.73 John Finnis understands Aquinas's conception of justice as
meaning that a person is ready to give to others what is theirs. The difficult questions center around what belongs to whom, as Socrates, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Rawls, among others, recognized.74
70. Judge Richard A. Posner complains that "[tihe problem with words like 'fairness' and
'equality' is that they have no definite meaning." POSNER, supra note 58, at 66.
71.
RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 68, at 136-42, 448.
72. Although, when discussing economic justice, Rawls specifies that his "founders" do not
know if they will be rich or poor in the society to come, when discussing abortion, he does not use
the veil of ignorance. Rather, he analyzes the issue as arising among people who are already born.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 68, at 243 n.32. It would seem that: (1) Questions about
the value of human life and when it begins are more politically (and morally) significant than allocations of property; and, therefore, (2) the veil of ignorance should obscure the vision of decision
makers so that, when constructing their basic constitutional order, none of them would not know
whether he or she would be among the born or the aborted. It is probable, however, that ringing
down that veil would have given an answer different from the one that Rawls preferred. Here he was
more a partisan of a specific policy than a detached political philosopher offering a general method
of constructing a just society.
73.

See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 133 (1980)

[hereinafter FINNIS, AQUINAS].
74. Kelsen claimed this definition "is an empty formula, because the decisive question, what
is that which is everybody's own, is not answered .. " KELSEN, supra note 57, at 13. On this point,
Kelsen's reading was either less than careful, or less than honest. Some two millennia earlier, Socrates had addressed this very difficulty. When Polemarchus quoted Siminodes's definition as "to pay
everyone what is owed to him," Socrates replied: "Simonides is a wise and inspired man.... But
what on earth does he mean by [that]?" PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 6, Bk I, 331:e (Tom Griffith trans.,
G. R. F. Ferrari ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). Aristotle, Aquinas, and modem Thomists have
spent a great deal of time and effort trying to demonstrate how a broad concept of justice applies to
specific situations in real life. In fact, it would be just to characterize these writers as treating justice
less as a general concept and more as a carefully developed attitude reflected in habit. For all of his
brilliance, Kelsen was not above creating and then attacking straw men. See generally Robert P.
George, Kelsen and Aquinas on "'The Natural-Law Doctrine," 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1625
(2000), in which George juxtaposes what Kelsen claimed Aquinas said and what Aquinas actually
said. The result does not flatter Kelsen's scholarly integrity. See supra note 58, for a discussion of
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Public officials and political theorists who are not pragmatists,
moral relativists, or legal positivists, and who differentiate themselves
from Rawls, confront very complex sets of philosophical issues that defy
easy solutions. Their analyses move beyond cultural, geographic, and
temporal boundaries in an attempt to determine if a putative moral good
is indeed good under universally applicable standards. Thomists are the
usual suspects here, although hardly the only culprits.75 They speak of
certain actions that are bad in themselves, regardless of actors' motives
or the specific circumstances surrounding the choice. 76 Thus, contradicting consequentialists and pragmatists, but following Paul of Tarsus, they
deny that a good end, even if pursued for the most noble of motives, can
justify any means; rather, only those means are justified that are themselves either good or morally indifferent. Carefully derived predictions
about the results of an action, whether in the long or short term, are important elements in moral choice. Nevertheless, good results cannot justify an act such as the deliberate taking of innocent life, itself an evil.
Thomists also differentiate between those things that are good in
themselves and those that are instrumentally good.77 As means to other
ends, these latter take their moral stamp from the character of their
ends.78 The first argument, that good ends do not justify evil means, has
Kelsen's spurious argument that Socrates's (Plato's) claim that only the just man can be happy
meant that Socrates equated justice and happiness. For a more favorable, though not entirely uncritical, evaluation of Kelsen's general theory, see POSNER, supra note 58, at ch. 7.
75.
Leo Strauss was a bitter enemy of moral relativism and legal positivism, which explains
why he counted Hans Kelsen, a fellow refugee from Hitler, among his chief intellectual enemies.
Strauss, however, disclaimed belief in Thomistic natural law. See LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT
AND HISTORY (1953). In his seminars, he repeatedly asserted that the first step toward philosophy
was to distinguish between one's own benefit and the good. See also the writings of the so-called
moral realists, especially: Michael S. Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277 (1985); Michael S. Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 453 (1987) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)); Michael S.

Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992); Sotirios A. Barber, Judge Bork's
Constitution, in COURTS, JUDGES, & POLITICS 641 (4th ed., Walter F. Murphy & C. Herman Pritchett eds., 1986); Sotirios A. Barber, The New Right Assault on Moral Inquiry in Constitutional Law,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253 (1986); Sotirios A. Barber, Epistemological Skepticism, Hobbesian
Natural Right and Judicial Self-Restraint, 48 REV. POL. 374 (1986). For a critical, but not hostile,
analysis of Barber's thesis, see Stanley C. Brubaker, Book Review, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 261 (1985)
(reviewing SOTIRIOS BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984)). Hadley Arkes takes a
position quite similar to that of the moral realists. HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JUSTICE (1986).

76.
Nevertheless, for a Thomist, specific circumstances are important. One example of what
he would consider an evil act under all circumstances is the wanton taking of human life. But, he
would also argue, one must know the context of the act to decide whether the killing was wanton, in
self-defense, or in defense of another (and innocent) human being.
77.
See, e.g., FINNIS, AQUINAS, supra note 73, at 86-90; ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN
MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 8-18 (1993); ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF
NATURAL LAW ch. 2 (1999). Aristotle, of course, made a similar distinction. Because he was not a
moral theologian, he did not make as much of the point as did Aquinas and his followers. See
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 55, at 95, Bk. I, ch. 2, 1094a.
78.
I deliberately exclude discussion of motives. Like the road to hell, the path to vicious
tyranny is paved with good intentions. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for example, said that despite the
evils of apartheid, some of the Afrikaner officials "genuinely believed" that this policy offered "the
best solution to the complexities of a multiracial land... " TRC REPORT, supra note 50, at 14
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obvious relevance to political morality and resonates well with constitutional democracy, for much of constitutionalism is concerned with regulating, even prohibiting, certain means, such as bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws, even when directed to laudable goals. The second argument, about the distinction between things good in themselves and
merely instrumental goods, is somewhat less valuable for analyses of the
justice of granting amnesty to vicious felons because the question centers
on instrumental goods-the policies made by governmental institutions,
processes, and policies. These are designed to accomplish certain ends,
and so are morally colorable according to the goals sought and the means
employed. In the latter choices, the notion of actions evil in themselves
becomes relevant.
Even constitutional democracy itself is only an instrumental good.
As with any political system, its goodness depends, as Aristotle would
have put it, on the extent to which the goals it pursues and the means it
utilizes maximize the chances for its citizens to live decent lives. 79 Obviously, a political system that tries to respect the great and equal dignity
of every human being, as constitutional democracy claims to, is not evil
in itself. Insofar as the regime's policies conform to its preachments, it is
a positive good. Alas, no constitutional democracy always lives up to its
own standards. Thus, political stability would enhance such a regime's
capacity to do good; but, in a flawed world, it might also enhance the
political system's capacity to do evil.
IV. JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT

We have danced around, rather than answered, except for pragmatism, moral relativism, and Kelsen's classic legal positivism, the question
whether justice, or more broadly, basic morality, mandates punishment
for tyrants. An affirmation of that demand threatens to legitimize stateimposed vengeance, and most, though hardly all moralists argue against
the propriety of revenge. As a practical political matter, the consequences
of revenge will differ, as we have seen, between situations in which the
old officials form a relatively small coterie of thugs and those in which,
while still thugs, seem to represent a large ethnic group or social class.
In the second situation, it is highly unlikely that vengeance will heal
social wounds. It is more likely to breed hatred and incite counterrevenge, starting, as Martin Luther King said, a society onto a downward
spiral toward darkness. Giving back harm for harm certainly establishes
a reciprocal relationship, but whether tit-for-tat heals is doubtful, as Ro(foreword by Chairperson D.M. Tutu). Similarly, no one doubts that Adolf Hitler thought the world
would be a better place if every Jew were dead.
Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 307 (James Madison) ("It is too early for politicians to
79.
presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is
the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than
as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object.").
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meo and Juliet attested. 80 Moreover, nothing in the history of violence
and counter-violence between Catholics and Protestants in Ulster, between Israelis and Palestinians, or among various ethnic groups in the
Balkans indicates a therapeutic effect. Nevertheless, strong themes in
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theology, which still provide the foundations of much of modern morality, even among non-believers, make precisely the argument that God does, and man should, punish all wrongdoing. 81 Leviticus and Deuteronomy command Israel to put to death kidnappers, perjurers, and those who commit adultery, sodomy, incest,
homicide, or have sex with animals, gather wood on the Sabbath, or
curse either of their parents. These capital crimes include both sins
against Yahweh and violations of the persons or property of other humans. The basic principle of the civil and criminal law of ancient Israel
was simple and direct:
When one man strikes and disfigures his fellow-countryman, it shall
be done to him as he has done; fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth
for tooth; the injury that he inflicted upon another shall be inflicted
upon him. Whoever strikes a beast and kills him shall make restitu82
tion; but whoever strikes a man and kills him shall be put to death.
The same sort of retaliatory theme was echoed in the oft-repeated biblical refrain of national survival. This chorus had five stages that varied
only in detail: Israel sins, suffers, does penance, is forgiven, and lastly is
liberated, its redemption confirmed by a new covenant. All is well for a
short time, but sin quickly re-ignites the cycle.
Most ominously, on occasion Yahweh might even punish sinners
after He had apparently forgiven them. According to 2 Samuel, for instance, David confessed to the Prophet Nathan that he had Uriah the Hittite slain so that he could add Bathsheba, Uriah's wife, to his own stable.
Nathan replied: "Yahweh, for His part, forgives your sin; you are not to
die. Yet because you have outraged Yahweh by doing this, the [first]
child that will be born to you [and Bathsheba] is to die. 83 This passage
80. Theorists of rational choice may differ, arguing that rational actors are likely to prefer
some sort of compromise to the destructiveness of endless retaliation and counter-retaliation. Among
the best works here is,
ROBERT AXELROD. THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). There are two

general difficulties--though less so with Axelrod's book than most such studies. The first is the
simple fact that people do not always behave rationally or even intelligently-a difficulty especially
large when, as immediately after liberation from brutal rule, emotions are likely to run high. The
second difficulty is that, in order to understand what political actors deem rational, one has to know
their hierarchy of values. During the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara began bombing
Ho Chi Minh's small factories in an effort to persuade him to stop his campaign against South Vietnam. Minh, a former peasant, did not value factories in the same way as did McNamara, the former
President of Ford Motor Company. As a result, the North's incentive to compromise was far weaker
than McNamara had supposed.
81.
For God, at least, the data are weak. In this world, punishment that we can ascribe, albeit
with small confidence, to the Deity seems random.
82.

Leviticus 24:17-21.

83.

2 Samuel 12:13-14.
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also provides a concrete example of Yahweh's wrath extending beyond
the current generation. The author of 2 Samuel does not speak of any sin
committed by the child Bathsheba was carrying. 84 "Fearing" the rage of
this "great and terrible" God was prudent indeed.
The standard Christian story of salvation conveys a similar message
of justice as retribution: God demands that mankind expiate sin through
suffering. Sinners are not forgiven through contrition alone. Only the
agony of a sacrificial Lamb's slow, asphyxiating, death on a cross could
satisfy divine justice after Adam and Eve's disobedience. The point of
Jesus's death was to change God, not man.85 Operating within this paradigm, Augustine saw punishment and justice as reciprocal and God as a
heavenly Rottweiler, ever waiting to pounce on those who violate His
laws. To support his speculations, the holy bishop quoted the sixth chapter of Luke's gospel: "With the same measure that ye mete withal it shall
be measured to you again? '86 Indeed, Augustine went so far as to say:
"As a rule, just wars are defined as those which avenge injuries, if some
nation or state.., has neglected to punish a wrong committed by its citizens, or to reclaim something that was wrongfully taken. 87 Across a
dozen centuries, Jonathan Edwards, the great American Protestant Divine, echoed Augustine's message about sinners: "[J]ustice calls aloud
for an infinite punishment .... The wrath of God burns against them;
pit is prepared; the fire is made
their damnation does not slumber; the
88
glow.
and
rage
do
flames
ready; the
The shari'a's endorsement of retaliation is directly based, so Islamic jurists aver, on the Qur'an. That collection of Mohammed's saying
sends complex messages of Allah as the all- merciful, both "benign and
forgiving. 89 Still, He accepts repentance "only of those who are guilty of
Islamic jurisprudence
an evil out of ignorance yet quickly repent . .,90
has resolved such ambiguities in favor of vengeance.
To the extent that the Bible, the standard Christian story of salvation, the Qur'an, and shari'a,express the traditional religious thinking of
Jews, Christians, and Muslims, the weight of these moral theologies is
clearly on the side of mandatory punishment. Outside the world of Islam,
the force of these orthodoxies may have weakened over the centuries but
still exert power over many minds. The move from a divine retribution
that imposes eternal damnation as payback for sin, to a necessity that
84. An atheist might construct an alternative hypothesis that is kinder to Yahweh: Bathsheba
had an abortion and the author of 2 Samuel provided a cover story.
85.
Burtchaell argues that this account has the story backwards: The real point of Jesus's
death was to change Man, not God. See generally BURTCHAELL, supra note 42, at 79-88 & ch. 4.
86. See generally SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 763, Bk XXI, §§ 11-14 (Marcus
Dods trans., Modem Library 1950).
87. BURTCHAELL, supra note 42, at 191 (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 81.
89. AL-QUR'AN 80, ch. 4, verse 43 (Ahmed Ali trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1988).
90.
Id. at 76, ch.4, verse 17.
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human authorities punish wrongdoing, has been a smooth skate, helping
to cloud distinctions between, on the one hand, vengeance and, on the
other, rehabilitation, deterrence, restoration of individuals' losses, and
repair of damages to the public order. Even assuming what takes a blind
leap of mindless faith to accept, that commentators on these texts have
accurately described their infinitely loving God as a vindictive doubleentry bookkeeper, 9 1 extrapolating from the supernatural to the mundane
is a dangerous conceit. The commands of Man's justice are murky and
the relationships between sinful humans, punishment, and justice are
labyrinthine, not linear.
Examination of the purposes of punishment might clarify its relation
to justice. Three justifications are generally accepted for inflicting punishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, and restoration. Socrates emphasized
the rehabilitative function, though he was impressed by Protagoras's
emphasis on deterrence. Using an analogy that both Aristotle and Aquinas 92 would adopt, Socrates compared punishing a person who had
committed a crime to giving medicine to a sick person. It was needed "so
the wrong-doer may suffer and [be] made whole." 93 From a different
perspective, the eminent moral theologian, James Tunstead Burtchaell,
speaks of the necessity of penance as the repentant sinner's "celebration
of what God has been forgiving." 94 In actual practice, however, the
therapeutic value of punishment for the moral sclerotics who have commanded the machinery of brutally authoritarian governments is doubtful.
None of those who ordered or operated the German concentration camps
or Russian gulags, incited the slaughter of the Tutus in Rwanda, or organized murders for the Argentine or Chilean generals, has publicly offered to do penance.
Furthermore, only rarely have any of these people demonstrated
even a hint of remorse for having committed murder and torture on a
mass scale. According to Mitscherlich and Mielke's analysis of the trials
of the doctors who conducted the Nazis' experiments on live human beings, most of whom pleaded guilty as charged, not one of them said "I
am sorry. ' 9 Even Albert Speer, who is sometimes cited as the one lead91.
Jewish commentators might respond that much of the work of Talmudists has been directed toward softening the Torah's harsh strictures. Moreover, not all Islamic jurisprudes accept the
dominant interpretations of the shari'a.
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 55, at 113, Bk. II, ch. 3, 1104b; I ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
92.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I-II, Q. 87, art. 7, at 997 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.,
Benzinger Brothers, Inc. 1947) [hereinafter AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA]. For a listing of cita-

tions to other places in which Aquinas used this analogy, see FINNis, AQUINAS, supra note 73, at
212 n.141.
93.

PLATO, Gorgias, in 3 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1 (B. Jowett trans., Charles Scribner's

Sons 1911 (1887)).
94.
BURTCHAELL, supra note 42, at 333.
95.
ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH & FRED MIELKE, DOCTORS OF INFAMY: THE STORY OF THE
NAZI MEDICAL CRIMES 18 (Heinz Norden trans., 1949) (quoted in TZVETAN TODOROv, FACING THE
EXTREME: MORAL LIFE IN THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS 234 (Arthur Denner & Abigail Pollak

trans., 1996)).
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ing Nazi who admitted evildoing, accepted only responsibility for his
actions; he waffled about his own guilt. "It is not only specific faults that
burden my conscience, great as these may have been," he wrote after
twenty years in Spandau Prison. "My moral failure is not a matter of this
item and that; it resides in my active association with the whole course of
events." The expectant reader waits for a mea maxima culpa. Instead, a
sadly inadequate explanation oozes out: Technology made me do it.
"Dazzled by the possibilities of technology, I devoted crucial years of my
life to serving it. But in the end my feelings about it are highly skeptical. 96 And the dog, about whom we should be highly skeptical, ate his
homework.
Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler died without expressing remorse, and
Idi Amin and Leopoldo Galtieri departed equally silent. Agosto Pinochet
slipped into senility urging his former generals to remain loyal to the
cause of anticommunism. In testimony before the TRC, some of South
Africa's former officials did appear contrite, even though the commission's rules did not require them to do so. One does not, however, have
to be a cynic to doubt the sincerity of defendants who hoped that evidencing sorrow would keep them out of prison. Although Christians believe repentance, conversion, and redemption are always possible, moral
rehabilitation of deposed despots is not an outcome on which Las Vegas
bookmakers would give odds. Thus, rehabilitative justice for officials of
the old regime remains only a remotely possible, not probable, outcome
of punishment.
Threats of punishment may deter decent people who are disinclined
to commit serious crimes anyway, which is not a small accomplishment,
of course.97 But its capacity to restrain, either psychologically or morally,
career criminals, or the sort of men who operate brutally oppressive governments is doubtful. The much publicized trials of war criminals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, followed by the execution of most of the defendants,
did not slow, much less stop, Stalin, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao Tse Tung,
Idi Amin, Kim il Sung, Kim Jong-il, Slobodan Miloslovic, Saddam Hussein, or any of several dozen Latin American generals and African dictators from terrorizing their own people. As Reinhold Niebuhr said, "The

96.
ALBERT SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD REICH: MEMOIRS 524 (Richard Winston & Clara
Winston trans., 1970). I once shared an editor with Albert Speer. I had remarked that at least Speer
had acknowledged his guilt. Our editor corrected me. In their conversations, Speer had conceded that
the charges against him were true, but, when our editor made the same comment as I, Speer interrupted to say that he accepted responsibility, not guilt.
97.
According to the Federalist Society, "of recidivists incarcerated [in state prisons] for a
violent offense, the number with only nonviolent priors actually exceeds the number with a violent
prior. The notion that criminality is neatly segmented into violent and nonviolent is fundamentally
wrong." Federalist Society White Paper, The USA PatriotAct of 2001: Criminal Procedure Sections
16-17 (2001), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/TerrorCrimPro.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2004).
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whip of the law cannot change the heart. 98 Like Mafia Dons, gangsters
who are in power do not believe they will be caught. Often they are right.
Yet, there is always an "on the other hand" in such matters as deterrence. Whatever the value of studies of threats of, and actual punishment
on, "ordinary" criminals, the number of coprophagers who have done the
dirty work of authoritarian political systems remains small when compared to mass populations in prisons. That fact may speak well for human nature but it does prevent statistical analysis on which scholars can
rely. Aryeh Neier, when he was Executive Director of Human Rights
Watch, spoke for "the other hand:" "Who's to say that clemency won't
simply further embolden the torturers, thereby inviting rather than preventing future abuses?" 99
Punishment's capacity to affect restorative (corrective) justice is
also problematic."°° Heavy fines, in the unlikely event that the new government could force ousted officials to pay, might compensate for damages to property.' 0 ' But no punishment can restore the murdered to life.
"My son can rest now," a mother in New Mexico said in 2003 when the
killer was ordered to serve a minimum of thirty years in prison. That
sentence may have quenched the mother's thirst for vengeance, but it is
doubtful that her son knew about it or, if he knew, cared. Not even the
Comanches' practice of skinning prisoners alive, and leaving them to
toast in the desert sun, can restore the murdered to life, or make whole
the numbed minds or crippled bodies of people who have been tortured;
nor can permanently locking a tyrant in a cage give back to those
wrongly incarcerated the lost years of their lives. Time swaps occur only
in science fiction.
Criminal trials may also serve a commemorative function. Stalin allegedly said that the death of one man is a tragedy, the slaughter of hundreds of thousands a mere statistic. By allowing victims and their relatives to testify, criminal trials could memorialize those who suffered. No
longer would victims be merely anonymous numbers. They, and their
families, could confront their tormentors in public and tell their storiesa process that transfigures faceless victims into flesh-and-blood human
beings with personal histories of courageous opposition to oppression.
Even if that testimony does not penetrate the thick armor of their tormentors' moral autism, it can comfort victims, as well as reinforce the revul98.

BURTCHAELL, supra note 42, at 213 (internal quotations omitted).

99.
Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, a Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers, in I
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 491, 497
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
100.
For "restorative justice," Aristotle employs a term that Richard McKeon, using the Oxford
translation, renders as "rectificatory justice." ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1008 n.6 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
101.
For a thorough analysis, see LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETrLING
ACCOUNTS WITH TORTURERS (1990).
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sion that the outside world feels, serving as a reminder, as the perpetrators stand humiliated in the dock, that the face of evil, although always
hideous, is also often ordinary. Moreover, there is something comforting,
perhaps wrongly so, in watching a cruel hunter become the prey. That
scene may also be morally instructive and, in a limited sense, educate the
educable, if not to deter the incorrigible.
On the other hand, testimony before a truth and reconciliation
commission, again, modeled on that of South Africa, might more effectively achieve that commemorative goal. Such an institution can provide
'10 2 Victhe stage for what Elizabeth Kiss calls "a national morality play.
tims, or their families, can tell their stories and present their evidence as
coherent packages, rather than in the piecemeal fashion required by the
less flexible rules of a court. "Retrospectively," Lawrence Wechsler concludes, "the broadcasting of truth to a certain extent redeems the suffering of the former victims. 10 3 More than post-conviction pleadings for a
reduced sentence, the prospect of amnesty could pressure even conscienceless pirates to confess their crimes and express remorse. If these
former officials craved absolution, they would be compelled to testify
and then submit to cross-examination. If they did not, they would not be
before the commission. In addition, they would know perjury could result in double punishment, for the crimes about which they lied, and for
the perjury itself. Although these people, often being psychopaths, sadists, egomaniacs, or all three, would probably not feel any shame, their
publicly expressing contrition would further tar themselves and, more
importantly, the political order that their crimes helped maintain. Moreover, if those seeking amnesty were questioned about the fates of the
thousands of people whom the regime made disappear, the victims' families could have whatever the thin comfort closure brings. This sort of
epiphany is not likely to happen in Argentina or Chile.
Possibly the most important result of putting political predators in
prison is to prevent them from again harming fellow citizens. As Niebuhr
completed his thought about "the whip of the law:" "But thank God
[government] can restrain the heartless" until they grow new hearts,
which, in this context probably translates "until death do us part." Removal from office usually prevents tyrants from continuing their oppression, although nothing less than swift executions, as Nicolai Ceaucescu
and his wife suffered, can guarantee an end to their vicious careers. Tyrants have been known to rise from political graves. Executions, however, may actually help a totalitarian movement by creating martyrs who
might be, as Rosa Luxemburg was, more useful to lost causes than are
live heroes. New leaders might also find it prudent to recall a stanza from
William Blake's "The Grey Monk:"
102.
103.

Kiss, supra note 50, at 70.
Weschler, supra note 99, at 498.
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The hand of Vengeance found the bed
To which the Purple Tyrant fled;
The iron hand crush'd the Tyrant's1 head
4
And became a Tyrant in his stead. 0

Punishment's protecting citizens against future harm leads to another function, which Thomists classify as retributive, but might be more
accurately characterized as rehabilitative for the community. Sin, Aquinas argued, disrupts the divine order of things, which only punishment
can restore. 10 5 By analogy, he reasoned that offenses committed by public officials disrupt society's order. This "inequality of justice" can only
be rectified by imposing "bads they are unwilling to undergo."'' 0 6 The
purpose of government's inflicting punishment goes beyond paying a
debt to injured individuals; more importantly, it tries to restore (or generate) harmony for the community. Punishment "is requisite" not only so
the criminal's soul will be healed but also so that
the disorder [in society] may be remedied by the contrary of that
which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore
the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so
that those who were scandalized ... may be edified [instructed and
deterred?] by the punishment .... 107

Seven centuries later, Lord Denning offered a variation on these
themes. "It is a mistake," he wrote to the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, "to consider the object of punishment as being deterrent or
reformative or preventive and nothing else., 10 8 Punishment's "ultimate
justification," he asserted, consists in its statement of the community's
104. William Blake, The Grey Monk, in POEMS (Dante Gabriel Rossetti ed., 1863).
105.
Although I am not sure I would be welcome in the fold, I count myself a Thomist. Nevertheless, I find this argument utterly unconvincing, as I do all arguments that, while accepting God's
omnipotence, try to specify limits on His unlimited and unlimitable power.
106. FINNIS, AQUINAS, supra note 73, at 211-15, espec. n.153, has an excellent analysis of
Thomas's short disquisition on punishment and justice. Throughout this brief discussion, Aquinas's
focus is on sin and the punishment to which he usually refers is that which God (supposedly, because
Thomas offers no data) imposes on sinners. The argument is thus theological, not political. Occasionally, however, Aquinas does include a reference (an aside?) to unjust and criminal acts done to
fellow men and to punishment imposed by rulers. For instance: "This restoration of the equality of
justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow men."
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 92, Pt. I-I, Q. 87, art. 6, 977. Aquinas's views on
tyrannicide, even punishing tyrants, are less than clear-in part because he died before completing
De Regimine Principum, the work in which he most thoroughly examined those problems. His
student, Ptolemy of Lucca, finished the essay and it is impossible to say what in that analysis was
written by whom.
107.
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 92, Pt. I-Il, Q. 87, art. 6, Reply Obj. 3, 977;
see also id. at Q. 87, art. 2, Reply Obj. 1 ("Sometimes indeed [punishment] is for the good of those
who are punished .... But it is always for the amendment of others, who, seeing some men fall from
sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning."); id. at Q. 87, art. 3, Reply Obj. I ("Even the punishment
that is inflicted according to human laws is not always intended as a remedy for the one who is
punished, but sometimes only for others. Thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own
amendment, but for the sake of others, who at least may be deterred through fear of punishment...
.

108.

t).
HART, supra note
46, at 65.
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"emphatic denunciation" of a crime.1° 9 In a broader sense, of course,
Aquinas and His Lordship were talking about an educative function-the
state's publicly reaffirming its values by imposing severe physical harm
on people who violated those norms. As an educational device, punishment can play an important role for constitutional democracy, instructing
its people about the polity's basic values. Then, so can the hearings and
final report of a truth and justice commission, as earlier paragraphs contend.
CONCLUSION: POLITICS AND JUSTICE

What does this long excursus tell us about justice's demanding punishment of former officials? The question would not be of much interest
to either pragmatists or consequentionalists. Moral relativists and legal
positivists would defer to either local conventions or the rules of local
legal systems. Augustine and Jonathan Edwards, convinced retributionists, would insist on scourging, imprisoning, or executing deposed tyrants. Aquinas, encumbered by a felt obligation to import into politics a
theology that included a vindictive God, would tend to agree, though
with less vehemence and joy. Socrates and Aristotle would prefer but
probably not require punishment. Still, the latter two, and Aquinas as
well, tinctured their public morality with splashes of political realism and
might have been quite willing to compromise. Rawls's theory of justice,
with its heavy infusion of reciprocity, would allow punishment, but it is
not certain that his conception of justice as fairness would demand retribution over amnesty.
There is always the haunting question: How much justice, fairness,
or retribution, do we as individuals really want? When Hamlet asks
Polonius to take care of the actors who will put on the play he wrote to
"catch the conscience of the king," the Chamberlain promises, "My
10
Hamlet responds:
Lord, I will use them according to their desert."'
his desert, and
after
man
every
use
better:
much
"God's bodykins, man,
a
similar point:
home
hammered
Dante
who should 'scape whipping?""'
agonizing
person
The most frightening aspect of his Inferno is that each
in one of the circles of a horrible Hell is getting exactly what he or she
has earned-not a cheering thought for self-reflective people who are not
blindly self-righteous. Few of us have committed such crimes as mass
rape, torture, or murder. Yet, by acts of omission as well as commission,
most of us have hurt our fellow humans. We have, for example, driven
an automobile too fast or after one or two drinks too many, spoken
thoughtless racial or ethnic slurs, padded an expense account, or failed to
report cash income on tax returns. For any of us to insist on exacting
exact retribution is hazardous. For others, we may demand a strict ac109.

Id.

110.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1I, Sc. 2.

111.

Id.
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counting of wrongdoing, demand punishment, and call that process justice. For ourselves we prefer a looser conception of justice, one tempered
by mercy.
For pure pragmatists, moral relativists, legal positivists, and, for
very different reasons, retributionists like Augustine, the question of
whether the basic concept of justice requires the new government to punish the old tyrants is easy. But for those of us who think both that justice
is not an empty word and that it differs from revenge, the problem is
shrouded in mist. Deciding the moral issue is not, however, a hopeless
task, only a very difficult one. Some of that mist may lift with a realization that justice has a positive as well as a negative aspect. It is concerned not merely with punishing wrongful actions but also with facilitating actions that will build a new life for citizens, actions that will enable the members of that society to pursue their own happiness while
respecting the same right of their fellow citizens.
For a new constitutional democracy, there is, the drafters of South
Africa's interim constitutional text of 1993 wrote in the epilogue to that
document, "a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for
reparation but not 'for
retaliation, a need for ubuntu [humaneness] but not
12
for victimization."'
Decisions to prosecute, or to compromise and offer conditional amnesty, or even to grant full absolution and attempt "no-fault reconciliation" are thus eminently political, again in Aristotle's sense. They are
concerned with authoritatively establishing goals for society and determining the means that are both most efficiently directed toward those
ends and most consonant with the principles of constitutional democracy.
Whatever the choice among kinds of punishment and amnesty, the goal,
at least for men and women who hope to establish a viable polity, must
be reconciliation rather than division. A nation fragmented by hate and
anger is unlikely able to honor norms of constitutional democracy or
even remain at peace with itself. The ideal society for the survival of
constitutional democracy is one in which citizens trust and respect one
another. The minimum condition is a society in which citizens do not
hate and fear one another.

112.

S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. ch. 16 (1993).

THE WAITE COURT AT THE BAR OF HISTORY
DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.t
INTRODUCTION

"I have at last finished the opinion," Chief Justice Waite wrote to
Bancroft Davis, the Court's Reporter of Decisions, on March 5, 1888.
One suspects that Waite audibly exhaled as he penned that sentence.2 His
reference was to the Telephone Cases,3 arguably the most significant
patent litigation in the late nineteenth century, at least in terms of its effects on the development of the telecommunications industry in the
United States. Waite had been at work on his opinion for months, and
understandably so. 4 Arguments in the cases had been heard over twelve
days in January and February 1887. 5 The bench had split four to three
over these eight challenges in circuit courts to Alexander Graham Bell's
1876 patent for the telephone. 6 A description of each of the patent disputes, Waite's opinion sustaining the patent, and Justice Bradley's much
shorter dissent, all consumed more than five hundred pages-the entirety
of volume 126 of the United States Reports.7 Waite's effort had been a
burden, even for a Chief Justice accustomed to overwork.
The decision was scheduled to come down on Monday, March 19.8
On Sunday, the eighteenth, the Chief Justice became ill. 9 He insisted
nonetheless on going to the Capitol the following day to read his opinion,
despite an apparent diagnosis of pneumonia. 10 He was concerned that his
wife Amelia, then traveling in California, would be alarmed if she read
newspaper accounts of his inability to be at Court. 1 She knew that he
had never fully regained his stamina following a breakdown in 1885,
which caused his absence from the bench for a short time.12 After Waite
arrived in the courtroom on the nineteenth, however, it was immediately

t
The title derives from an article written over a half century ago by one of Professor
Beaney's colleagues at Princeton: Alpheus Thomas Mason, CharlesEvans Hughes:An Appeal to the
Bar of History, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1952).
1.

C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON

R.

WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER

309 (1963)

(internal quotations omitted).
2. Id.
3.
Id.; see also The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
4.
MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 309 (noting that the Telephone Cases considered several
extremely complex telephone patent disputes).
5. The Telephone Cases, 31 L. Ed. 863, 864 (1888).
6. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 1 (syllabus).
7. See generally id. (syllabus).
8.
See MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 309.
9. Id.
Id. at 309-10.
10.
11.
Id. at 309.
See id.
12.
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clear that he was too weak to carry on. 13 Justice Blatchford announced
the judgment in the Telephone Cases in his place.' 4 Attorney General
Augustus Garland later recalled the spectacle of the enfeebled Chief: "'It
was evident to the observer death had almost placed its hand upon
him." ' 15 On the morning of Friday, March 23, in his seventy-second year,
"Mott" Waite died at home, fourteen years and nineteen days after Jus16
tice Nathan Clifford had sworn in the lawyer from Toledo.
Predecessors John Marshall, Roger Brooke Taney, and Salmon
Portland Chase had also died in harness, as would later Chief Justices
Melville Weston Fuller, Edward Douglass White, Harlan Fiske Stone,
and Fred Vinson. 17 Alongside his six predecessors, Waite served longer
than all but John Marshall and Taney, whose combined tenures practically encompassed the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. 8
Among the sixteen Chiefs to date, as shown in Table 1, Waite's tenure
ranks sixth. Fuller, whom President Grover Cleveland picked as his successor, would serve eight years longer than Waite; but after Fuller, no
Chief Justice would exceed the length of Waite's service until Eisenhower appointee Earl Warren, who retired in 1969.19
The fifteen Justices who made up the Waite bench are listed in Table 2. They were, by and large, an impressive team, both professionally
and intellectually. The list included some individuals-Justices Samuel
Miller, Stephen Field, Joseph Bradley, and John Marshall Harlan, for
example-who, in the terminology of competitive athletics, would have
been considered "starters" or even "all stars" in any period of Supreme
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 309-10 (quoting A. H. GARLAND, EXPERIENCE INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 36 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1963 (1898))).
16.
See id. at 310. Eight months passed before President Grant found a replacement for Chief
Justice Chase, who died on May 7, 1873. Id. at 2. Waite's nomination on January 19, 1874 marked
the end of an appointment charade. See id. at 5 (calling the appointment process "tragicomic"). "We
had 'a time' over the Chief Justiceship," Secretary of State Hamilton Fish exclaimed on the day of
the nomination. Id. at 2 (citation omitted). "It has been a hard parturition .....
Id. (citation omitted).
By most accounts, the Ohio lawyer who succeeded Chase was Grant's seventh choice for the post.
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE

SUPREME COURT 131 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining Waite's newly acquired nickname: "His Accidency"). Grant had apparently never met Waite; indeed, Waite was not widely known outside the
Buckeye State and had never argued a case before the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. He had "every
requisite except repute," insisted Senator Hannibal Hamlin in January in a last-ditch effort to forestall his nomination. ALFRED R. CONKLING, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF ROSCOE CONKLING 463

(1889).
Waite's name was surely familiar to Grant. MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 15-16. Friends had recommended him for the Chief Justiceship months before. Id. at 15. Moreover, he had been one of
three American attorneys at the international arbitration over the Alabama claims, which resulted in
an award of $15.5 million for the United States, one of the few achievements of Grant's third-rate
and scandal-ridden presidency. Id. at 13-14.
17.
See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at 65, 120,
194-95, 250, 275, 365,425 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT JUSTICES].
18.
See id. at 531.
19.

See SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 531-32; infra tbl.1.
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Court history.2 ° Moreover, the Waite bench had both strength and depth
in the second tier. There was the Chief Justice himself, plus colleagues
Samuel Blatchford, David Davis, Horace Gray, Stanley Matthews, William Strong, L.Q.C. Lamar (at the very end), and perhaps William
Woods. 2' These men could have more than held their own as members of
22
any Court before or since. For twelve of the fifteen Justices to have
performed at a level ranging from able and workmanlike to outstanding
is remarkable. The fact that some members of the Waite Court have not
been acclaimed as such may be due more to the routine nature of much
of nineteenth century judicial business-"routine," that is, by late twentieth and early twenty-first century standards.2 3 A study commissioned in
1970, to rank the ninety-six Justices who served between 1789 and 1967,
suggests that the Waite Court Justices were, as a group, unusually capable. Harlan is counted among the twelve that the study deemed "great,"
and Miller, Field, Bradley, and Waite are among the fifteen "near
greats. 25 Nine Justices (Blatchford, Clifford, Davis, Gray, Hunt, Lamar,
Matthews, Swayne, and Strong) are among the fifty-five receiving an
"average" mark, and only Woods is lodged among the six earning the
,,26
None were among the eight judged "failgrade of "below average.
27
ure." Few periods of Supreme Court history fare as well or better in the
survey.28
Talented people, however, are frequently strong-willed people. That
was true of Waite's colleagues. Moreover, several of them thought they,
not Waite, should have been named Chief Justice in 1874, and some continued to believe that they could have done a better job in the center
chair. 29 The Waite Court may not have been "nine scorpions in a bottle,"
as Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes was supposed to have described a later
Court on which he sat, but by no means was Waite's a friction-free
bench. 30 These realities, combined with some peculiar difficulties, caused

20.

See ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 412-413.

See id. at 120, 128, 131, 133, 138-39, 141-42.
21.
22. "Court," when used here as a proper noun, refers either to the United States Supreme
Court generally, or to that Court during the period in which it was headed by a particular Chief
Justice, as in the "Hughes Court" (1930-1941) or the "Burger Court" (1969-1986).
23. This assessment is based on the evaluation presented in chapter 2 of DONALD GRIER
STEPHENSON, JR., THE WAITE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY (Peter G. Renstrom ed.,

2003).
24.

See ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 412-13.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

29.

See MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 7.

30.

The quoted words come from the title: MAX LERNER, NINE SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE:

GREAT JUDGES AND CASES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Richard Cummings ed., 1994); see also Rich-

ard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J.Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV.L.REV. 13, 14 (1990).
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by the weaker members of Waite's
roster, posed special challenges for
31
skills.
leadership
s
Chief
the
Moreover, Waite's fourteen years were hardly quiescent ones. Indeed, institutionally, politically, and legally, they were eventful, and in
some ways even tumultuous. 32 First, in the constitutional crisis of 18761877, several Supreme Court Justices helped to resolve a disputed presidential election. 33 Second, the Waite bench may fairly be described as the
hardest working in American history. Under no other Chief Justice has
the Court encountered so many cases for so long a time that it was
obliged to decide. 34 Indeed, the experience of the Waite years demonstrated the unworkability and inadequacy of the federal judicial system as
it was then organized. 35 The result was a major structural and jurisdictional reorganization soon after the Chief's death.36 Third, alongside the
hundreds of routine, fact-bound cases, the Court, in those days, was
obliged to decide important constitutional questions.37 A few of these had
been fixtures in the Reports for decades, but others, thanks to the three
Reconstruction amendments, were just beginning to crowd their way
onto the docket as Waite became Chief Justice.38 Waite was probably too
close to his work to appreciate fully the changes that were underway.
Yet, had he been given the perspective afforded by the hindsight of more
than a century, he would have recognized the situation for what it was:
the United States Supreme Court was an institution truly in transition.

31.
See generally MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 251-275 (detailing Chief Justice Waite's difficulty keeping relations positive with other Justices such as Justice Clifford; also describing the
numerous health problems that plagued several Justices of the Waite Court).
32.
See generally id. at 313-21 (describing the Waite Court's decisions involving civil rights,
corporations, and bondholders).
33.
See DAVID M. O'BREN, STORM CENTER 96 (5th ed. 2000).
34.

See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND

DEVELOPMENTS 58 tbl.2-2 (3d ed. 2003).
35.
See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 177 (1993); MAGRATH,
supra note 1, at 266-267.

36. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 177.
37. See id. at 164, 166, 169 (discussing decisions interpreting the Constitution, upholding the
states' power to regulate, determining that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to private actors, and giving corporations protections as "people" under the Fourteenth Amendment).
38. See id.
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Table 1 - Tenures of the Chief Justices of the United States

Chief Justice

Appointing
President

Tenure as
Chief Justice

Rank Order in
Years of Service'

Jay

Washington

1789-1795

11th (6 yrs.)

Rutledge*#

Washington

1795

14"' (1 yr.)

Ellsworth

Washington

1796-1800

13th (4 yrs.)

Marshall

Adams

1801-1835

1st (34 yrs.)

Taney

Jackson

1836-1864

2 nd

Chase, S. P.

Lincoln

1864-1873

9 th (tie)(8 yrs.)

Waite

Grant

1874-1888

6th (14 yrs.)

Fuller

Cleveland

1888-1910

3d

White, E.+

Taft

1910- 1921

8"' (10 yrs.)

Taft

Harding

1921-1930

9"' (tie)(8 yrs.)

Hughes#

Hoover

1930-1941

7 h (11 yrs.)

Stone'

Roosevelt, F.

1941-1946

12 h (5 yrs.)

Vinson

Truman

1946-1953

10t" (7 yrs.)

Warren

Eisenhower

1953-1969

5"' (15 yrs.)

Burger

Nixon

1969-1986

4 h (tie) (17 yrs.)

Rehnquist**+

Reagan

1986 -

4 th

(28 yrs.)

(22 yrs.)

(tie) (17 yrs.)**

* Served on a recess appointment; nomination rejected by the Senate.
** To date, as of 2003.

' Rounded off to nearest year, from date of judicial oath.
+ Sworn in as Chief Justice while serving as associate Justice. Years
shown exclude service as associate Justice.
4 Previous service as associate Justice terminated before appointment
as Chief Justice. Years shown exclude service as associate Justice.

39.

SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 531.
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Table 2 - Justices of the Waite Court (1874-1888), in Order of
Appointment4 °
Justice

Appointed
by

Nominated
on

Confirmed
on

Judicial
Oath Taken

Service
Ended

Nathan
Clifford

Buchanan

12-9-1857

1-12-1858

1-21-1858

7-25-1881

Noah
Swayne

Lincoln

1-21-1862

1-24-1862

1-27-1862

1-24-1881

Samuel
Miller

Lincoln

7-16-1862

7-16-1862

7-21-1862

10-13-1890

David
Davis

Lincoln

12-1-1862

12-8-1862

12-10-1862

3-4-1877

Stephen
Field

Lincoln

3-6-1863

3-10-1863

5-20-1863

12-1-1897

William
Strong

Grant

2-7-1870

2-18-1870

3-14-1870

12-4-1880

Joseph
Bradley

Grant

2-7-1870

3-21-1870

3-23-1870

1-22-1892

Ward Hunt

Grant

12-3-1872

12-11-1872

1-9-1873

1-27-1882

Morrison
Waite

Grant

1-19-1874

1-21-1874

3-4-1874

3-23-1888

John
Harlan

Hayes

10-16-1877

11-29-1877

12-10-1877

10-14-1911

William
Woods

Hayes

12-15-1880

12-21-1880

1-5-1881

5-14-1887

Stanley
Matthews

Garfield

3-14-1881

5-12-1881

5-17-1881

3-22-1889

Horace
Gray

Arthur

12-19-1881

12-20-1881

1-9-1882

9-15-1902

Samuel
Blatchford

Arthur

3-13-1882

3-27-1882

4-3-1882

7-7-1893

L.Q.C.
Lamar

Cleveland

12-6-1887

1-16-1888

1-18-1888

1-23-1893

I. PART CLASSICAL, PART MODERN: THE WAITE BENCH AS A
TRANSITION COURT

The Waite Court can usefully be viewed as a transition court, straddling a period during which the Supreme Court underwent an unprece40.

See id. at 531-33.
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dented metamorphosis from what might be called the classical Court to
the modem Court. This is different nomenclature from what sometimes
is found in literature about the Supreme Court.4 ' Yet a classical/modern
distinction may better highlight the place of the Waite era in Supreme
Court history, making it easier to grasp the ways in which the Waite
Court was both similar to, and different from, the Courts that preceded
and followed it.
Supreme Court nomenclature often draws a contrast between the old
pre-1937 Court and the new post-1937 Court (or, sometimes, the modem
Court).4 2 By most accounts, the dividing line between the two falls during the years 1937-1940, when the nation witnessed a judicial revolution. 43 The proverbial "irresistible force" (in the form of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal program to cope with the Great Depression)
met the "immovable object" (in the form of the Supreme Court under the
leadership of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes that stymied many of
the president's initiatives). 44 The result was Roosevelt's audacious assault on the Court through the Court-packing plan, and the hasty change
of mind by Hughes and Justice Owen J. Roberts, that gave Roosevelt the
five sure votes he needed so that his agenda could receive the constitutional stamp of approval. 45 This flip-flop was promptly followed by the
Court's adoption of a new agenda for itself.46
From this perspective, the old Court in its constitutional decisions
was property-oriented, with an emphasis on minimizing the restrictive
role of government in commercial affairs.47 With commercial interests
enjoying heightened protection, legislation regulating property was constitutionally acceptable only if the Court was satisfied that the policy was
reasonable.4 8 The agenda of the new Court, by contrast, turned that order
of things on its head, guarding mainly the nonproprietary rights and lib-

41.
See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 110, 114-15 (1988) (discussing scholars labeling the Court in the period of 1873-1937 as the
"formalist era" or "laissez-faire," and labeling the Court post-1937 as "modem").
42.
See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 180 (1960); see also
WIECEK, supra note 41, at 139.
43.
See generally CARL BRENT SWISHER, THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE 28-29

(Greenwood Press 1980) (1958) (describing the late 1930s as the renaissance of constitutional interpretation); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 154, 160-

61, 175 (2d prtg. 1963) (outlining the "judicial about-face" that brought the 1938 doctrines of "preferred freedoms, judicial self-restraint, and political restraints .... "); SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at
233-45 (discussing what commentators called the "Constitutional Revolution Ltd.," beginning in
1937).
44.

See SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 232.

45. See id. at 233-36.
46. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also WIECEK,
supra note 41, at 156-57 (discussing Carolene Products' adoption of an equal protection agenda).
47. See WIECEK, supra note 41, at 116.
48. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905); SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 244;
MASON, supra note 43, at 119.
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erties of individuals. 49 Ever since, property matters have been deemed
less important than, for example, free speech or criminal justice issues,
and so have been far less deserving of judicial protection than rights in
the preferred category. 50 Accordingly, since the late 1930s, regulation of
property has largely been left to the discretion (and protection) of legislatures, and are only rarely struck down, while restrictions on speech
and
51
similar liberties are typically viewed as constitutionally suspect.
To be sure, the categories of old Court and new Court, as they are
usually understood, are helpful in understanding a prominent watershed
in Supreme Court history. Yet they may obscure as much as they reveal
in grasping both fundamental changes in the Court's development across
more than two centuries, and the Waite bench's position in that development. For this task, different nomenclature seems appropriate: hence
the categories of classical Court and modem Court (albeit with the "new"
or post-1937 Court being a subset of the latter). Compared to the relatively sudden transformation after 1937, the shift from classical to modem Court moved more slowly, spanning approximately the last one-third
of the nineteenth century.52 Waite's Chief Justiceship, therefore, fell
roughly in the middle of this period.53
The era of the classical Court was marked by (1) an exceedingly
limited federal jurisdiction, (2) a structure that made the bench mainly a
court of errors, not a court of legal policy, and (3) onerous circuit-riding
duties.5 4 Until after the Civil War, the great bulk of litigation in the federal courts consisted of admiralty and diversity cases. 55 Cases in the Supreme Court that raised federal constitutional questions usually came
from the highest court of a state; under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, these qualified for Supreme Court review only if the court below
had ruled against the federal claim.56

49.
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 281-83 (describing the "preferred-position theory,"
under which the Constitution gives a preferred status to personal rights rather than property rights).
"The modem Court has turned away due process challenges to economic regulation with a broad
'hands off approach. No such law has been invalidated on substantive due process grounds since
1937." GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 482-83 (13th ed.

1997).
50.
51.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 281.
Id. at 281-82; see HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT

7 (7th ed. 1998).
52. Author's interpretation of developments between ratification of the three Reconstruction
amendments to the Constitution, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV, and passage of the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
53.
See supra tbl. 1.
54. See O'BRIEN, supra note 33, at 107, 156-57; see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 12
(W.M.W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1993) (1927).
55.

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 12.

56.

Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85; 1 CHARLES

SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 11 -12 (1928).
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Moreover, except for admiralty and a handful of other cases, the
Supreme Court was the sole tribunal in existence to hear appeals within
the federal judicial system (the circuit courts were principally trial, not
appellate, bodies).57 There was no intermediate appellate bench between
the circuit courts and the Supreme Court.58 Thus, as Table 3 suggests,
much of the Justices' energy was expended reviewing circuit court decisions, regardless of their importance.
TABLE 3 - Number of Cases Pending in the U.S. Supreme Court,
1850-189059

Term

Cases pending

1850

253

1860

310

1870

636

1880

1,212

1884

1,315

1886

1,396

1888

1,563

1890

1,800

Every case in federal court, it seemed, had an equal claim on the
Supreme Court's time, unless it was a criminal case. Congress did not
extend a right of appeal to the Supreme Court, even in capital cases, from
the circuit courts until 1889. 60 Thus, unless a criminal case managed to
reach the Supreme Court through some extraordinary route such as habeas corpus or by certification, the federal trial (i.e., circuit) court had the
final word in criminal cases. 6'
The burden of review by right of an ever-expanding number of circuit court rulings was compounded by the system of judicial staffing that
Congress had decreed in 1789.62 There were three types of federal courts
57.

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 13 (citing the Act of September 24, 1789,

§§13, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 80, 85).
58.
Id.
59.
See id. at 60, 86.
60.
Id. at 79 n.107 (citing United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 174 (1805); Act of
Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655; United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 321-22 (1892)).
61.
Id.; More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 173-74.
62.
§4, 1 Stat. at 74-75 (establishing circuit riding duties for Justices of the Supreme Court).
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(district, circuit, and the Supreme Court), but only two types of federal
judges (district judges and Supreme Court Justices).63 Every state contained at least one federal judicial district, and some states contained
more than one district. 64 Districts in two or more states were in turn
combined to form a circuit.65 A circuit court for a district would be
staffed by the local district judge and a Supreme Court Justice.66 Thus, at
the time Waite became Chief Justice, the Circuit Court for the District of
New Hampshire was staffed by the district judge in that state, plus Nathan Clifford, who was the designated Justice for the First Circuit, which
included all of New England, except Vermont and Connecticut. 6 If the
circuit Justice was unable to be present, and this was sometimes the case,
the district judge held circuit court by himself.68 Thus the circuit court
was, practically speaking, often a replica of the district court. Except for
a brief period in 1801 when Congress created separate circuit judgeships 69 (a new Congress repealed that measure in 1802)70 and a geography-driven creation of a circuit judgeship for California in 1855,71 there
were no distinct circuit judges until 1869, when Congress also reduced
the circuit-riding duties of the Justices. 72 Thereafter, Justices were expected to sit on the circuit court bench in each district only once every
two years. 73
The era of the modern Court has been marked by (1) a vastly expanded federal jurisdiction, (2) an increase in cases involving individual
rights, and (3) a structure that has allowed the Court to become a court of
policy for the nation.74 The three Reconstruction amendments to the
Constitution (the Thirteenth in 1865, 75 the Fourteenth in 1868,76 and the
Fifteenth in 187077), combined with congressional statutes intended to
63. §§ 1, 3, 4, 1 Stat. at 73-75.
64. § 2, 1 Stat. at 73.
65. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 11.
66. Initially, two Justices were assigned to hold court on a circuit. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75. This
number was reduced to one in 1793. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333-34. As a
result, six Justices (the size of the Supreme Court's initial roster) were available for the original three
circuits. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 22.
67. See table titled, "Allotments, Etc. of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States" preceding the table titled, "General Table of the Cases Reported in this Book." 23 L. Ed. 6
(1926).
68.

See JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V. DANIEL,

1784-1860, at 142-43 (1964); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 109 (noting that it was
becoming common practice for district judges to hold court alone).
69. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90 (repealed in 1802).
70. Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132, 132 (repealed in 1911).
Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 142, 10 Stat. 631, 631.
71.
72. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44-45.
73.

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 74.

74.

ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 51, at 5 (commenting on the federal judiciary's role in

strengthening basic civil rights); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5-6 (12th ed. 1999).
75.
J.W. PELTASON, CORWIN & PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 382-83

(14th ed. 1997).
76. Id. at 385-86.
77. ld. at 432.
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enforce those amendments, imposed new restrictions on state authority as
a means of protecting individual rights.78
Moreover, the "convenient vagueness" in the language of the allimportant Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment presented the Supreme Court with unprecedented opportunities to determine just how
broad or narrow the protections for individual rights would be. 79 The
inclusion of the Equal Protection Clause was itself a noteworthy event
because it handed the Supreme Court a far-reaching and entirely new
mission-to be the final arbiter on matters of racial justice. 80 To be sure,
the other guaranties of Section One, regarding privileges and immunities
and due process of law, were litigated initially more in the context of
restrictions on occupational freedom and uses of property than they were
in the context of attacks on racial discrimination.8 In the eighteenth and
82
nineteenth centuries, property interests were critical civil83 rights issues.
Property was seen as the indispensable basis of freedom.
The addition of those amendments proved even more significant for
the federal judiciary because of the major jurisdictional leap Congress
took in 1875. It was then that Congress granted the circuit courts full
Article III jurisdiction-the authority to entertain suits involving a statute, the Constitution, or a treaty of the United States, as well as a right of
removal of such cases from state to federal court. 84 Almost simultaneously, while clearly small by contemporary standards, cases raising questions of nonproprietarian issues under the Bill of Rights became a discernible part of the Supreme Court's business for the first time.8 5 Ratifi78.

WIECEK, supra note 41, at 94.

79. See Charles M. Hough, Due Process of Law-To-day, 32 HARv. L. REV. 218, 218 (1919).
80. See WIECEK, supra note 41, at 99 (noting that although the federal judiciary was initially
reluctant to use the Fourteenth Amendment to narrow federal authority, it ultimately did so).
81.
See id. at 96 (discussing the SlaughterhouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), in which
white men used the Fourteenth Amendment to support their argument opposing trade fees imposed
on butchers).
82. See Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
[T]he right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the
natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property
is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its
security was one of the objects, that induced them to unite in society. No man would become a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labour and industry. The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social
compact ....
Id.; see also POLLY J. PRICE, PROPERTY RIGHTS 3, 3-4 (2003) (noting that property rights were

critical because voting rights were often tied to owning property).
83.
See Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 310 (finding that deprivation of property without just compensation is "contrary both to the letter and spirit of the Constitution"); PRICE, supra
note 82, at 3-4.
84. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1, 3, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71.
85. See generally Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (discussing the right of privacy
in U.S. mail under the Fourth Amendment); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878)
(discussing the First Amendment protection of religious freedom); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
394 (1879) (discussing the Bill of Rights as an important feature in determining state versus federal
power); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (analyzing whether the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments allow imprisonment as punishment for being in contempt of court); Ex parte Curtis,
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cation of the Fourteenth Amendment also reopened the federalism86
rattling question of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states.
Despite an invigorated docket, with the arrival of such novel issues
alongside the standard judicial fare, the organization of the federal courts
during the 1870s and 1880s remained as it had been in 1800, with the
exceptions of the addition of separate circuit judges and the reduction
(but not elimination) of the Justices' circuit-riding duties.87 The Waite
Court remained the sole court of appeal for most cases from the federal
courts. 88 This was a painful fact because the number of such cases was
surging.89
The first steps toward relief came in 1891, three years after Waite's
death (if any Chief Justice can be said to have died from overwork, it
was Waite). For all but the most stubborn congressional holdouts, the
Waite Court had demonstrated how anachronistic the classical organization of the federal courts had become. 90 The system was breaking down
under the strain. Too many cases qualified for the Supreme Court's attention and taxed the collective abilities of nine men to do their work in a
timely fashion. 9' "The plan of providing some intermediate courts having
final appellate jurisdiction of certain classes of questions and cases has, I
think, received a more general approval from the bench and bar of the
country than any other," declared President Benjamin Harrison in his
first annual message to Congress in 1889.92 "Without attempting to disthat provision be made for the establishment
cuss details, I recommend
93
of such courts."
Congress responded in 1891 with the Circuit Court of Appeals
Act.94 In at least three ways, the statute-passed 101 years after the Supreme Court's first session-radically broke with the classical tradition.
First, it created a layer of intermediate appellate courts-the circuit
courts of appeals.9 5 For the first time, for most cases in federal court, the
106 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1882) (considering the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting federal
employees from receiving monies for political purposes from other government employees); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 519-20 (1884) (considering whether a defendant has a right to a
grand jury in a trial for felony murder punishable by death, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-36 (1886) (considering the right
against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the right against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment).
86. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 519-20.
87.

88.
89.
cases, up
90.
91.
92.

See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 74.

See id. at 76.
Id. at 60 (noting that by 1890, the Supreme Court docket was at approximately 1,800
from 253 in 1850).
See id. at 96-97 (discussing concern about the Supreme Court's overwhelming docket).
See id. at 60.
Benjamin Harrison, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1889), in 12 A COMPILATION OF

MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 5467, 5477-78 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).

93.
94.
95.

Id. at 5478.
ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 98.
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first point of appeal would not be to the United States Supreme Court.
The old circuit courts were soon merged with the district courts, and the
latter became the primary federal trial courts. Second, for certain categories of cases, the circuit courts of appeals would ordinarily be the courts
of last resort.96 Those cases could reach the Supreme Court only by certification or certiorari.97 The effects of the 1891 legislation were nearly
instantaneous. In Waite's last term, 482 new cases had been docketed, a
number that grew to 623 new cases in 1890, after Melville Fuller had
become Chief Justice.9 8 In 1891, with the new law in effect only a few
months, new cases dropped to 379, and then to 275 in 1892.99 The statute
also eliminated circuit riding by the Justices, although each Justice retained certain circuit responsibilities.°° The 1891 Act was only a beginning, of course, toward the contemporary federal judicial system-but it
was a crucially important beginning. The Supreme Court began to move
toward a day when, for the most part, it decided only those questions that
the Justices considered worthy of their time.
Viewed alongside these developments, the Waite Court was truly
part classical and part modem. Organizationally, the Waite Court had far
more in common with the Marshall Court (1801-1835) than with the
Fuller Court (1888-1910) that succeeded it. Granted, Waite era Justices
had to do less circuit riding than did most of their predecessors, but the
country was also larger.' 0 t At least Waite and his colleagues could travel
by rail from state to state, in Pullman palace cars no less, instead of on
horseback, by stagecoach, or by canal and riverboat. 102 The fact remained
that the Supreme Court possessed virtually no control over its docket.
The notion of meriting Supreme Court review was under discussion, but
its realization lay in the future.
Regarding jurisdiction, the Waite Court had more in common with
the Fuller and later Courts than with any Court that preceded it. Looming
over everything were the Reconstruction amendments, especially the
Fourteenth, which with their implementing statutes, vastly expanded the
kinds of cases the Supreme Court might hear. 10 3 Perhaps not one of the
subsequent twelve amendments to the Constitution, from the Sixteenth
96.

Id. at 99.

97.

Id. at 99 n.195; § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.

98.

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 101-02.

99.

Id.

100.
Id. at 78 n.100; see also PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION 10-11 (1973).

101.
Sixteen states entered the Union between 1845 and 1889. D. GRIER STEPHENSON JR., ET
AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 43 tbl.2.6 (1988) [hereinafter AMERICAN GOVERNMENT].
102. See generally FRANK, supranote 68, at 275-91 (describing some of Justice Peter Daniel's
travel experiences on the circuit prior to the Civil War).
103. ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 328-334, 346-349 (7th ed. 1991). The Reconstruction amendments (the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth) were ratified in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively. See supra notes 75-77
and accompanying text.
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through the Twenty-Seventh, has so affected the business of federal
courts. 1° 4 Moreover, given the nature of those amendments, cases arising
under them typically involved a claim by an individual or a business enterprise that constitutional rights had been violated. 10 5 In Waite's day,°6
there were not only more people, but more laws that affected them.'
Indeed, Waite was Chief Justice at the same time that the volume of government regulations, particularly at the state level, was increasing dramatically. 10 7 True, as noted, claims were frequently associated with property, but they were nonetheless claims based on an individual right.
Moreover, the Waite docket had its share of juror and voting rights cases
that went to the heart of the question regarding those whom the Constitution had admitted to the political community-those to be counted
among "We the People . . . ." Thus, in the Waite Court, one finds the
earliest signs of a "rights culture" developing, where Americans would
routinely look to the judiciary to both vindicate and sustain their liberties. 108
II. THE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877

Less than three years after Waite's Chief Justiceship began, five
members of his bench were caught up in a political quagmire of major
proportions: the disputed presidential election of 1876.1°9 This would be
the first of three constitutional crises that the United States endured between the end of the Civil War in 1865, and the extended and fiercely
contested presidential election of 2000.'10 In each one, Justices of the
Supreme Court were key players. Each demonstrated that, while the
Court has always made a pretense of being removed from politics, it is
truly never very far removed from the political arena.11' Although the
separate institutions mandated by the Constitution have made judicial
independence possible, its shared powers long ago allowed the Court to
become a partner in governing the nation.
In 1974, the Supreme Court virtually dictated President Richard M.
Nixon's departure from office-the only instance in American history

104.
105.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 101, at 48.

106.

See THOMAS H. JOHNSON, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 645 (1966)

See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-126 (1876).

(noting that the population of the United States grew at a rate of about thirty percent per decade
between 1790 and 1910).
See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
107.
MAKERS 1-45 (1950); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY
(2002).

108.
See generally Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
109.
Paul Finkleman, The Compromise of 1877, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL HISTORY 97, 97-98 (Paul Finkleman & Peter Wallenstein eds., 2001).
The other two were the court-packing episode of 1937 and the Watergate affair that re110.
sulted in the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon in 1974. See O'BRIEN, supra note 33, at
246-53.
111.
O'BRIEN, supra note 33, at xiii.
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when a president has stepped down during his term.' 12 In United States v.
Nixon,' 3 the Court held that the President, against a claim of executive
privilege, was obliged to hand over certain documents and sound recordings to a court in the District of Columbia for use as evidence.' 14 The
documents and recordings in turn amounted to the proverbial "smoking
gun" that revealed the President's complicity in a two year cover-up of
illegality.' 15 The President thus had a choice between vacating the White
House voluntarily, or facing certain impeachment by the House of Representatives and near-certain
conviction, and therefore, removal from
16
office by the Senate."
In 1937, by contrast, the judiciary was on the presidential griddle. It
was the Court's own unprecedented obstinacy during 1935 and 1936, in
reaction to major economic reforms in the midst of the Great Depression,
which prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt's equally unprece-7
11
dented assault on the structure and composition of the Supreme Court.
President Roosevelt lost the Court-packing battle, but, 8because he secured an administration-friendly bench, he won the war. 1
In contrast to the crises of 1974 and 1937, however, the Court, as an
institution, was not a participant in the 1876 election. No decision rendered by the highest court in the land decided that election. Instead, the
Court was indirectly entangled because five Justices accepted appointment as members of a fifteen person commission established by Congress to resolve disputes over contested returns.11 9 Indeed, one of the five
Justices sat in place of another who had been expected to serve. 120 Thus,
six members of the Waite Court were connected in one way or another
with the commission. Moreover, one former Justice, two future members
of the Waite Court, and the older brother of a sitting Justice had roles in
the drama that unfolded as the United States, barely twelve years removed from a war among the states that had claimed hundreds
of thou12 1
sands of lives, found itself again on the brink of civil strife.

112.
113.
114.
115.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 333.
418 U.S. 683, 713-14 (1974).
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713-14.
O'BRIEN, supra note 33, at 246-49, 252-53.

116.

See id. at 248, 253.

117.

See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 194-195 (1941).

118.

Id. at 195-96.

119.
120.

Finkleman, supra note 109, at 98.
See id.

121.

See MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 289, 292-95 (highlighting the controversy surrounding the

1876 election); see also CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 270275 (Archon Books 1963) (1930). The former Justice was John A. Campbell; the two future Justices
were Stanley Matthews and L. Q. C. Lamar; the older brother was David Dudley Field. SWISHER,

supra; see also Arnold M. Paul, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1431, 1439 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
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The election of 1876 was the third in the country's relatively short
history in which the routine presidential electoral machinery failed to
produce a winner. The first two arose when no candidate received a majority of electoral votes, as Article II and the Twelfth Amendment require.1 22 Not anticipating the formation of national political parties, the
framers of the Constitution required presidential electors to cast two
votes for president. 23 The one who received a majority of the votes
would be president, and the runner-up would be vice president. The election of 1800 yielded a tie between top electoral vote recipients Thomas
124
Jefferson and Aaron Burr, both of them Democratic-Republicans.
There were more Democratic-Republican than Federalist electors, and all
seventy-three of the former uniformly, if unwisely, cast their votes for
Jefferson and Burr. 125 Pursuant to the Constitution, the House of Representatives then performed its backup function and, with each state's
delegation casting one vote as the Constitution mandated, elected Jefferson as the third president. 126 To greatly reduce the possibility of another
tie vote for president, and to take account of the rise of the political parties, Jefferson promptly secured ratification of the Twelfth Amendment
required electors to cast separate votes for president and
(1804), which 127
vice president.
Again, in the election of 1824, no candidate received a majority of
the electoral vote. 128 If the failure of the election of 1800 occurred because of the advent of the party system, the election of 1824 yielded no
winner because of its virtual collapse. Jefferson's party had so thoroughly decimated the Federalists as a national political force, that they
had not fielded a presidential candidate since 1816.129 Without competition between two parties, factions emerged within the only party that
remained. 130 The electoral vote was badly split: ninety-nine for Andrew
Jackson, eighty-four for John Quincy Adams, forty-one for William
Crawford, and thirty-seven for Henry Clay. 13' Again acting in its backup
mode, because no contender had an electoral vote majority, the House
elected Adams as the sixth president. 132 The outcome was doubly difficult for Jackson and his followers to swallow. Not only had he enjoyed a
plurality of electoral votes, but a plurality (41.3 percent) of popular votes
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 2; Id. amend. XU1. As explained in this and the following
122.
paragraph, the first two occasions in which the routine presidential electoral machinery failed to
produce a winner were the elections of 1800 and 1824.
123.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2.
124.

DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., CAMPAIGNS

COURT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 31 (1999).

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 55.
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as well. 133 However, it was the vote in the House, not the vote in the precincts, that mattered.
The election of 1876 posed an altogether different predicament, one
for which the elections of 1800 and 1824 offered no obvious solution. "I
think the result of the election is more uncertain than I have felt it to be
for twelve years," Justice Miller wrote to William Ballinger, his brotherin-law, in July of the election year. 134 "There is enough of opposition to
the Administration, perhaps enough to the Republican party, to defeat the
latter if it could be combined. But the folly of the opposition has saved us
before and will probably do it again."' 35 When the votes were counted
months later, Miller's prediction was as right as it was wrong.
In the race against Ohio Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, Democrat
Samuel J. Tilden of New York comfortably won the popular vote, with
136
an edge of about 250,000 votes, out of over eight million votes cast.
That statistic surely pleased Democrats: it was the first presidential election since 1856 in which they out-polled the Republicans, and the first
37
since 1852 in which the party received at least fifty percent of the vote.'
Their euphoria, however, was tempered by one sobering fact. Although
Tilden seemed certain of 184 electoral votes to Hayes's 165, twenty electoral votes remained in play because of disputed returns from Florida,
Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina. 38 From that pool of twenty
votes, Tilden needed only one vote to reach the minimum majority of
185, and thus the White House. To reach the same magic number, Hayes
required all twenty votes. Democrats were acutely aware of the fact that
in three of those states, Hayes's hopes rested on the legitimacy of actions
taken by local canvassing officials, who were themselves part of the Reconstruction governments that Republican congressional majorities had
imposed on a vanquished South. 3 9
Of the four state controversies, South Carolina's seemed most encouraging for Hayes. Although Hayes's electors had received a majority
of the popular vote, Democrats claimed that the election results were
tainted, in part because of failure to comply with a state constitutional
requirement for voter registration and in part because of the intimidating
presence of federal troops. 140 By their reasoning, the state had not legiti-

133.

Id. at 244.

134.

CHARLES FAiRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at 282

(1939).
135.
136.
137.

Id.
STEPHENSON, supra note 124, at 246.
1 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 651-657 (John L. Moore et

al. eds., 4th ed. 2001).
138.
Id. at 740.
139.
SWISHER, supra note 121, at 275-277.
140. FAtRMAN, supra note 134, at 283.
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mately appointed electors because the federal4 1troops made it impossible
to know the will of the people with accuracy.
Oregon's situation was problematical for both Hayes and Tilden. As
in South Carolina, Oregon's three Republican electors garnered more
votes than Tilden's, but one of the three was a postmaster at the time of
the election, and so was constitutionally ineligible to be an elector. After
he resigned his postal job, the Oregon Secretary of State, a Republican,
officially certified him and the other two Republican electors, and authorized them to cast Oregon's electoral votes. 142 The state's Democrat
governor then declared two Republicans, and one Democrat, as the duly
chosen electors, on the theory that the postmaster's resignation could not
make valid what had been invalid on election day. 14 3 Complicating matters further was a state law that allowed a vacancy among electors to be
filled by the remaining electors. 144 The result was a pair of competing
returns. One set awarded three votes to Hayes; this number included the
45
The other awarded two votes to
vote cast by the now ex-postmaster.
1 6
Hayes and one to Tilden.
The situations in Louisiana and Florida were considerably more
convoluted. There were allegations of voter fraud in Louisiana, and white
Democrats in both states had frightened off unknown numbers of black
Republicans from the polls. 47 With the voter canvassing boards in both
states in Republican hands, returns from selected precincts were excluded, and the election was certified for the Hayes electors. 48 Believing
that
that victory had been snatched from their hands, Democrats insisted 49
the Louisiana and Florida electoral votes belonged instead to Tilden.
The Twelfth Amendment specified that electors were to meet in
their respective states to cast votes for president and vice president, and
then to transmit those votes to the president of the Senate-the vice
president, who was then a Republican. 50 In the presence of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the president of the Senate was to
open the certificates of election "and the votes shall then be counted...
19151 However, the Constitution did not address what was to be done
when rival sets of returns claimed to be "the votes.' 52 Nor was it clear
141.

Id.; see Charles Fairman, Five Justices and the Electoral Commission of 1877, in 7 THE

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 117118 (Supp., Paul A. Freund et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES].
FAtMAN, supra note 134, at 283-284.
142.
See id.; see also Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supranote 141, at 43.
143.
144.
See FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 284.

145.
146.

Id.
Id.

147.
148.
149.

See id. at 283; Finkleman, supranote 109, at 97.
FAIRMAN, supranote 134, at 284.
Finkleman, supra note 109, at 98.

150.

U.S. CONST. amend. XII.

151.

Id.

152.

See id.
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whether the president of the Senate was the one who did the actual
153
counting and thus, presumably, separated valid from invalid votes.
Had one or
the other party
the dispute
ould•
retms been in full control of Congress,
•154
puted returns would probably not have generated a crisis. A Democrat
majority in the House and Senate would no doubt have accepted some
returns for Tilden; after all, only one electoral vote stood between him
and the White House. A Republican majority in the House and Senate
would no doubt have uniformly accepted votes for Hayes, thus handing
the White House to him. However, control of Congress was split: Democrats held a majority in the House, and Republicans held a majority in
the Senate. 155 It was therefore highly improbable that a majority of both
houses would vote to accept the same set of returns.
With no obvious solution to this conundrum, both houses of Congress created special committees to investigate the controversies and to
make recommendations. 156 In January, a consensus emerged between
them that a special commission be established to weigh the conflicting
claims and to report to a joint session of Congress. 157 The majority position of the tribunal in turn would determine the fate of the twenty electoral votes unless at least five senators and five representatives objected,
and each house, meeting separately, agreed to reject the findings of the
tribunal. 158
The commission idea became a reality on January 29, 1877, when
President Grant signed into law a bill creating a tribunal. 159 Five of its
members, or commissioners (three Democrats and two Republicans),
would come from the House of Representatives and five (three Republicans and two Democrats) from the Senate. 160 The remaining five would
consist of Justices of the Supreme Court, including two Democrats (Clifford and Field 16 1-the Court's only professed members of the party of
153.
See id.
154.
See generally L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 DICK. L.
REV. 321, 331-34 (1961).
155.
The Forty-Fifth Congress would not convene until after March 4, 1877. See SWISHER,
supra note 121, at 272. The current practice, whereby the terms of members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives begin in January, is a function of the Twentieth Amendment, ratified in
1933. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX. Thus, it was the balance between the parties in the Forty-Fourth
Congress that mattered. See generally D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Chief Justice as Leader: The
Case ofMorrison Remick Waite, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 899 (1973).
156.
SWISHER, supra note 121, at 270.
157.
See generally id. at 270-73.
158.
Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227, 229; see also KELLY ET AL., supra note
103, at 351.
159.
19 Stat. at 227.
160.
See KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 350-51.
161.

See DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN'S SUPREME COURT 84-85 (1998). Field was the only

Democrat that Lincoln named to the Supreme Court, and the seat Field filled was case-driven. Id. at
88-89. Between February 10 and 25, 1863, the Justices heard arguments in the Prize Cases. Id. at 84.
Involving captured ships and their cargos, these challenged the legality of the Union blockade of
Confederate ports. Id. at 104. If southerners were engaged only in insurrection, the blockade would
be illegal under international law. Id. at 105. Declaring the hostilities to be war in a legal sense
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Jackson) and two Republicans (Miller and Strong). 162 These four Justices
in turn were to select a fifth, the expectation being that they would agree
on Justice David Davis who had once been a staunch Republican (and
also Lincoln's campaign manager in the election of 1860163), but whose
recent vacillations left all unsure about his party loyalties.164 This arrangement thus provided for seven Democrats, seven Republicans, and
one presumed independent. All seemed to be counting on Davis to
"maintain the tribunal's equipoise," as the secretary to the House's special committee later recorded. 65 "In the ponderous Illinois jurist were
centered the hopes of Democracy, the apprehensions of Republicanism.' ' 166 As senior Justice, Clifford would chair the commission. 167 The
statute thus reflected both the widespread conviction that a way out of
the morass had to be found quickly, as well as the confidence of each
party that the chosen device would work to its advantage. Moreover,
inclusion of members of the Supreme Court suggested a belief that the
Justices would not be swayed by the partisanship that was expected to
dictate the votes of the congressional membership; yet the struggle
within Congress about the composition of the judicial component suggested that they would.
would legitimize the blockade but would confer recognition on the Confederacy as a nation. Id. at
104. Other countries would then be free to recognize it as such. l. Moreover, the blockade had
begun in April 1861, but had not been formally approved by Congress in July. Id. What was the
status of seizures in the interim? In a large sense the Republican theory of the war and the Union
seemed to hang in the balance. See generally id. at 104-08. By a one-vote margin on March 10, the
Court sustained both the blockade and the administration's theory of a de facto war. See generally
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
Understandably, concern pervaded the administration and Congress, even prior to this close
call that the Court had to be made firmly "safe" for the Union. See SILVER, supra, at 86. Not coincidentally a bill was introduced in the Senate on February 20, to provide for a new circuit consisting of
California and Oregon and to add a ninth associate Justice to the Supreme Court. Id. at 84-85. Lincoln signed the measure into law on March 3, seven days before the decision in the Prize Cases was
announced. Id. at 85. At one level, the legislation was a warning to the bench that its size and jurisdiction, perhaps even its existence, lay in Congress's hands. Id. At another level, the legislation
recognized the importance of cementing the Pacific coast states into the Union, particularly in light
of the fact that 1862 had been another dismal year for northern generals on the battlefield. Id. at 88.
For Lincoln, Field, who was Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, no doubt seemed
the obvious choice for the ninth seat. See PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY

FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 11, 2, 10 (1997). "A forty-niner, not a miner," Field was
a Democrat, but was loyal to the Union; that was an important consideration in a divided nation and
in a state where Democrats from southern states comprised a vocal minority. See SILVER, supra, at
91. When the transcontinental telegraph line transmitted its first dots and dashes in October 1861,
one of its "first messages" was one from Chief Justice Field to President Lincoln expressing the
loyalty of Californians to the Union. Id. at 89. Moreover, Field enjoyed near unanimous endorsement
from those who mattered in California politics, including its congressional delegation and Governor
(and aspiring railroad baron) Leland Stanford. Id. at 91. Besides, he would bring valuable expertise
to Washington. As much as anyone, Field understood the complex land title cases so prevalent in the
state. Id. at 89.
SWISHER, supra note 121, at 271.
162.
163.

164.
165.
923, 926
166.
167.

See generally WILLIARD L. KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER: DAVID DAVIS 143-61 (1960).
SWISHER, supra note 121, at 271.

Milton Harlow Northrup, A Grave Crisis in American History, 62 CENTURY MAGAZINE
(May-Oct. 1901).
Id. at 933.
SWISHER, supra note 121, at 271.
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Expectations about Davis promptly went awry. Practically on the
eve of the congressional vote establishing the commission, William P.
Pelton, Tilden's nephew, colluded with Democrats in the Illinois legislature to engineer Davis's election to the United States Senate. 6 8 Presumably, the thinking was that Davis, out of gratitude to Democrats, would
then be obliged to favor Tilden over Hayes. Neither Tilden nor congressional Democrats, however, seem to have had any forewarning of this
scheme. "Thunder out of a clear sky could not more thoroughly have
startled the Democratic leaders in Washington., 169 The intrigue backfired. Davis announced his resignation from the Court to take effect on
March 4, 1877, whereupon he would be sworn in as a senator. 170 In the
meanwhile, as a senator-elect, Davis could hardly sit as a judicial member of the electoral tribunal. The four judicial members of the commission then named Justice Bradley to take Davis's place. 171 Long a Republican, Bradley nonetheless was not an outspoken partisan. His political
involvement over the years had been minimal, consisting of a single (and
unsuccessful) campaign for a congressional seat in 1862.172 Nonetheless,
the expectation that Davis would be the fifth judicial member had helped
convince congressional Democrats to accept the commission plan.
Moreover, the timing of Davis's exit, coming as it did at such a late date,
meant that the process had gone too far and gained too much momentum
for Democrats to back out.
The commission met between January 31 and March 2, hearing arguments and testimony in the old Senate chamber, now quarters for the
Supreme Court. 173 Able counsel did battle for both sides. Among those

whom the Democrats deployed were former Justice John A. Campbell,
former Attorney General Jeremiah Black, and David Dudley Field,
brother of Justice Field. 174 The Republican team included future Justice
Stanley Matthews.175 Another future Justice, L.Q.C. Lamar, was the
member of the House of Representatives who officially nominated the
five House members, who had each been chosen by their respective caucuses. 17 6 Shortly thereafter, he would have much to do with achieving the
Democrats' acquiescence in Hayes's election, and, through negotiations
that led to the removal of the last
federal troops from the South, with the
177
formal end of Reconstruction.
168.
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 3, cl.3; id. amend. XVI. Prior to ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment (1913), which mandated popular election of U.S. Senators, state legislatures elected
U.S. Senators.
169.
Northrup, supra note 165, at 933.
170.

SWISHER, supra note 121, at 272.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
See SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 203.
Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 56-57.
FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 285-86, 288.
Id. at 288.
Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 54.
See Paul, supranote 121, at 1439-440.
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In resolving the disputes from Louisiana and Florida especially, the
commission's initial task was to decide whether it would look "behind"
the officially certified election returns. 178 Democrats argued that the official tallying of electoral votes in the presence of Congress made no sense
if Congress could not be assured of the integrity of the votes. 179 The
question was critical and had not been answered by the statute setting up
the commission.1 80 If the tribunal made its own independent assessment
of the validity of the returns, it would then have to consider ample evidence of voter intimidation and fraud, as well as the discounting of Democratic ballots.1 81 Under that broader mission, some of the electoral
votes might be awarded to Tilden. This step would have been devastating
for Republicans because of the ever-present reality that Hayes needed all
contested votes to win. On the other hand, if the commission decided it
could not look behind the returns, then its role would encompass little
more than assuring that the certifications had been presented in the
proper form. Republicans argued that going behind the election returns
would place Congress in the unprecedented position of second-guessing
state canvassing officials. 182 They pointed to the specter of Congress's
routinely making and unmaking election results from the states. 83 So
circumscribed a role would probably validate the Hayes electors. On this
and all other substantively important questions, members of the commission, including Justice Bradley, voted precisely according to party affiliation, accepting the
Hayes electors from Louisiana and Florida by a vote
184
of eight to seven.
By parity of this reasoning, Democrats hoped to prevail in the Oregon dispute. If so, they would pick up the necessary and sufficient single
electoral vote for Tilden. The state's governor (a Democrat) had certified
185
that one Democratic and two Republican electors had been chosen.
The argument that reaped electors for Hayes in Florida and Louisiana
favored Tilden in Oregon. 86 If the commission was not to look behind
the official returns, Hayes seemed to face certain defeat. Stanley Matthews and lead Republican counsel William Evarts, however, managed
to turn matters to the Grand Old Party's advantage. State law made the
secretary of state (a Republican) the official canvassing authority.187 Refusal by the governor to sign that certificate of election did not undercut
the validity of the conclusion of the canvassing authority. 188 Members of
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 289.
See SWISHER, supranote 121, at 277.
See ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227.
SWISHER, supranote 121, at 275.
FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 289.
Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 65.
SWISHER, supranote 121, at 277.
FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 290.
Id.
Id.

188.

Id.
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the commission, again voting by party, decided eight to seven that the
secretary of state, not the governor, spoke for the people of the state. 189
By the same margin, the commissioners accepted the Hayes electors
from South Carolina, in the last of the four cases they considered.' 90
Amazingly, with Oregon perhaps excepted, each side had effectively switched doctrinal position, reversing entrenched political views
that had defined a principal difference between the parties since 1856.
Democrats professed high nationalism, insisting on intervention by a
federal authority into elections conducted by the states. Republicans argued for the sanctity of state's rights and congressional deference to state
officials. As Justice Miller remarked eleven years later at a dinner at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, "To permit Congress to determine the vote would have resulted in the destruction of the Government.
That body never acts judicially. It would be like their determination upon
the rights to seats which are
invariably decided in favor of those in sym191
pathy with the majority."'
The commission's rulings that favored Republican electors in each
state made it virtually certain that Hayes, not Tilden, would be the nineteenth president. The Republican Senate accepted the verdicts, and the
Democratic House of Representatives rejected them. Under the terms of
the statute that created the commission, the commission's judgments
were to stand, unless a majority in both houses voted to discard them.
March 4, the usual inauguration day, fell on a Sunday in 1877.
Hayes, therefore, privately took the oath of office on March 3, and the
public inauguration occurred on Monday, March 5. "I am just returned
from the .

.

. ceremonies," Justice Miller wrote his brother-in-law Wil-

liam P. Ballinger in Texas, "and the cannon are peacefully playing the
last part in that drama. It is to me a great relief.
,,.9' In Miller's mind,
the "peaceful inauguration of Hayes ...

[was] due largely, very largely,

to the discretion, forbearance, good sense and patriotism of the southern
leaders of the democratic party."'' 93 Miller specifically cited the contributions of L.Q.C. Lamar, among three others.
If Miller was relieved, Bradley was anguished. More than any of the
five Justices on the commission, he incurred the greatest personal cost.
As he wrote a year later, he had endured "immense gratuitous and unfounded abuse."' 94 Although all fifteen members had taken the same oath
"impartially [to] examine and consider. . . and a true judgment give," no
189.
Id. at 117.
190.
Id. at 119.
191.
SAMUEL WHrrAKER PENNYPACKER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A PENNSYLVANIAN 132
(John C. Winston Co. 1918) (1917).
192.
FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 291.

193.
194.
ted).

Id.
Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 123 (internal quotations omit-
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one seemed surprised (although many were decidedly unhappy) that
fourteen voted by party. 195 Bradley, the fifteenth member, was therefore
in a unique and impossible position: both sides expected him to act impartially on their behalf. However, if unhappy Democrats aimed most of
their invective at Bradley, they saved some for Miller and Strong too.
When the three were hung in effigy in Monticello, New York, Bradley's
likeness was positioned in the
center and bore this inscription: "I am cru196
cified between two thieves."'
The outcome was costly to the Court as well. Although the Court
had not acted institutionally with respect to the electoral commission,
participation by five of its members rekindled images of "that bitter and
unscrupulous spirit of faction with which the politics of our day threatens
to taint the judiciary."1' 97 Reflecting the consensus among Democrats that
they had been duped into accepting the electoral commission as a way
out of the election dispute, Field and Clifford conspicuously absented
themselves from the inauguration of "His fraudulency," as critics had
already begun to call the nineteenth president. 198 One newspaper with
Democratic leanings praised them for having a sense of propriety, but
added that they would have served their country better had they refused
appointment to the electoral commission. 199 A Republican paper decried
their absence as "an act of discourtesy as discreditable and unworthy as it
was uncalled for and undignified. The only explanation ... is that, not
being able to forget that they were Democrats, they were unable to remember that they were justices.,, 200 Never one to keep opinions to himself, Field was believed to have started a rumor that Bradley changed his
mind at the last minute on critical issues, after being visited by influential
Republican leaders and railroad magnates. 20 Bradley demanded that
Field prove the accusation or retract it. 20 2 Field insisted that he had been
misquoted and misunderstood.2 3 Hard feelings between the two persisted.2 °4 Moreover, the experience steeled Clifford to remain on the
bench, incapacitated or not, until a Democrat again occupied the White
House. While Garfield's election in 1880 made that hope impossible to
realize, Clifford's mental deterioration soon posed a serious problem for
Chief Justice Waite. With other members of the bench suffering various

195.
196.

197.
198.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
SWISHER, supra note 121, at 278 (internal quotations omitted).
The Week, THE NATION, July 23, 1881, at 62.
See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 98 (1995).

199.

SWISHER, supra note 121, at 281.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 281-82 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 278-79.
Id. at 279.
Id.
See id.; see also Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 135-36.
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infirmities, a smaller number of Justices were left to shoulder an increasingly burdensome caseload.2 °5
As distasteful as each man must have found the final resolution of
the election of 1876, Field and Clifford had performed a valuable public
service. As the only two true Democrats on the Court, it seems improbable that there would have been an electoral commission had one or both
refused to serve. How the disputed election would then have been resolved remains anyone's guess.
Nonetheless, participation by a majority of the bench in resolving
the dispute over electoral votes meant that they (perhaps Bradley alone)
were effectively deciding the identity of the next president. Since 1877,
this has happened only twice: in 1974, when the judicially driven ouster
of Nixon made Vice President Gerald Ford the thirty-eighth president;
and in 2000, when Bush v. Gore20 6 cut short a hastily arranged recount in
Florida and handed the White House to George W. Bush.20 7
Moreover, the Waite Court's part in the electoral debacle of 1876
shaped the Supreme Court. Had the commission not awarded the election
to Hayes, it is highly improbable that either John Marshall Harlan or
William Woods would ever have been appointed to the Supreme Court.
Hayes owed a political debt to Harlan,2 °8 and Tilden assuredly did not.
As for Woods, he was the right Republican, in the right place, at the right
time, for a Republican president who wanted to ease sectional tensions
by elevating a southerner-albeit a recently relocated former Union
Army officer-to the Court for the first time since the Civil War.209 Had
the electoral controversy gone Tilden's way, the withdrawal of federal
troops would surely have proceeded, as it did under Hayes, but there also
would surely have been the nomination of a "real" southerner to the
205. See MAGRATH, supranote 1, at 260-61, 266.
206. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
207. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110 (finding that no constitutionally acceptable hand recounting was
possible with voting by the electoral college just days away).
208. See YARBROUGH, supra note 198, at 86-102. This was true for at least two reasons. First,
Harlan, who was both famous and notorious, and whose career generously revealed that he would
rather be right than consistent, had been law partner of Benjamin Bristow, the first U.S. solicitor
general, and Grant's last treasury secretary. Id. at 86-87. Bristow's fight against corruption within his
own department made him a contender for the 1876 Republican presidential nomination, and Harlan
headed the Kentucky delegation at the party's national convention. Id. at 88, 90. Republican regulars
and anti-reform elements supported New York's James Blaine. Id. at 92-93, 95. When it became
apparent that Bristow would lose, Harlan shifted Kentucky's votes to Hayes at a critical moment,
assuring Hayes the nomination. Id. at 95. Hayes was in Harlan's debt, although Bristow and Harlan
soon had a permanent falling out. Id. at 95-96, 102. Second, Hayes, as president in the wake of the
disputed elections of 1876, named Harlan to a commission to determine the legitimate government
in Louisiana. Id. at 100-02. Two governors claimed lawful dominion: there was the carpetbag Republican administration of Stephen Packard and the Democratic administration of Confederate
veteran and amputee Francis Nicholls. Id. Federal troops shored up the former, white voters the
latter. Id. Partly on Harlan's recommendation, Hayes abandoned Packard, and withdrew the army.
Id. Harlan thus enabled Hayes to defuse a crisis in the first months of his presidency. Id.
209. See generally Thomas E. Baynes, Jr., Yankee from Georgia:A Search for Justice Woods,
in SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK 31, 31-36 (1978).
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Court, well prior to Grover Cleveland's selection of L.Q.C. Lamar in the
twilight of the Waite years.2t °
III. WAITE AS COURT LEADER
Morrison Waite was the last person commissioned as "chief justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States.",211 Beginning with Melville

Fuller, all successive commissions for the occupant of the Court's center
chair have read "chief justice of the United States. 212 That change in
wording in 1888 was symbolic of the national stature that the office had
acquired, but it was also prophetic. Beginning in 1922, every Chief Justice, working through the Judicial Conference of the United States, has
been the administrative head of the entire federal court system, a thirdbranch chieftain.21 3 Given the caseload that swamped his Court, it is just
as well that Waite was not saddled with that larger oversight responsibility. Instead, his responsibilities were similar to those shouldered by the
six Chiefs who preceded him: he was administrative head of the Supreme
Court and its presiding officer.2 14 Any influence over other federal
courts, outside of the Fourth Circuit (to which Chiefs have traditionally
been assigned), was informal at most and occasional at best. 2 15
In a formal sense, all Chief Justices, Waite included, have been
primus inter pares-first among equals.21 6 With the post's supervisory
duties has always come a modest differential in salary, but the Chief Justice is officially "in charge" with respect to the associate Justices only in
a very limited sense. 1 7 While the Chief traditionally is the one who controls the assignment of opinions, even that power applies only when he is
in the majority. 1 8 Moreover, his vote in deciding cases is worth no more
than the vote of any of the associate Justices.2 1 9 Similarly, the associate
Justices are not accountable to the Chief Justice. 220 They do not "work"
for him. There is no chain of command on the bench. The relationship
between Chief Justice and associate Justice is not the relationship that
exists between the president and a member of the cabinet. Associate Justices do not serve at the pleasure of their Chief. Thus, the lines of authority that might otherwise assure a smoothly functioning military unit,
business, or other organization are missing at the Supreme Court. The
210.
Daniel J. Meador, Lamar to the Court: Last Step to NationalReunion, in SUPREME COURT
HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK 27, 27,41, 44 (1986).

Peter Graham Fish, Chief Justice, Office of the, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
211.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 140, 141 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
212. Id.
213. FISH, supra note 100, at 32-33.
214. Fish, supra note 211, at 141.
215.
See generally id.
216. Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States: Primus Inter Pares,17 J.
PUB. L. 20, 21 (1968).
Fish, supra note 211, at 140-41.
217.
218. Id. at 140.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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Supreme Court is no well-oiled machine, but rather seems to consist of
nine little law firms where each Justice "is his own sovereign. 22' A right
to preside does not carry with it a right to prevail. Nor does it entitle a
Chief to exercise influence over "his" Court. A Chief Justice may reign
without also ruling. "Being Chief Justice," laconically commented Justice Harlan F. Stone after observing Taft at work for five years, "is a
good deal like being222Dean of the law school-he has to do the things the
janitor will not do.,
Nonetheless, even without the usual accouterments of power, some
Chief Justices have been known as Court leaders.223 The name of John
Marshall immediately stands out. For a variety of reasons, some of which
were unique to his day, Marshall dominated his Court like no other Chief
Justice.224 It was indisputably his Court in fact as well as in name.2 25 To
what degree was the Supreme Court between 1874 and 1888 truly the
Waite Court? Is the name suggestive of real impact and influence, or
does it remain a mere linguistic convenience?
A path-breaking paper written over four decades ago (and since reprinted in several anthologies on judicial behavior) applied the concept
of small group leadership functions, specifically "task" and "social"
leadership, to the Chief Justice.2 26 From this perspective, a task leader is
one who presents his views with force and clarity, defends them successfully in discussion with colleagues, provides guidance for handling perplexing situations, and assumes responsibility
for orienting conference
227
deliberations and writing opinions.
Someone who excels in social
leadership relieves tensions, encourages solidarity and agreement, attends to the emotional needs of colleagues, and is often the best-liked
member of the bench. 228 This conception of leadership confirms "the
common sense observation that a man who wishes to exert influence
over his fellows can do so most effectually if he is both intellectually
disciplined and tactful in interpersonal relations. 229

221.
Felix Frankfurter, Chief JusticesI Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 901 (1953).
222. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 281 (1956).
223. Fish, supra note 211, at 140-41 (listing the limited powers of the Chief Justice, while at
the same time highlighting some great accomplishments that have been made from the position).
224. R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 524, 526 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
225.

Id.; HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835, at

12 (1997) (stating that Chief Justice Marshall "exerts as much charm posthumously over biographers
as he did over his contemporaries in life").
226. David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in
COURTS, JUDGES, & POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 662, 663 (Walter F.

Murphy etal. eds., 5th ed. 2002).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Walter F. Murphy, Marshaling the Court: Leadership, Bargaining, and the Judicial
Process, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 640, 642 (1962). Of course the same "common sense observation"
would apply to a woman as well.
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Inhering in the idea of task leadership, however, are two distinct
functions: managerial and intellectual leadership.23 ° Considering these
separately may offer a clearer window into judicial leadership, especially
when a Chief Justice is stronger with respect to one than to the other.23'
"A chief justice as a managerial leader must stay abreast of the docket,
maintain a maximum degree of court unity, provide expeditious direction
of the judicial conference, and assign opinions thoughtfully and with
deliberation. ''232 A Chief Justice as intellectual leader presents his views
persuasively, "is a principal source of ideas and doctrine, and provides
tactical and strategic guidance in political dilemmas. 23 3 This division
thus allows a probing of three measures of leadership: social, managerial,
and intellectual-a trichotomy that seems especially appropriate in assessing Waite. So judged, Waite excelled at social leadership, performed
adequately as Court manager, and ordinarily looked to others for intellectual leadership.
From the beginning, Waite attempted to fashion the camaraderie
that would be necessary for the Court to function effectively. Waite's
careful handling of the "problem brethren," particularly Field, Clifford,
Hunt, and Swayne, exemplifies his attempts.234 More of a follower than a
leader, Hunt suffered a paralytic stroke in January 1879, but clung to his
seat even though he could do no judicial work.235 The absentee jurist was
a heavy burden for the other brethren to bear. The impasse-Hunt had
not served long enough to qualify for a pension-was not broken until
230. Danielski, supra note 226, at 668.
231.
Stephenson, supra note 155, at 900; Robert G. Seddig, John Marshall and the Originsof
Supreme CourtLeadership, Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y 63, 64 (1991).
Stephenson, supranote 155, at 900.
232.
233.
Id.
234. Each presented different challenges for institutional collegiality. Field was brilliant but
was also headstrong and easily offended, and sometimes tempestuous. He also possessed "a quite
special capacity both for making enemies and for being one." Robert McCloskey, Stephen J. Field,
in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 1069, 1083 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). Field had highly unrealistic
aspirations for the White House in 1880. After a dispute with Democratic president Grover Cleveland, Field claimed, "he would not set foot inside the White House so long as Cleveland remained
president." FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 298. As one contemporary commented, "when Field hates
he hates for keeps." McCloskey, supra, at 1084 (internal quotations omitted).
Clifford's mental decline in the 1870s partly explains why Waite assigned him almost no opinions in constitutional cases. Moreover, most of his opinions were lengthy and almost always ponderously written. As his grandson explained, "He began at the beginning, and marched by careful stages
through every possible phase or contingency. The result was that when he arrived at his conclusion,
there was no point which had not been covered." PHILIP G. CLIFFORD, NATHAN CLIFFORD,
DEMOCRAT, 1803-1881, at 87 (1922). Waite no doubt agreed. As the Chief commented in a letter
about one opinion, "'It will take a good while to find out all there is in it. Bro. Clifford is never very
short."' Letter from Morrison R. Waite to D.T. Wright (Feb. 22, 1877) (on file in Morrison R. Waite
Papers, Library of Congress).
By 1879, Swayne's mental faculties were in decline. "But as the old fox don't want to go,"
wrote Miller, "he readily seizes on the objection, that the business of the court might be suspended to
delay action." FAiRMAN, supra note 134, at 380. Not until President Hayes prevailed upon Swayne
to retire, by assuring him that Swayne's friend and fellow Ohioan Stanley Matthews would have his
seat, did Swayne agree to step down. Id.
235.
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 209.
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Senator (and former Justice) David Davis pushed a private bill through
Congress in early 1882 that made Hunt eligible for his pension at full
salary, provided he retire within thirty days.236 Hunt stepped down as
soon as the bill became law, 237 demonstrating that the Chief was "sensitive to the benefits which could be derived from relieving interpersonal
tension and supporting fallen egos. '238 He did so without the "judicial
handshake" that his successor Melville Fuller introduced as a device to
maintain harmony.239
Soon after Waite became Chief Justice, the Court, in United States
v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,2 40 held that the acts of Congress chartering the
newly constructed western railroads did not require a railroad to pay
semi-annual interest prior to maturity of the government's second mortgage bonds. 241 Because the decision was in favor of the company, Waite
assigned the opinion to Davis, then perceived as the member of the
bench least friendly to corporate privilege.2 42 In fact, at the conference
where the case was decided, the Chief Justice remarked that it would be
best that the opinion not be written by anyone closely identified with the
industry.243 Bradley had come to the Court as an experienced railroad
attorney, but it was no doubt Field whom Waite had in mind because the
Californian was a close friend of Leland Stanford, head of the Central
Pacific. 2" Field-always strong-willed and quick to take offensevented his feelings in a note to the Chief Justice. 245 "I had no idea that
you specially desired it," Waite gingerly replied, "and when the announcement was made, supposed you would not fail to see its propriety. ,,246 Unmoved, Field scratched off a second note, and Waite made a
second attempt to mollify his colleague:
I have just received and read your note of yesterday. I think you
must be mistaken in your understanding of the words I used after the
consultation. If those you give were the words I did use, certainly
they were not used in the offensive sense you appear to have received
them.

236.
See id. at 210.
237.
Id.
238.
Stephenson, supranote 155, at 908.
239.
William J. Brennan, Jr., Inside View of the High Court, in CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
154, 158 (Donald R. Cressey ed., 1971). To this day, upon entering the conference room, each Justice shakes the hand of every other Justice. It remains "a symbol that harmony of aims if not of
views is the Court's guiding principle." Id.
240.
91 U.S. 72 (1875).
241.
Union Pac.R.R. Co., 91 U.S. at 79.
242.
Stephenson, supranote 155, at 908.
243.
Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Stephen Field (Nov. 7, 1875) (on file in Morrison R.
Waite Papers, Library of Congress).
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We cannot conceal from ourselves the fact, that in the excited
state of feeling which exists, or has existed, with the public in respect
to the connexion of the government with the Union Pacific there may
be some feeling of disappointment at the result of this case. It seems
to me, therefore, to be specially important that the opinion should
come from one who had not only been understood to be watchful of
the government purse, but who would not be known as the personal
friend of the parties representing these rail road interests....
No one appreciates your vigorous style more than I do, and, but
for these considerations I should have been glad to have had its use in
this case ....As for opinions in important cases, I don't know, but I
think you fared better than the Judge [Davis] who has the case did at
the last term. Certainly during the present term he has had no advantage over you. I certainly intend to treat all my brethren fairly in this
most delicate and at the same time important part24of
my work. If I do
7
not, it is the fault of the head and not of the heart.
Waite's second note to Field may not have calmed him entirely, but
there is no evidence in Waite's papers or in other sources that he ever
again challenged his Chief on an opinion assignment.
Clifford posed a different problem for Waite. A carry-over from the
Buchanan administration, and the oldest member of the Court, his mental
abilities weakened noticeably soon after Waite became Chief Justice.248
Clifford, however, was alert enough to sense what others were thinking.
Waite tried on several occasions to assuage the situation. On one occasion, for example, Clifford voted with the majority in a case, was assigned to write the opinion, but later returned it to Waite, declining to
write it because he was unprepared.249 Waite wrote the opinion himself.250 In a comparable instance, Clifford notified Waite that he was "not
willing to write an opinion in No. 93 and therefore return it. If you want
No. 99 for any of your friends you may have that also. 25 1 Waite replied:
I regret that my assignment of cases to you last evening was not
satisfactory. I gave you 93 because you were familiar with the law of
copyright, and although the case was a simple one, I thought it might
be made the foundation of one of your useful opinions.

247.
Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Stephen Field (Nov. 10, 1875) (on file in Morrison R.
Waite Papers, Library of Congress).
248.
Stephenson, supra note 155, at 910.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251.
Letter from Nathaniel Clifford to Morrison R. Waite (Dec. 25, 1878) (on file in Morrison
R. Waite Papers, Library of Congress).
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If you still think you do not want 93, I will keep it .... I wanted
but
to give you the two important land cases which Judge Miller has,252
them."
want
not
did
you
that
conference
the
in
expressly
you said
Confusion between Swayne and Miller, in conference in November
1879, led to a note from the Chief Justice to Swayne-an attempt to
avoid further disagreement with Miller.253 (Not only did Miller consider
Swayne unworthy of the judicial robe, but was willing to say so.) "As I
said in the consultation room," Waite explained to Swayne, "I am entirely satisfied with your opinion. ' 54 Waite then went on:
I think however, Miller had the right to believe from what occurred
when the case was decided, that the point which he suggested yesterday was not to go into the opinion. While no formal vote was taken
he had good reason to believe his objection was assented to.
I submit to you, therefore, whether, under all the circumstances,
that part of the opinion had better not be left out. You know how important it is to avoid, as far as possible, all occasion for unpleasant
criticism in our consultations, and if one judge is allowed to write an
opinion on a different ground from that on which the decision was
placed, it is easy to see how difficult it may sometimes be to enforce
the rule as to others.
I hope you will receive this suggestion in the same spirit it is
made....
I leave the matter entirely to your own judgment.

255

Four years earlier, when Swayne complained about the amount of work
he had to do, Waite had tried to accommodate him, even at a sacrifice to
himself.25 6 "It was an imposition to ask you to take the French... case.
Send it 57back to me and I will write it. I shall have plenty of time this
,2

week.

As such incidents illustrate, opinion assignment can be fraught with
controversy, even as it is one of a Chief Justice's most important functions. How those assignments are administered thus speaks not only to
social leadership, but managerial leadership as well. Waite understood
that the choice of the author of an opinion played a part in maintaining
Court cohesion, and in achieving public acceptance of the ruling.

BRUCE R. TRIMBLE, CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE: DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 259
252.
(1938) (quoting Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Nathaniel Clifford (Dec. 25, 1878)).
See Stephenson, supra note 155, at 911 n.47.
253.
Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Noah Swayne (Nov. 8, 1879) (on file in Morrison R.
254.
Waite Papers, Library of Congress).
255.

Id.

Stephenson, supra note 155, at 911 n.47.
256.
TRIMBLE, supra note 252, at 265. Waite's comment regarding "plenty of time" must
257.
surely have been facetious.
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In 1881, the Chief Justice compiled for historian George Bancroft a
list of those cases decided since 1874 that Waite thought were of greatest
constitutional significance. 258 Of the seventy-two cases on the list, Waite
was in the majority in all but six. 259 Of those sixty-six, he assigned the
bulk to some of the most intellectually capable members of the bench:
Waite had written fourteen, Field and Miller eleven each, Strong ten,
Bradley seven, and Harlan, the newest member, five. 260 Swayne and
Davis, respRectively, wrote four and two, and Clifford and Hunt each had
only one. 1 By authoring a plurality of the important cases, Waite
seemed to be suggesting both to his colleagues and to the public that a
Chief Justice ought to write the greater number of opinions. This he routinely did across most categories of cases. Many of Waite's opinions,
especially those on jurisdictional matters, may have amounted to little
more than brief statements of fact and law, followed by an order of the
Court, but they represented a clear commitment of time just the same.262
Moreover, Waite made a conscious effort to vote with the majority,
especially in important cases, in order to retain the opinion assignment
power.263 His personal docket books indicate that he sometimes switched
his vote, after conference, so that he would be able to choose the author
of the opinion.2 4 Indeed, Waite was one of the Court's least frequent
dissenters. 265 This pattern of behavior supported what one study has described as the norm of consensus, whereby published (that is, public)
dissenting votes were discouraged. 266 Waite took pride in unanimity,
once noting in a letter to his wife in 1878 about an unnamed case
in
267
which he had managed to persuade Field and Clifford not to dissent.

258.
MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 263 n.40.
259.
Id. at 263.
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
See, e.g., Gray v. Blanchard, 97 U.S. 564 (1878); United States v. Hailey, 118 U.S. 233
(1886).
263.
Stephenson, supra note 155, at 917.
264.
Id.
265.
Id..
266.
Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 362, 362 (2001).
267.
Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Amelia Waite (May 19, 1878) (on file in Morrison R.
Waite Papers, Library of Congress). The actual number of dissenting votes initially cast by Waite
Court Justices was considerably greater than the published record reveals. Epstein et al., supra note
266, at 366. That is, many seemingly unanimous decisions were in fact initially decided with one or
more dissenting votes. Likewise, decisions reporting only one or two dissenters may have been
initially reached with three or four dissenting votes. This is known not merely anecdotally but because of very precise records that Chief Justice Waite maintained in his docket books that indicate
the vote among the Justices at the conference where the case was decided. Waite's data can then be
compared to data drawn from the Reports. The most thorough study of this phenomenon finds that
dissenting votes at conference were recorded in forty percent of the cases, or about four times the
percentage indicated by the Reports. Id.
In trying to account for such divergence between the conference tally and the Reports, Epstein,
Segal, and Spaeth consider the Waite Court's pattern as part of a trend in judicial behavior during the
past two centuries. Until 1940, the Supreme Court's public dissent rate never exceeded thirty percent
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Managerial leadership also encompasses efficient handling of the
Court's docket. That was an exceedingly difficult goal during the time of
the Waite Court, especially during periods when the bench was understaffed. That left more work to be done by the able-bodied (and ableminded). "I am hard at work but still very well," Waite wrote in 1881.268
"The experience of this fall has satisfied me entirely that six or seven is
less than nine.,, 269 That was soon after Waite appointed a committee consisting of Miller, Swayne, and himself, to see if the workload could be
made more manageable by reducing the length of opinions. 270 However,
as Miller complained in a letter:
[W]e have not been able to suggest any satisfactory remedy.
The truth ...is that the one man of our court who ought to take

the lead and without whose firmness and courage nothing can be
and usually hovered between five and ten percent. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 150-52.
Since 1940 the public dissent rate has rarely been below fifty percent. Id.
Some scholars have argued that the sharp increase in dissents in the modem era is a function of
the Court's increasing control over its docket. That is, in contrast to the situation in Waite's time
when the Court was obliged to decide every case that qualified jurisdictionally, the Court, in a small
step after 1891, and in a giant step after 1925, found itself able to select cases for decision, and to
turn away the rest. The abundance of routine and "easy" cases, therefore, disappeared from the
docket, and "hard" cases, with a greater tendency to provoke disagreement, took their place.
That may explain some of the contrast between the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century and
the last half of the twentieth century, but it does not account for the many instances in which Waite
Court Justices dissented at conference, only later to join with the majority. If the bulk of the late
nineteenth century cases were easy, involving only perfunctory appellate review of correctly decided
cases from courts below, that fact presumably would have been apparent at conference. So, what else
could account for the divergence between the private-public dissent rates among the Waite Court
Justices?
Using various statistical tools, Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth prefer an alternate explanation: a
prevailing norm of consensus that discouraged the public display of a divided bench. A Justice who
indicated disagreement at conference would later typically acquiesce in what the majority decided. It
is that norm, the authors contend, that collapsed in the twentieth century.
An additional factor should be considered as well. The number of cases on the Court's docket
mushroomed during Waite's tenure, due both to congressional expansion of federal jurisdiction and
to economic and social changes underway. By the time of Waite's death, the docket was more than
four years in arrears. This was also at a time when the Justices had practically no support staff. The
Justices truly did their own work. (Justice Gray was the first Justice with a law clerk; in 1882 he
hired a recent law school graduate and paid him out of his own salary. Not until 1922 would Congress appropriate money to provide a clerk for each Justice). Even manual typewriters were not
widely marketed until after Waite's tenure began.
While a growing backlog itself might not discourage dissent, the number of opinions of the
Court that the Justices had to write might. The number of opinions issued rose considerably after the
1878 term, and it was during the five year period preceding 1878 that the rate of public dissents was
highest. EPsTEN ET AL., supra note 34, at 150. More significantly, the first five terms displayed the
highest rate of published dissenting opinions, averaging ten percent. In contrast, during the remaining terms, dissenting opinions were attached to only five percent of majority opinions. EPsTEIN ET
AL., supra note 34, at 150. Then there were the occasions when illness prevented one or more Justices from shouldering a normal share of opinion writing. Waite, for instance, was absent from the
Court between December 1884 and March 1885 while recuperating in Florida. MAGRATH, supra
note 1, at 272-274. With added work to do because of another's incapacity, a Justice might conclude
that prudence, including a wariness of trying to do too much, advised writing a dissent only in exceptional circumstances.
268. TRIMBLE, supra note 252, at 273.
269. Id.
270. See Stephenson, supranote 155, at 914; see also FAIRMAN, supranote 134, at 408-09.
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done is sadly wanting in both those qualities. He is much more anxious to be popular as an amiable, kind hearted man (which he is) than
as the 27dignified
and capable head of the greatest court the world ever
1
knew.

Miller's disparaging reference was to the Chief Justice.2 72
The situation, however, would have been difficult for any Chief,
with or without the infirmities that plagued the Waite bench.273 As noted,
the Court would neither be entirely relieved of circuit-riding duty, nor
enjoy even modest control over its docket until after 1891.274 Instead, the
Justices were expected to spend some part of each year on the circuit,
and were obliged to decide all qualifying cases. With an expanded federal jurisdiction in the decade after the Civil War, that meant a docket
increasingly in arrears. A backlog of about 600 cases in May of 1876 had
nearly tripled at the time of Waite's death in March of 1888.275 Such
276
numbers pointed to what Waite himself called an "oppressive wrong.,
Speaking at a bar association meeting at the Academy of Music in Philadelphia in September 1887, the Chief Justice spelled out the grim reality:
"business is now more than three years and a half behind; that is to say,
that cases entered now, when the term of 1887 is about to begin, are not
likely to be reached in their regular order for hearing until late in the term
of 1890.,,277
Responsibility for relief, Waite made clear, lay with Congress, although neither Waite nor any of his associate Justices shared the enthusiasm for lobbying, in which Chief Justice Taft would so handily engage
for the Court's benefit in the 1920s.278 Even so, Waite in his remarks
went out of his way to issue what amounted to an advisory opinion that
acceptable relief did not include the easy option of dividing the Court
into panels so that it, presumably, would be able to move ahead at three
times its usual pace. 279 He reminded his audience that the Constitution
precluded that alternative: "I beg you to note this language: One Supreme Court," he quoted from Article 111.280 "Not a Supreme Court or
Supreme Courts, but one-and only one."28'

271.
FAIRMAN, supranote 134, at 409 (citation omitted).
272.
Id.
273.
See discussion supranote 234. Hunt suffered a paralytic stroke in January 1879, but clung
to his seat, even though he could do no judicial work, until he retired in early 1882. SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 209.
274.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 3,6, 26 Stat. 826, 827, 828; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS,
supranote 54, at 78-79 n.100.
275.
TRIMBLE, supra note 252, at 250 n.43.
276.
Morrison R. Waite, Remarks of Chief Justice Waite, 36 ALB. L.J. 318, 318 (1887).
277.
Id.
278.
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HowARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 105-114 (1964).
279.
Waite, supranote 276, at 318.
280.
Id.
281.
Id.
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As for intellectual leadership, there is little evidence that Waite led
his Court doctrinally in any consistent way. One reason for that had nothing to do with Waite at all. The reality was that a few bright, articulate,
and doctrinally aware Justices were already in place when he arrived. It
would have been difficult for any new Chief to have led a Field, a Miller,
a Bradley, or, later, a Harlan. It is, after all, far easier to lead colleagues
who are in need of leadership. Felix Frankfurter much later pointed to
what was perhaps a second reason: "the stuff of the artist was not
him.' 282 Waite's opinions, noted the future Supreme Court Justice, were
"not delectable reading. That is a defect for which he properly suffers. 283 Nevertheless, the limited appeal of his opinions, in contrast to
those of predecessors Marshall and Taney, "is due in part to something
else-to fulfillment of one of the greatest duties of a judge, the duty not
to enlarge his authority., 284 Instead, Waite's important intellectual accomplishment as the Chief Justice was that he tended to reinforce the
dominant doctrinal views that were present. For instance, he embraced
the limited understanding of the Slaughterhouse Cases,285 articulated by
Miller (and in sharp contrast to Field), regarding the limited intent and
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 86 The Court largely adhered to that
construction throughout Waite's tenure, in both economic and race discrimination cases.287 Yet the significance of Waite's support of that view
should not be minimized. Chief Justice Chase cast a dissenting vote in
that five to four decision.2 88 Waite's endorsement of Miller's position
thus made the 1873 ruling far more enduring.
Also to be considered in the arena of intellectual leadership is the
all-important ruling in Munn v. Illinois, where Waite wrote for a sevenJustice majority, affirming the authority of states to set the rates that
could be charged by grain warehouses, and presumably by all other enterprises, where property was "affected with a public interest., 289 Here,
however, Bradley was of great help to Waite as he was writing his opinion. In conference, the Court had agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was no barrier to rate-regulation in such instances. 290 Bradley's contribution lay in supplying his Chief with ample
foundation, by way of a treatise by an English jurist and English court
decisions, for the doctrine that the Munn Court was writing into American constitutional law. 291 Waite's imprint on Munn lay in his insistence
282.
FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
79 (Quadrangle Books 1964) (1937).
283.
Id. at 80.
284. Id.
285.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
286.
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79-80.
287.
See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
288. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111.
289. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126 (internal quotations omitted).
290. Id. at 125.
291.
Stephenson, supra note 155, at 921-22.
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that (1) the Court should give legislators wide latitude in selecting the
property which fell within that category and that (2) once the right to
regulate was established, the reasonableness of the rate or other regulation was a legislative, not a judicial, question.292
Munn was one of the so-called GrangerCases,293 all decided on the
29
same day.294 The others involved state regulation of railroad rates. 5
Those cases presented not only the due process issue that Munn resolved,
but a Commerce Clause problem as well.296 Waite steadfastly clung to
his view, in those cases, that state regulation of railroads was acceptable
under the Commerce Clause, even when it impacted interstate travel and
shipments. 297 It was on this critical point that his seven to two majority in
the Granger Cases became a six to three majority against his position
nine years later in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois.298
Miller, who had been in the majority in the Granger Cases, led the new
majority, with Bradley, Gray, and Waite in dissent. 299 The Chief Justice
not only failed to command his Court on this vital question, but steadfastly refused to adjust his own views to accommodate the new majority.
Perhaps Waite's singular contribution to the Court derived from his
character, in the broadest sense of that word. It seemed to imbue all that
he did as Chief. The Court under Chief Justice Taney was badly sullied
by Dred Scott in 1857.300 It took a bevy of Lincoln appointees before the
Court appeared reasonably trustworthy again in the wake of secession
and the Civil War.30 ' Even then, an occasional anti-war or antiReconstruction opinion such as Davis's in Ex parte Milligan, °2 or
Field's in the Test Oath Cases,30 3 was enough to awaken doubts about
the institution's fealty to the Union. °4

292. See id. at 924-925.
293. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 164.
294. Stephenson, supra note 155, at 920.
295. See, e.g., Peik v. Chicago & N.-W.Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877).
296. Peik, 94 U.S. at 175.
297. Id. at 175, 177-78.
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118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
299. Wabash, 118 U.S. at 560, 577.
300. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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See Stephenson, supra note 155, at 902.
302. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Exparte Garland,71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
304. For example, while later generations have hailed Davis's defense of liberty in Milligan,
the Republican press and leading Republican lawmakers soundly chastised him at the time-"[t]his
constitutional twaddle of Mr. Justice Davis," editorialized the New York Herald, "will no more stand
the fire of public opinion than the Dred Scott decision." 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 1836-1918, at 432 (Gryphon Editions, special ed. 1992) (1926). The
Court is "a relic of the past, nine old superior pettifoggers, old marplots, a formidable barrier to the
consummation of the great revolution." Id. at 432 n. 1.
Critics feared that Milligan would deny the authority of military commissions in the occupied
states of the old Confederacy and thus undermine Reconstruction. The criticism mystified Davis.
There was "not a word said in the opinion about reconstruction, & the power is conceded in insurrec-
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Chief Justice Chase, Taney's successor, generated his own liabilities for the Court. A gifted but vain man 3°-it was said that there were
four persons in his conception of the Trinity-he was "afflicted," as Carl
Schurz recorded, "with the presidential fever., 30 6 It was the White
House, not the Chief Justiceship, which Chase coveted as the crowning
jewel on an already impressive list of lifetime achievements. °7 He had
sought the Republican nomination in 1856, 1860, 1864, and in 1868,
while Chief Justice, and had courted the affections of both parties, although, due to his meticulous handling of the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson, his standing was far higher among Democrats
than Republicans. 30 8 Chase's opinion for a four to three bench in Hepburn v. Griswold,3° the first round of the legal tender litigation, that invalidated the greenback-financing scheme enacted while he was Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, reinforced the view that he was trying
to ingratiate himself to the Democratic Party in hopes of a presidential
nomination in 1872.310
By contrast, Waite went out of his way to be both not Taney and not
Chase. He tried to avoid Taney's mistake in Dred Scott by embracing a
modest view of the federal judicial power.31' His most memorable
phrase, perhaps his only memorable phrase from fourteen years of service, can be found in Munn: "For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts. 3 12 And he was
not Chase. When rumors circulated in 1876, in the last year of President
Grant's second term, that Waite might be a prospect for the Republican
nomination for the White House, the Chief Justice quickly squelched the
idea.313 "The Court is now looked upon as the sheet anchor," the Chief
Justice replied unequivocally to his nephew, John Turner Waite, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Connecticut. 314 Waite
continued:

tionary States," he wrote in 1867. STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION

POLITICS 67 (1968) (internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, even though the Court never ruled on
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Will it be if its Chief Justice is placed in the political whirlpool? The
office has come down to me covered with honor. When I accepted it,
my duty was not to make it a stepping-stone to something else, but to
preserve its purity and make my own name as honorable, if possible,
as that of my predecessors.... The other field is altogether untried. If
I should fail there, it would to a certain extent drag my office down
to
with me. No man ought to accept this
3 15 place unless he takes a vow
leave it as honorable as he found it.
And he did. Even Miller, who never seemed hesitant to point to
what he regarded as his Chief's failings, developed increased respect for
the man. 31 As senior associate Justice, he presided over the Court in
1885 during Waite's illness. 31 7 This experience with the full demands of
the office led Miller, in a letter to his brother-in-law, to pay his Chief a
backhanded compliment 318 -"I always knew that he did a great deal
more work than I ....
IV. APPRAISAL

"That he should develop any great strength as a judge was not to be
expected of him, and the public expectation was not disappointed," remarked the American Law Review soon after Waite's death. 320 "Certain it
is that he left no great memorials of his strength as a judge," the influential journal continued, "and it is saying much in favor of the character of
Chief Justice Waite to say that he was able to avoid the display of any
great deficiencies as a lawyer while occupying the seat of Chief Justice.",32 1 Because Waite was so closely identified with the decisions of his
Court, the faint praise of this "it-could-have-been-worse" obituary would
seem to be as much a commentary on the Court as a whole, as it was on
its late presiding Justice. If so, then one may fairly conclude, with that
assessment as a baseline, that the stature of the Waite Court has waxed
rather than waned in the intervening twelve decades.
In at least one key respect, the Waite Court stands in moderate contrast to the Chase Court (1864-1873) that preceded it, and in sharp contrast to the Fuller Court (1888-1910) that followed: within the economic
realm, the Waite Court affirmed the power to govern. 322 The corollary to
that affirmation was equally important: reasserted was the principle that
the primary check on government was electoral-through the legislative
315.
Id.
See FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 391.
316.
317.
Id.
318.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 391.
319.
Death of Chief Justice Waite, 22 AM. L. REV. 301, 303 (1888).
320.
321.
Id.
See infra notes 328-34, 367-99 and accompanying text. "Waite and his colleagues . . .
322.
decided as they did with the firm conviction . . . that economic regulation was within American
experience and law." MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 315.
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process-not judicial.323 The Waite Court's overall deference to the
elected branches of both the national and state governments may nearly
place it in a class by itself among all other court eras. Rarely did one hear
cries of "judicial usurpation" or "government by judiciary., 324 Waite's
insistence in Munn that, for protection against legislative abuses, the
people were to "resort to the polls, not to the courts," echoed an idea that
was nearly as old as the Republic. 325 "We must be content to limit power
where we can," argued Justice James Iredell in 1798, "and where we
cannot, ... we must be content to repose a salutary confidence."' 3 26 Chief
Justice Marshall was even more forceful: "The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which
their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances ... the 327
sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them
from its abuse.,
In less than a decade, the Chase Court, on eight occasions, held unconstitutional all or parts of an act of Congress.32 8 This count does not
include Ex parte Milligan, which in 1866 held unconstitutional an executive order of the Lincoln administration. 329 The statistic was remarkable,
because it was at sharp variance with the Marshall and Taney Courts
(1801-1864), when only two acts of Congress were struck down in that
sixty three year period. 330 Despite the Taney Court's debacle in Scott v.
Sanford, the Chase Court invigorated judicial power as a major counterweight to congressional power.
At first glance, the record of the Waite Court seemed nearly identical. Seven decisions invalidated all or part of an act of Congress, and an
eighth did so soon after Waite's death, but before Fuller arrived. 331 However, it must be remembered that the Waite Court was more than four
years longer than the Chase Court.3 32 Moreover, it is important to note
the kind of legislation in those two Court periods that suffered the judicial veto. Plainly, there is nothing comparable during the Waite years to
the Chase Court's holding on legal tender in Hepburn v. Griswold.33 3
Whatever else might be said about that case, it is undeniable that it foreclosed as unconstitutional one of the essential means that Congress had

323.
MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 315.
324.
Id. at 316.
325.
Munn, 94 U.S. at 134.
326.
Iredell's statement was made in the context of the Court's rejecting a challenge to a Connecticut statute under the ex postfacto clause. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 400 (1798).
327.
Marshall's statement was made with respect to the extent of Congress's commerce power.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
328.

EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 96.
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Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 142.
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See Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626.
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chosen to finance the Civil War.334 And what would apply to a war
among the states, presumably would apply to a war with one of the great
powers of the world. From this perspective, the Chase Court complicated
the task of those charged with preservation of the nation.
The prominent exception to the Waite Court's general support for
national power lay in its hostility to federal civil rights legislation. Indeed
four of the seven invalidations while Waite was Chief fell into that category; three involved predations against African Americans (United States
336 and the Civil Rights Cases337) and
v. Reese,335 United States v. Harris,
one against Chinese (Baldwin v. Franks338). Of the remaining three, one
concerned trademarks (Trade-Mark Cases33 9 ), one struck down a criminal statute associated with bankruptcy (United States v. Fox34), and the
other invalidated a customs law on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds
(Boyd v. United States34 1). In fairness to Chase, it should be noted that,
based on his circuit court opinions, he was much more favorably disposed than Waite toward a broad reading of the Reconstruction amendments and civil rights legislation.342 Yet, as questionable as some of the
Waite Court's civil rights rulings might be, none of them threatened paralysis of the national government. Nearly anything the national government wanted to do, the Waite Court seemed prepared to accept as constitutionally permissible. One thinks especially of Waite's vision of the
commerce power in Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Tele34 3
which rivaled Marshall's nationalism in Gibbons v.
graph 34Co.,
4
Ogden.
Still, the hostility that the bench displayed to federal civil rights legislation merits close attention in any appraisal of the Waite Court. The
record shows that the bench was more hospitable to claims brought by
private citizens against state laws and policies, which arguably infringed
the Fourteenth Amendment directly, than it was to upholding congressional enactments designed to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth and
other Reconstruction amendments.34 5 Alongside such civil rights defeats
for the government in Reese and the Civil Rights Cases were civil rights
victories for individuals in Strauder v. West Virginia,346 Neal v. Dela334. See WIECEK, supra note 41, at 87.
92 U.S. 214 (1875).
335.
106 U.S. 629 (1882).
336.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
337.
120 U.S. 678 (1887).
338.
100 U.S. 82 (1879).
339.
95 U.S. 670 (1877).
340.
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
341.
342. HAROLD M. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE 129 (Peter
Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull eds., 1997).
343. 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
344. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1.
345. Compare Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304, 312 (1879), with United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548, 559 (1875).
346. Strauder, 100 U.S. 303.
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ware,347 and Yick Wo v. Hopkins.348 The key to proving a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in a case brought by
an individual, however, lay in establishing racially derived invidious
discrimination. 349 In Justice Strong's words from Strauder, the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by "unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored .... Where legislation was racially discriminatory, but superficially treated blacks and whites "equally," the Waite
Court ordinarily let it pass, although Yick Wo was an obvious exception
352
to that pattern. 351 That perspective lay at the heart of Pace v. Alabama,
and was a precursor to the Fuller Court's353
formal embrace of the separatebut-equal doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson.
The Waite Court's stance obscured an important dynamic at work in
the protection of civil rights. Charges under any of the Reconstructionera civil rights laws would be brought by a federal prosecutor in the appropriate judicial district.354 Upon observance of a crime or on the complaint by a victim, that official could bring to bear the full prosecutorial
resources of the Department of Justice.355 An offense against a person
became an offense against the American people: hence the case name
United States v. Reese. 356 To the degree that the Waite Court narrowed,
or otherwise invalidated, federal civil rights laws as it did in Reese and
United States v. Cruikshank, the role of the government's attorney was
severely marginalized.
Lawsuits to challenge state laws or policies that arguably were in
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment were exactly that: actions instituted by individuals, not by the United States government. In the Waite
Court era, these typically sprang from criminal prosecutions, as in challenges to racially based juror selection.35 7 Such challenges would be developed by counsel or by the defendants themselves.3 58 It would not be a
challenge propelled by the full weight of federal authority. Outside the
context of race discrimination in criminal prosecutions, the hostility of
local community opinion might effectively censor challenges to other
discriminatory practices. There might be a heavy price, in terms of intimidation, that any plaintiff would incur. That prospect alone might incline someone to accept second-class citizenship instead of challenging
it. And without litigation, a court could not act.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
'355.
356.
357.
358.

103 U.S. 370 (1880).
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08.
Id. at 308.
Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1882).
See Pace, 106 U.S. at 584-85.
163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See MAGRATH, supranote 1, at 120-22.
92 U.S. 214 (1875).
See, e.g., Neal, 103 U.S. at 387.
YARBROUGH, supra note 198, at 146.
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Thus, the myopia of the Waite Court on civil rights lay in believing
that a person's rights would be properly vindicated through the ordinary
workings of the judicial process, relying on the Reconstruction amendments alone, without the help of Congress. Perhaps because of their recent memories of an invigorated Reconstruction-era Congress, there was
a latent suspicion among some Waite Justices of an enlarged federal
power. 35 9 Whatever benefit the latter might bring seemed not to be worth
the cost, in most instances at least, of destruction of a widely shared vision of the Union as it was before the Civil War. The irony was that individuals would feel free to vindicate their rights only in the absence of the
very intimidation that the federal statutes, gutted in some instances by the
Waite Court, had been designed to prevent.
A second part of this dynamic involved the results of litigation.
Successful prosecutions brought by the government against persons violating the legal rights of another would mean fines and/or jail sentences
for the individuals found guilty. 360 Not only would these perpetrators be

punished, but the punishments would perhaps make others think twice
before committing similar offenses. In contrast, the effects of an individual's success in convincing the Supreme Court that a particular state law
or policy violated constitutionally protected rights were often far more
limited. No one was fined or imprisoned. True, the courtroom victory
became a precedent that was to govern litigation in similar cases from
that time forward. Yet if a trial judge failed to heed the precedent, there
was little an individual could do beyond an appeal on that point to a
higher court, in the hope that the law would be applied correctly. The
difference was between vindication of individual rights by government
and vindication of the same rights by individuals.
Still a third part of this dynamic involved power. Especially with respect to voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment, energetic enforcement backed by a generous construction of federal civil rights statutes would have translated into a franchise generally free of racial discrimination and so open to all otherwise eligible males. 361 Then, as now,
voting is empowerment. Denial of the right to vote condemns a person to
the mercies of those who do vote. This was Justice Hunt's point in his
in
Reese dissent: "Just so far as the ballot to... the freedmen is abridged, 362
the same degree is their importance and their security diminished.,
"Punishment is the means; protection is the end.9 363 The truth of that
comment became especially evident soon after the last of the federal
troops were withdrawn from the South in 1877. 364 By the end of the cen359.

FAIRMAN, supranote 134, at 332.

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Reese, 92 U.S. at 254 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 105-7 (2000).

Reese, 92 U.S. at 248 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
Id. at 254 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
KEYSSAR, supranote 361, at 107.
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tury, disfranchisement of blacks had become the rule in southern
states. 3365 Moreover, a harsh system of racial segregation entrenched itself
in southern legal systems that was mimicked by private discrimination
elsewhere in the nation.3 66
With the exception of this negativity toward federal civil rights legislation, the Waite Court, in affirming national power, stands out in contrast not only to the Chase Court, but to the Fuller Court as well. During
its twenty-two years, Chief Justice Fuller's bench handed down fourteen
decisions that invalidated all or part of a congressional statute.367 That
number was somewhat higher per term than Waite's seven, but the real
difference lies in the significance of some of those fourteen. Among
them was Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., which struck down the
income tax enacted by Congress in 1894.368 In at least one respect, Pollock was on a par with the Chase Court's ruling in Hepburn. Or at least
Justice Harlan seemed to think so in terms of the risk that the 1895 decision posed for the nation: "It strikes at the very foundations of national
authority, in that it denies to the general government a power [that] is, or
may become, vital to the very existence and preservation of the Union in
' 369
a national emergency."
Also among the Fuller Court's fourteen negations was Adair v.
United States,37 which nullified the Erdman Act of 1898. That law was
an attempt by the federal government to use its commerce power in support of the rights of labor. 37 1 The law prohibited yellow dog contracts, as
well as the firing or blacklisting of employees for union activity.372 Not
counted among the fourteen, because it emasculated but did not invalidate a statute, was United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,373 sometimes called
the Sugar Trust Case. Relying on an exceedingly narrow interpretation
of the commerce power, a five-Justice majority confined the constitutionally acceptable application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 to
374
monopolies involving "commerce," as distinct from "manufacturing.,
The Court placed the refining of sugar in the latter category, and so
pushed the sugar business beyond the statute's reach.375
Arguably, the Waite-Fuller Court comparison is unfair because
Congress flexed its muscles during the Fuller years in ways it did not

365.
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367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at 107-13.
See KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 328-34, 346-49.
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158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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208 U.S. 161 (1908).
KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 447.
See Adair, 208 U.S. at 169; YARBROUGH, supra note 198, at 181.
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while Waite was Chief Justice. 37 6 So, the argument might go, one does
not know what the Waite-era Justices would have done had they been
faced with a similarly activist congressional agenda, beyond the realm of
civil rights. Perhaps, but the same contrasting pattern concerning the
power to govern emerges in the reaction of the Waite and Fuller Courts
to state legislation.
Outside the contexts of the Contracts and Commerce Clauses, the
authority of the states to legislate did not surface in American constitutional law as a major issue until the very end of the Chase Court. 37 7 This
occurred in the Slaughterhouse Cases, when the Court turned back a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state law restricting occupational
rights. 378 Munn v. Illinois,379 easily the most far-reaching decision on that
amendment's due process clause in the Waite period, exemplified the
380
Waite Court's jurisprudence respecting the state police power. On no
occasion did the Waite Court strike down a statute as a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38 ' Practically to the
end, the Waite bench was prepared to allow states a free hand with respect to rate regulation, even when those state-set rates had an impact on
interstate commerce. 382
To be sure, near the close of the Waite era there were signs of judicial impatience with the nearly complet, carte blanche handed state
legislatures in Munn. 383 Just as oral argument was about to begin in Santa
3 84
a case challenging
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,
taxation of certain railroad property, Waite informed counsel that the
bench was not interested in the question of whether the word "person" in
the Fourteenth Amendment included corporations. 385 "We are all of the
opinion that it does, 386 the Chief Justice said, thus making explicit for
the first time, and appearing to emphasize, an understanding that had
387
been implicit in the Court's decisions at least since the GrangerCases.
Mugler v. Kansas then signaled that the Court, in applying standards of
See id. at 370-371.
376.
SlaughterhouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 62 ("The power here exercised by the legisla377.
ture of Louisiana is ...one which has been, up to the present period in the constitutional history of
this country, always conceded to belong to the States, however it may now be questioned in some of
its details.").
See id. at 78.
378.
94 U.S. 113 (1876).
379.
MAGRATH, supra note 1,at 315.
380.
See FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 197-202. The first to do so seems to be Chicago, Mil381.
waukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
Compare Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876) (one of the
382.
GrangerCases), with Wabash, 118 U.S. 557.
383.
See generallyMugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
118 U.S. 394 (1886).
384.
S. Pac.R.R. Co., 118 U.S. at 396.
385.
Id.
386.
EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING AND
387.
DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JURIDICAL CONCEPT 193-94 (Greenwood Press 1978) (1948).
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due process of law, would henceforth look for a connection between legislative means and ends, even as it upheld the statute in question in that
case. 388
Yet it was the Fuller Court that pulled down the curtain on the era
of judicial self-restraint. In an opinion by Blatchford (joined by Fuller
and Brewer, plus Waite-era holdovers Field and Harlan, with Miller concurring separately), Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co. v.
Minnesota held that the reasonableness of rates could not be left by the
legislature to be determined by a state commission but, under the standards of Fourteenth Amendment due process, had to be subject to judicial review.389 That decision completed a judicial revolution, contradicting Waite's insistence in Munn that reasonableness of rates was a legislative, not a judicial, question. 390 The Court was well on its way to becoming what Miller himself had feared in the Slaughterhouse Cases-a"perpetual censor" of state legislation.391
The Fuller Court built on the Minnesota rate case in Smyth v.
Ames. 392 Writing for a unanimous bench, Harlan not only invalidated a
set of rates promulgated by Nebraska, but, in the process of holding that
regulated industries were entitled to a fair return, laid out a formula by
which that return was to be determined.3 93 In the same year, in Allgeyer
v. Louisiana,394 the Fuller Court also found embedded in the Fourteenth
Amendment a right not previously recognized by the Court: liberty of
contract. Employee and employer now enjoyed a constitutionally protected right to bargain individually over the terms of labor, free of undue
interference by the government.395 The implications of this new right
were vast, and were soon realized in Lochner v. New York,396 when
Fuller and four other members of his bench set aside a New York statute
limiting the hours of labor in bakeries. 397 Justice Rufus Peckham's opinion for the majority asserted that it would be the Court's task to ascertain
what restrictions on liberty of contract were reasonable and which ones
were not.398 Until 1937, the ruling cast a long shadow of doubt over the
399
constitutionality of any governmental regulation of the workplace.
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Situated as it was between the Chase and Fuller Courts, the Waite
Court was transitional, but not merely in terms of its chronological place
in the development of the federal judicial system and the questions that it
confronted. It was transitional as well in terms of its rulings. On matters
of civil rights, it was reluctant to admit that the Reconstruction amend400
ments had radically altered the constitutional structure of the Union. It
40 1 Today it is commonplace
acknowledged some change, but not much.
to find references in the literature to the Reconstruction amendments as
"the second American Constitution. ' 4°2 Most of Waite's bench did not
read them that way. To the degree that the outcome of the Civil War
had launched a second revolution in American government, that revolu4
tion, temporarily at least, had ground to a halt by the 1870s and 1880s.40
It would fall to later Congresses and Courts to recognize broader protections within those amendments.4 5 In view of the depth and breadth of
Jim Crow legislation that mushroomed in the years that followed, and the
pervasive and ingenious devices that would be deployed until well after
the middle of the twentieth century to keep African Americans from the
polls, 40 6 the Waite Court might have saved the nation much anguish by
accelerating, not retarding, congressional protection of individual
rights.4 7
Still, it may be unfair to criticize Waite's Court for an absence of
omniscience. The trend of the Court's civil rights decisions after 1875
only conformed to dominant white opinion in both the North and
South.40 8 If blacks gained their freedom as a result of a war among
whites, they were, for a very long time, denied the full realization of that
freedom because of a reconciliation among whites. Sectional harmony
took priority over fulfillment of the promises of Reconstruction. Thus,
the fact that Waite's bench did not do what a late twentieth century
bench would doubtless have done is only to recognize the fallibility that
pervades all human undertakings. His Court was, after all, a collection of
jurists whose world views had been shaped by a pre-Civil War, mainly
Jacksonian, America. It was that America, minus slavery, that most of
them seemed to want to preserve.
If so, that goal-outside the context of civil rights-generally
served the nation well. On questions of the scope of the state police
400.
401.
402.
403.
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power with respect to property, the Waite Court's understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment was very close to the interpretation that controls
today.40 9 On Commerce Clause issues, viewed in the light of the change
of course in the Wabash case, against which Waite dissented, its holdings
were not that far from those of later courts. On Bill of Rights questions
that have so defined the Court since 1937, the Waite Court deserves
credit at least for engaging a few of them seriously. 410 If Waite, as Chief,
and his Court did not achieve true greatness, he and they at least touched
the hems of greatness.
On March 13, 1874, just nine days after his swearing-in as Chief
Justice, Waite wrote a letter to his wife Amelia who was still in Toledo at
the time. "What does all this mean? I suppose I shall realize it all bye and
bye. But it seems strange now., 4 11 Little did he realize what lay in store.
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See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
410.
See, e.g., Jackson, 96 U.S. 727; Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145; Siebold, 100 U.S. 371; Kilbourn,
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RUNNING THE GAUNTLET: ONCE Is ENOUGH WHEN
RUNNING FOR YOUR LIFE
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court faced a novel question in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania: whether or not a defendant, who has received a
statutorily imposed life sentence, mandated by the state after the jury
deadlocked during his capital sentencing hearing, is entitled to double
jeopardy protection.2 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded
that the jury deadlock during the sentencing hearing was a "non-result,"
and should not be protected by double jeopardy.3 In contrast, the dissent,
led by Justice Ginsburg, argued that double jeopardy, in the context of
capital sentencing hearings, should be interpreted more expansively to
protect defendants from choosing between their constitutional right to
appeal and their state-mandated life sentence. 4
The Sattazahn Court's decision holds serious implications for
criminal defendants sentenced to statutorily-imposed life imprisonment.
In particular, after Sattazahn, the costs of an appeal may now be too high
for a defendant given a statutory life term. Beyond the financial stress of
an appeal, a defendant and his family must also face the anxiety of a second capital sentencing hearing. But, more importantly, in the wake of
Satazahn, that same defendant might ultimately pay for an unsuccessful
appeal with his life.
Though the entirety of consequences from the Court's decision in
Sattazahn remains to be seen, criminal defendants and their attorneys
have already felt its impact. For instance, in July 2003, only six months
after the Sattazahn decision, Kristen H. Gilbert withdrew her application
for appeal, even though she steadfastly maintained her innocence. 5 Gilbert was convicted of killing four patients while working as a nurse at a
veteran's hospital, and was sentenced to life in prison because the jury
could not unanimously agree on imposing the death penalty.6 Gilbert
faced the ultimate dilemma in deciding whether to appeal her conviction,
because after Sattazahn, if she appealed, double jeopardy would not protect her from receiving the death penalty on retrial. Faced with this uncertainty, Gilbert explained, "I do not wish to face the death penalty

1.
2.
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4.
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537 U.S. 101 (2003).
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again, and I do not7 wish to subject my family to the ordeal of a death
penalty trial again.",
Moreover, Sattazahn's impact is not limited to defendants, but has
also affected the attorneys who represent criminal defendants forced to
consider these issues. After Sattazahn, criminal defense attorneys worry
about the difficulty of advising clients under similar circumstances to
pursue an appeal of their conviction.8 Christopher Adams of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers summed up this angst noting,
"There is now a class of people basically prevented from appealing their
case." 9 In short, in the post-Sattazahn world, a defendant's options for
appeal may be significantly limited, and are, at the very least, significantly colored by the possibility that he may face death if he opts to challenge his conviction.
Finally, lurking in the shadows of Sattazahn, are recent studies that
raise substantial questions regarding the effectiveness and reliability of
the death penalty process. 10 In January 2003, former Illinois Governor
George Ryan commuted the sentences of 167 on death row, saying he
felt "a moral obligation to act because the system is 'haunted by the demon of error."' 11 Nationwide, as of July 2003, 110 former death row
inmates have been exonerated at retrial. 12 Richard Dieter, executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center, postulated on Sattazahn's impact on this phenomena, and questioned how many of those
former prisoners would have13risked their appeals if they knew they could
face another death sentence.
Within this backdrop, this Comment will explore the Supreme
Court's decision in Sattazahn and the historical setting that precipitated
the Sattazahn Court's ultimate conclusions about double jeopardy and its
application to capital sentencing. Specifically, Part I of this Comment
will review the historical framework of United States Supreme Court
double jeopardy decisions as well as the underlying context of capital
punishment sentencing, including the evolution of the bifurcated trial.
Part II will specifically consider and unravel both majority and dissenting
opinions presented in Sattazahn. Part III will critically analyze these
opinions with attention to the underlying principles of the double jeopardy doctrine and the fundamental tenants of capital sentencing theory.
Within this framework, Part III will also suggest that the Sattazahn maId.
7.
8. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject a Double-Jeopardy Claim, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2003, at A14.
9.
Id.
10. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-19 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(discussing recent studies and journal articles that call into question the effectiveness and propriety
of the death penalty).
11. A Stir in Death Penalty Debate, NEWSDAY, Jan. 13, 2003, at A13.
12. See Burge, supra note 5, at B 1.
13. Id.
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jority disregarded the Court's own precedent by refusing to acknowledge
that "'death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may
be imposed in this country."",14 Finally, the Comment concludes that the
Sattazahn Court abandoned the primary protection historically and theoretically afforded by double jeopardy--specifically that once a defendant
has run the gauntlet by submitting his case to a jury and receiving a final
judgment, he will not be required to run that gauntlet again.
I. BACKGROUND

A. HistoricalOverview of Double Jeopardy
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb .... 15 The Supreme Court set forth the American double jeopardy standard in the landmark case, Ball v. United
States.'6 The Ball decision established the principle that an acquittal, no
17
matter how defective, is a final judgment protected by double jeopardy.
Moreover, the decision established the corollary of that principle: that
double jeopardy does not protect a conviction
that is overturned on an
8
appeal initiated at the defendant's request.1
1. Stroud v. United States

19

After the Ball Court set the American standard for double jeopardy
doctrine, the Court next addressed the double jeopardy implications for a
defendant who received a harsher sentence after retrial in Stroud v.
United States.2 ° In Stroud, the jury convicted the defendant of murder
and sentenced him to death by hanging. 2' Due to a procedural error,
however, the Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial.2 2 Upon retrial, the jury again convicted
the defendant of murder, but this time sentenced him to life in prison.23
Once again, the appellate court set aside the verdict due to error, and the
defendant was tried a third time.24 At the conclusion of the third trial, the
jury again found the defendant guilty of murder, but, rather than recommending a life sentence, the jury imposed death.25

14.
United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474 (D. Vt. 2002) (quoting Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977)).
15.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

163 U.S. 662 (1896).
Ball, 163 U.S. at 671.
Id. at 672.
251 U.S. 15 (1919).
Stroud, 251 U.S. 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 17-18.
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The Stroud Court held that, in accordance with Ball, double jeopardy did not protect the defendant's two prior reversals.26 Accordingly,
the Stroud Court concluded that the defendant was properly retried for
the same offense.2 7 As for receiving the death penalty after the third trial,
the Court determined that the jury was given the option to recommend a
life sentence, but declined to do so. 28 The fact that the defendant received
a life sentence after his first retrial did not trigger double jeopardy protection because that sentence was vacated when the defendant successfully appealed his conviction. 29 Therefore, the Court concluded, the defendant was properly retried for murder, and his sentence, the death penalty, was a legitimate punishment for that crime.3 °
31
2. North Carolinav. Pearce

Fifty years after Stroud, the Court again addressed the question of
whether double jeopardy should protect a defendant from receiving a
harsher sentence upon retrial in North Carolina v. Pearce.32 In Pearce,
the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, and
was sentenced to twelve to fifteen years in prison. 33 Several years after
his conviction, the defendant successfully appealed his case and was
granted a new trial.34 Upon retrial, the defendant was again found guilty

and was sentenced to eight years in prison. 35 However, when the court
considered the defendant's second sentence, coupled with the time he
sentence resulted in a longer prison term
had already served, his total
36
sentence.
original
his
than
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that double jeopardy does not
bar a harsher sentence upon retrial when the original conviction has been
set aside at the defendant's request. 37 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, summed up the history and purpose of the double jeopardy doctrine by explaining that "the rationale [for double jeopardy] ...

rests ul-

timately upon the premise that the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean. 38 However, the Court ultimately ruled that, although the defendant must be

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 18.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
Pearce,395 U.S. 711.
Id. at 713.
State v. Pearce, 145 S.E.2d 918, 920-21 (N.C. 1966).
Pearce,395 U.S. 713.
Id.
Id. at 719-20.
Id. at 720-21.

2003]

RUNNING THE GAUNTLET

given credit for the time he has served under his original sentence, the
unexpired portion of the original sentence should be vacated.39
Thus, the Pearce Court concluded that, if acquitted, the defendant
would not have to serve the remainder of his original sentence. 40 However, if convicted upon retrial, the defendant must serve his lawful punishment for his second conviction, even if that resulted in a longer total
sentence than his original sentence. 4' This rationale has provided the
basis for the modern double jeopardy standard: there is no constitutional
guarantee protecting a defendant from a harsher sentence at retrial.4 2
43
3. Bullington v. Missouri

Even after Pearce, the Supreme Court's treatment of double jeopardy remained unsettled, particularly in the context of the death penalty.
In fact, only twelve years later, the Court in Bullington v. Missouri4 refused to extend the Pearce rationale to life sentences imposed in the context of capital sentencing.4 5
Capital punishment in the United States went through significant
transformations in 1972 with the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia.4 6After Furman47 and its progeny, states continuing to enforce
the death penalty developed bifurcated trials to meet Furman's dual constitutional mandates of guiding and limiting the jury's discretion, and
ensuring that the jury has the opportunity to consider the defendant's
individual circumstances.48 A bifurcated trial divides a capital murder
trial into two separate components: first, a trial on guilt or innocence, and
then, if the defendant is found guilty, a separate sentencing hearing to
consider the appropriateness of the death penalty. 49 For example, in Bullington, Missouri law required that during the capital sentencing hearing,
the jury should consider additional evidence of mitigating and aggravating factors relevant to the defendant's crime. '0 Additionally, Missouri
39. See id. at 718-19, 721.
40. Id. at 721.
41.
See id.
42.
See id. at 720-21.
43.
451 U.S. 430 (1981).
44.
Bullington, 451 U.S. 430.
45.
Id. at 445.
46.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
47.
Each of the five Justices concurring in the judgment of the Court issued a separate opinion
finding that the death penalty, as applied to three petitioners, one convicted of murder and two
convicted of rape, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57, 305, 310, 314, 370.
48.
See United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 475-76 (D. Vt. 2002) (discussing the
reasoning behind the bifurcated trial system).
49.
See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 433-34.
50.
See id. at 433-34, 435 n.4. The defendant was sentenced under Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006
(1978), that provides in relevant part:
Where the jury ... returns a verdict or finding of guilty as provided in subsection 1 of
this section [trials upon an indictment for capital murder], the court shall resume the trial
and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury ... at which time the only issue shall
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law required the judge to instruct the jury that, even if they found proof
of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, they were permitted,
but not required, to impose the death penalty. 51
Within this legislative and constitutional framework, the Supreme
Court considered the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to modem capital sentencing schemes. In Bullington, the defendant was convicted of capital murder.5 2 The day after his conviction, the sentencing
phase of the trial began with the prosecution presenting evidence of aggravating circumstances justifying the death penalty. 53 The defense presented no evidence of mitigating circumstances.5 4 After deliberations, the
jury recommended a life sentence for the defendant, rather than the death
penalty. 55
Shortly after his conviction, the Court granted the defendant a new
The state promptly notified the defense of its intent to pursue the
death penalty at retrial.57 Bullington argued that his life sentence was
protected by double jeopardy, thus barring the prosecution from retrying
the death sentence. 58 The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, held that
neither double jeopardy, nor any other constitutional provision, barred
the prosecution from seeking the death penalty upon retrial.59
trial.56

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Supreme
Court of Missouri in a landmark opinion that remains controversial to
this day. 60 First, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, distinguished
Buffington from previous double jeopardy cases. 6 ' Justice Blackmun
be the determination of the punishment to be imposed. In such hearing, subject to the
laws of evidence, the jury . . . shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation,
and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions
and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any
such prior criminal convictions and pleas. Only such evidence in aggravation as the
prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The
jury... shall also hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney regarding the punishment to be imposed.... Upon conclusion of the evidence and
arguments, the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions and the jury shall retire
to determine the punishment to be imposed.
Id.
Bullington, 451 U.S. at 434-35 (citing Mo. APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS CRIM. § 15.46
51.
(1979)).
Id. at 435.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 435-36.
55.
Id. at 436. After Bullington was convicted, the United States Supreme Court decided
56.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), in which the Court found Missouri's constitutional and
statutory provisions allowing women to claim automatic exemptions from jury duty deprived a
defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360. Thus, the trial
court granted Bullington a new trial based on Duren. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 436.
Bullington, 451 U.S. at 436.
57.
Id.
58.
State ex rel Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
59.
Bullington, 451 U.S. at 437, 446.
60.
See id. at 444-46.
61.
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found that, while Pearce stands for the principle that a retrial after appeal
nullifies the first judgment and wipes the slate clean, this principle does
not apply when a jury finds the prosecution has failed to prove every
element of its case, including the aggravating factors necessary to impose
the death penalty. 62 Further, Justice Blackmun grounded the Court's dev.
cision in precedent and suggested that the Court's decision in Green
64
United States63 foreshadowed this exception to the Pearcerationale.
In Green, the jury declined to convict the defendant of first-degree
murder, but did convict him of the lesser included charge of seconddegree murder.65 Upon retrial, the Court held that double jeopardy protected the defendant from facing a second trial on first-degree murder
because the defendant "was forced to run the gantlet once on that charge
and the jury refused to convict him.",66 Applying Green's rationale to
Bullington, Justice Blackmun explained that in a capital sentencing hearing, the prosecution carries the burden of proving such aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.67 Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded that
a modem capital sentencing hearing resembled a trial, with a life sentence being the equivalent of an acquittal on the death penalty, and therefore warranting double jeopardy protection.6 8
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun declared that affording double jeopardy protection to the results of capital sentencing hearings was consistent with the underlying constitutional principle of protecting defendants
from the "embarrassment, expense and ordeal" of multiple prosecude that allowing the State,
Baku added
tions. 69 Significantly, Justice Blackmun
with its limitless resources, to continue to pursue the death penalty,
would result in an "'unacceptably high risk'

...

[of] an erroneously im-

1170

posed death sentence ....

In contrast, Justice Powell, writing for the dissent in Bullington, disagreed that a sentencing hearing in a bifurcated trial sufficiently resembled a trial on the merits thus warranting double jeopardy protection. 71 In
a strongly worded dissent, Justice Powell proclaimed, "I consider the
Court's opinion irreconcilable in principle with the precedents of this
Court. 7 2 Citing both Stroud and Pearce, Justice Powell reiterated the
long-established double jeopardy principle that a defendant may receive

62.

See id. at 443-46.

63.

355 U.S. 184 (1957).

64.
65.

See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 442-43 (citing Green, 355 U.S. 184).
Green, 355 U.S. at 186.

66.

Id. at 190.

67.

Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446.

68.
69.
70.

See id. at 445-46.
Id. at 445 (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88).
Id. (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980)).

71.
72.

See id. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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a harsher sentence upon retrial.73 Furthermore, the dissent rejected the
majority's conclusion that a jury's recommendation of a life sentence in
a capital sentencing hearing amounted to an implicit acquittal of the
death penalty.74
75
4. Arizona v. Rumsey

Three years after Bullington, the Court, in Arizona v. Rumsey 76 extended double jeopardy protection to capital sentencing hearings in
which the judge, rather than the jury, sentenced the defendant to life in
prison.77 The Supreme Court held that a life sentence issued by the trial
judge amounts to "an acquittal on the merits," and in accordance with
Bullington,
must bar any retrial on sentencing, even if based on legal
78
error.

Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented on the basis
that Bullington was wrongly decided, and, moreover, that the reasoning
behind Bullington does not apply to cases in which resentencing is required due to legal error.79 Justice Rehnquist argued "[b]ut for the trial
judge's erroneous construction of governing state law, the judge would
have been required to impose the death penalty., 80 Thus, Rehnquist concluded, there was no logical reason to overturn the death sentence in this
case, simply because the Arizona Supreme Court corrected a legal error
of the trial judge.81
Thus, double jeopardy doctrine evolved over the course of a hundred years. Beginning with the basic concept of permitting the State to
retry a defendant who has successfully overturned his conviction, the
Court then addressed the application of double jeopardy to a defendant
who received a harsher sentence upon retrial. Finally, the Court considered the more complex issues of how double jeopardy doctrine should
apply in a context of capital sentencing. Bullington and Rumsey, the
Court's final words on double jeopardy before Sattazahn, represent the
crossroads between traditional double jeopardy doctrine and the relatively new concept of capital sentencing hearings.
B. Overview of the History and Development of CapitalSentencing
Under English law in the late eighteenth century, a defendant's conviction on an indictment resulted in a specific statutorily determined sen73.

Id.

74.
75.

Id. at 448-49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
467 U.S. 203 (1984).

76.
77.

Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203.
Id. at 211-12.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 211.
Id. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 214 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 214-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tence that the judge had no discretion to alter.8 2 The judge's sole recourse, if he thought the sentence was exceedingly harsh, was to commute the sentence through the pardon process.83
In contrast, as American sentencing procedures developed during
the nineteenth century, trial judges began to exercise wide discretion in
determining a defendant's punishment within the parameters of statutorily prescribed limits. 8 4 During this period, the jury's role was to determine if the prosecution had proved every element of the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.8 5 If the jury found the defendant guilty, the judge's
role was to review a broad range of information regarding the case to
determine the most appropriate sentence. 86 In accordance with the philosophy of individualized and indeterminate sentencing, the judge was
permitted to consider a broad range of facts, including facts that would
not be admissible at trial, such as hearsay.87
Currently, a judge's sentencing discretion is restricted by federal
and state sentencing guidelines.88 Capital sentencing hearings are restricted at the federal level by the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) and
at the state level by statutory requirements.8 9 However, the more relaxed
evidentiary standards permitted during the discretionary period of sentencing remain in place today. 90 Furthermore, in a post-Furman world,
sentencing must meet the dual constitutional requirements of guiding and
limiting the jury's discretion, as well as providing for individualized consideration of facts specific to the defendant's circumstances. 91 In order to
meet these seemingly disparate goals, the FDPA, for example, treats aggravating death penalty factors as similar to elements of a capital offense,
thus requiring the prosecution to prove such factors to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.9 2 However, if these factors were proven during the
sentencing phase of the trial, the relaxed evidentiary standards, not permissible at trial, would be allowed.93
94
1. Apprendi v. New Jersey

In recent years, the Supreme Court has struggled to determine the
scope and nature of constitutional requirements with respect to modem
82.
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 (2000) (discussing criminal law treatment
in eighteenth century England).
83.
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
84.
See id. at 481.
See Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
85.

86.

See id.

87.

See id.

88.

See id.

89.
90.
91.

See id.
See id. at 482-83.
See id. at 482.

92.

See id.

93.

See id. at 483.

94.

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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criminal sentencing. For example, in Apprendi v. New Jersey,95 the Supreme Court considered the nature of sentencing factors that had the effect of enhancing a defendant's punishment for the crime but were not
part of underlying crime. In particular, the Supreme Court examined
whether the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants at
trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied with equal force
solely in the context of sentencing. The Apprendi Court found that when
proof of an additional fact increases the statutory maximum penalty for a
crime, then that fact is the "functional equivalent" of an element, regardless of its label. 96 Further, the Court concluded that if a fact is the "functional equivalent" of an element, then the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
require that a jury make that finding of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.97
98

2. Ring v. Arizona

Only two years after deciding Apprendi, the Supreme Court, true to
form, followed the same analysis in the context of capital sentencing in
Ring v. Arizona.99 In Ring, the jury convicted the defendant of felony
murder.' °° According to state law, after the defendant's conviction, the
trial judge was required to make further findings regarding the existence
of aggravating and mitigating factors.10' After his review, the sentencing
judge recommended the death penalty,10 2 a sentence later affirmed by the
Arizona Supreme Court. 10 3 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
overturned the Arizona decision.' °4 The Ring Court applied the Apprendi
rationale to conclude that a sentencing factor enhancing the defendant's
ultimate sentence from life to death is the functional equivalent of an
element of the offense.105 Accordingly, like Apprendi, the Ring Court
found that to comport with Sixth Amendment guarantees, a jury and not
a judge must find the existence of that sentencing factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 106 In short, after Furman, capital sentencing requires
proof of aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the appropriateness of the death penalty. In Ring, the Court found the statutory aggrava95. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83. Apprendi pled guilty to one count of second-degree possession of a firearm after he fired several shots into the home of an African-American family, and stated
he did not want the family living in his neighborhood because of their race. Id. at 469. Apprendi later
retracted this statement. Id. Apprendi's conviction carried a prison sentence of five to ten years;
however, because the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was racially
motivated, his sentence was enhanced beyond the statutory limit to a twelve-year term. Id. at 470-71.
96.
Id. at 494 n. 19.
97.
Id. at 490.
98.
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
99.
Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
100. Id. at 592.
101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 594.
State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1154-56 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc).
Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
Id.
Id.
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tors and mitigating factors to be functional equivalents of elements of the
defendant's underlying crime and, thus, required that a jury make findings on those factors beyond a reasonable doubt.° 7
In addition to the significant effects on states' capital sentencing regimes, 1 8 the Ring opinion also illustrated the Court's disparate views on
the capital sentencing process since Furman. °9 The majority emphasized
that in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth
Amendment, the states had devised elaborate capital sentencing procedures, but that this alone was not constitutionally sufficient if the process
did not also incorporate other protections, such as the right to a trial by a
jury under the Sixth Amendment." 0 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, expressed his concern over the burdens placed on the states by
Furman.11 However, Justice Scalia joined with the majority largely because of his concerns over the erosion of the right to a jury trial. 1 2 Justice Breyer, who dissented in the Apprendi decision, nevertheless joined
in the Ring decision based on his belief that a constitutional capital sentencing hearing under the Eighth Amendment requires that a death sentence must be imposed by a jury, and not a judge.13
Thus, the capital sentencing process today reflects the tension between Furman's requirements of limiting the jury's discretion by providing sentencing guidelines, and the concomitant obligation to provide
defendants with the benefit of individualized consideration. This inherent
tension is exacerbated by the deep divisions within the Court as to what
constitutional protections should apply to capital sentencing hearings and
the rationales behind those protections. An appreciation of the history of
the capital sentencing process as well as the Court's conflicting ideologies is essential to unravel and comprehend the Court's otherwise inexplicable decision in Sattazahn.
I. SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA"

4

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
In Sattazahn, the defendant and his accomplice robbed a restaurant
manager one evening, and shot him in the back as he tried to flee. 1 5 At
107.
108.

Id.
See Jason E. Barsanti, Ring v. Arizona: The Sixth and Eighth Amendments Collide: Out of

the Wreckage Emerges a Constitutional Safeguardfor Capital Defendants, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 519,
522-23 (2004) (noting that the Ring Court's decision requiring that juries impose the death penalty
struck down capital sentencing schemes in seven states and called into question the schemes of at
least four other states).

109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Ring, 536 U.S. at 606-19.

Id. at 606-08.
Id. at 610-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 614, 618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
537 U.S. 101 (2003).
Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 103.
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trial, a jury convicted Sattazahn of numerous charges, including capital
murder, assault, and conspiracy. 116 During the penalty phase of trial, the
prosecution presented evidence of one aggravating circumstance: the
7
commission of murder while perpetrating another felony. 11 The defense
presented evidence of two mitigating circumstances: first, the defendant's lack of a significant criminal history, and second, his age at the
time of the crime. 1 8 After three and a half hours of deliberation, the jury
19 The judge
notified the judge that they were hopelessly deadlocked.
by Pennsylvania statute, 120 entered a
dismissed the jury, and, as required
2
sentence of life imprisonment.
Sattazahn appealed and successfully had his original conviction
overturned on the basis that the trial judge erred when instructing the jury
regarding the charges. 122 Upon retrial, the defendant was again convicted
of capital murder. 2 3 During his capital sentencing hearing, the prosecution offered evidence not only of the original aggravating factor, but also
24
of an additional aggravating factor not presented during the first trial.
The defendant argued that double jeopardy barred the state both from
seeking the death penalty on retrial, and also from presenting evidence of
2
denied
the second aggravating circumstance on retrial. 2 The trial 1court
to death. 26
him
sentenced
jury
the
and
motion,
the defendant's
On appeal before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Sattazahn argued that his statutorily mandated life sentence should be protected by27
a jury deadlock.
double jeopardy, despite being required as a result of
Moreover, the defense argued that the imposition of the death penalty
violated Pennsylvania's constitutional guarantee granting a right to ap2
peal, a right omitted from the Federal Constitution. 8 Sattazahn further
Id.
116.
Id. at 104.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id. at 104-05 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (c)(1)(v) (Purdon Supp. 2002) which
120.
states "the court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.").
Id. at 105.
121.
Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597, 600, 606 (Pa. Super Ct. 1993).
122.
123. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105.
124. Id. During retrial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of two aggravating factors: the
commission of the murder during the perpetration of another felony, and the defendant's prior felony
convictions involving threats of violence against another person. Id.
125. Id.
Id.
126.
Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 367 (Pa. 2000).
127.
Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 368. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides in relevant part:
128.
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record;
and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative
agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as
provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by

law.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 9.
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argued that any rational defendant in his position would decline to exercise his state constitutional right to appeal if the ultimate failure of that
129
appeal could result in losing the life sentence that he already received.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Sattazahn's arguments,
instead finding that since the jury deadlocked during the sentencing proceeding, there was no clearly implied acquittal on the merits warranting
double jeopardy protection. 130 Furthermore, the court added that there
was no evidence that the legislature intended the imposition of a life sentence after jury deadlock to equate to a final sentence. 13' Finally, the
court dismissed the defendant's argument that the imposition of the death
penalty had a chilling effect on his state constitutional right to appeal,
concluding "Sattazahn ignores the fact that .. .the United States Supreme Court has rejected the claim that a harsher sentence on retrial ' has
32
a chilling effect on the defendant's right to appeal... his conviction." 1
B. The Majority Opinion
Sattazahn presented the Court with an opportunity, for the first
time, to define what constitutes a mistrial during a capital sentencing
hearing.133 Specifically, the Court addressed whether double jeopardy
protects a defendant who receives a life sentence because of a jury deadlock during the sentencing phase of a capital trial from facing another
death penalty prosecution upon retrial. 134 The Court sharply divided on
the issue, with Justice O'Connor providing the tie-breaking vote in favor
of the State's position that the life sentence was not a final verdict on the
merits and therefore not protected by double jeopardy. 135
Writing for the five justice majority, Justice Scalia first distinguished Sattazahn from Bullington and Rumsey. 136 Justice Scalia suggested that double jeopardy applied to those cases because they resulted
from the jury's finding of additional facts during the sentencing hearing
and not because of the life sentences initially imposed. 137 Further, Justice
Scalia rejected the defendant's argument that Bullington recognized a
unique standard for double jeopardy protection in the context of capital
sentencing. 38 Rather, Justice Scalia explained that the relevant trigger
for double jeopardy protection was merely whether or not the sentence
equated to an acquittal on the merits. 139 Thus, because Sattazahn's life
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 368.
Id. at 367.
ld. at 368.
Id. at 368-69.
See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 108-10.
Id.
Id. at 109.
Id.
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sentence resulted from a jury deadlock, and not from the jury's findings
majority reasoned that double jeopardy should not apon the
n merits, the
ply.
pl-140
Additionally, in Part III of the opinion, Justice Scalia discussed the
impact of Apprendi and Ring to support his conclusion that a jury dead1 41
lock during capital sentencing is not protected by double jeopardy. In
particular, Justice Scalia reiterated that, under Apprendi, any fact that
increases the maximum sentence a defendant may receive for his crime is
the functional equivalent of an element of that crime, and must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 Justice Scalia noted that Ring applied Apprendi's analysis to capital sentencing, and found that, in accordance
not a judge, can find the
with the Sixth Amendment, only a jury, and
143
existence of additional aggravating factors.
Applying Apprendi and Ring to the double jeopardy consideration,
Justice Scalia reasoned that "'murder plus one or more aggravating cirproceeding. 44
cumstances"' is the offense on trial during the sentencing
A jury's recommendation of a life sentence, therefore, is essentially an
implied acquittal on the charge of "murder plus one or more aggravating
circumstances" and a conviction of the lesser-included offense of murder.' 45 Accordingly, Justice Scalia acknowledged that after Ring, double
jeopardy protection must be afforded to the jury's life sentence when that
on the offense of 'murder plus aggraresult is essentially an "'acquittal'
' 146
vating circumstance(s). ,
However, the majority refused to extend this reasoning to cases like
hearing. 147
Sattazahn' s, where the jury deadlocked during the sentencing
In Mr. Sattazahn's case, his life sentence resulted from the default judgment mandated by Pennsylvania statute and not from a jury's findings on
the merits. 48 Thus, because there was no implied acquittal on Sattazahn's charge of murder plus aggravating circumstances, the majority
concluded that49 double jeopardy did not protect his statutorily imposed
life sentence.'
Justice Scalia also added that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court correctly found that there was no evidence indicating that the state legislaverdict. 50
ture intended the statutorily required life sentence to be a final
140.

Id.

141.

Id.at I11.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
at112-13.
Id.
Id. at112.
Id. at103-04.
at113.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 110.
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Justice Scalia suggested that, in the interest of saving the expense and
resources required by another sentencing hearing, a State may be willing
to accept the life sentence.151 However, should the State have to go to the
expense of a whole new trial, due to the defendant's successful appeal,
the state may be "eager to attend to that unfinished business ....
Finally, Justice Scalia used his opinion to respond to several arguments raised by the dissent. First, Justice Scalia rejected the suggestion
that the Court's earlier holding in United States v. Scott 5 3 mandated a
different result in Sattazahn.154 Specifically, Justice Scalia denounced the
dissenters' assertion that because double jeopardy may protect a judge's
termination of trial proceedings in favor of a defendant where the basis
of the termination is not related to guilt or innocence, a similar application of double jeopardy is appropriate where the defendant is sentenced
to death on retrial. 55 According to Justice Scalia, the dissent's reliance
on Scott was misguided, and was "a thin reed on which to rest a hitherto
unknown constitutional prohibition of the entirely rational course of
making a hung jury's failure to convict provisionally final, subject to
change if the case must be retried anyway."'' 56 Moreover, Justice Scalia
explained that double jeopardy does not protect either the termination of
charges on a motion for pre-indictment delay as in Scott, or the life sentence in Sattazahn, because, in both cases, the outcomes did not result
157
from a jury's findings on the merits of the case.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia addressed and summarily dismissed the
argument that allowing the state to pursue the death penalty a second
time following defendant's successful appeal of his underlying conviction would have a chilling effect on future appeals. 58 According to Justice Scalia, the chilling effect of multiple prosecutions has never been
determinative of double jeopardy protection, and there was no reason for
the Court to change course in Sattazahn.159 Reiterating his earlier discussion of the state's economic interests, Justice Scalia stated "[t]his case
hardly presents the specter of 'an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing
a defendant ....,,,60 Instead, Justice Scalia reasoned, the circumstances
in Sattazahn illustrated a state, reasonably willing to conserve its eco-

151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (rejecting "the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited
any new trial after the setting aside of a of a judgment of conviction against the defendant or that it
guarantees to him the right of being hung, to protect him from the danger of a second trial" (internal
quotations omitted)).
154.

Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 113-14.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id.
ld. (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 96).
Id. at 114-15.
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nomic resources by accepting the default life sentence, unless required to
undertake the expense of a retrial at the defendant's behest. 16'
In sum, the majority was unwilling to reexamine and ultimately
modify the application of double jeopardy protection in the context of
capital sentencing.1 62 The Court held, quite narrowly, that double jeopardy only protects verdicts based on the findings of the jury, and a default judgment entered by the State because of a jury deadlock is not a
final verdict. 163 Additionally, the majority concluded that, on balance,
any potential chilling effect on the defendant's right to appeal was outweighed by the economic interests of the State."
C. Justice Ginsburg'sDissent
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
joined, took issue with the majority, and instead found that the defendant's statutorily imposed life sentence should be considered a final verdict warranting double jeopardy protection.1 65 Justice Ginsburg explained
that even though Sattazahn's verdict resulted from a hung jury, this fact
alone should not be dispositive, because jeopardy may terminate in circumstances other than acquittal. 166 Ginsburg suggested that Sattazahn's
statutorily imposed life sentence belonged in the same category of cases
as Scott, where a judge terminates the trial before a determination of guilt
or innocence, and the prosecution may not immediately refile the indictment, but must seek a reversal of the trial court ruling. 67 Under Justice
Ginsburg's reasonsing, this category includes proceedings where the
168
where the State
in Sattazahn,
or asdeadlock.1
terminate,
to because
69
a motion
grants
court
of a jury
sentence
a life
mandates
In Scott, Justice Ginsburg explained, the Court refused to grant
double jeopardy protection because the defendant elected to terminate his
trial before submission to the jury, even though the prosecution was willing to present its case. 170 Distinguishing Sattazahn from Scott, Justice
Ginsburg underscored the fact that Sattazahn submitted his case to the
17
jury, thereby "running the gauntlet" once on the death penalty. Unlike
the defendant in Scott, Justice Ginsburg noted that Sattazahn, did not

Id. at 115.
161.
See id. at 109.
162.
See id.
163.
See id. at 110, 115.
164.
Id. at 118 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165.
Id. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166.
See id. at 121-22 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167.
See id. at 122 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court considers motions
168.
to terminate that are immediately subject to re-prosecution as mistrials, as distinguished from motions to terminate that must be appealed by the prosecution before retrial).
Id. at 122 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169.
Id. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170.
Id. at 125 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171.
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voluntarily terminate his sentencing hearing.172 In fact, Justice Ginsburg
explained, Scott's voluntarily termination of the proceedings before
submitting his case to the jury was the very basis for the Court's denial
of double jeopardy protection. 73 Unlike the State in Scott however,
Pennsylvania already had one complete opportunity to present its case
against Sattazahn to the jury.174 In short, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, Sattazahn's sentencing hearing terminated not because the jury deadlocked,
but rather because
the State required termination in accordance with its
175
statute.
own
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg stressed, the State was required to
accept the statutory life sentence as a final judgment, and had no statutory right to appeal the sentence. 176 This, according to Justice Ginsburg,
afforded Sattazahn far more entitlement to double jeopardy protection
177
than the defendant's dismissal for pre-indictment delay in Scott.
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg strongly criticized the impact of the
majority's decision on defendants and warned that the holding would
necessarily force defendants to choose between exercising their constitutional right to an appeal or risk losing a life sentence to a sentence of
death. 78 According to Justice Ginsburg, this unenviable choice violates
previous Court interpretations of double jeopardy. 179 To support her assertion, Justice Ginsburg explained that in Green, the Court refused to
prolong jeopardy on a first-degree murder charge when the defendant,
convicted of a related second-degree murder charge, successfully appealed his conviction. 180 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the Green Court
ultimately concluded that prolonging jeopardy would impermissibly require the defendant to "'barter [his] constitutional protection against a
second prosecution for an offense punishable
by death as the price of a
8
successful appeal ...of another offense.""1 '
Finally, Justice Ginsburg stressed that Sattazahn was facing the
death penalty, a punishment the Court has long recognized as being
"'unique in both its severity and its finality.' ' '182 Because Sattazahn was
facing death, he had a heightened double jeopardy interest in protecting
his life sentence and avoiding a second death penalty trial. 83 Thus, Jus172.
Id. (The defendant in Scott voluntarily terminated his trial by making a motion for preindictment delay).
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
Id. at 123-24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
176.
Id. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177.
Id. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
178.
Id.
179.
Id. at 126-27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180.
Id. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
181.
Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957)).
182. Id. (quoting Monge v. Califomia, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998)).
183.
Id.
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tice Ginsburg concluded that the historical double jeopardy principles of
protecting defendants from the ordeal and anxiety of multiple prosecutions are even more significant when considered in a death penalty context.'84

HI. ANALYSIS
A. ConstitutionalAnalysis
Justice Scalia's reliance on Apprendi v. New Jersey185 and Ring v.
17
Arizona'86 to support his decision in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania is disingenuous, given that both Apprendi and Ring provide capital murder
defendants with additional constitutional protections,1 88 while Sattazahn
190
strips constitutional safeguards away.1 89 Since Furman v. Georgia, the
Court has addressed repeatedly the safeguards necessary to ensure that
capital sentencing regimes adequately protect a defendant's constitutional rights. 19' For instance, the bifurcated trial evolved as a solution to
the dual constitutional requirements of sufficiently guiding a jury's discretion while providing the defendant with the benefit of individualized
consideration. 192 Ring provided further protections to capital murder defendants by ensuring that any aggravating factors justifying the imposition of the death penalty must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 193 Sattazahn, however, uses the reasoning of Apprendi and Ring to
justify applying another constitutional protection, double jeopardy, in a
draconian fashion, thus resulting in an outcome that places capital murtheir appeal. 194
der defendants in a worse position than they were before
Justice Scalia conceded in Sattazahn that a defendant's life sentence
should be afforded double jeopardy protection, but only when such 195a
Ring.
sentence is based on a jury's findings as defined in Apprendi and
While this is a seemingly attractive argument at first glance, the ugly
underside comes to light after close examination. In Ring, Justice Scalia
proposed that the protections afforded to capital murder defendants, start' 96
ing with Furman, had "no proper foundation in the Constitution."' Additionally, Justice Scalia stated that he was "reluctant to magnify the bur97
These
dens that our Furman jurisprudence imposes on the States.'
184.

Id.

185.
186.

530 U.S. 466 (2002).
536 U.S. 584 (2002).

187.
188.
189.
190.

537 U.S. 101 (2003).
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 118.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 606.
See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,432-33 (1981).
See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111-12.
Id. at 112.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
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"burdens" include the bifurcated trial, and constitutional protections such
as requiring the prosecution to prove every element beyond a reasonable
doubt, and guaranteeing the defendant that only a jury, not a judge, may
impose a death sentence. 98 Justice Scalia, however, ultimately concurred
in the Ring decision because he believed "our people's traditional belief
in the right of trial by jury is in perilous decline."' 199 Thus, even though
Justice Scalia expressed significant reservations regarding the legitimacy
of the current capital sentencing process, he nevertheless concurred in a
judgment that effectively enhanced constitutional protections afforded to
capital murder defendants. °°
However, Sattazahn, presented Justice Scalia with an opportunity to
take the rationales of Apprendi and Ring and use them to undermine the
fundamental goals of the bifurcated trial process. 20 1 Essentially, by finding that only life sentences imposed as a result of a jury's findings are
protected, Justice Scalia effectively eliminated from constitutional protection any life sentence imposed as a default judgment when a jury cannot unanimously agree to the death penalty, even if such a sentence is not
subject to appellate review by the State.20 2 Such sentences will only be
considered final verdicts protected by double jeopardy if the State clearly
expresses that intention. 203
Justice Scalia is correct that, traditionally, double jeopardy doctrine
allows for harsher sentencing upon retrial when a defendant successfully
appeals his conviction. 20 4 However, Justice Scalia ignores that this double jeopardy doctrine developed well before the idea of a bifurcated trial
was even imagined.20 5 Furthermore, he is correct that Apprendi and Ring
provide that a jury must find every element of an offense, including
aggravating sentencing factors, beyond a reasonable doubt.20 6 However,
the Sattazahn majority ignores that Apprendi and Ring were driven by
the necessity for further constitutional protections in the capital sentencing hearing process. 207 Thus, through selective interpretation, Justice
Scalia cleverly cloaked his majority opinion in Sattazahn under
traditional double jeopardy doctrine, Apprendi and Ring, while hoping
others do not see his naked intention of undermining the last thirty years
of capital sentencing jurisprudence.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id.
See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111-12.
See id. at 113-14.
See id.
at 110.
See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,722 (1969).
See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 442.
See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Ring, 536 U.S. at 596-97.
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B. Policy Discussion
The fundamental principle of the double jeopardy doctrine is to protect defendants from facing the embarrassment, anxiety and ordeal of
multiple prosecutions. °8 Additionally, this principle recognizes that allowing the State, with its infinite resources, multiple opportunities to
prosecute the same defendant, increases the likelihood of an improper
conviction. 209 Furthermore, the Court has long held that death is different
and unique among punishments. 1 0 In fact death is the ultimate punishment-entirely irreversible in its finality. 211 Therefore, when the underlying principles of the double jeopardy doctrine are combined with the
constitutional requirements for capital punishment, the result should be
21 2
an exponentially magnified concern for the rights of the defendant.
Regrettably, this is precisely what did not happen in Sattazahn.
For a defendant, who has already "run the gauntlet" once on the
death penalty and received a life sentence by any means other than by the
agreement of the jury, the Sattazahn decision effectively eliminates any
prospect for appealing his underlying conviction, while avoiding the
death penalty.213 The defendant, under these circumstances, would only
appeal his underlying conviction if he were willing to risk being prosecuted for the death penalty a second time.214 In Sattazahn, Justice Ginsburg implored, "the perils against which the Double Jeopardy Clause
seeks to protect are plainly implicated by the prospect of a second capital
sentencing proceeding. 21 5 This is precisely the type of constitutional
quagmire into which the Court has historically refused to place defendants.216
Furthermore, Justice Scalia's suggestion, that a state, in the interest
of economic efficiency, would be willing to accept the default judgment
of life imprisonment as a "conditionally" final verdict, is yet another
attempt to relieve the States from the constitutional "burdens" of the
217
Furman decision. By suggesting, not once, but twice in his opinion
that a state might reasonably seek to retry the death penalty should the
defendant appeal his conviction, Justice Scalia has sent a clear message
to states that unless they explicitly declare otherwise, a defendant foolish

208.

See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 445-46.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id.
Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

217.

See id.at 110.
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enough to appeal his conviction under these circumstances is fair
game.21 8
In conclusion, there is no line of reasoning grounded in the underlying principles of double jeopardy and capital sentencing that supports the
decision in Sattazahn. If anything, Sattazahn further illustrates the ideological gulf separating members of the Court on the issue of the death
penalty. Sattazahn presented the Court with a double jeopardy question,
which was answered on post-Furmancapital sentencing backlash.
CONCLUSION

In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania,219 the Court rejected the principle of
protecting defendants from the dilemma of exercising their right to appeal at the risk of being prosecuted a second time for the death penalty. 0
Furthermore, the Court's decision, based on a narrow application of traditional double jeopardy principles, was an attempt to alleviate some of
the post-Furman v. Georgia221 constitutional "burdens" placed on the
States, at the expense of defendants.222 Since 1972, when the Court found
that the capital sentencing process constituted cruel and unusual punishment in Furman, our judicial system has responded by adding more and
more constitutional protections around the capital sentencing process. 223
By requiring defendants such as Sattazahn to "run the gauntlet" on the
death penalty more than once, the Court is not only undermining the
fundamental goals of the double jeopardy doctrine, but is also out of step
with the capital punishment jurisprudence of the last thirty years.
The current state of capital sentencing in America reflects a continuing conflict about issues such as whether the fundamental purpose of
capital punishment should be deterrence or retribution, the potential unreliability of the process, and the risk of arbitrary application. 224 Ultimately federal and state legislatures bear the burden of creating a constitutional capital sentencing structure. 225 However, the Court will continue
to play a major role in shaping the capital sentencing process. As illustrated in Sattazahn, however, defendants with the most to lose can become unwitting casualties of this continuing ideological battle.

218.
See id. at 110, 114-15.
219.
537 U.S. 101 (2003).
220.
See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 126-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
221.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
222.
See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 108-13; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
223.
See Ring, 536 U.S. at 606.
224.
See id. at 614-18 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
225.
See United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 489 (D. Vt. 2002).
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THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL REALITY OF CALIFORNIA'S
THREE STRIKES LAW: EWING V. CALIFORNIA AND THE
NARROWING OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
INTRODUCTION

For the first time in Ewing v. California,' the United States Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of California's three strikes law.
Despite the controversial 25-year-to-life sentence given to Gary Albert
Ewing for shoplifting three golf clubs, the Court rejected his claim that
the length of his sentence was "grossly disproportionate," and, thus,
"cruel and unusual," under the Eighth Amendment. 2 In fact, the Court's
5-4 decision confirms the proposition, first promulgated in Rummel v.
Estelle,3 that "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare. ' 4
California's three strikes law aims to punish repeat criminal offenders by "ensur[ing] longer prison sentences and greater punishment for
those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses."5 Although voters originally intended
to put "'rapists, murderers and child molesters behind bars where they
belong, '" '6 in practice, non-violent and non-serious offenders make up the
majority of those sentenced under three strikes.7 Consequently, questions
and concerns regarding the proportionality of repeat offenders' sentences
have emerged in the shadows of the three strikes law.
This Comment analyzes California's heavily debated three strikes
law and the Supreme Court's decision in Ewing. Part I offers a brief synopsis of the facts surrounding the Ewing case. Part H addresses the origins of three strikes, provides an overview of the law's key provisions,
and examines the jurisprudence surrounding the proportionality of noncapital sentences under the Eighth Amendment. Part III is an in-depth
look at the Court's plurality decision, which affirmed the indeterminate
1.
2.
3.
4.

538 U.S. 11 (2003).
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-3 1.
445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.

CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(b) (West 2003).
6. Autumn D. McCullough, Three Strikes and You're in (ForLife): An Analysis of the California Three Strikes Law as Applied to Convictionsfor Misdemeanor Conduct, 24 T. JEFFERSON L.

5.

REV. 277, 280 (2002) (citing CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, GEN. ELECTION 5 (Nov. 8, 1994), available

at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1994g.pdf (last visited April 21, 2004)).
7.
Id. at 277-81 (citing Carl Ingram, Serious Crime Falls in State's Major Cities, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at A3).
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life sentence in Ewing. Part IV argues that the Ewing plurality's extremely narrow threshold test stopped short of applying the fundamental
principle of the "'evolving standards of decency' 8 to Ewing's three
strikes sentence and, thus, missed the mark in resolving the proportionality debate. Part IV also addresses the plurality's ruling that any reform of
the law should be left to the legislature, by examining the plausibility of
such reform, as well as the social and economic arguments for revising
three strikes. Finally, the Comment concludes that the California legislature should accept the Ewing Court's challenge and limit the law's application to only serious and violent crimes: a solution that would not only
alleviate the economic and social burdens of three strikes, but would also
ultimately silence the controversy surrounding California's divisive recidivist statute.
I. FACTS OF EWING V. CALIFORNIA

On March 12, 2000, only ten months after being paroled from a
nine-year prison term, Gary Ewing limped out of a pro shop in El Segundo, California in an attempt to hide three golf clubs in his pants leg.9
Suspicious of Ewing, a shop employee notified the police, who subsequently arrested Ewing for theft in the golf course's parking lot.' 0 The
value of the three clubs totaled approximately $1,197." As a result of his
actions, the State convicted Ewing of' "one count of felony grand theft of
personal property in excess of $400." 12
Ewing's criminal history dated back to 1984, when he pleaded
guilty to theft at the age of twenty-two.' 3 Between 1988 and September
1993, Ewing's "rap sheet" continued to grow. In particular, Ewing
served time for a variety of offenses, including thefts, battery, burglary,
and trespassing.' 4 On December 9, 1993, Ewing was arrested and later
convicted of "first-degree robbery and three counts of residential burglary," of an apartment complex in California. 15 In 1999, after serving
approximately six years of a nine-year sentence, Ewing once again faced
the wrath of California's criminal justice system for stealing the three
golf clubs. 16
Given Ewing's four prior strikes for the three burglaries and the
robbery, Ewing desperately tried to avoid the harsh consequences of
California's three strikes law. Specifically, during his sentencing hearing
8.
(1958)).
9.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17-18 (2003).

10.
11.
12.

Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18.
See id.
Id. at 19 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 484 (West. Supp. 2002); § 489 (West 1999)).

13.

Id. at 18.

14.
15.
16.

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
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for stealing the clubs, Ewing asked the court to reduce his grand theft
conviction to a misdemeanor under California's "wobbler" law.17 Ewing
also asked the trial court to use its discretion and "dismiss ... some or all
of his prior serious or violent felony convictions ... ."
,8 However, Ewing's pleas went unanswered. Instead, the trial court sentenced Ewing to
25-years-to-life under the three strikes law.19
On appeal, Ewing raised an Eighth Amendment argument contending that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime of shoplifting three golf clubs. 20 Yet, the California Court of Appeals disregarded Ewing's claim, and affirmed his conviction. 2' The court justified
Ewing's sentence pointing to "the legitimate goal [of the three strikes
law] of deterring 'repeat offenders ....
The Supreme Court of California followed suit and declined to review Ewing's case.23 Finally, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of Ewing's sentence. 24

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Birth of the Three Strikes Law
California's three strikes law was the culmination of public and political concerns over the need for penological reform. 5 Following the
murder of Kimber Reynolds by a parolee, Reynolds's father called on
state officials to sponsor a measure directed towards incarcerating repeat
offenders. 26 In response to his cries, Assembly Bill 971 emerged. 27 Mike
Reynolds's extremely broad proposal endorsed substantial sentencing
enhancements for a second felony, allowed a non-violent criminal history
to necessitate a 25-year-to-life sentence, and accepted any felony in Cali-

17. Id. A "wobbler" is an offense that can be charged as either a misdemeanor or a felony at
the court's discretion. Id. at 16-17. Grand theft is a "wobbler" despite the defendant's prior record.
Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 489(b) (West 1999). Conversely, other crimes, which are
typically categorized as misdemeanors, become "wobblers" because of the defendant's prior record.
Id. at 1183 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 490 (West 1999); § 666 (2002)). If a court uses its
discretion to lower a felony, such as grand theft, to a misdemeanor, a three strikes punishment can be
avoided. Id.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 20. Ewing will not be eligible for parole for at least 25 years. Brief of Amici Curiae
Families Against Mandatory Minimums at 10, Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003) (No. 016978).
20. People v. Ewing, No. B 143745, 2001 WL 1840666, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2001).
21.
Ewing, No. B143745, 2001 WL 1840666, at *3.
22. Id. at *4.
23. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20.
24. Id.
25. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND
YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 3-6 (2001).

26. Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law Is Working in California, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 23, 23 (1999).
27. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15 (2003).
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fornia's penal system for the third strike.28 Despite bipartisan support, the
Assembly Committee on Public Safety defeated the bill soon after its
introduction.2 9
By the beginning of 1994, five new versions of the three strikes legislation resurfaced in reaction to public fury over the kidnapping and
murder of twelve-year-old Californian, Polly Klaas.30 Rather than voting
for one of these alternatives, the California legislature deferred the decision to Governor Pete Wilson, and announced it would pass any plan the
governor selected. 31 Not surprisingly, Governor Wilson chose a "copycat" version of Reynolds's radical three strikes proposal to support his
"getting tough on crime" campaign.32 Upon the murder conviction of
"career kidnapper," Richard Allen Davis, public support of the three
strikes initiative intensified.3 3
By January 31, 1994, an amended version of Assembly Bill 971
passed the Assembly, and shortly thereafter, the California Senate, by
considerable margins.34 After Governor Pete Wilson signed the bill into
law in March 1994, voters "overwhelmingly approved [Proposition 184]
by a margin of 72 percent to 28 percent., 35 Ultimately, California enacted two codified versions of the three strikes law.36 Following the birth
dramatic effects of the law's unique
of three strikes, the broad scope and
37
provisions became a stark reality.
B. Overview of Three Strikes' Statutory Provisions
Three strikes is "designed to increase the prison terms of repeat felons," 38 by punishing offenders convicted of prior "serious" ' 39 or "vio-

See ZLMRING ET AL., supra note 25, at 4. Reynolds's proposed three strikes program was
28.
significantly broader than any other habitual-offender laws being proposed in the nation. Id. For
instance, Washington passed the first habitual-offender law in 1993, which enumerated only select,
serious felonies, with a life sentence on the third conviction. Id. (citing Daniel W. Stiller, Initiative
593: Washington's Voters Go Down Swinging, 30 GoNz. L. REV. 433, 434-35 (1995)).
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14, 15.
29.
30.
ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 25, at 6.
31.
Id. By deferring the choice to the governor, the Democratic legislature hoped he would
back down from tough on crime stance or "be politically neutralized if he persisted." Id.
32.
Id. The governor rejected a narrow version of three strikes proposed by the California
District Attorneys Association. Id.
33.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15.
34.
Id.
35.
Jones, supra note 26, at 24. The passage of Proposition 184 was overshadowed by Proposition 187, which addressed immigration issues in California. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 25, at
6.
Shannon Thorne, One Strike and You're Out: "Double-Counting" and Dual Use Under36.
mines the Purpose of California's Three Strikes Law, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 99, 101 (1999). The two
provisions included: CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 667(b)-(i) (2003) (based on Assembly Bill
971), and 1170.12 (2003) (premised on Proposition 184). Id.
37.
See ZIMRING ET AL., supranote 25, at 17-22. For instance, by 1998 California had 40,000
sentences under its three strikes law while none of the other jurisdictions with recidivist statutes had
reached 1,000 convictions. Id. at 20-21.
People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996).
38.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL REALITY

2003]

lent '40 felonies, generally referred to as "prior strikes.' Paramount to
the three strikes law is that both second-time and third-time convicted
criminals receive enhanced sentences. 42 Specifically, an offender with
one prior "serious" and/or "violent" strike must receive a sentence of
"twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony
conviction. 4 3 Under the "third-strike provision," an offender, who has
two or more prior strikes, is sentenced to "an indeterminate term of life
imprisonment," with the minimum term equaling at least twenty-five
years.44
Although an offender's two prior strikes must fall under the definition of serious and/or violent felonies, the third strike, or "triggering offense," definition includes both non-violent and non-serious felonies.45
The law also allows a "wobbler"-an offense that can be charged as either a misdemeanor or felony-to constitute a third strike.4 6 For example,
the "'petty theft with a prior"' statute, "classifies a petty theft as a 'felony"' if the offender's record contains at least one theft-related conviction.47 As a result, a repeat offender who has committed one prior violent
crime and one prior property-related crime will fall into the "wobbler"
provision if convicted of petty theft.48 On the other hand, a repeat offender with two prior violent crimes, and no history of property-related
crimes, will not be subjected to a three strikes penalty.49
In order to mitigate the ostensible harshness of the law, supporters
of three strikes point to the discretionary dilutions available to prosecutors and judges under California's legal system. First, prosecutors have
an enormous amount of discretion in charging recidivists. 50 Although the
law mandates that prosecutors "shall charge" repeat offenders with a
third strike, in practice, prosecutors can choose to charge a "wobbler" as
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1192.7(c) (West 2003). Serious offenses include arson,
burglary and assault with a deadly weapon among more than 30 enumerated offenses. Id.
40. See id.§ 667.5. Violent offenses include such crimes as murder, rape, mayhem and child
molestation. Id.
41.
Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did "Three Strikes" Cause the Recent Drop in
California Crime? An Analysis of the CaliforniaAttorney General's Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.

101, 102 (1998).
42.

See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(e).

43.
Id. §§ 667(e)(1), 1170.12 (c)(1). While the first strike must be a serious or violent felony,
the second strike can be either a non-serious or non-violent felony. See Beres & Griffith, supra note
41, at 103.
44.
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(e)(2)(A) (stating that a minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence is calculated as "the greater of: (i) Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment
for each current felony conviction .... (ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years. (iii) The
term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any
enhancement[s] .... ).
45.
Beres & Griffith, supra note 41, at 103.
46.
See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 16.
47.
Id. at 50 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (2002)).
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 25, at 26.
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either a felony or misdemeanor and, thus, spare the offender of an enhanced three strikes penalty. 51 Second, if an offender faces a third strike
charge, the court may exercise leniency by dismissing prior felonies "in
the furtherance of justice. 52 However, a judge's discretion is restricted
to "proceed[ing] in strict compliance with section 1385(a) [of California's Penal Code], and is subject to review for abuse of discretion. 53
Additionally, the judge must consider whether the defendant falls outside
the spirit of the three strikes law, by examining the offender's background, the present offense, and the nature of the offender's prior offenses.5 4 Accordingly, a judge's exercise of discretion is substantially
limited in scope and is rarely used.55 Thus, while prosecutors maintain a
substantial influence in determining a repeat offenders' punishment, "the
checks and balances of judicial.., discretion have been removed. 56
Moreover, despite the legal system's alleged safeguards, California's three strikes is still considered "one of the harshest habitual offender laws in the nation. 57 Beyond the fact that any third felony triggers a three strikes penalty, once convicted, the law also precludes release of offenders for good credit at any time before the minimum term is
served.58 Furthermore, plea bargaining of prior strikes is not allowed, and
out of state, as well as juvenile adjudications, can count as prior strikes.59
Critics of three strikes note that both "dual use," (counting a prior felony
conviction twice), and "double counting," (when a single act constitutes
two strikes), add to the law's inconsistencies. 60 However, the primary
critique of three strikes is that the 25-year-to-life sentence mandated under the law is "grossly disproportionate" to the crime and, consequently,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.6' In order to fully understand the
Supreme Court's plurality decision in Ewing, an analysis of the Court's
prior decisions regarding the proportionality of non-capital sentences is
imperative. Throughout the Court's lengthy examination of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause over the years, the Court remains divided
on whether the proportionality principle applies to non-capital sentences.

See McCullough, supra note 6, at 284.
51.
52.
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1385(a) (West 2003) (giving judges the discretion to strike
prior felonies to avoid enhancing a sentence); see also Romero, 917 P.2d. at 632 (recognizing that
judges may use § 1385(a) to impose lesser sentences).
53.
Brief of Amicus Curiae for Respondent Leandro Andrade at 6, Lockyer v. Andrade, 123
S.Ct. 1166 (2003) (No. 01-1127) (internal quotations omitted).
54.
Id. at 7 (quoting People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148, 161 (Cal. 1998)).
55.
Id. at 2.
56.
See ZIMRING Er AL., supra note 25, at 27.
See McCullough, supra note 6, at 282 (citing Andrade v. Attorney Gen., 270 F.3d 743
57.
(9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that only four states, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia and Louisiana,
have repeat offender laws that marginally compare to California's three strikes law)).
58.
Id. at 283.
59.
Id.
60.
See Thorne, supra note 36, at 106-16.
61.
See McCullough, supra note 6, at 278.
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C. Supreme Court JurisprudenceRegardingProportionalityof NonCapitalSentences

The Eighth Amendment demands that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted. 6 2 For more than a century, the Supreme Court has attempted
the daunting task of determining whether the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause includes a proportionality principle. 3
In addressing the proportionality question, courts often consider "'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ' '64 Accordingly, the prohibition of grossly disproportionate sentences most frequently appears in death penalty cases due to the egregious nature of the punishment.65 Although successful proportionality
challenges to non-capital sentences are uncommon, the Ewing Court relied on four leading cases, Rummel v. Estelle,66 Hutto v. Davis,67 Solem v.
Helm,68 and Harmelin v. Michigan,69 to address the proportionality of

Ewing's three strikes sentence.
70

1. Rummel v. Estelle

The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of recidivist statutes for non-capital offenses in Rummel v. Estelle.71 In this 1980
case, the Court concluded that the "length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative. 7 2 The Court affirmed
a mandatory life sentence with a chance of parole for Rummel's conviction of "obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. 7 3 Although Rummel
pointed to the absence of violence, the "small amount of money taken,"
and the harshness of Texas's recidivist statute in his argument, the Court

62. U.S. CONST. amend. ViII.
63. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (reasoning that punishment of
cadena temporal, which entailed 15 years of hard labor with chains fastened to the prisoner's wrists
and ankles at all times, constituted cruel and usual punishment); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.
616 (1912) (rejecting a claim that life imprisonment for horse theft was "cruel and unusual"); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (finding a 90-day sentence excessive for the crime of being
"addicted to narcotics"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (suggesting that only "unique"
forms of punishment can violate the Eighth Amendment, and holding that imposing capital punishment for rape of an adult woman was disproportionate).
64. Gregg v. Florida, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)).
65. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982) (holding the death penalty is excessive for felony murder when the defendant did not
take a life, attempt to take a life, or intend that a life be taken).
66. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
67. 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
68. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
69. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
70. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
71.
Rummel, 445 U.S. 263.
72. Id. at 274.
73. Id. at 265-66. His two prior felonies included fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain
$80.00 and passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id.
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found his pleas unpersuasive. 4 The Court reasoned that "successful challenges to the proportionality of [non-capital sentences] have been exceedingly rare, ' 75 and reserved only for extraordinary circumstances.
The Rummel Court further analyzed the constitutionality of Rummel's sentence by comparing the stringency of Texas's recidivist statute
to other states' habitual offender provisions. 77 Ultimately, the Court concluded that, "[a]bsent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to
traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any other
State., 78 Thus, Texas's comparatively harsh sentencing scheme did not
render Rummel's conviction unconstitutional. 79 Rather, the Court concluded that "Texas was entitled to place upon Rummel the onus of one
who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms prescribed by ...the State." 80 Therefore, by deferring the proportionality
question to the legislature and noting the "rarity" of challenges to prison
terms, the opinion did little to answer the question of whether the proportionality principle applies to non-capital cases.
8
2. Hutto v. Davis '

Two years later, the Court in Hutto v. Davis82 continued to evade
the proportionality question and, instead, reiterated Rummel's holding
that courts are "reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment., 83 In its per curiam opinion, the Court rejected defendant
Davis's Eighth Amendment challenge to a forty-year sentence and fine
of $20,000 for the possession and distribution of about nine ounces of
marijuana. 84 In fact, the Court chastised the Fourth Circuit for finding
Davis's sentence unconstitutional and ignoring the Court's decision in
Rummel. 85 The Court emphasized that "the basic line-drawing process
[regarding the proportionality of sentences] is 'properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.' ''86 Moreover, the Court once again

74. Id. at 275-76.
75. Id. at 272.
76. Id. at 274 n. 1 (noting that Justice Powell's extreme example in the dissent of receiving a
mandatory life sentence for overtime parking constitutes addressing proportionality).
77. Id. at 279-82.
78. Id. at 282.
79. See id. at 281.
80. Id. at 284.
81.
454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
82. Hutto, 454 U.S. 370.
83. Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274).
84. Id. at 375.
85. Id. at 374-75. The Court noted that the "Court of Appeals could be viewed as having
ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court system created by the
Constitution and Congress." Id.
86. Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76).
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stressed that "'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
87
sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare."'
88

3. Solem v. Helm

While Rummel and Hutto deferred the proportionality question to
the legislature, the Court in Solem v. Helm8 9 finally suggested that "all
sentences of imprisonment are subject to appellate scrutiny to ensure that
they are 'proportional' ....,90 In affirming the reversal of Helm's life
sentence without parole for uttering a no account check for $100,91 the
Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits not only barbaric
punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime
committed. 9 2 In response, Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, accused
the majority of "distort[ing] the concept of proportionality of punishment
by tearing it from its moorings in capital cases. 93 Yet, the majority bolstered its decision by applying a broad interpretation of Rummel.94 The
Court recognized "that some sentences of imprisonment are so
disproportionate that they violate the Eighth Amendment," 95 and,
to foreclose proportionality
therefore, Rummel "should not be read
96
review of sentences of imprisonment.',
The Court in Solem also delineated three objective factors to aid
courts in analyzing a proportionality challenge: "(i) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions., 97 Although
Rummel implied that courts were incapable of impartially judging the
gravity of an offense and severity of a sentence, the Solem Court suggested that courts are in fact competent to make these subjective judgments in an objective manner. 98 Accordingly, courts are justified in punishing a recidivist more severely. 99 However, the level of harm caused to
society is also weighed in determining the constitutionally permissible
87. Id. (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).
88. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
89. Solem, 463 U.S. 277
90. Id. at 305. The Court noted that it "do[es] not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of
appellate review of sentences. ...[RIather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate court
at 290 n.16.
decides only whether the sentence under review is within constitutional limits." Id.
Id. at 281.
91.
92. Id. at 284.
93. Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined the
Chief Justice in his dissent. Id. Ultimately, the dissent accused the majority of ignoring the standard
adopted in both Rummel and Hutto. Id.
94. See id. at 303 n.32. The Court stressed that its decision in Solem was "not inconsistent
with Rummel v. Estelle." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 292. These are the same factors proposed by Justice Powell in the Rummel dissent.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 292.
99. Id. at 296.
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degree of harshness in a sentence.'°° Therefore, the Court found that because Helm's prior convictions were minor and nonviolent, his sentence
was disproportionate to the harm and, thus, unconstitutional.' 0 ' By applying the proportionality principle to non-capital sentences, the Solem
Court recognized that lengthy prison sentences could indeed constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. However,
despite the Solem Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, discordance eventually reemerged
in the proportionality debate and resulted
02
in even more confusion.1
03
4. Harmelin v. Michigan'

Because of the conflicting standards in Rummel and Solem, the
Court's recognition of a proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment remained unclear. Almost ten years later, the Court in Harmelin v.
Michigan attempted to resolve the conflict. The Harmelin Court concluded that its decision in Solem "was simply wrong; the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee."'' 4 Yet, the Court
differed on why Harmelin's proportionality claim failed. 0 5 Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, affirmed first-time offender
Harmelin's life sentence without parole for possessing 652 grams of cocaine. 10 6 Unlike Solem, the Court instead concluded that the three-part
test outlined in Solem mistakenly invited judicial subjectivism and, therefore, failed to create a workable objective test.10 7 Furthermore, after careful examination of the historical pretexts of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Eighth Amendment
should be directed at prohibiting the "methods of punishment," rather
than length of sentences. 0 8 Simply put, Justice Scalia drew a bright line
at capital punishment, and refused to extend proportionality review to
non-capital sentences.'°9
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor
and Souter, invoked a "narrow proportionality principle" in his concur0 In contrast to
rence in Harmelin."1
Justice Scalia's "no proportionality
guarantee" for non-capital cases, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the pro-

100. Id. at 292-95.
101.
Id. at 303.
102.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23.
103.
501 U.S. 957 (1991).
104. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965.
105.
Compare id. at 994, with id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
106. Id. at 996.
107. Id. at 986.
108. ld. at 979.
109. See id. at 996.
110. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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portionality principle does apply to non-capital sentences.' In trying to
make sense of the Court's contradictory standards for reviewing proportionality claims, Justice Kennedy extracted four common principles that
emerged over the years-"the primacy of the legislature, the variety of
legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the
requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors,"
such as those delineated in Solen.' 12 However, Justice Kennedy emphasized that in applying Solem's objective three-factor test, "intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare
case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the3
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.""
Overall, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the Eighth Amendment does not
mandate strict proportionality in criminal sentencing, but rather, "forbids
only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the
crime.,,114

In short, Justice Scalia once again maintained that an objective
analysis of non-capital sentences is impossible and, therefore, proportionality reviews should remain with death penalty cases. In contrast,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, successfully illustrated that an objective
analysis is achievable under his modified version of Solem's objective
test. Following Justice Kennedy's lead, the Ewing Court applied a similar
test to evaluate the propriety of Ewing's sentence under California's
three strikes law.
Notwithstanding this precedent acknowledging a proportionality review of non-capital sentences, the definition of what constitutes an "extreme sentence that is 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime," has remained ambiguous. Within this backdrop, the Supreme Court in Ewing
once again addressed the proportionality principle, but this time shrouded
in the controversy of California's three strikes law.
III. EWING V.

CALIFORNIA 15

Following the Court's previous holdings that proportionality reviews of non-capital cases are "rare," the plurality in Ewing adopted an
exceedingly narrow proportionality standard to apply to recidivists' sentences. 1 6 Specifically, the plurality extended the initial threshold inquiry
Id.; see also Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3 (recognizing the possibility of a proportionality
111.
review); Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (holding life sentence for habitual offender with nonviolent felonies as
unconstitutional and grossly disproportionate).
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg112.
ment).
Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
113.
Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
114.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 288). The Harnelin dissent is beyond the scope of this Comment because the
Ewing Court focused on Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
538 U.S. 11 (2003).
115.
116. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20.
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to include a repeat offender's entire criminal history. 7 and, thus, made
"gross proportionality" challenges to non-capital cases practically impossible. 1' 8 Accordingly, the plurality upheld the constitutionality of Ewing's sentence." 9 Justices Scalia and Thomas, went one step further and
reserved proportionality review to only capital cases.120 Finally, while
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, suggested adopting a broad proportionality principle,1 2' Justice Breyer applied a thorough comparative analysis in
his dissent to Ewing's case and concluded that under the circumstances,
Ewing's sentence
was grossly disproportionate and, therefore, unconsti122
tutional.
A. The PluralityOpinion: Reforming Harmelin's NarrowProportionality
Principleto Apply to Non-Capital Cases
In Ewing, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy, affirmed a 25-year-to-life sentence for three-time offender Ewing. 123 In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the proportionality principles set forth in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin. 124 Specifically, Justice O'Connor maintained that the "Eighth
Amendment . . .contains a 'narrow proportionality principle' that 'applies to noncapital sentences."",125 The Court recognized the same four
basic guidelines of proportionality review set out by Justice Kennedy in
Harmelin-'"the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement
that proportionality review be guided by objective factors," similar to
those outlined in Solem.' 26 Accordingly, like Justice Kennedy in Harmelin, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Eighth Amendment proscribed
only "extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the
crime.,,127

In applying a "narrow proportionality principle" to Ewing's sentence, Justice O'Connor first addressed the legitimacy of California's
three strikes law. The Court noted that "[t]hough three strikes laws may
117.
See id. (noting that the trial court considered Ewing's entire criminal history during sentencing).
118.
See id. at 42-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the severity of the plurality's threshold
inquiry).
119. Id. at 30-31.
120.
Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
121.
Id. at 32-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 30-31.
124.
Id. at 30.
125. Id. at 20 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
126. Id. at 23 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
127. Id. (quoting Harnelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment)).
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be relatively new, our tradition of deferring to state legislatures in making and implementing such important policy decisions is longstanding."'128 The Court reasoned that because "[riecidivism has long been
recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment,"' 21 9 California
was justified in "'deterring and segregating habitual [offenders].' 13 ° In
fact, the Court acknowledged that the State's interest in protecting the
public's safety added to the law's validity. To rationalize its reasoning,
the Court pointed to the decrease in California's crime rate, as well as
evidence indicating that more parolees have left California since the inception of the three strikes law. 13' The Court reiterated that any criticism
of three strikes should be directed at the legislature, and emphasized that
"[the Supreme Court] do[es] not sit
as a 'superlegislature' to second32
guess [the State's] policy choices.'1
In addressing Ewing's constitutional challenge, the Court first conducted a threshold analysis of "the gravity of the offense compared to the
harshness of the penalty," as summarized in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin.133 The Court noted the Supreme Court of California's
recognition of the "'seriousness' of grand theft in the context of proportionality review."' 134 Accordingly, the Court opined
' 35 that "[e]ven standing
alone, Ewing's theft should not be taken lightly."'
Notwithstanding the "seriousness" of Ewing's triggering offense,
the Court also considered Ewing's prior crimes when balancing the gravity of the offense against the harshness of the penalty. 136 Unlike Solem
and Harmelin, where the Court only measured the proportionality of the
offender's current crime, 137 Justice O'Connor stated that "[i]n weighing
the gravity of Ewing's offense, we [also] must place on the scales... his
long history of felony recidivism."' 38 This expanded approach, the Court
reasoned, is the only way "[t]o give full effect to the State's choice of
this legitimate penological goal [of deterring and incapacitating habitual
offenders] .... In weighing Ewing's prior offenses against the State's
128.
Id. at 24-25 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998).
129.
Id. at 25.
130.
Id. (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992)).
131.
Id. at 26.
132.
Id. at 28.
133.
Id. This is the first prong of the Solem three-part test. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. Although
the plurality and Justice Breyer's concurrence follow the objective test in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin,the objective factors employed in this analysis are identical to the three-prong test
in Solem. For purposes of this Comment, the author will refer to the framework as the Harmelin
framework.
134.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28.
135.
Id.
136.
Id. at 29.
137.
See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1003-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
138.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29.
139.
Id.
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public safety interests, the Court concluded that Ewing's sentence was
not a "rare case" that was grossly disproportionate to the crime. 40 Thus,
because Ewing's sentence failed to reach the initial threshold, the Court
stopped short of conducting an intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional
comparison of three strikes.
Finally, the Court respected the trial judge's decision to not extend
misdemeanant privileges to Ewing under California's "wobbler" provision. 14 1 Justice O'Connor reasoned that one of the purposes behind the
law's allowance of judicial discretion to reduce certain felonies to misdemeanors was to avoid imposing harsh penalties on rehabilitated defendants. 142 Justice O'Connor rationalized, however, that given Ewing's
long criminal history, the trial judge properly declined to reduce Ewing's
triggering offense to a misdemeanor and, was justified in concluding that
Ewing did not deserve "lenient treatment."'' 43 By affirming the trial
judge's ruling on Ewing's "wobbler" argument, Justice O'Connor acknowledged the legitimacy of using a "wobbler" as a triggering offense
under three strikes.
To summarize, in its plurality opinion, the Court justified Ewing's
sentence in light of the State's primary goal of ensuring public safety.
Instead of following both Solem and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Harmelin and comparing only the gravity of the triggeringoffense to the
harshness of the penalty, the plurality expanded the threshold test to include placing Ewing's entire criminal history on the proportionality
scales. Consequently, given Ewing's habitual criminal behavior, the
Court affirmed the California courts' finding that Ewing's sentence did
not violate the Eighth Amendment, and was not "grossly disproportionate" considering his long criminal history.44 While the Court recognized
that, in theory, the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality principle for non-capital cases, 145 in practice, the narrow scope of the plurality's balancing test does little to advance the reality of proportionality
concerns in non-capital sentences like Ewing's.
B. Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's ConcurringOpinions: The
Eighth Amendment Does Not Include a ProportionalityPrinciplefor
Non-Capital Cases
Although the plurality followed a "narrow proportionality" standard, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, in their separate concurring
opinions, maintained that the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 30.
See id.
at 28-29.
See id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 20.
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is reserved solely for capital punishment.146 The Justices contended that
only to modes of punishment, and not to
the Eighth Amendment applies
47
sentence.
a
of
length
the
Specifically, Justice Scalia referred to his concurring opinion in
Harmelin,148 that the "Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and
unusual punishments' ... was not a 'guarantee against disproportionate
sentences.' ,, 49 While recognizing the importance of stare decisis, Justice
Scalia stated that he would accept a "narrow proportionality principle" if
he "could intelligently apply it."50 Justice Scalia acknowledged the difficulty in applying the proportionality principle when courts must "giv[e]
'51
weight to the purpose of California's three strikes law: incapacitation."'
In fact, Justice Scalia suggested that in order to make clear that the Court
is "evaluating policy," the plurality opinion should "read[] into the
Eighth Amendment . . . the unstated proposition that all punishment
' 52
should reasonably pursue the multiple purposes of the criminal law."'
Justice Thomas, in his brief concurrence, agreed with Justice
Scalia's contention that Solem's proportionality test is "incapable of judicial application."15 3 In keeping with the notion that Solem was "simply
wrong," 15 4 Justice Thomas stated that "[e]ven were Solem's [objective
factors] test perfectly clear, [he] would not feel compelled by stare dethat "the Eighth
cisis to apply it.' 55 Justice Thomas further declared
156
Amendment contains no proportionality principle."
Thus, although both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas concurred in
the plurality's result, they both denied the necessity of even applying a
proportionality principle to Ewing's non-capital sentence.

146. See id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
147. See id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
148. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia announced the judgment of
the Court in Harmelin and delivered the opinion with respect to Part IV, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter joined. In addition, Justice Scalia
offered an opinion with respect to Parts I, H and I1 of the Harmelin decision, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined. Accordingly, Parts I, II and Il of Justice Scalia's Harmelin opinion are referred to
as "concurring" opinions. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961.
149.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 984-85).
150.
Id.
151.

Id.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Harmelin,501 U.S. at 965.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
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C. Justice Stevens's and Justice Breyer's Dissents: The Eighth Amendment ProhibitsExcessive Punishments
1. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Unlike the concurring Justices' opinions that proportionality review
is incapable of judicial application to non-capital sentences, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reasoned that the
Eighth Amendment "directs judges to exercise their wise judgment in
assessing the proportionality of all forms of punishment." 157 While courts
are often called upon to "'draw... lines in a variety of contexts, ' " 58 the
Court has acknowledged the complexity in objectively analyzing the
proportionality of sentences. 159 However, contrary to the plurality's
adoption of a "narrow proportionality principle," Justice Stevens invoked
a "broad proportionality principle."1 60 Accordingly, under Justice Stevens's reasoning, judges should take into account "all of the justifications for punishment-namely, deterrence, incapacitation, 16retribution and
rehabilitation," when conducting a proportionality review. 1
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Similar to Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, concluded that Ewing fell within the "rare
cases" that warranted a proportionality review. 62 Applying the Harmelin
framework, Justice Breyer initially conducted "a threshold comparison of
the crime committed and the sentence imposed.' 63 To analyze the
harshness of Ewing's sentence, Justice Breyer initiated a comparative
analysis between Ewing's case and Rummel and Solem. 164 Justice Breyer
defined three "sentence-related characteristics" to apply in his comparative analysis: (1) "the length of the prison term in real time;"' 165 (2) "the
sentence-triggering criminal conduct;" and (3) "the offender's criminal

157.
Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens notes that the Solem
three-factor test is more on point than Harmelin, since the Solem Court addressed a recidivist sentencing. Id. at 32 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158.
Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 294). Justice Stevens gives
the examples of "line drawing" in cases involving the Due Process Clause, in which judges are
called upon to assess the constitutionality of punitive damages. Id. Similarly, courts exercise discretion to determine if a delay is unconstitutional, in relation to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a
speedy trial. Id. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159.
See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988-89 (recognizing that it is difficult to objectively define
gravity).
160. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161.
Id.
162.
Id. at 36-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163.
Id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
164.
Id. Justice Breyer explained that Rummel and Solem were the precedent "most directly in
point," because these cases addressed the "constitutionality of recidivist sentencing." Id.
165.
Real time is the time "that the offender is likely actually to spend in prison... Id.
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history."' 166 Under his analysis, Justice Breyer determined that Ewing's
claim fell "within the twilight zone between Solem and Rummel ....
First, in comparing the "offender characteristics" of the three cases,
Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's four prior convictions did not
differ significantly from Helm's six prior offenses in Solem. 168 Conversely, Ewing's four "priors" considerably differed in degree from
Rummel's two prior felony convictions, which involved small amounts
of money. 169 Next, in evaluating the differences in the "offense behavior"
between the three cases, Justice Breyer reasoned that the disparity in the
value of the goods stolen, when examined in relation to inflation, was
marginal at best. 70 Ultimately, for Justice Breyer, the key distinction
between each case rested in the length of real prison time. 171
Justice Breyer reasoned that "Ewing's sentence on its face impos[ed] one of the most severe punishments available upon a recidivist
who subsequently engaged in one of the less serious forms of criminal
conduct."' 172 In comparison, although Helm faced life in prison without
parole, 173 Justice Breyer reasoned that Ewing's 25-year-to-life sentence
"is long enough to consume the productive remainder of almost any offender's life.' ' 174 In other words, Ewing's sentence was equally as harsh
as Helm's. Moreover, in Rummel, the Court upheld the sentence, but the
state's recidivist statute allowed parole after ten to twelve years. 175 By
comparing Ewing's circumstances to the factors in Rummel and Solem,
Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's sentence was severe and, thus,
76
unconstitutional. 1
Beyond the comparative analysis, Justice Breyer also considered
several other factors in making his threshold determination. First, in
looking at the harm caused to the victim or society, the "'magnitude of
the crime,"' and Ewing's "'culpability,"' Justice Breyer reasoned that
Ewing's triggering offense "rank[ed] well toward the bottom of the
criminal conduct scale."'' 77 Second, at the recommendation of the Solicitor General, Justice Breyer applied three additional criteria: (1) the fre166. Id.
167. Id. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168.
Id. at 38-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted, however, that one of Ewing's
prior offenses did involve the use of a knife, whereas, Helm's priors were all unarmed offenses.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-80.
169.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 38-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266.
170. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer compared the inflationadjusted price of the golf clubs to Solem and Rummel: $505 compared to $100 in Solem, or $309
compared to $120.75 in Rummel. Id.
171.
Id. at 39-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172.
Id. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 282.
174.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 267.
176. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. 292-93).
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quency of shoplifting; (2) the simplicity or difficulty of detecting the
crime; and (3) deterrence of the crime by varying degrees of punishment. 7 8 Justice Breyer argued that shoplifting is easy to detect because
of surveillance cameras, as well as the presence of witnesses, such as the
store's employees and customers. 179 Justice Breyer also remained skepti80 Finally,
cal as to whether enhanced sentences deterred shoplifting.
although shoplifting occurs frequently, Justice Breyer stressed that "'frequency,' standing alone, cannot make a critical difference."1 81 Based on a
comparative analysis and these additional factors, Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's claim fell within the "rare" occurrences that surpass
the initial "'threshold' test."' 8 2 Although Justice Breyer applied the plurality's narrow proportionality test and examined Ewing's criminal history when balancing the gravity of the offense against the harshness of
focused on Ewing's trigthe penalty, generally Justice Breyer's analysis
183 and his lengthy sentence. 184
gering offense
Because Ewing's "grossly disproportionate" sentence crossed the
initial threshold, Justice Breyer turned to the next prong of the Harmelin
framework-a comparison of Ewing's sentence to California's sentencing scheme before the adoption of the three strikes law, and to other jurisdictions.1 8' Before the enactment of three strikes, Ewing would have
186
served a maximum of approximately ten years. Recidivists, claimed
Justice Breyer, would have served only a "small fraction of Ewing's real1 87
time sentence," before the implementation of three strikes. To illustrate the harshness of Ewing's sentence, Justice Breyer indicated that
California reserved 25-year-to-life sentences for "nonrecidivist, firstdegree murderers."' 188 In comparing Ewing's sentence to other jurisdictions, Justice Breyer found that in thirty-three jurisdictions and the federal courts, "the law would make it legally impossible for a Ewing-type
offender to serve more than 10 years in prison ... ,,"189 In the end, Justice
Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 24-25, Ewing v. California,
178.
123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003) (No. 01-6978)).
Id.
179.
See id.
180.
Id. at 40-41(Breyer, J., dissenting).
181.
Id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also presented statistics from the United
182.
States Sentencing Commission, which did not include shoplifting as a trigger crime. Id. at 41-42
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 35, 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184. See id. at 39-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 42-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The plurality did not undertake an intrajurisdictional
185.
and interjurisdictional comparison because it concluded that Ewing's sentence did not pass the
threshold requirement. Id. at 30. Although the plurality and Justice Breyer follow the objective test
from Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harnelin, the objective factors employed in this analysis are
identical to the three-prong test in Solem. See id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186.
Id. at 44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "On average, recidivists served three to four additional..
187.
years in prison, with 90 percent serving less than an additional real seven to eight years." Id.
188.

Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 190(a) (2003)).

189.

Id. at 45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Breyer reasoned that "[o]utside the California three strikes context, Ewing's ... sentence is virtually unique in its harshness ...by a considerable degree." 90
After finding Ewing's sentence extreme under the Harmelin framework, Justice Breyer subsequently considered whether the legislative
intent behind three strikes reasonably justified Ewing's punishment.' 9'
Although the plurality reasoned that three strikes meets California's pur192
ported goals of deterring repeat offenders and preserving public safety,
Justice Breyer found no criminal justice rationalization for Ewing's sentence. 193 Instead, he suggested that "California's three strikes statute is a
series of anomalies."' 94 For instance, the variance in the seriousness of
the triggering offenses, the random application of three strikes punishments, and the statute's absence of enumerated applicable triggering offenses, resulted in unacceptable administrative justifications for Ewing's
sentence. 95 Justice Breyer further contended that because the law aims to
reduce serious and violent crime, Ewing's 25-year-to-life sentence for
shoplifting is "overkill."' 196 Therefore, "the State cannot find in its three
strikes law a special criminal justice need sufficient to rescue a sentence
197
that other relevant considerations indicate is unconstitutional."'
Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of applying an analytical
framework on a case by case basis to determine whether a sentence is
proportional to the crime.1 98 Unlike Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's
concurring opinions, Justice Breyer reasoned that "a bright-line rule
would give legislators and sentencing judges more guidance."' 99 With
such a rule, courts may more readily recognize that 25-year-to-life sentences like Ewing's are grossly disproportionate to a triggering offense of
stealing three golf clubs. 2°
In short, although the plurality conducted a proportionality analysis
of Ewing's sentence, the narrow principle applied does little to remedy
the gross disparity of sentences prevalent in non-capital, recidivists'
cases. By reiterating the principle that proportionality reviews of noncapital cases are "exceedingly rare,, 20 ' the plurality implied that proportionality principles adhere better to death penalty cases. In fact, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas sustained in their concurring opinions that
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id. at 24-27.
Id. at 48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 48-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 52-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 52-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 21 (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).
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proportionality principles should only apply to "modes of punishment,"
rather than length of sentences.2 °2 Justice Breyer, on the other hand, suggested in his dissent that courts are capable of applying objective factors
and conducting a comparative analysis to determine the proportionality
of non-capital sentences. 20 3 However, given the extremely restrictive
nature of the plurality's balancing test, few cases will ever get past the
initial threshold to warrant an application of Justice Breyer's comparative analysis. As a result, by affirming the constitutionality of Ewing's
sentence, any future successful challenges to three strikes are highly
unlikely.
IV.

ANALYSIS

In granting certiorari the Ewing Court had the opportunity to review
the legitimacy of California's three strikes law, and to determine the constitutionality of indeterminate life sentences for recidivists convicted of
non-violent and non-serious crimes. In response, the plurality not only
affirmed the constitutionality of Ewing's sentence, but also upheld the
longstanding view that "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [are]
exceedingly rare. ' '20 4 This Comment argues that by adopting an exceptionally narrow balancing test, the plurality failed to address the funda20 5
engrained in
mental principle of the "evolving standards of decency,
the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, aside from the plurality's neglect of
the constitutional questions surrounding three strikes, the Court adamantly redirected any future criticism of the law to the state legislature. 20 6 Thus, unless California's legislature steps up and accepts an
amended version of three strikes, targeting only serious and violent felonies, California's resources will continue to be pinched by the costs of
this radical law. Even more troubling, other non-violent habitual offenders, like Ewing, will spend the majority of their lives behind bars because
of the cruel effects of an overly-broad law originally aimed at imprisoning violent offenders.
A. California'sThree Strikes Law is Unconstitutional
In reviewing the constitutionality of Ewing's sentence, the plurality
failed to address an essential factor under the Eighth Amendmentsociety's "evolving standards of decency. 20 7 By applying an extremely
208
"narrow proportionality principle" to non-capital sentences, the Court
See id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in
202.
the judgment).
203. See id. at 52-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 292 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
205.
206. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
207. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101).
208. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20.
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significantly circumscribed any future attempts at surpassing the initial
threshold and successfully challenging the constitutionality of three
strikes' mandatory minimum sentences in relation to non-violent offenders.
1. The Ewing Court's Narrow Threshold Test Slams the Door on
Recidivist's Proportionality Claims
To conduct a pertinent objective analysis of excessive sentences,
Justice Breyer maintained that "[a] threshold test must permit arguably
unconstitutional sentences, not only actually unconstitutional sentences,
to pass the threshold .... ,,209 However, the plurality's narrow balancing
test, which requires courts to consider an offender's prior offenses in
weighing the gravity of the current offense against the harshness of the
penalty, produces an insurmountable legal hurdle for recidivists wanting
to bring a constitutional claim.2 10 In fact, the plurality's balancing test
goes beyond being a simple threshold inquiry and, instead, creates a determinative standard. 211 By building a barrier out of a habitual offender's
criminal history and placing it in front of the threshold, the plurality
makes fighting an excessive punishment utterly impossible for recidivists. 212 The most unreasonable effect of the Court's conclusive balancing test is that it precludes taking into account the "evolving standards of
decency," which is fundamental to any Eighth Amendment objective
analysis.
2. The Plurality Disregarded Any Notion of Human Decency in
Ewing
The Eighth Amendment embodies the idea that maintaining human
dignity is essential to a mature and civilized society.213 In fact, "[t]he
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards. 2 14 In order to evaluate the "'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values,"' courts must be able to take the
next step in a proportionality analysis and compare similar legislative
enactments throughout the country. 215

209. Id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
210. See id. (reasoning that any "test that blocked every ultimately invalid constitutional claim
... would not be a threshold test but a determinative test" (emphasis excluded)).
211.
See id.
212.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is Any Sentence Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, TRIAL, May
2003, 78, 78.
213. See Blake v. Hall, 668 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1981).
214. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100.
215. Brief of Amicus Curiae California Public Defenders Association at 9, Lockyer v.
Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003) (No. 01-1127) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312
(2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))) [hereinafter CPDA Brief].
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Recently the Court confirmed that "[a] claim that punishment is excessive is judged .. .by [standards] that currently prevail," in today's
society. 216 Accordingly, if the plurality had conducted the pertinent intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparative analysis outlined in
Solem's three-prong test, 21 7 the results would have indicated that no other
state would have given Ewing as harsh a punishment as he received from
California.218 Although the plurality noted the seriousness of Ewing's
grand theft 219 when reaching its decision, 220 a serious sentence for shoplifting three golf clubs still does not warrant 25-years-to-life. In fact,
even in California, the punishment for the non-violent crime of stealing
approximately $1,200 in merchandise is typically one year in a county
jail for first time offenders, 221 and no more than ten years under thirtythree other recidivist statutes. 22 The plurality further justified its decision
by pointing to California's public safety concerns.223 Yet, considering
that Ewing's prior crimes were primarily non-violent property offenses, 224 Ewing does not fall into the category of the threatening, violent
offenders Californians intended to reach when they voted for three
strikes.225 Consequently, the plurality's restrictive balancing approach
impedes any chance of defining society's contemporary values and,
therefore, is not in accordance with an individual's fundamental rights
under the Eighth Amendment.
Notwithstanding the plurality's failure to address significant constitutional concerns in its Ewing decision, in the end, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of three strikes, and the law's effects of sending nonviolent offenders to prison for life. In fact, the Court all but foreclosed
any future judicial challenges to three strikes and left any revision of the
statute to "the legislatures, not ... the federal courts." 226 Therefore, any
hope of mitigating the harshness of the controversial recidivist statute
now rests with California's legislative process.

216. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (reasoning that determining the excessiveness of a crime should
not be judged by the standards that "prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the 'Bloody
Assizes' or when the Bill of Rights was adopted").
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
217.
CPDA Brief, supra note 215, at 9.
218.
Shoplifting nearly $1,200 worth of merchandise is considered felony grand theft and is a
219.
"wobbler." CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 487(a) (West 2003).
See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28.
220.
221.

CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 489 (West 2003).

Ewing, 538 U.S. at 45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
222.
Id. at 24-26.
223.
224. Id. at 19. However, one of Ewing's prior offenses involved a knife. Id.
See generally Amend 3 Strikes, Understand the Problem and the Solution, at
225.
http://amend3strikes.com/problemsolution.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Problem and
Solution]; see also generally CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, GEN. ELEcTION 5 (Nov. 8, 1994), available
at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1994g.pdf (last visited April 21, 2004)).
226. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284.
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B. Leave the Reform of Three Strikes to the Legislature
Even though opponents of three strikes are still feeling the sting
from the Court's decision, they have not stopped fighting.227 In response
to the Court's ruling, activists in the three-strikes reform movement have
refocused and placed modification of the three strikes law back in the
hands of California's legislature.22 8
1. Is Legislative Reform Possible?
Courts generally defer statutory reform to state legislatures, but
California's government seems reluctant to make changes to the three
strikes law. According to the statute's provisions, the law can only be
amended by a supermajority. 229 However, in January 2003 State Assemblywoman Jackie Goldberg introduced Assembly Bill 112, which proposed to put a modified version of three strikes before voters in 2004,
and would only need a majority to pass in the legislature.23 ° Specifically,
the amendment would limit the law's application to repeat violent and
serious felons. 231 Additionally, the bill would give already convicted
third-strike felons the opportunity to have their sentences reviewed and
possibly reduced. 232 Although two-thirds of Californians say they would
support the initiative, negative sentiment against the proposed modifi234
cation is equally evident.
In response to the proposed bill, proponents of three strikes contend
that an amendment of the law is "part of liberal Democrats' 'criminalfriendly agenda' that 'could threaten public safety by releasing dangerous criminals back into society.'' 235 Three strikes supporters further argue that adopting Goldberg's bill would give California an unwanted
"soft-on-crime" image. 236 In fact, newly-elected Governor
Arnold
Schwarzenegger, adamantly opposes any modification to the three strikes
law, and probably will veto Assembly Bill 112 if it passes a legislative

227. See generally Dana Parsons, 3 Strikes Opponent Still in the Game, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2003, at B3 (recognizing the optimism of three strikes opponents, despite the Courts recent ruling).
228. Id.
229. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6670) (West 2003).
230. See Assembly Bill 112, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at
http://www.cdaa.org/abl12introduced.pdf (last visited May. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Assembly Bill
112].
231.
Id. Currently, every other state that has three strike laws requires that the triggering offense be a serious or violent crime. See Erwin Chemerinsky, 3 Strikes: Cruel, Unusual and Unfair,
AMEND

THREE

STRIKES

Now,

Mar.

10,

2003, at http://www.amend3strikes.com/_supreme

_court/sc006.htm (lastvisited Nov. 2, 2003).
232.
See Parsons, supra note 227, atB3.
233.
Id.
234.

Voters Should Get to Pass Judgment on Three-Strikes Law, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,

Mar. 17, 2003, at 6B,available at http://amend3strikes.com/_news/031703.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2003) [hereinafter PassJudgment].
235. Id. (quoting Republican Assembly Leader Dave Cox).
236. Id.
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Hence, any legislative efforts at revising three strikes likely will
face considerable resistance.238 Yet, in analyzing some of the social and
economic weaknesses of three strikes, the need for reform of the law
becomes even more evident.
vote. 237

2. The Misleading Social Ramifications of the Three Strikes Law
The minor results seen from the three strikes law thus far support
the notion that the law is doing everything but cracking down on violent
crime and, therefore, it must be changed. In Ewing, the plurality attempted to validate the three strikes law by relying on the 1998 Attorney
General's study, which credited the law with significantly reducing California's crime. 239 However, comparable studies show that three strikes
24 °
was not the only catalyst to the State's reduction in crime.
According to studies performed after the enactment of three strikes,
the overly-broad statute has barely put a dent in California's violent
crime rate.2 41 First, scholars suggest that California's prosperous labor
242
market positively impacted the crime rate. Specifically, both the unemployment rate and crime rate moved in the same direction during the
first six years after the adoption of three strikes pointing to alternative
24 3
reasons for the State's reduction in crime. Second, studies indicate that
crime rates dropped faster in the California counties that only applied
three strikes law to serious and violent offenses than in counties where
2
prosecutors broadly applied the law to any felony. " In particular, crime
decreased "21.3% in the six counties that have been the most lenient in
enforcing three strikes, while the toughest counties experienced only a
12.7% drop in their crime rates. 2 45
See Join Arnold!, Arnold's Views on Crime, at http://www.joinamold.com/en/agenda/
237.
arnoldsviews.php (last visited May 17, 2004).
See PassJudgment, supra note 234, at 6B. Assembly Bill 112 was in an inactive file in
238.
Sacramento at the time of writing this paper. E-mail from Jim Benson, Vice Chairman, Citizens
Against Violent Crime, to Sara J. Lewis (Oct. 11, 2003, 13:33:29 EDT) (on file with author). Assemblywoman Goldberg can put the bill up for a vote at any time during this session, which ends
later in 2004. Id. However, supporters of the amended law are skeptical that the bill will pass and
subsequently receive Governor Schwarzenegger's signature. Id.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 27 (citing Office of the Atty. Gen., Cal. Dep't. of J., Three Strikes and
239.
You're Out: Its Impact on the CaliforniaCriminalJustice System After FourYears, 10 (1998)).
See Beres & Griffith, supra note 41, at 108.
240.
Findings from the California Department of Justice's Criminal Justice Statistics Center
241.
could not verify any "valid evaluations" of the State's "get tough" laws that conclude three strikes
has a direct effect on crime rates. Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The Sentencing Project, Aging
Behind Bars: "Three Strikes" Seven Years Later7 (2001), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/
9087.pdf (last visited May 17, 2004).
See Beres & Griffith, supra note 41, at 108.
242.
Id.
243.
Mike Males et al., Striking Out: The Failureof California's "Three Strikes and You're
244.
Out Law," JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, Mar. 16, 1999, available at http://www.justicepolicy.
org/article.php?id=260 (last visited May 17, 2004).
Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy:A Hard Look at Three Strikes' Overblown
245.
Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 270 (2002) (citing Jon Hill, Crime Stats CaptureBoth Arguments,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at Al).
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Probably the best evidence showing that three strikes has not significantly contributed to the drop in California's crime rate comes from
an analysis conducted by The Sentencing Project in 2000.246 This study
of states' crime rates concluded that "substantial increases in incarceration did not necessarily translate into significant declines in [California's] crime., 247 To illustrate the discrepancy, although crime rates decreased by thirty-six percent in California from 1991-1998 as incarceration increased by fifty-two percent, in the previous period, 1984-1991,
crime rates increased by five percent despite a ninety-six percent increase
in imprisonment. 248 Thus, this study demonstrates that three strikes, designed to imprison more habitual offenders as a means to deter crime,
exhibited no independent effect on California's crime rate.
Finally, in measuring the incapacitating effect of three strikes, opponents emphasize that any positive impact on the crime rate will not be
known until the offenders begin serving the increased portion of their
sentences. 249 As a result, current California crime rates are misleading,
and should not be used by three strikes supporters as evidence for the
law's success. In addition to the ambiguous social ramifications of three
strikes, the clearest projected consequence of the law is the pressure it
will place on California's economy.
3. The Long-Term Economic Effects of Three Strikes
By passing reform of three strikes to the legislature, California must
continue to address the noticeable financial strains resulting from flooding California's prisons with non-violent repeat offenders. 250 Assemblywoman Goldberg estimates that it costs $27,000 a year to house each
inmate. 22551 Undoubtedly, after the Court's adoption of a restrictive
proportionality standard, repeat non-violent offenders will continue to
face long-term sentences and further crowd the State's prisons.252

246.
See generally Jenni Gainsborough & Marc Mauer, The Sentencing Project, Diminishing
Returns: Crime and Incarcerationin the 1990s (2000), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/
9039.pdf (last visited May 17, 2004).
247.
King & Mauer, supra note 241, at 8 (citing Gainsborough & Mauer, supra note 246).
248.
See Gainsborough & Mauer, supra note 246, at 10, 14.
249. See Vitiello, supra note 245, at 268.
250. Approximately 7,000 convicted habitual offenders have been sentenced to at least 25
years to life under California's three strikes law, and more than half of those received their sentence
for a non-violent crime. Kristina Horton-Flaherty, Court Rulings, Public Opinion Chip Away at
'Three Strikes,' CAL. B.J., Mar. 2002, available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/2cbj/02mar/

page l-l.htm (last visited May 17, 2004).
251.
Parsons, supra note 227, at B3.
252. As mentioned, by requiring courts to weigh an offender's entire criminal history in the
proportionality balancing test, the Court basically makes proportionality challenges against three
strikes sentences virtually impossible. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying text. In essence, the
standard produces a chain reaction. By upholding the constitutionality of Ewing's sentence under the
plurality's restrictive test, other non-violent third-strike offenders will likely forego challenging the
proportionality of their sentences and, therefore, wind up in California's prisons serving their mandatory term of at least 25 years. At $27,000 a year per inmate, not including inflation or costs related
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Although proponents of the law claim the penal system can handle
the increased number of inmates, the estimated costs of three strikes on
California's prison system are staggering.2 53 Critics of three strikes,
claim the effect on the prison system is "a crisis deferred, one for which
254 In fact,
Californians will pay dearly . . .on the installment plan.
"
"160,000 inmates are crowded into prisons designed for 80,000., 255 Even
more troubling is the additional cost to taxpayers. When Californians
cast their votes in favor of three strikes, they implicitly approved using
more of their tax dollars to deter violent crimes.256 Yet what Californians
got in return was a law that costs taxpayers "more than $500 million per
year," to house non-violent recidivists.25 7 An estimate by The Sentencing
Project puts the bill for accommodating three strikes inmates at $750
million annually by 2026.258 Therefore, while the California legislature
should consider the social propriety of three strikes, the legislature must
also undoubtedly seriously consider the fiscal impact of the statute, and
recognize that reformation of the law is economically inevitable.
CONCLUSION
In 1994, in the heat of the distressing murder of twelve-year-old
Polly Klaas, California's legislature sold three strikes to voters as a law
that would lock up repeat violent criminals and put an end to these heinous crimes.259 Instead, when Californian's went to the ballot box that
November they chose a law made up of extreme variables and a "onesize-fits-all mandatory minimum sentencing scheme [for] minor
crimes.,, 260 The foreseeable depletion of California's resources resulting
from this deluded legislation calls for the immediate reform of three
strikes law. Accordingly, change must begin by returning to the voters'
original intentions-to deter violent crime.
Given the strong policy arguments for revising the law, legislators,
the governor, and California's voters should amend three strikes to only
apply to violent and serious felonies. 261 First, by adopting a narrower
to medical needs of older prisoners, a third strike offender will cost the prison system at least
$675,000 by the end of serving the minimum 25-year sentence. See Parsons, supra note 227, at B3.
Vitiello, supra note 245, at 279-80.
253.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
254.
See Problem and Solution, supra note 225.
255.
See King & Mauer, supra note 241, at 3. Some of the laws "staunchest supporters" as256.
serted that the law was designed to isolate and punish the most serious, habitual offenders. Id.
See Problem and Solution, supra note 225.
257.
See King & Mauer, supra note 241, at 5.
258.
See Parsons, supra note 227, at B3.
259.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Families Against Mandatory Minimums at 3, Ewing v.California,
260.
123 S.Ct. 1179 (2003) (No. 01-6978). To illustrate, in a sample of more than 1,300 cases, burglary
or drug offenses are twice as likely to receive a mandatory 25-year-to-life sentence under three
strikes than are all of the violent offenses in California's penal code combined. See ZIMRING ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 50.
This proposed amendment is similar to Assembly Bill 112 proposed by Assemblywoman
261.
Goldberg's. See Assembly Bill 112, supra note 230.
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law, courts will not have to weigh down the proportionality scale with
prior violent acts in order to prove that the punishment fits the crime. z6 2
Simply put, the gravity of a violent and serious triggering offense, will fit
the harshness of the penalty, and likely will do away with proportionality
concerns. Similarly, by ceasing the disproportionate punishment of nonviolent offenders, courts will adhere to the "evolving standards of decency" set forth in the Eighth Amendment, and implicit in other recidivist statutes throughout the nation. Finally, as part of an amended version
of the law, the highly discretionary "wobbler" offenses should not be
allowed to constitute third strikes. Instead, the new law should adhere to
the defined violent and serious offenses and likewise permit eligibility
for three strikes only after an offender commits a third truly violent or
serious crime. Ultimately, with the passage of a narrower law, the constitutionality of three strikes likely would be moot.
In addition to alleviating any constitutional concerns, California's
projected economic problems and social inconsistencies resulting from
three strikes will dissolve. First, as proposed by Assemblywoman Goldberg, already convicted third-strike offenders should have the opportunity to have their convictions reviewed and possibly reduced. 263 By allowing a retroactive application of the new law, the overcrowding currently present in California's prisons will eventually subside with each
reduced sentence. Finally, if California's penal system moves away from
incarcerating petty thieves for up to twenty-five years, the costs saved by
the State will be colossal. z6
While the problems associated with three strikes are overwhelming,
the solution is simple-change the law. If California's legislature steps
up and passes a revised version of three strikes targeting violent offenders, California's prisons will no longer be bursting at the seams with minor third-strikers. More importantly, California's resources can go to
more important social necessities, like higher education, 265. instead of to
housing the golf club thieves of today's society.

Sara J. Lewis*
262. See ACLU of Southern California, What's at Stake: Three Strikes Reform, at
http://ga1.org/campaign/abI 12/explanation (last visited May 17, 2004).
263.
See Parsons, supra note 227, at B3.
264. See generally King & Mauer, supra note 241 (examining the impact three strikes has on
California's economy and penal system); see also supra Part IV.B.3 (evaluating the economic costs
of three strikes).
265.
See generally, Kathleen Connolly et al., From Cellblocks to Classrooms - California,
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, Oct. 17, 1996, at http://www.justicepolicy.org/article.php?id=281 (last
visited May 17, 2004) (noting that the higher proportion of tax dollars that go to the corrections
system occurs at the expense of other programs, such as higher education).
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Denver College of Law. To Professor Sam Kamin,
Lyndall, and the rest of the Law Review Board; I greatly appreciate your wisdom and advice. To
my supportive parents, my loving family, Dave, and friends; thank you for the constant encouragement you gave me throughout this process.

BOOK REVIEW
THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
FUTURE

Review by ChristaSchuller*
What separates the United States from other developed nations on
the issue of the death penalty; what influences are affecting the current
death penalty in the United States; and what changes must take place for
the United States to follow suit and abolish the death penalty? Franklin
Zimring addresses each of these questions in his book, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, explaining the United States'
view in the context of a history of vigilante tradition.'
Zimring relies on a variety of sources including national polls, national publications, and foreign publications, first to document the history of the death penalty in the United States since the late 1800s; and
second, to explain the American divergence from current international
views. 2 Zimring also seeks "to explain the contradictions in American
culture that generate conflict over the death penalty and the changes that
will be necessary to bring American capital punishment to a peaceful
end."3 In sum, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment attempts to explain four questions that pertain to the character of American
policy regarding capital punishment: (1) why the U.S. reintroduced the
death penalty when other developed democracies abolished and pushed
for prohibition; (2) why patterns have developed within the U.S.
concerning the prevalence of the death penalty; (3) why conflicts over
the death penalty have increased; and (4) what the future holds for
conflicts over the death penalty.4
I. DIVERGENT TRENDS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER

DEVELOPED NATIONS

The United States and Europe began to diverge in their death penalty positions after World War II, which has lead to the current contro-

*
1.
(2003).
2.
3.
4.

J.D. Candidate, May 2004, University of Denver College of Law.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

See id. at 243-49.
Id. at ix.
Id. at13-14.
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versy between the U.S. and the rest of the Western world.5 The United
States initially followed other nations with decreasing rates of executions
each year that eventually led to a nationwide moratorium in 1967 .6However, the Supreme Court did not declare the death penalty unconstitutional as other nations were starting to do. Rather, the Supreme Court
invalidated the current death penalty statutes and gave the states an opportunity to address procedural concerns. As a result, individual states
rewrote their death penalty statutes leading to a reintroduction of state
executions starting in 1977 in the United States. 8 In contrast, the European nations, which had prevalently used capital punishment prior to
World War II, abolished its use after World War 11. 9 Postwar abolition in
Europe took place from 1944-1981, and the last execution took place in
France in 1977.10
The divergence in death penalty positions between the United States
and Europe is the result of different death penalty images that emerged
after World War 11.11 "It is not that the two sides differ on the answers to
a common question; instead, there is a fundamental difference of opinion
on what the key questions are that should determine whether governments should be allowed to kill citizens intentionally as a criminal punishment."' 12 Zimring also sets forth the notion that:
What other nations see as a basic political question about the proper
limits of government is not regarded in the United States as a fundamental question of governmental structure. The death penalty instead
is regarded as a policy intended to serve the interests of the victims of
crime and those who love them, as a personal rather than a political
concern, an undertaking of government to serve the needs of individual citizens for justice and psychological healing. 13

5. See id. at 5-6 ("While the rest of the Western world has been creating and attempting to
enforce non-execution as a human rights orthodoxy, the policy of the... United States has shifted to
the toleration of capital punishment by the states ....
Id.
at5.
6.
Id. at 5-6.
7.
8.
See id.at 6. In 1976 the Supreme Court issued a series of opinions which permitted the
reintroduction of capital punishment by states. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976)
(permitting the death penalty if it conforms with the Eighth Amendment); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 331-32 (1976) (finding that the imposition of the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) (finding that the specific procedural requirements in place in Florida were sufficient to withstand Eight Amendment inquiry); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976) (finding that the Texas death penalty survived Eighth Amendment standards because the Texas legislature had sufficiently "narrowed the scope of its laws relating to
capital punishment").
9. See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 17.
10.
Id.at 22-23 tbl.2.1 (citing Michel Forst, The Abolition of the Death Penalty inFrance, in
THE DEATH PENALTY: ABOLITION IN EUROPE 105, 113 (1999); Amnesty International, Abolitionist

and Retentionist Countries, at http://web.amnesty.orglpages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last visited
Jan. 13, 2004)).
11.
See id. at 45.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 49.
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When the death penalty was reintroduced in the United States in
1976, it was reinvented through the personalization and modernization of
capital punishment, which neutralized Americans' distrust of government. 14 The modernization of the death penalty through the introduction
of lethal injection likely addressed many American
concerns that the
15
death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment.
Personalization of the death penalty resulted when the death penalty
was made into a process to serve the personal interests of the victim's
family. 16 The trial has changed into one in which the victim's family asks
the jury for execution during the penalty phase by attesting to the loss
that the family must face now that the victim is gone.1 7 These attestations
are called "victim impact statements," which can be introduced in the
penalty phase of a bifurcated criminal trial.' 8 Victim impact statements
are introduced through the prosecutor's reading of a summarized version
of interviews with the victim's friends and family, or by direct testimony
of those individuals.' 9 This has transformed the death penalty trial into a
competition between vindicating the interests of the victims and their
families and showing mercy for the murderers. 20 Prosecutors present the
death penalty as the only option to serve the victim's interest. 2' A process
that ideally should be about the defendant's moral fault has developed
into "an evaluation of the social worth of victims of homicide., 22 This
status competition may cause discontent among victims' families involved in cases in which the prosecutor never sought the death penalty or
a defendant's guilty plea led to a lesser sentence.23
The personalization of the death penalty into a service for victims
serves three functions: first, "it gives the horrifying process of human
execution a positive impact that many citizens can identify with: closure,
not vengeance;,, 24 second, "citizens do not have to worry about executions as an excessive use of power by and for the government; ' 25 and
third "it links the symbolism of execution to a long American history of
14.
See id. at 50.
15.
See id. at 51 ("[T]here is no doubt that the institutionalization of lethal injection has neutralized the reputation for brutality and anachronism associated with the electric chair and the gas
chamber.").
16.
Id. at 52.
17.
Id. (reasoning that the penalty phase in death penalty trials "is a measure of the value of
the homicide victim's life").

18.

Id.

19.
Id. at 53; see, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1987).
20.
ZIMRING, supranote 1, at 55.
21.
See id. The irony is that prosecutors only seek the death penalty in 2 percent of murder
cases, leaving the majority of victims seemingly unvindicated. See id. at 57.

22.

Id. at 56.

23.
See id. at 56-57 (quoting Jo Napolitano, National Briefing Midwest: Missouri: Stepfather
Gets Life Term in 5 Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at A13). "[Rielatives of victims whose
death does not produce a capital sentence .
are made to feel that their terrible loss has not been
properly recognized." Id. at 57.
24.
Id. at 62.

25.

Id.
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community control of punishment. 26 Whereas the death penalty once
was seen as vengeance for the crime, it is now portrayed as necessary
closure for the family, contributing to the personalization of the death
penalty.27 The modernization and personalization of the death penalty in
the United States has thus served to make international concerns irrelevant, specifically international concerns about government power.28
In other nations, the death penalty has become a political issue concerning the limits of government power and the morality of sanctioning
death. 29 Europe's current view of the death penalty revolves around three
elements of the orthodox position: (1) "[t]he question of capital punishment is fundamentally a matter of human rights, not an isolated issue of
criminal justice policy;" 30 (2) "[flor that reason, policy on the death penalty should not be governed by national prerogatives but by adherence to
international human rights minimum standards;" 31 and (3) "[s]ince there
is no case where capital punishment can be justified under the international human rights standard, European citizens, organizations, and governments are fully justified in demanding the end of all executions by all
governments. 32 Currently, capital punishment has become a human
rights33issue and has moved from a national to an international movement.
Western countries have been successful in abolishing capital punishment. 34 "A stand against capital punishment is now an orthodoxy in
Europe and most Commonwealth nations . . . . This orthodox is "a
moral imperative believed necessary to the status of any civilized modern
state, and this morality is exported to other nations with missionary
vigor., 36 Once the abolition movement became international the progress
was swift, partly as a result of the number of respected nations that took
the lead.37 Currently, Japan is the only other fully developed nation that

26. Id.
27. See id. at 49.
28. See id. The United States' personal service image of the death penalty has no limited
government component, rather, the death penalty is regarded as "an undertaking of government to
serve the needs of individual citizens,"meaning that fear of government is not included in the American death penalty debate. Id. at 48-49.
29. See id. at 49.
30. Id.at 27.
31.
Id.
32. Id."The orthodox belief in current European politics is that the death penalty is fundamentally a question about human rights and the proper limits of government power rather than
merely a question of the costs and benefits of a particular punishment." Id. at 25.
33.
See id. at 24-25. Protocol 6 in 1983 was the first international statement against the death
penalty, making it an international standard of human rights and providing a foundation for judging
other nations' positions on the death penalty. Id. at 29.
34.
See id. at 23 ("Indeed, nowhere in Europe did the death penalty stay an important political
issue for very long after abolition.").
35. Id. at 17.
36. Id.
37.
See id. at 37.
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retains the death penalty.38 Less developed nations also retain the death
penalty, possibly following the lead of the United States.39 This intense
commitment to abolition of the death penalty is a direct challenge to the
legitimacy of capital punishment in the United States, and indicates that
the international controversy will continue.4 °
Despite divergent trends between the United States and the rest of
the Western world, public support for the death penalty has remained
stable and consistent, even among nations that have abolished the death
penalty.4 Polls indicate that there is not a link between public support
and the prevalence of the death penalty among nations or states.4 2 On
average, two-thirds of the American population supports the death penalty. 43 "[T]he American public believes that death is an appropriate penalty for murder, but the average citizen neither trusts nor supports the
system that determines who shall be executed." 44 "If American support
for the death penalty turns out to be distinctive, it is in the intensity with
which people identify with the death penalty rather than in the proportion
of respondents who express support. '45 Although the public still overwhelmingly supports the death penalty in those countries that have abolished it, abolition is apparently tolerated. 46 Perhaps this toleration is the
result of a conflicted and uncertain majority without the desire to expend
resources to reintroduce the death penalty as an important national issue.47
II. EXPLAINING THE AMERICAN DIFFERENCE BY EXAMINING THE
PATTERNS IN THE UNITED STATES

Zimring attempts to explain the United States' different death penalty experience and the extraordinary patterns of the death sentences and
execution. 48 He provides two explanations for revival of the death penalty in the United States: (1) federalism and the amount of power states
38.
Id. at 38.
39. See id. at 39 (explaining that it is difficult to label capital punishment as the refuge of only
primitive regimes when the United States is still executing, providing an example for less developed
nations to follow in setting their capital punishment policy).
40.
See id. at 39-40 ("Some of the high-intensity enthusiasm invested in the death penalty
may stem from the opportunity this issue presents to catch the United States in an indefensible
human fights position.").
41.
See id. at 10-11 (citing FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT & THE AMERICAN AGENDA 12-15, 21 (1987)). In 1975 a public opinion poll in Great
Britain showed that 82 percent of the public supported the death penalty, despite its abolition in
1965. Id.
42. See id. at 11.
43. Id. at 11 fig. 1.3.
44. Id. at 10.
45. Id. at 11.
46. See id. at 23 (citing Tom Wicker, In the Nation; Refusing the Rope, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1983, at A23; Howard 'Witt, Canada Refuses to Bring Back Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., July 1, 1987,
at C3).
47.
Id. at 23-24.
48

See id. at 14
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have in administration of the death penalty; and (2) the persistence of
strong vigilante traditions, most concentrated in the South where the majority of executions take place.49
A. Federalismand the Amount of Power States Have Over the Administrationof the Death Penalty
The 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia50 marked a substantive
change in administration of the death penalty by making capital punishment a federal issue.5' The Supreme Court invalidated every state death
penalty statute then in effect52 by holding that it was cruel and unusual
punishment to have unguided discretion in deciding between life and
death.53 However, although Furman invalidated the death penalty and
started a moratorium in 1972, Furman did not result in abolition.54 Instead, Furman made the Supreme Court the ultimate authority on the
status of each state's death penalty, creating a need to establish explicit
substantive principles to govern the death penalty process nationally. 5
Whereas once states had almost complete control over the death penalty,
the Supreme Court, by extending its constitutional reach over death penalty procedures, changed the death penalty from primarily a state issue to
a federal one.5 6
The Supreme Court has since tried to "loosen the links between federal constitutional law and the administration of the death penalty" by
giving deference to the states through implementation of strict requirements for attaining federal review. 57 Statutes enacted during the 1990s
ensured state deference by requiring defendants to "'exhaust state remedies' prior to federal habeas corpus ....allowing them to correct errors

even on federal questions, and exposing the case to federal judges only
after all state remedies have been pursued. 5 8

49.
50.
51.

Id. at 65-66.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
ZIMRLNG, supra note 1, at 69-70 (citing ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 41, at 50-76).

52.

Id. at 69.

53.
See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Eighth Amendment
cruel and unusual punishment clause "require[s] legislatures to write penal laws that are evenhanded,
nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied
sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups." Id.
54.
See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 70 (noting that although the Supreme Court struck down
"open-ended discretionary systems in 1972," it "approv[ed] some state systems in 1976" when it
decided Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).

55.
56.

See id.
See id. at 69-70.

57.

Id. at 9-10.

58.

Id. at 78 (citing 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 941 (4th ed. 2001)). See infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text,
discussing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, implementing procedural
barriers to habeas corpus.
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Unfortunately, attempting to create national standards did not guarantee any uniformity in the outcome of death penalty cases.59 Instead, the
post-Furman federal system enhanced the variation in death penalty policy and created procedural complications and delays. 60 These procedural
complications, while ensuring state deference, effectively delay review
of the substantive issues: determining the constitutionality of each state's
death penalty procedures are federal questions that cannot be raised until
exhaustion of state remedies and appeal to the federal courts. 6 1 This
means that the most important part of the review process, reviewing the
substantive deficiencies of a capital trial, cannot be addressed for many
federal review is "the most critical stage for any of the
years. 62 Also, fd
quality controls on state capital punishment outcomes that were supposed
to rescue the systems from the arbitrary lawlessness that Furman v.
Georgia struck down. 63
B. Vigilante Tradition in the South Caused Variations that Remained
After National StandardsWere Imposed
1. Variation in Execution Patterns Today
The variation of execution rates between states in the U.S. that existed before Furman have remained in the current system, despite the
imposition of national standards. 64 Fifteen American states conduct no
executions, twelve have no death penalty statutes 65 and six other states
have not had an execution since 1976.66 Of the thirty-eight states that
authorize executions, there is a vast gap in the number of executions,
ranging from under fifteen per year in the four most populous Northern
states, to over forty per year in the Southern states. 67 The regional patterns and variations are most dramatic between the South and Northeastern regions, with the South executing 100 times more frequently.68 In the
year 2000, eighty-nine percent of executions occurred in the South.6 9
This variation indicates that the homogenous efforts applied since the re-

ZIMRING, supra note 1,at 71.
59.
See id. at 72, 78.
60.
61.
Id. at 78.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 79.
See id. at 7.
64.
Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode
65.
Island, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin have no death penalty statute. Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty Information, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=l 21 &scid= 11 (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
66.
Connecticut, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and South Dakota have not
conducted an execution since 1976. Id.
67.

See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 7.

68.
69.

Id.at 11.
Id.
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implementation of the death penalty have not decreased the arbitrary
results that the Supreme Court addressed in Furman.7 °
There have also been several changes in the post-Furman death
penalty era: a higher death row population, longer delays between a
death sentence and actual execution, and a small likelihood of death sentences leading to actual execution. 7' There is currently a more attenuated
link between death sentences and execution.72 There has also been an
increased concentration of execution in a few states, as exemplified by
three of the states comprising two-thirds of all executions. 73 Capital sentences and capital statutes are less concentrated than executions.74 For
example, the South has just over half of all condemned prisoners, but
accounts for over four out of every five executions.75
2. The Variation of Execution Rates is a Reflection of the Variation
During the Lynching Era
Zimring attempts to explain the variation among states by comparing the current death penalty with the earlier era of lynchings prevalent a
century ago.76 Lynching is "the killing of one or more people by groups
of citizens without government authority. 77 Zimring asserts that the
variation of executions among states prevalent today is a reflection of the
variation between the North and South prevalent during the lynching
era. 78 This assertion is that the extraordinary patterns of execution are a
result of the vigilante values that were widespread in only some areas in
the 1800s, but that have had a residual effect today.79
The link between the two eras is best exemplified by comparing
lynching rates with current execution rates. 80 The fourteen states with the
lowest lynching rates account for only three percent of current state executions. 81 The highest lynching states were those that have current death
70.
See id. at 77. "The system is slow, redundant, and expensive yet produces very little
evidence of quality control or consistent principles in the selection of those criminal defendants who
are sentenced to death or eventually executed." Id. at 88.
71.
Id. at 7-8. In 1950 one out of two individuals receiving a death sentence was executed,
while currently only one in forty is actually executed. Id. at 7.
72.
See id. at 7-8.
73.
Id. at 7. Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia are the three states that are responsible for twothirds of all executions. Id.
74.
Id. at 87. The difference in death row population between the South and the West is 29
percent while the difference in execution rates is 78 percent. Id. at 87 fig.4.5 (citing Department of
Justice, Capital Punishment Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2004); Death Penalty Information Center, Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by
Year, at www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRowlnfo.html#state (last visited Jan. 14, 2004)).
75. Id.
76.
See id. at 86. Zimring assumes that the explanation for variation among the states will also
explain why the United States differs from Western governments on the death penalty issue. See id.
77. Id.at 90.
78. Id. at 89.
79.
See id.
80. See id. at95-96.
81. Id.at96.
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penalty statutes, including the ten states with the highest execution
rates. 8 Consistent with current execution trends, the Southern states accounted for eighty-eight percent of all lynchings, the Northeast accounting for the least amount at 0.3 percent. 83 "The statistical contrast between
these two groups of states shows that they occupy the same extreme positions on the distribution of two distinct varieties of lethal violence in the
United States separated by almost a century and the formal participation
of government authority in the killing., 84 Lynching reflects a tradition of
vigilante values, 85 and the link between the variations in execution rates
then and today indicates that vigilante tradition has some effect on the
current status of the death penalty.86
The vigilante tradition creates intense support for the death penalty
today because it neutralizes the fear of unlimited government power by
portraying capital punishment as a community, rather than a governmental, response to crime. 87 The image of the death penalty as community
justice reduces the fear of government because it is not seen as a governmental power.88 "As long as this tradition is the animating symbolism
of the death penalty, the executioner is imagined as an agent of the community rather than of the government." 89 Therefore, in those areas where
vigilante tradition is the strongest, such as the South, there is more intense support for the death penalty because they can identify with the
punishment process better than those lacking a vigilante tradition. 90
The American tradition of lynching was unique from other nations,
due to their regular occurrence, the volume of killings, the extended period of time over which they occurred, and its link to racism. 9' There
were close to 5,000 lynchings between 1882 and 1968, with ninety-eight

82. Id. at 91 fig.5.1. Texas, Virginia, Florida, Missouri, Oklahoma, Louisiana, South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama and Arkansas have the highest execution rates. Id. at 95 tbl.5.1.
83.
Id. at 90. "The values and behavior of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
generated a vigilante tradition in the South that was not reflected in vigilante violence in the Northeast." Id. at 92.
84. Id. at 96.
85. See id. at 98. The vigilante tradition prevalent during the lynching era is the "tradition of
regarding the punishment of criminals as a local [rather than governmental] concern," because the
perpetrator is identifiable and the government cannot be trusted to protect the public from these
enemies. See id. at 98, 122.
86. See id. at 98.
87.
Id. at 98-99. "Those parts of the United States where mob killings were repeatedly inflicted as crime control without government sanction are more likely now to view official executions
as expressions of the will of the community rather than the power of a distant and alien government." Id. at 89.
88. Id. at 136-37 ("This vigilante tradition imagines the power behind punishment to be
citizens acting collectively.").
89. Id. at 111.
90. Id. at 98-99. "The citizen who has positive feelings about vigilante values will identify
more closely with the punishment process, will think of punishments as a community activity rather
than the conduct of a governmental entity separate from community processes." Id. at 99.
91.
Id. at 90 (citing W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND
VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 2-8 (1993)).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

percent occurring before 1936.92 Because this identification with vigilante values is unique to the United States, it not only explains the variation within the United States, but also the different approach taken by
other nations.93
I1. THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCES A CONFLICT UNIQUE FROM
OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH PREDICTS A DIFFERENT EXPERIENCE WITH
ABOLITION

The conflicting values in the current American tradition, the vigilante tradition (discussed above) and Due Process values are unique to
the United States.9 4 The source of unrest about the death penalty is the
result of a conflict in traditions between fear of government without limits, producing Due Process concerns on the one hand, and the vigilante
tradition remnants of the lynching era on the other.9 5
In addition to the strong vigilante tradition, many Americans also
value the Due Process tradition while distrusting the government to fairly
administer the death penalty. 96 These individuals fear that the government may wrongly accuse citizens, that it is hard to identify the innocent
from the guilty, and fear government abuse and wrongful punishment in
the system.97 This creates the contradiction in poll results, which show
overwhelming support for the death penalty, but also illustrate concern
about abuse and injustice within the system.98 The same person could
have both values, the vigilante tradition winning when a defendant is
clearly guilty, and the Due Process values controlling when it is less
clear whether a defendant is guilty. 99 These two traditions create conflict
over the procedural aspects of the death penalty because vigilantism insists upon immediate punishment, while Due Process creates long delays. 1°° Because these two traditions have contradictory implications,

92.
Id.
93.
See id. at 126.
94.
Id. at 119. "The conflict in the United States is unique not because of what is missing in
our political culture, but because of what is present: two distinct contradictory sets of traditions." Id.
at 121.
95.
See id. at 109.
96.
See id. at 122.
97.
Id.
98.
See id. at 121.
99. Id. at 123.
100.
Id. at 123-24.
The conflict between vigilante and legality traditions on the question of capital punishment often plays out as a competition between two competing images of the death penalty. Those who oppose the capital sanction stress that the penalty is after all the administration of state power and seek to invoke due process standards and concern about fact
finding and discrimination. The image is one of government as powerful strangers.
Those who favor execution try to bring the whole death penalty process within the
tradition of community control. The death penalty is in this view protecting victims and
potential victims from predators who threaten the community ....
Id. at 109.
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"public attitudes toward capital punishment can be ambivalent and volatile." 10 '
The contradictory reform cries of the 1990s provide an example of
the dynamics of the conflict between the vigilante and Due Process traditions. 102 These demands for change were focused on expediting the process between the death sentence and execution, and increasing certainty of
guilt before imposition of the death penalty.10 3 Unfortunately, these two
reforms were mutually exclusive because the margin of error increases
with the decrease in delay.'1 4
Delay in the system was essential for correcting error, as evidenced
1 05
by the amount of time exonerated defendants served on death row.
There have been 98 death row exonerations since 1970.106 Zimring assumes that there are as many innocent people that were not exonerated as
there were exonerated, and uses the error rate of one in seventy death
sentences to estimate the number of innocents executed. 0 7 Zimring considers that only one in ten death sentences result in execution, and compares that with the one in seventy error rate, to conclude that probably
between five and seven innocent people have been executed. 0 8 He concludes that it is the inefficiency of the capital punishment system that
limits the number of innocent executions.1 9 When the average delay
between a death sentence and exoneration is eight years, delaying the
process is essential in preventing erroneous executions. 10
The conflicting values reflect a difference in views concerning
proof of error in the system.' Proponents of the death penalty argue that
discovery of the innocent on death row is proof that the system is work12
ing, while opponents argue it is evidence that major errors are routine'
"[T]he absence of an unambiguously innocent defendant who has been
executed might be regarded as a challenge to those who believe on actuarial grounds that innocent defendants are missed by the current sys101.
Id. at 109.
102.
See id. at 144 ("[T]he dissatisfaction with the death penalty that proliferated in the 1990s
was a classic result of two contradictory value traditions driving policy in two inconsistent directions.").
103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 168 ("The fundamental conflict is that any reforms that speed up the appeal and
execution process would also increase both the odds that innocent defendants are executed and the
volume of such wrongful executions.").
105.
See id. at 174-75.
106.
Id. at 164-65.
107.
See id. at 165. "Given the unselective nature of appeals processes and the accidents of fate
that were necessary to deliver many of the ninety-eight exonerated defendants from the death chamber, it would not be unreasonable to estimate that another one-seventieth of the death sentences ...
involve[d] innocent defendants." Id. at 167.
108.
See id. at 169.
109.
Id.
110.
See id. at 174-75.
111.
Seeid. at 158.
112.
Id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

tem."' 1 3 The reason there is no poster child is because many on death row
do not provoke inquiry; they have no resources or social contacts to generate the concern." 4 Also, states have resisted efforts to vindicate the
executed, fearing it would generate uncertainty in the system without
reaping any benefits. ' 5 There is neither a proceeding to reexamine evidence after conviction nor procedural
necessity, so claims of innocent
6
executions are never tested.'
Ironically, public opinion shows that the majority of Americans believe innocent defendants have been executed, and many believe it happens with regularity." 7 "If the American tolerance for deadly error is
relatively low, only the absence of clearly identified cases is saving the
system from major embarrassments." '"1 8 In contrast, those opposing the
death penalty are extremely concerned about putting innocent people to
death. " 9
In an attempt to address this problem, there is a movement for 2a0
moratorium of the death penalty until the mistakes can be resolved.'
Several states, and likely many citizens, support halting executions until
the death penalty can be restructured to address the mistakes. 12' However, there are two different views of moratorium: (1) "prelude to abolition" and (2) "prelude to a reformed death penalty."'' 22 Those who wish
to reform the death penalty suggest several ways, including: better funding, more resources, better counsel, and decreasing uncertain evidence
such as jailhouse snitches and coerced confessions. 123 The extent of efforts apparently required to reform the death penalty raise questions as to
whether it is worth the effort. 124 Furthermore, the system will never have
zero margin of error: the death penalty would need to be abolished to
have zero risk of erroneous executions. 25 Thus, moratorium may serve
as a quick solution to the conflicting values, but eventually Americans
will have to choose between the two value traditions: between ending

113.

Id. at 168-69. The innocent defendants that are "missed" are those that were executed, or

are still serving out sentences on death row. See id.

114.
Id. at 169.
115.
See id.
116.
Id. at 170.
117.
Id. at 163.
118.
Id. at 164.
119.
See PollingReport.com, Crime, at http://www.pollingreport.com/crime.htm (Newsweek
Poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates, June 1-2, 2000) (last visited Jan. 14,
2004). Most opponents answered that their reason for opposing the death penalty was the possibility
of executing the innocent. Id.
120.
See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 161 ("The Illinois exonerations have provoked sympathetic
responses in other states where there is conflict about the legitimacy and reliability of the capital
punishment system.").
121.
Id.
122.
Id. at173.
123.
See id.
124.
Id. at 174.
125

Id
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punishcapital punishment or redesigning and re-implementing capital
126
ment, "[e]ither choice will provoke anger and dissatisfaction."'
The Supreme Court and the legislature have attempted to address
these policy issues by creating iron clad time and manner restrictions on
death penalty appeals in the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 127 The AEDPA "modifie[d] the habeas corpus
statute to make more restrictive the rules applicable to all habeas petitions .... ,,128 It sets a statute of limitations, one year from completion of
the direct appeal, for filing habeas corpus applications.' 29 Also, it limits
review of state factfinding by "limit[ing] the circumstances under which
an evidentiary hearing will be granted when material facts were not developed in the state court."'130 Last, "the act substantially narrows the
circumstances under which a federal court may hear a successive petition.,, 131 "The effect of all three of these changes is to limit significantly
the substantive scope of habeas corpus review and to deny a remedy for
constitutional violations for which relief would be available on direct
appeal."' 132 Because these rules turn on procedure rather than on the merit
of the claims on appeal, those with good lawyers will make the deadlines
and have their cases heard, even if their claims are less meritorious than
those who cannot afford good lawyers. 133 "So the same bad lawyering
and low level of resources for the defense that prejudice the client's trial
to appeal when procedural
chances will cost the defendant the' chance
34
defaults govern access to the courts.
The problem with procedural rather than substantive limitations to
death penalty appeals is that a court's refusal to allow constitutional
claims guarantees injustice in the system, likely generating hostility in
those to whom Due Process is important. 135 Zimring gives two examples
136
of the conflict between procedural defaults and substantive justice:
Coleman v. Thompson'

37

38

1
and Herrerav. Collins.

Id. at 177.
126.
Id. at 148 (citing The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
127.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 & 42

U.S.C. (2000)).
128.

NINA RIVKIND & STEVEN F. SHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY

605 (West Group 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253, 2254 (2000))).
Id. at 606.
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 607.
131.
Id.
132.
See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 148.
133.
Id. at 148-49. Thus, "the most disadvantaged defendants at trial face a form of double
134.
jeopardy because bad lawyering handicaps the defendant at trial and prejudices his chances of having the merits of his appeal ever examined." Id. at 149.
See id. at 148.
135.
Id. at 149,151.
136.
501 U.S. 722 (1991).
137.
506 U.S. 390 (1993).
138.
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In Coleman, the defendant, Coleman, claimed he was innocent of
the rape and murder of his sister-in-law, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari presumably because both the state and federal courts refused to
consider his substantive complaints because his lawyers filed the notice
of appeal three days late.' 39 The Virginia Supreme Court granted the
Commonwealth's motion to dismiss based solely on this procedural default. 14 Coleman raised eleven claims in his federal habeas petition, and
the Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision to
dismiss based on procedural default constituted independent and adequate state grounds and that Coleman had not shown cause to excuse the
default. 41 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding:
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims
in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the
prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as
a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that
failure to consider
the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage
142
of justice.

State deference is the rationale for this harsh result.14 3 In order to meet
this narrow exception to state procedural deadlines, the defendant must
present strong evidence that he is innocent, and there is no parallel exception for failure to meet federal procedural deadlines.144 Coleman was
put to death without either the state or federal courts examining his substantive complaints concerning his criminal trial, including ineffective
45
assistance of council. 1

In Herrera, the defendant sought to produce evidence of innocence
in a second federal habeas proceeding, even though the procedural rule
provided that subsequent habeas proceedings could not involve new
claims not mentioned in the previous appeals.' 46 Defendant brought his
second habeas petition ten years after his conviction, urging that he was
innocent of the murder for which he was sentenced to death. 147 Defendant argued it was a violation of the "Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process of law" to execute an innocent person. 48 In139. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-28.
140.
Coleman v. Commonwealth, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983).
141.
Coleman v. Thompson, 895 F.2d 139, 143-44 (4th Cir. 1990).
142.
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
143. See id. ("We now recognize the important interest in finality served by state procedural
rules, and the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal courts to respect
them.").
144. See ZIMRtNG, supra note 1, at 151.
145. Id. at 149.
146. Herrera,506 U.S. at 396, 400.
147. Id. at 396.
148. Id. at 393.

20031

BOOK REVIEW

stead of deciding whether a claim of innocence precludes application of
the procedural bars, the Court decided that the showing in this case fell
short of what would be required to get a new habeas proceeding based on
new evidence. 49 The Court held that "[c]laims of actual innocence based
on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for
federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding."'' 50 The Court further
concluded that the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception was
not available absent an independent constitutional violation.'15 In dicta,
the Court discussed the high burden of proof necessary to show actual
innocence and warrant federal habeas relief. 152 The rationale behind this
strict rule was to serve the need for finality in capital cases. 153 The problem is that requiring such a high burden of proof to show actual innocence may increase the "number of procedural default cases that54 lead to
execution," which creates grave risks of executing the innocent.
Changes in policy in the 1990s made it "all but impossible to find
observer who was content with the system . . . ."155 There
informed
an
were increases in executions, and by the year 2000, the death row population had nearly doubled. 56 Also, the South continued accounting for
three-fourths of all executions, even though the states that executed defendants more than doubled. 17 The conflict over capital punishment will
probably continue as long as the U.S. implements the death penalty, because changes in the procedures or execution rates will upset one of the
conflicting values, creating a stalemate.I18
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Influences on the Future of the Death Penalty
Zimring argues that the end of capital punishment is near, but will
not come about without severe conflict that will continue until the United
States changes itself. 5 9 The United States' experience with abolition,
should it come, will not be nearly as diplomatic as the process in Europe
because "values and traditions might have to change in the United States
149.
Id. at 417 (stating that the burden of showing actual innocence is an "extraordinarily high"
one).
Id. at 400.
150.
151.
See id. at 404.
Id. at 417 ("[Ihe threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be
152.
extraordinarily high.").
See id. (discussing "the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence
153.
would have on the need for finality in capital cases").
See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 154.
154.
Id. at 144.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
See id. at 130-3 1. "Fewer executions means more anger about punishment avoided. More
158.
executions means larger anxieties about injustice and arbitrariness." Id. at 129.
See id. at 141.
159.
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before a peaceful adjustment to government without executions can be
completed."'' 60 Commitment to the vigilante tradition has not been tested,
but the bigger the commitment, the more intense the struggle will be to
end executions.' 6' Therefore, "[a]s long as the vigilante image of execution has substantial public acceptance, the aftermath of abolition
in the
' 62
United States will be anger and the urge to reverse policy."'
Zimring explores four key cultural and political influences on the
fate of the American death penalty. 163 First, Zimring explores the trend in
other developed nations to abolish the death penalty. 64 The "gap between the United States and the rest of the developed West, along with
the willingness of foreign leaders to criticize and stigmatize American
practice, is a brand new factor in the American discourse on capital punishment."'1 65 The damage to the view of the United States as according
high regard for individual liberties is most important for persuading
American views. 166 Also, it is the personal relations between nations with
students and businessmen that may influence public opinions on the issue. 167 Government extradition of suspects and criminals is 68also an im1
portant complication should the U.S. keep the death penalty.
The second influence that Zimring explores is the changing political
views on the United States Supreme Court. 69 There are three pressures
shaping the capital punishment views of the Court: (1) "tendency for
centrist judges to grow impatient with using procedural defaults as a
strategy for managing capital cases;' 170 (2) "pressure from the negative
opinion of foreign elites;'' 1 and (3) "their own commitment to the due
process tradition that is in conflict with the operation of state death penalty machinery in the United States."' 172 The views of the centrist justices
are slowly becoming concerned enough to place limits on state execu-

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

135.
137.
139.
180.

164.
Id.
165.
id. at 181.
166.
Id. at 183 ("[lIt is the damage that foreign attitudes do to U.S. dignity rather than the
financial or law enforcement consequences of U.S. policy that carries the most important potential
for the American debate . .
167.
See id.
168.
Id. The intensity of the current death penalty controversy was exemplified by the deterioration of the concert of action in the war on terrorism. See id. at 43-44. When the U.S. sought the
death penalty against the twentieth hi-jacker of September 11, a French national, France refused to
release any information. See id. Even in these extreme circumstances, France demanded that the
United States seek only life in prison because they believed the death penalty was never acceptable.
See id. This may illustrate that the opposition is absolute, as not many can imagine someone more
deserving of the death penalty as one who was involved in a conspiracy that killed thousands.
169.
See id. at 180.
170.
Id. at 185.
171.

Id.

172.

Id. at 186.
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173
tions, such as the prohibition against executing the mentally retarded.
The belief system of the justices who join the Court in upcoming years
how much active involvement the Court will take in the
will determine
74
future.1

Third, the disposition of the President is a big influence on capital
punishment because he chooses the Supreme Court justices, who deter175
mine the constitutionality of all issues surrounding the death penalty.
Increased public concern over the death penalty will increase federal
in the issue from the executive and legislative branches of
participation 76
government. 1
Fourth, the levels of execution in the future, and the execution policy in general, will influence the future of the death penalty. 177 The two
elements changing in execution policy that will affect death penalty policy and public opinion are, first, the role of federal government in conducting executions themselves and, second, the increase of executions in
the non-Southern states to match the South's levels that will intensify the
scrutiny and controversy178 "What happens in the federal system will
probably be an early indicator of trends in the state death penalty systems
and in the federal court regulation of state cases."'179 The rate and pattern
across the states will also influence the future execution
of executions
180
policy.
B. Changes That Must Take Place to Make Abolition Possible
First, making "the death penalty a major issue in every important
part of American public life" will help bring about abolition.' 8' Increasing the number of groups, promoting new ideas and public debate, will
increase the importance of the issue. 182 Public information campaigns are
necessary to make more Americans aware of the problems with the death
penalty. 183 In order to soften support, the focus must be on those groups
most conflicted, such as conservative minorities and conservative Catho-

173.
See id. at 184 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)).
174.
Id. at 185.
See id. at 191.
175.
Id. ("The more salient the question of the death penalty becomes in the nation, the larger
176.
will be the influence of leadership in the federal executive and legislative branches to its resolution.").
177.
See id. at 187.
178.
Id.
179.
Id. at 188.
See id. at 189. "So a continuation of the extreme concentration of execution risk in a very
180.
few states seems objectionable, but any real diversification of executions will increase the vulnerability of death penalty systems to outside scrutiny." Id. at 190.
Id. at 194.
181.
Id. at 201 ("The larger the number of groups concerned with the death penalty, the more
182.
likely that the number of concerned groups will continue to grow.").
Id. at 200-01.
183.
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lics. 84 Zimring argues that "finding and motivating activist campaigners
on America's campuses" is a key to motivating opposition
groups who
85
power.1
government
on
limit
a
as
abolition
need to recast
Next, creating opposition to aspects of the death penalty is a step in
86
creating momentum towards opposing capital punishment as a whole.'
In order to weaken the intensity of support, opponents will have to focus
on the elements of the death penalty that create doubt. 187 These include
distrust of government power and government mistakes in convicting the
innocent. 1 88 Creating the image of capital punishment as primitive, brutal
and undesirable, and stereotyping supporters as such helps facilitate abolition. 189 Zimring argues that shaking the American commitment to capital punishment will facilitate its end.' 90 Increasing the intensity of those
opposing the death penalty is also important. 91 "A visible and persistent
activist presence within the community can serve as a stimulus to the
moral uncertainties that destabilize the mainstream support for the death
penalty." 192
VI. ANALYSIS: THE AMERICAN DIFFERENCE IS THE RESULT OF A
MISINFORMED PUBLIC, AND INFORMING THE PUBLIC OF THE REALITIES
AND DEFICIENCIES OF THE DEATH PENALTY WILL LEAD TO ABOLITION

Zimring's thesis that a strong vigilante and Due Process tradition
create the American difference and unique conflict within the United
States is an inadequate explanation of the current problem and the steps
that need to be taken to achieve abolition. Although the vigilante tradition may account for the variation in execution rates among the states, it
is not the primary reason that the United States still imposes the death
penalty in the face of international opposition. The death penalty is still
an option because the United States has a bigger problem with violent
crime, and it is the perceived will of the majority. Since Zimring fails
to account for these important facets of capital punishment, he also fails
to include ways to decrease the struggle and pave the road for abolition.

184. See id. (arguing that focus should be on "the next 30 percent or so of the population that
stands in support of a death penalty but may be uneasy about executions.... Particular targets might
include the libertarian right and Catholic intellectuals with right-of-center political orientations.").
185.
Id. at 202.
186.
See id. at 196.
187.
Id. at 197-98 (arguing that the "primitive essence of the killing process" may be an element of capital punishment capable "of softening up significant segments of death penalty support.").
188.
Id. at 197.
189.
Id. at 197-98.
190.
See id. at 198.
191.
Id.
192.
Id. at 199.
193.
See infra notes 199-243 and accompanying text.
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As of 2000, the United States had the highest homicide rate among
the developed nations. 194 Although violent crime rates in the United
States are declining, the rates are significantly higher than the rates in the
non-death penalty developed nations.19 5 According to the international
homicide statistics, the United States has the highest homicide rate of any
developed nation studied, 5.87 per 100,000.196 This high rate of homicide
is "four to 14 times higher than in other Western, industrialized nations."' 197 The significant difference in violent crime rates alone could
account for why the United States continues to implement the death penalty in the face of international opposition. 198
Capital punishment is the perceived will of the majority because the
misperceptions and lack of information that pervade the United States
create abstract support in the face of uncertainty.1 99 Thus, Zimring's argument that part of the American difference from other countries is the
intensity of their support for the death penalty200 is flawed. Comparing
different poll results indicates that support for the death penalty is shallow. 20 ' For instance, "[w]hen Americans are asked about the death penalty in the context of particular facts, support drops. 20 2 These polls suggest that "[mlost Americans favor the death penalty because they feel
that killing is wrong .... ,, 2 0 3
This abstract support for the death penalty is not conclusive of support because Americans lack the information they need to make informed
decisions about whether or not they support the death penalty. 2° Studies
and articles document the incorrect perceptions of Americans on numerous aspects of the death penalty.20 5 Significant misperceptions are the
194.
See Gordon Barclay & Cynthia Tavares, International Comparisons of Criminal Justice
Statistics, at *10 tbl.1.1, at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hosb502.pdf (last visited Jan.
19, 2004). Because international statistics come from several sources it is often difficult to make
absolute comparisons, but because the "definition of homicide is similar in most countries, absolute
comparisons of rates are possible." Id. at *3.
195.
See id. at *10.
196.
Id.
197.

Julia Sommer, Distinguishing Crime From Violence, BERKELEYAN CAMPUS NEWSPAPER,

(last
Oct. 1, 1997, at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/1997/1001/crimeviolence.html
visited Jan. 19, 2004).
198.
See id. ("Lethal violence is a distinctively American problem.").
199.
See infra notes 205-243 and accompanying text.
200.
ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 11.
201.
Richard C. Dieter, Sentencing for Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to the Death
Penalty (Apr. 1993), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=481 ("These
polls repeatedly showed that when people were presented with alternatives to the death penalty, their
support for the death penalty dropped dramatically.") (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting
202.
Personal,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1473 (1998) (explaining that death penalty support drops in
the context of a particular defendant, whereas simply asking whether individuals support the death
penalty yields higher support).
203.
Id. at 1472.
204.
See Dieter, supra note 201, at Introduction.
205.
See Gross, supra note 202, at 1457-59; see also Dieter, supra note 201 (citing J.Mark
Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?":A Capital Defendant's Right to a Meaningful Alternative
Sentence, 26 LOY.L.A. L. REV. 327, 392 (1993)).
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deterrent effect of the death penalty20 6 and the length of time convicted
murderers serve when they receive life in prison or life without parole.20 7
Furthermore, Americans are not informed on the extent of the problems
facing the death penalty, including the cost 20 8 and the prevalence of racial
discrimination.2 0 9 In polls in which people are asked simply whether they
support the death penalty or not, majority support reflects only abstract
feelings, but when presented with specific information regarding particular defendants, support for the death penalty decreases. 210 This decrease
in support may be the result of the misperceptions discussed below.
Although there is evidence that the death penalty is not a deterrent
to homicide, 21 approximately half of the population believes it does.21 2
Using national demographics, including race, age, education, income,
region and political preference, over forty percent of people believe the
death penalty has a deterrent effect. 1 3 When asked about the reason for
supporting the death penalty, thirty-four percent say they support the
death penalty because it deters others.21 4 However, there is a negative
correlation between capital punishment and deterrence of violent crime,
as evidenced by comparing the crime rates between the death penalty
states within the U.S. with the non-death penalty states.215 Although nationwide murder rates have decreased, there is an identifiable gap in the
murder rates between non-death penalty and death penalty states that
continues to increase. 2116 As of 2001, the murder rate in the death penalty
states was thirty-seven percent higher than the rate in states without the
death penalty.2t 7 These statistics may indicate that, at least, that the death
penalty has a negligible, if any, deterrent effect.
Americans also misperceive the length of time a convicted murderer
will serve in prison should he or she be spared the death penalty. 2 18 The
206.
207.
208.
(2002).
209.
1180-82,
210.
211.

E.g., Dieter, supra note 201, at Recurrent Problems Erode Death Penalty Support.
See id.
See Gerald Kogan, Errors of Justice and the Death Penalty, 86 JUDICATURE 111, 114
See Kenneth Williams, The Death Penalty: Can It Be Fixed?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1177,
1203 (2002).
See Gross, supra note 202, at 1471.
Id. at 1459 (citing Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death

Penalty: The Views ofthe Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7-9, 12-15 (1996)).

212.
Id. (citing Telephone Survey of 1,024 Adult Americans by Yankelovich Partners Inc., for
Time/CNN (June 5, 1997)).
213.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2001, at 146 tbl.2.69 (2002).
214.
PollingReport.com, supra note 119.
215.
Death Penalty Information Center, Deterrence:States Without the Death Penalty Fared
Better This Decade, Chart I, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=12&did=168
(showing that "[in every year, the death penalty states had the higher murder rate") (last visited Jan.
19,2004).

216.
Id. Chart I compares murder rates of states that have the death penalty with states that do
not. Id.
217.
Id.
218.
See Dieter, supra note 201, at Recurrent Problems Erode Death Penalty Support, Results
From State Polls.
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public believes that the average person convicted of murder will only
serve fifteen years, unless they receive the death penalty as their punishment. 9 Furthermore, only eleven percent of Americans believe that
those sentenced to life without parole will never be released from
prison.220 These estimates are inaccurate considering that "[tiwo-thirds of
the states utilize sentences for first degree murder which guarantee that
the inmate will never be eligible for release," and "[m]ost of the remaining states forbid considering parole for at least 25 years. ' 2 2'
Jurors lack information concerning alternatives to the death penalty,
which they need to make informed decisions about whether to sentence a
convicted murderer to death.222 Studies indicate that "many jurors are
sentencing people to death because they either lack adequate alternatives
or because they are unaware that such alternatives exist.''223 The death
penalty is discussed in politics at length, but other alternatives, such as
restitution and life without parole, are not.224 Thus, although most states,
45 out of 50, offer the option of life without a parole possibility for
twenty-five years or more, most Americans do not know about this available alternative.225
Contributing to this misinformation is that most states do not allow
the jury to be informed about alternative sentences should they not impose the death penalty.226 Even when jurors ask the judge how soon the
convict would be paroled they are given no information. 227 This lack of
information creates a dilemma between choosing a death sentence, which
jurors may not believe the perpetrator deserves, and releasing those convicted in a short amount of time to wreak havoc on society once again.228
This uncertainty leads to imposition of the death penalty for fear these
convicts will be walking the streets in less than ten years. 229 "People are
frustrated and frightened about violent crime. If they are offered no alter-

219. Id. at Recurrent Problems Erode Death Penalty Support. Jurors specifically assume that a
defendant not sentenced to death will be out in seven years. Id. at Results From State Polls.
220.
Id. at Recurrent Problems Erode Death Penalty Support.
221.
Id. at fig.4 (citing Julian H. Wright, Jr., Life-Without-Parole:An Alternative to Death or
Not Much ofa Life At All?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 529, 540-57 (1990)).
222.
Id. at Effectiveness of Alternative Sentencing.
223.
Id.
224.
See id. at The Politics of Death ("[P]oliticians who favor the death penalty have resisted
stiffer sentences which eliminate parole because they fear that with real alternatives in place there
will be no more need for the death penalty.").
225.
See id. at Introduction.
226.
See id.
227.
Id. at Results From State Polls ("Jurors faced with making life and death decisions repeatedly inquire about the true meaning of a 'life sentence,' apparently hoping that this sentence will
provide them with an acceptable alternative to sentencing someone to death." (citing Lane, supra
note 205, at 333-34)).
228. Id. at Effectiveness of Alternative Sentencing.
229. Id. (citing William W. Hood, III, The Meaning of "Life
"for Virginia Jurorsand Its Effect
on Reliability in CapitalSentencing, 75 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1624-25 (1989)).
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natives which reasonably meet their concerns for protection and punishment, then the death penalty seems attractive. 23 °
Another problem is that life without parole is not even offered in a
state with one of the highest execution rates. Texas, the state with the
third-highest execution rate,231 does not offer life without the possibility
of parole.232 In states that do not offer life without parole as an option,
politicians admit they fear the option will lead to less death penalty sup2 33

port.

The difference that offering these alternatives makes is exemplified
Maryland, which specifically instructs its juries that they have a choice
234
between life without the possibility of parole and a death sentence.
Since Maryland implemented this option, merely eight new defendants
were added to that state's death row between 1987 and 1992.235 This is a
tremendous contrast with those states that do not offer life without parole
such as Florida, which added 45 new defendants to death row in 1991
alone.236
Giving Americans information and alternatives will likely decrease
238
support for the death penalty. 237 Polls conducted in several states all
concluded that many people, when presented with such choices, have a
239
preference for alternative sentences as opposed to the death penalty.
"Although a majority of those interviewed said they favored capital punishment abstractly, that support is reversed when the sentence of life
without parole, coupled with a requirement of restitution, is offered as an
alternative.' 24 0 Forty-four percent of Americans support such alternatives
Id. at Results From State Polls.
230.
Death Penalty Information Center, State Execution Rates, (Aug. 11, 2003), at
231.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=477 (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
Death Penalty Information Center, Life Without Parole, at http://www.deathpenalty232.
info.org/article.php?did=l 81 &scid=1 2 (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
Dieter, supra note 201, The Politics of Death.
233.
234. See id. at The Effects of a Life Sentence.
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BULLETIN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1991, at 15 (1992)).
237. See id. at Results From State Polls ("[Plolls repeatedly showed that when people were
presented with alternatives to the death penalty, their support for the death penalty dropped dramatically." (citing Death Penalty Information Center, Summaries of Recent Poll Findings, at
2
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did= 10 (last visited Jan. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Recent Poll Findings])).
238. Id. (stating that polls were conducted in California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Virginia and West Virginia (citing Recent Poll Findings,
supra note 237)).
Id. (citing Recent Poll Findings, supra note 237).
239.
240. Id. at Public Opinion and the Death Penalty.
Compared to the 77% who favor the death penalty in the abstract, support drops by 21%
when a sentence of life with no parole for 25 years is considered; if a requirement of restitution is added to that sentence, support drops by 33%. And the sentence of life without
parole plus restitution causes a support drop of 36% and relegates capital punishment to a
minority position.
Id. at fig.2.
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when given the choice. 24' Thus, jurors and the public in general need to
be informed of the alternatives to capital punishment. Stating the alternatives is not enough. The alternatives must be explained in detail, otherwise the majority will continue misinterpreting the meaning of a life sentence and life without possibility of parole.24 2
Also, the public and political leaders need to learn the extreme difference in cost between the death penalty and life without parole.243 Life
in prison without parole is more cost effective than the death penalty,
because it only costs $600,000 per defendant, whereas it costs $3.2 million to execute an individual. 244 Thus, the death penalty costs $2.6 million more per defendant than a life sentence without parole. 245 Furthermore, capital cases are time-consuming. In Florida, for example, deathpenalty cases account for only 3 percent of those reviewed by the state's
highest court, but take up almost 50 percent of the court's time.24
Last, the public needs to be informed that the death penalty can
never be fixed because of the inherent problems in its administration that
can not be eradicated.247 Some scholars contend that one of the biggest
problems is that the death penalty is administered in a racially discriminatory way. 24 8 According to those contentions, even if every other problem could be fixed, the death penalty will never be administered in a
racially indiscriminate way.249 Minorities continue to account for a much
higher percentage of the death row population than their percentage in
the population at large, which is an indication that discrimination continues to pervade the system. 250 There have been several studies of juror
decisions that illustrate the pervasiveness of racial views in the system. 25 1
There are actual decisions in which members of the jury explicitly stated
their racism. 252 Studies suggest that jurors act subconsciously in sentenc241.
Id.
242.
See id. at Effectiveness of Alternative Sentencing.
243.
Kogan, supra note 208, at 114.
244.
Id. at 113 (citing Dave Von Drehle, Capital Punishment in Paralysis: Huge Caseload
Bloats Lethargic,Costly System in Florida,U.S., MIAMI HERALD, July 10, 1988, at LA).
245.
See id. (citing Von Drehle, supra note 244).
246.
Id.
247. Williams, supranote 209, at 1224 ("Rather than legitimate the death penalty by calling for
a moratorium, opponents should call for its abolition on the ground that it cannot be fixed because it
will never be fairly implemented.").
248. Id. at 1180.
249. Id. at 1203-04.
250. Id. at 1205-06 (explaining the pervasiveness of racial disparity in federal implementation
of the death penalty by observing that "the proportion of minority defendants in federal capital cases
exceeds the proportion of minority individuals in the general population" (citing U.S. Dep't of
Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary Data Analysis and Revised Protocols
for Capital Case Review, (June 6, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenalty
study.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004))).
251.
Id. at 1212-16 (citing generally David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discriminationand the
Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings
from Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638 (1998)).
252.
Id. at 1226 (quoting Bob Herbert, In America; Tainted Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001,
at A13).
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ing minorities to death more frequently than whites.253 The same studies
have shown that race is a factor in capital sentencing among prosecutors,
judges, and jurors.25 4 Prosecutors request the death penalty more often in
cases where the defendant is a minority.255 Also, the race of the victim
seems to make a difference in whether the death penalty is sought.2 56
Blacks are now allowed on juries, but prosecutors have used their peremptory challenges to disqualify black candidates in order to have an all
white jury. 7 Considering the current prevalence of racism in the criminal justice system, some scholars contend that the death penalty cannot
effectively be reformed.2 58
Attempting to reshape individual values, as Zimring suggests in
bringing about abolition, is a difficult, if not impossible task that will
take many resources. Instead, approaches to abolition should focus on
informing the public of the realities of the death penalty, which may be
sufficient to achieve abolition. In general, people need to be made aware
that the death penalty "requires far more of our resources than this country should be willing to invest" and for that reason innocent people will
be executed due to our human limitations.259
CONCLUSION
Because of the pressure and changing support for the death penalty,
abolition may be inevitable. The pressure is too strong to ignore, regardless of the vigilante tradition. In order to minimize the struggle towards
abolition the best course of action is to first encourage the spread of the
moratorium movement. It will provide the time that will be necessary to
educate the public and generate support for abolition. Zimring's premonition of a long struggle 6° even after abolition will likely not come true.
"[A]s the public's preference for alternative sentences becomes more
widely known, and as those sentences become incorporated into law, the
justifications for the death penalty will have finally disappeared., 261 If
Zimring's ultimate conclusion that "[s]ooner or later, both the execu262
tioner and the vigilante tradition will leave the American scene,,
253.
Id. at 1215-16.
Id. at 1181.
254.
Id. (citing Paul Butler, Starr Is to Clinton as Regular ProsecutorsAre to Blacks, 40 B.C.
255.
L. REv. 705, 714-16 (1999)).
Id. at 1180 (citing David Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
256.
EmpiricalStudy of the GeorgiaExperience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661,709-10 (1983)).
Id. at 1181 (citing William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An
257.
EmpiricalAnalysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
171, 175 (2001)).
See id. at 1220-22 ("[Tlhe death penalty, as presently applied in the United States, cannot
258.
be completely reformed. There is simply too much racism and too many mistakes for it to be an
effective and morally justifiable form of punishment.").
Kogan, supra note 208, at 114.
259.
260.

See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 203.

261.
262.

DIETER, supra note 201, The Politics of Death.
ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 202.
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comes true, the United States will likely join other developed nations in
opposing capital punishment.

